Ophiocus wrote:

You have all missed the main point of this thread (which I must take some blame for, as I only mentioned it once briefly in a sentence). I am not questioning whether or not we can be held responsible for our actions in a deterministic world.

Rather, I am saying that is is difficult for us to decide which outcomes should be attributed to which actions.

Right now, I exhaled in a certain direction which disturbed the air molecules of Canada a little bit. Over time, I expect that this will contribute to the formation of a deadly hurricane somewhere on the other side of the world, perhaps causing a lot of suffering. It might happen in a few years, or it might happen in a few millenia. Who knows. The problem is that if consequentialism places value on just the consequences, then I would be responsible for everything that happens in the universe after I was born (or at least achieved sentience)! The fact is, I interact with every other body of matter in the universe in some way however slight, so I am the cause of a lot of things.

This is like saying that the natural sciences can establish causal connections to a high degree of probability but because we cannot exclude variables in the human sciences, the human sciences are inexact.Historiography is a case in point.The history writer is more or less an interpreter of what original sources are available for her to interpret. The historiographer also is biased to a greater or lesser extent as to her metahistorical stance. For instance to what extent are great men or to what extent is the natural environment or human nature the cause of change in the human past?

This is why I believe that there is no correspondence between the narratives by which we explain the world and some supposed objectively true world. I personally believe that some narratives, those that are informed by reason, are better than badly informed narratives. The narratives that are informed by reason are not only well judged but have more information fed into them , so that as many contributory causes as are humanly possible to know about are fed into the narrrative that explains the event.

Poster, what about the power of deterrence when we come to simply selfish or psychopathic criminals? Either the ethical criminal justice system tries to deter purely selfishly motivated would-be criminals or the system deems them to be events in the web of of circumstances like the rest of us. If the former, the punishment is indistinguishable from retribution, if the latter the punishment, if I may still call it punishment, is something like locking them up in reasonable comfort for the safety of the socialised majority.

There will be some who are capable of being socialised, and in any decent criminal justice system this will already be being done.

I agree that we humans are each responsible for each other's errors, either the causes of the errors or the results of the errors or, more likely, both. No man is an island, someone else wrote.

Indeed, Poster. By 'reason' I should have said that I include the reason which pertains to the brain work of a whole individual with the social parts of the brain intact. I understand that those are specifically forebrain, and amygdala, although someone who knows more neuroscience than I may well correct me in this factual detail. I also claim that intuition may be correct in its conclusions only when the brain is whole and undamaged.

I'd also say that the reason which assumes that the reasoner is in outer space ,or otherwise elevated beyond the empirical world, is not the better reason. The better reason includes the experimenter, observer, or executive as one of the causes of whatever event is to be predicted. This effect is apparent when a virgin society is being observed(typically participant observation) during anthropological social research. After the first anthropologist has left a footprint,however carefully she treads, the society no longer exists in its original purity.

Belinda wrote:Indeed, Poster. By 'reason' I should have said that I include the reason which pertains to the brain work of a whole individual with the social parts of the brain intact. I understand that those are specifically forebrain, and amygdala, although someone who knows more neuroscience than I may well correct me in this factual detail. I also claim that intuition may be correct in its conclusions only when the brain is whole and undamaged.

I'd also say that the reason which assumes that the reasoner is in outer space ,or otherwise elevated beyond the empirical world, is not the better reason. The better reason includes the experimenter, observer, or executive as one of the causes of whatever event is to be predicted. This effect is apparent when a virgin society is being observed(typically participant observation) during anthropological social research. After the first anthropologist has left a footprint,however carefully she treads, the society no longer exists in its original purity.

I apologise to McDoodle, to whom I should have addressed my post.