"The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates itself to its own self." Soren Kierkegaard. Now, I don't pretend fully to understand this doctrine and its ramifications, but I take two main insights away from this, which seem correct. First, that selfhood is an activity rather than a state; in the conttext of an infinitessimal time-slice, there is no meaningful difference between a living person and a recently dead one (assuming metaphysical materialism). Second, that in order to successfully 'posit a self' to torture the language just a bit, the being must be polysubjective, must be composed of multiple loci of perception and desire that interactively intend a consensus, which consensus we call the self.
Also, Mark, good accounts of intrapersonal conflict are especially abundant in the literature on self-deception and human irrationality. Of course, some accounts are better than others--Antonio Damasio and Joseph Ledoux are personal favorites--and I've just picked up a book by Rita Carter titled Multiplicity: The New Science of Personality, Identity, and the Self, which looks quite promising. I hope that helps.