I agree, Belinda. I vaguely recall a satirical short story by the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges which reached the logical conclusion that every human being who has ever lived is responsible for every moral infringement that has ever occurred and ever will occur.
I find myself bothered that the definition given of consequentialism connotes (at least to me) that a judiciary action per se, based in consequentialist justification, should not itself be fully subject to its own consequentialist tenets.
As an example, I have three liberal friends who fully believe that former president George W. Bush and his vice-president Dick Chaney should be tried and executed for treason. They have carefully demonstrated to me how, given the constitutional definition of treason, these 2 men unequivocally acted as traitors to the U.S. The fact that their intentions were to help the country, not harm it, are seen as irrelevant by these individuals but I find it impossible to believe a U.S. court would think so. I also find it impossible to believe that any due process in a U.S. court would be able to "objectify" specific actions by these men as treasonous, despite an objective (constitutional) definition of treason. I suspect this would be so because the consequences of executing the head of State without proof of malicious intent would set a precedent whose consequences would be forseen as unacceptable. Yet in principle such a consideration should have nothing to do with any such objectification. I feel there is more that needs to be said for a definition of consequentialism.