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Return to: The contraposition of Descartes' cogito ergo sum

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The contraposition of Descartes' cogito ergo sum

July 16th, 2012, 3:22 pm

Does the logical contraposition of Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" hold true? In other words, is it true to say that "I do not think, therefore I am not."? (Assuming that what Descartes has said is true to begin with...)

Re: The contraposition of Descartes' cogito ergo sum

July 17th, 2012, 2:25 am

Jjpregler wrote:

"How could you say that without thinking it?"

I think the aim of my post, there, was to perhaps point out that "Cogito Ergo Sum" is inherently not true because the contra positive does not make sense. But, as Scott pointed out, my rendition of the counter-point was backwards. Which leads to Climacus' observation that the contrapositive of the Cogito is, "I am not, therefore I do not think."

I have read that over about six times, trying to comprehend it. I cannot. Does it not stand to reason that this contrapositive must hold true in order for Descartes' famous observation to also hold true? If this expression has no meaning, does that imply that Descartes' observation is faulty?

Apart from that, I have a different objection to the saying. When Descartes' says "I think, therefore I am." - isn't he really saying, "I think, therefore I am...something!" Is it really ever possible to say "I am" without some reference to an action or state?

I can't think of any examples where the word "am" is at all meaningful without some context. Descartes' may like to say "I think, therefore I exist." since "existing" is an action. But, and I think I am not the first to say this, Descartes' Cogito seems to be really saying "I think, therefore I am...thinking."!!!

"Existentia. Ergo, possum numen cogito." - Discards

-- Updated July 17th, 2012, 1:29 am to add the following --

Or, if you like:

"Existentia. Ergo, possum numen cognito su."

Re: The contraposition of Descartes' cogito ergo sum

July 17th, 2012, 3:32 pm

Johannes Climacus wrote:The contrapositive for the Cogito would be
I am not, therefore I do not think.

If P then Q
If not Q then not P


Having given this brief thought I think it is clear that the counter indicative of "I think, therefore I am" is a non-trivial result.

Descartes' allows himself to do away with every allowable misconception and finds that in the end, he still thinks. He concludes that since he thinks, he is. However this is only true if it also follows that when or if he is not, he does not think.

Descartes' establishes that he is, because he thinks. But in order for that to be true it must also be the case that if he is not, it follows consequently that he will not think. But Descartes has already established that it is impossible for him not to think. Descartes in fact establishes that he is - from the fact that it is impossible for him not to think. So whether or not Descartes assumes an existential state in which he is not, he has already concluded that it is impossible for him not to think.

But the nihilist in all of us might point out that Descartes only establishes that he is, because he must think, but only so long as he lives and breathes. If he dies, and for all intents and purposes we can say that Descartes is "not", it is a simple, obvious supposition to assume that he consequently does not think thereafter. Hence, any truthful validity to Descartes counter indicative relies on his testimony in the after life. And few of us have anything to say about that, so the counter example stands on the basis of us not being able to come back from the dead and say anything to the contrary.

Fair enough. "Cogito, ergo sum" stands on the basis of not knowing the afterlife. But, the question is a matter of "being". Descartes assumes that because he can think, he has being. But this only is true if he can also NOT have being, and in that case not have thoughts. Once again, ordinary thinking may lead us to believe the proof in the pudding lies in the rotting of our dead bodies. But existentialists like Jean Paul Sartre will tell you in great detail that you in fact do not have being. Or they will demonstrate that if you do have being, whatever being that is, is a non-being. Sartre has explained that "consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question insofar as this being implies a being other than itself."

If that is the case, and I believe it is, and Sartre would probably conclude that this is the whole point of his philosophy, the truth of Descartes' Cogito is completely backwards. In fact it should be the case that "I think, therefore I am not."

In Sartre's terminology, and in the terminology established before him, there is:

Being (être): Including both Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself, but the latter is the nihilation of the former. Being is objective not subjective or individual.

Being-in-itself (être-en-soi): Non-conscious Being. The sort of phenomenon that is greater than the knowledge that we have of it.

Being-for-itself (être-pour-soi): The nihilation of Being-in-itself; consciousness conceived as a lack of Being, a desire for Being, a relation of Being. The For-itself brings Nothingness into the world and therefore can stand out from Being and form attitudes towards other beings by seeing what it is not.

To see if the reverse Cogito can stand it must follow, the logic must be...now let me see...if P, then not Q ---> If Q, then not P. This means, "If I am, then I do not think!"

Sartre's conception of being is "being-in-itself-for-itself". So if I "am" anything, I am this same "being-in-itself-for-itself." But, as Sartre explains, we are never "being-in-itself-for-itself", only "being-for-itself" desperately attempting to realize "being-in-itself" with no rewards.

Still, if we were not only "being-for-itself", but also "being-in-itself", then we would have that property of being non-conscious. If we really were something, as in "having being", we would consequently not have thought, since being-in-itself has the property of existing in a non-conscious state. This proves that the initial statement "I think, therefore I am not" is a sound one.

It is more sound than Descartes' statement because it can establish the validity of its own counterpositive statement, whereas the validity of Descartes' counterindicative proposition can not be established by any one other than a dead man. And dead men do not tell secrets.

Re: The contraposition of Descartes' cogito ergo sum

July 17th, 2012, 3:41 pm

Ah...yes. And if only the walls could speak...There is no way to establish either position. End.

Re: The contraposition of Descartes' cogito ergo sum

July 18th, 2012, 1:30 am

Spectrum wrote:There is a wide range of convincing argument to support why Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" does not hold true.

However, the contraposition "I do not think, therefore I am not." is not logical as stated by the various posts above.
'I do not think" imply a thinking entity, thinking "I do not think".
"I am not" violate the Law of Non-Contradiction, as "I am" (is not not) and "not" make no sense.


To say "I am not" is just a way to express the idea that my existence is lacking being. For instance, there are many infinite ways to use the expression "I am not..." with a qualifying ending. I am not here. I am not there. I am not breathing. I am not existent. All of these expressions indicate a certain lack of something. Just as Descartes expression "I am" relates essentially to the positive fullness of his existence, the expression "I am not" relates to the negative lack of my existence.

If Descartes and others wish to believe that "they are" in the sense that their existence has some fullness to it, that is up to them. If I and others like me choose, or rather will not oppose the idea that "we are not", in the sense that our existence is lacking in any fullness (reality, truth, substance), that is up to us.

Obviously, there is a middle ground. But potentially, one camp is right and the other is wrong. Having read Sartre, having been "enlightened" by his progressive analysis of existence, I am convinced that in my core I am a lack of being, rather than an example of being. As he says, "The For-itself, in fact, is nothing but the pure nihilation of the In-itself; it is like a hole of being at the heart of Being." This means that this substance which is what we call being-in-itself has an incurable property of establishing its own existence. However when this "being-in-itself" exists "for-itself" it nihilates itself. It can no longer be-itself when it exists for-itself. It ceases to be-itself when it exists as a justification for itself. We are that justification of being-in-itself. We are that thing that being-in-itself gives rise to as a reflection of itself. Being cannot simply exists in-itself. It must also exist for-itself. However being-in-itself is not being-for-itself. And Sartre's insight is that being-for-itself is the antitheses of being-in-itself, even if there is no possibility of a being-for-itself without a being-in-itself. We are the establishment of the very knowledge of being which nihilates its very characteristic of being in the establishment of its being. We are transparent reflections of being-in-itself, able to appropriate being with our senses, but utterly at a loss to exist in the same way it does. That is the utter bottom line of the saying "I am NOT".

So, in my mind, "I am not what I am, and I am what I am not." Thinking merely extends my nothingness even further into the expanse of my lonely lack of existence.

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