Fhbradley wrote:1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.
2) There is a distinction between mind and brain.
C1) Therefore, dualism is at least true.

1) If dualism is at least true, we should opt for Idealism.
2) Dualism is at least true.
C2) Therefore we should opt for Idealism.

(Note that what is meant by at least is that it is not possible for pure materialism to be true).

Essentially, since dualism is so problematic, we should adopt an Idealist model of reality. Also, it satisfies Occam's Razor.

I disagree with 1 of the first argument. As in Neutral Monism there is a distinction between mind and brain, but it is essentially a materialist theory.

Although, I think your second argument is interesting. (Not often do I see advocates for idealism.)

Fhbradley wrote:Well, in nuetral monism, there is only a distinction in a descriptive sense, not an ontological sense. When I say there is a distinction between the two, I mean an ontological difference. And yes, us Idealists are of the minority. In fact, last semester in my philosophy class I presented some of my mind/body distinction arguments to my professor. He responded by saying my view doesn't make sense since I must posit a 'ghost in the machine'. When I told him that wasn't a problem for me since I am an Idealist, he would not believe me! He literally thought I was trying to piss people off!

Right, I see what you mean.

So, obviously, if there is an ontological distinction between mental and physical categories, then, of course, at the very least, dualism is true - by definition.

You then say that there is a distinction, and so "dualism is at least true." Which is equivalent to saying that there exist at least two ontological categories, physical and mental.

However, isn't it contradictory to assert that both idealism and dualism are true? Since idealism is the theory that everything that exists is immaterial, and mental, which makes it a monist ontology - as opposed to the dualist ontology.

I don't see how you can assert both. For if monism is true, then dualism is false.

Fhbradley wrote:I'm not asserting that they are both true, however. I'm asserting that pure materialism is false. That is, there exists mental stuff. This is where the second argument comes in. If there exists mental stuff, we should abandon dualism and come to embrace only mental stuff. Essentially, dualism for me is sort of a bridge from materialism to idealism.

But look. Your argument for idealism rests on the truth of dualism:

1) If dualism is at least true, we should opt for Idealism.
2) Dualism is at least true.
C2) Therefore we should opt for Idealism.

If the second premise is true, then idealism is false; if it is false, then the argument doesn't work. Either idealism is false, or your argument for idealism is unsound.

Fhbradley wrote:It doesn't rest on dualism being true, it rests on there existing mental stuff. This is why I emphasized on what I meant by at least. I don't mean to say that, if dualism is true, then idealism is true. Obviously that would but a contradiction as you say. Rather, if mental stuff exists, then pure materialism is not true. If pure materialism is not true, then either dualism is true or idealism is true. Dualism is not true, therefore, Idealism is true.


Another way to put the argument:

(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true.

Ok, I see what you are saying. I would suggest re-phrasing the first argument as well, because that seems confused by what you have said. Perhaps:

I)
(1) There is an independent mental ontological category.
(2) If there is an independent mental ontological category, then materialism is false.
(3) If materialism is false, then dualism or idealism is true.

Which then leads to your second argument:

II)
"(1) Either dualism is true or idealism is true.
(2) Dualism is not true
(3) Therefore, Idealism is true."

From your first argument before you had:

1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.
2) There is a distinction between mind and brain.

The problem with those two above is that you are already committing yourself to mind and body; or, mental and physical, which is obviously dualist, not idealist. Which explains my confusion.

Fhbradley wrote:Well, again, what I meant by at least was that pure materialism could not be true. I guess I just worded it funny. At least implies that there are other possibilities, namely, Idealism.

I'm not sure I agree. "At least dualism is true" implies that dualism is true - at the very least - perhaps along with something else. Although, I'm not sure what that "else" could be. In any case, "at least dualism is true" implies that idealism is false, as far as I can see. The two just aren't consistent.

Fhbradley wrote:Well, I'm sure we could go back and forth but as long as you understand what I mean there's no problem. I'll just reword by argument.

Agreed.

Scott wrote:

Fhbradley wrote:1) If there is a distinction between mind and brain, then dualism is at least true.

I think this premise is false, but to be completely sure I think I need you define distinction exactly. For instance, monists do not claim that the word brain is identical in meaning to the word mind, or they would say things like the human mind weighs 3lbs since the human brain weights 3 lbs which is absurd and would claim that a dead man who has donated his brain to science has a mind long after death and his mind is being dissected.

I think it's been worded slightly confusingly. But you just have to interpret Fhbradley charitably to see that he means by "mind" "mental" and by "brain" "physical" - or something similar, in order to make a distinction.

But as already noted, I think Fhbradley decided to change premise 1 to:

1) There is an independent mental ontological category.

Or something similiar, which doesn't raise any problems about a mind weighing 3lbs.