Truly, What Is Consciousness?

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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote:
Consul wrote:No, it's not, because you cannot have an experience without a subject of experience (which is not itself an experience). Necessarily, an experience is had or undergone by something different from itself, because experiences cannot be experienceRs and they cannot exist without being experienced by an experiencer.
How do you know for certain? The convenient 'mental grammar' of Subjects and Verbs describes what it seems like, that the Experiencer must a real thing. But the experience of eating an apple makes the apple seem like it must be a real thing.
So why are apples and everything else open to doubt, but not the possibility that only the experiences themselves exist? Why isn't the sense of being a single (maybe embodied or maybe not, maybe relating to a real external world or maybe not) Subject-Experiencer open to doubt?
Experience is necessarily experience-for, experience for something/somebody; and since an experience cannot be an experience for itself by experiencing itself, it must be an experience for something else, viz. an experiencer that is not itself an experience. Experiences and experiencers/subjects of experience are interdependent but different from one another. A feeling/thinking cannot exist unfelt/unthought and it cannot feel/think itself, so there must be a distinct feeler feeling/thinker thinking it. It is plainly incoherent to accept the existence of subjective experiences and not to accept the existence of (distinct) subjects of experience.

Even Berkeley acknowledged the difference between subjects and their experiences:

"Besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them; and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived."

(Berkeley, George. Principles of Human Knowledge. 1710. Part 1, §2)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Tamminen
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Tamminen »

Gertie wrote:Be in what? You're assuming experience has spatial properties/requirements.

As I said, it's an epistemological issue. And as soon as you start the process of doubting, you can continue doubting, or stop at an arbitrary point. Your syllogism requires stopping at an arbitrary point. You doubt the existence of a world which isn't represented by a/any subject's experience.

I can doubt you exist, and the existence of your syllogism. I experience the world, but can still doubt it exists. I can doubt subjects ontologically exist, only experiences do, but the world does anyway, etc.

I don't see how you're saying more than that.
Let us suppose that we are in a certain kind of a world, are part of it at the same time as we are conscious of it. The world means here the universe as a whole, it past, present and future, the space-time with its inhabitants, which are there as we know. Now the question is, whether there is a possible world, in the sense of Leibniz, where nobody is judging if it is the best possible world. Is it logically possible? Is it physically possible? Remember that it is the one and only world there is, there are not many worlds, because that was our presumption. To be honest, I do not believe that there are possible worlds at all, in the sense of physically possible. In that sense I am a determinist. And this means, as I have said elsewhere, that consciousness is a key "property" of the world we live in, as well as the subject-object relation. I am arguing that those two are the essential structures of any world whatsoever, all worlds that are possible, if there is more than one possible world, which I doubt. Consciousness is in the center of existence, ontologically closest to us, and it needs no eplanation for itself by the material world, which belongs to its existential structures, together with temporality, and it is rather the being of the material world and matter which needs explanation or understanding. And all this is closely connected with the being of Others. But that goes too far from the present topic.

I admit that this was not a proper reply to your post, but sometimes my thoughts go wandering.

By the way, I still argue that my syllogism works. It only needs some reflective insight.
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote:
Gertie wrote: (Nested quote removed.)

How do you know for certain? The convenient 'mental grammar' of Subjects and Verbs describes what it seems like, that the Experiencer must a real thing. But the experience of eating an apple makes the apple seem like it must be a real thing.
So why are apples and everything else open to doubt, but not the possibility that only the experiences themselves exist? Why isn't the sense of being a single (maybe embodied or maybe not, maybe relating to a real external world or maybe not) Subject-Experiencer open to doubt?
Experience is necessarily experience-for, experience for something/somebody; and since an experience cannot be an experience for itself by experiencing itself, it must be an experience for something else, viz. an experiencer that is not itself an experience. Experiences and experiencers/subjects of experience are interdependent but different from one another. A feeling/thinking cannot exist unfelt/unthought and it cannot feel/think itself, so there must be a distinct feeler feeling/thinker thinking it. It is plainly incoherent to accept the existence of subjective experiences and not to accept the existence of (distinct) subjects of experience.

Even Berkeley acknowledged the difference between subjects and their experiences:

"Besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them; and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived."

(Berkeley, George. Principles of Human Knowledge. 1710. Part 1, §2)
You've outlined how we naturally contextualise experience, make it coherent to us, based on this sense of a unified self located in a physical body moving through space and time. However even when we look at brains we see integrated subsystems from which a sense of a unified self somehow emerges, not a mini-me homunculus watching a Cartesian Theatre play out and directing the action. No core experiencing self we can point to. Now take away the body and neural subsystems where the experiential states appear to be manifested, and what is left which you can identify as The Subject? Anything? Can you know?
Tamminen
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Tamminen »

Consul wrote:...Could the actual world be subjectless? or Could the actual world have been subjectless?. In other words: Is there a possible world which is subjectless?
The correct answer to this question is yes. I can easily and consistently conceive or imagine a world of which I am not part and which doesn't contain any subjects at all. In fact, as far as we know, there was a long time when the actual of world was subjectless: from the Big Bang to the evolutionary appearance of conscient animals.
About possible worlds: The sentence "It is possible that there are no people in the world" is meaningful because we know what people are like. The sentence "It is possible that there is no life in the world" is meaningful because we know what life is like. But the sentence "It is possible that there are no subjects in the world" is meaningless because the subject is not an object or entity at all. It has no properties, being only, as Wittgenstein says in his Tractatus, a point along which the world is coordinated. Any description of any possible world presupposes the subject in this sense, but it cannot be included in the description, because only entities with known properties can be included in it. This is why the subject is always there already as a precondition of any possible world we can imagine.

But there seems to be a paradox here. It is meaningful to say that a world without life is possible, but it is meaningless to say that a world without subjects is possible. Is it possible that there is subjectivity without life? I think not, but that is a question of physical possibilities and necessities (and perhaps logical as well) which goes beyond my capacities.
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Belindi »

Gertie wrote;
You've outlined how we naturally contextualise experience, make it coherent to us, based on this sense of a unified self located in a physical body moving through space and time. However even when we look at brains we see integrated subsystems from which a sense of a unified self somehow emerges, not a mini-me homunculus watching a Cartesian Theatre play out and directing the action. No core experiencing self we can point to. Now take away the body and neural subsystems where the experiential states appear to be manifested, and what is left which you can identify as The Subject? Anything? Can you know?
Me and Not-Me are appropriate to sentient systems , not to rocks and patches of water. Me and Not-Me are a component of conatus, which keeps systems integrated as systems. Sentient systems with their conatus function evolved by natural selection.

-- Updated April 27th, 2017, 4:25 am to add the following --

I should have said "viable sentient systems". Not rocks, patches of water, vegetables (probably), apples, legs, toenails.

True, nature as a whole contains sentient things, but is not itself sentient.
Tamminen
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Tamminen »

Gertie wrote:Be in what? You're assuming experience has spatial properties/requirements.

As I said, it's an epistemological issue. And as soon as you start the process of doubting, you can continue doubting, or stop at an arbitrary point. Your syllogism requires stopping at an arbitrary point. You doubt the existence of a world which isn't represented by a/any subject's experience.

I can doubt you exist, and the existence of your syllogism. I experience the world, but can still doubt it exists. I can doubt subjects ontologically exist, only experiences do, but the world does anyway, etc.

I don't see how you're saying more than that.
My starting point is that experience and the material world are the same thing seen from the immanent and transcendent points of view. Of course you need not accept this.

So I am in the world as my body. And in this world I am an experiencing subject. Now if we look at the universe as a whole, the one and only universe there is (this is the definition of the universe), the epistemological and ontological issues overlap. We cannot jump off from the world even in imagination, because it is the only world there is, and all the worlds we can imagine must contain something in common. This common feature is subjectivity, which defines the logic of all possible worlds, the possibility of which can only be secured by the concepts of our own actual world.

This is an interesting debate, and I look forward to see if I am right or I am right :)
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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote:
Consul wrote:…It is plainly incoherent to accept the existence of subjective experiences and not to accept the existence of (distinct) subjects of experience.
You've outlined how we naturally contextualise experience, make it coherent to us, based on this sense of a unified self located in a physical body moving through space and time. However even when we look at brains we see integrated subsystems from which a sense of a unified self somehow emerges, not a mini-me homunculus watching a Cartesian Theatre play out and directing the action. No core experiencing self we can point to. Now take away the body and neural subsystems where the experiential states appear to be manifested, and what is left which you can identify as The Subject? Anything? Can you
know?
To say that there are subjects, egos or "selves" (silly noun!) in addition to and distinct from experiences is not to answer the question what (sort of entity) they are. Berkeley's answer is that they are immaterial/spiritual substances (souls/spirits). My answer is that they are material substances, animal organisms (animals), to be precise. This view is called animalism. I find the idea that I am a member of the zoological species homo sapiens most plausible. Astonishingly, it is rejected by many philosophers. (For example, the late Derek Parfit wrote a paper titled "We Are Not Human Beings".)

-- Updated April 27th, 2017, 10:00 am to add the following --
Tamminen wrote:
Consul wrote:...Could the actual world be subjectless? or Could the actual world have been subjectless?. In other words: Is there a possible world which is subjectless?
The correct answer to this question is yes. I can easily and consistently conceive or imagine a world of which I am not part and which doesn't contain any subjects at all. In fact, as far as we know, there was a long time when the actual of world was subjectless: from the Big Bang to the evolutionary appearance of conscient animals.
About possible worlds: The sentence "It is possible that there are no people in the world" is meaningful because we know what people are like. The sentence "It is possible that there is no life in the world" is meaningful because we know what life is like. But the sentence "It is possible that there are no subjects in the world" is meaningless because the subject is not an object or entity at all. It has no properties, being only, as Wittgenstein says in his Tractatus, a point along which the world is coordinated. Any description of any possible world presupposes the subject in this sense, but it cannot be included in the description, because only entities with known properties can be included in it. This is why the subject is always there already as a precondition of any possible world we can imagine.

But there seems to be a paradox here. It is meaningful to say that a world without life is possible, but it is meaningless to say that a world without subjects is possible. Is it possible that there is subjectivity without life? I think not, but that is a question of physical possibilities and necessities (and perhaps logical as well) which goes beyond my capacities.
1. "The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world." (Wittgenstein, TLP §5.632)

That's false: the subject does belong to the world as an object among objects, since subjects are simply experiencing objects, objects with consciousness.
What is true is that the subjective perspective and the subjective perceiving are not part of the subject's perceptual field. For example, my seeing is not part of what I see. What is not true is that the subject isn't part of its perceptual field, because I perceive myself both from the outside through e.g. visual sensations and from the inside through bodily sensations.

2. For a natural object to have consciousness is for it to have a conscious life; and for it to have a conscious life is for it to have a life. So there is no natural consciousness in lifeless worlds. (I do not exclude the possibility of artificial life or artificial consciousness.)

3. You're always making the same fundamental mistake, because the mind-dependence of all world-representations (perceptions, conceptions or imaginations), including ones of mindless worlds, doesn't entail the mind-dependence of worlds.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Tamminen
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Tamminen »

Consul wrote:1. "The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world." (Wittgenstein, TLP §5.632)

That's false: the subject does belong to the world as an object among objects, since subjects are simply experiencing objects, objects with consciousness.
On this I totally disagree with you and agree with Wittgenstein's view.
Consul wrote:3. You're always making the same fundamental mistake, because the mind-dependence of all world-representations (perceptions, conceptions or imaginations), including ones of mindless worlds, doesn't entail the mind-dependence of worlds.
What you say is a fundamental mistake, becomes almost self-evident taking account of my view in the Wittgenstein case.
Consul wrote:2. For a natural object to have consciousness is for it to have a conscious life; and for it to have a conscious life is for it to have a life. So there is no natural consciousness in lifeless worlds. (I do not exclude the possibility of artificial life or artificial consciousness.)
There seems to be at least one thing about which we think the same way.
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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Tamminen wrote:
Consul wrote:1. "The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world." (Wittgenstein, TLP §5.632)
That's false: the subject does belong to the world as an object among objects, since subjects are simply experiencing objects, objects with consciousness
On this I totally disagree with you and agree with Wittgenstein's view.
What and where do you think subjects are?
Tamminen wrote:
Consul wrote:3. You're always making the same fundamental mistake, because the mind-dependence of all world-representations (perceptions, conceptions or imaginations), including ones of mindless worlds, doesn't entail the mind-dependence of worlds.
What you say is a fundamental mistake, becomes almost self-evident taking account of my view in the Wittgenstein case.
Imagine that all conscious beings fall into a dreamless sleep right now. Please give me one plausible reason to believe that this would be the end of the world!
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Tamminen
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Tamminen »

Consul wrote:Imagine that all conscious beings fall into a dreamless sleep right now. Please give me one plausible reason to believe that this would be the end of the world!
Now you have totally misunderstood what I mean by the world. The world would not end, of course, but there would have been conscious beings before they all fell asleep. So the world would not be subjectless. And though the universe was subjectless right after the big bang, it is not, and I think cannot be, subjectless during the whole of space-time, be it finite or infinite. And as I have said, I think subjectivity is the primus motor of the whole universe.
Consul wrote:What and where do you think subjects are?
All right, now we come to metaphysics, but you asked this. I think there is only one subject with no properties or places. The subject is a point of view to the world, and this point of view consists of successive experiences of the world and usually also experiences of previous experiences. The finite chain of experiences that consists of experiences connected together by experiencig previous experiences, is memory. Memory defines an individual. When the present experience no longer has any connection to earlier experiences, the individual is dead. But time goes on, and temporal succession is in fact the only thing that defines subjectivity as such. As such it is tabula rasa, the point or limit in the sense of Wittgenstein, a pure presence without experiental content or inner properties. And now comes the mortal sin: my view is some sort of a sophisticated combination of solipsism and a modified transmigration theory which, when combined to a theory of others, makes a unified world view that perhaps satisfies only me, but what else can one hope! I think my views are so far away from yours that you are perhaps not interested to get acquainted with them, but I have written a few longer texts on this forum which could clarify for example this subject question from my point of view.
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Belindi »

Tamminem wrote:
Consul wrote:
Imagine that all conscious beings fall into a dreamless sleep right now. Please give me one plausible reason to believe that this would be the end of the world!

(Tamminem replied) Now you have totally misunderstood what I mean by the world. The world would not end, of course, but there would have been conscious beings before they all fell asleep. So the world would not be subjectless. And though the universe was subjectless right after the big bang, it is not, and I think cannot be, subjectless during the whole of space-time, be it finite or infinite. And as I have said, I think subjectivity is the primus motor of the whole universe.
Tamminem, you have used a passive verb "there would have been". This has to imply the view from eternity not the view of men of this relative world which must involve either asleep or awake at any specific time. Passive mood in verbs indicates lack of explicitness and I always suspect the use of passive mood especially in philosophy and science.

The view from eternity does not contain subjects or objects as the view is absolute not relative: the view from the relative world contains subjects and objects. In the case of which we speak the object of the subjects' attention is the universe.

You say "subjectivity is the primus motor of the whole universe." That's true of a man's view from the relative world . But from the perspective of eternity the primus motor is irrelevant because eternity is changeless.
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Tamminen »

Felix: ...they're always seen dancing together...
A beautiful metaphor. But it was Lady Subject who invited Mr. World to dance. For dance is what it is all about: life, existence, being there in the world, not just an abstraction of the world or universe in itself. The being of the world presupposes the being of the subject, and the being of the subject presupposes the being of the world, and the being of the world makes it possible for us to be there. To dance.

-- Updated April 28th, 2017, 10:40 am to add the following --
Belindi wrote:You say "subjectivity is the primus motor of the whole universe." That's true of a man's view from the relative world . But from the perspective of eternity the primus motor is irrelevant because eternity is changeless.
The universe as a whole, seen from the point of view of eternity, as it is seen in modern cosmology, must have a cause or reason for its being, or then it is causa sui. I think the subject is causa sui and the formal cause, in the sense of Aristotle, for the being of the universe.
Belindi wrote:The view from eternity does not contain subjects or objects as the view is absolute not relative: the view from the relative world contains subjects and objects.
The universe, seen as a whole, has coordinates in space-time. This is called the history of the universe. And in history there surely are subjects and objects.
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Felix »

I believe that Franklin Merrill Wolfe's writings clearly elucidate what you are trying to say, Tamminen.

"Based on his fundamental Realizations, Franklin Merrell-Wolff developed a transcendental philosophy which he distilled into three fundamental propositions. Wolff emphasizes that these propositions, like his philosophy as a whole, are conceptual symbols of an ineffable Reality. Moreover, Wolff acknowledges that the Realizations upon which his philosophy is based are not necessarily ultimate, and are authoritative only for Wolff and anyone who has had similar Realizations. Nevertheless, the philosophy has value for others who aspire to such Realization."

The three fundamentals of his philosophy are as follows:
1. Consciousness is original, self-existent, and constitutive of all things.
2. The Subject to Consciousness transcends the object of Consciousness.
3. There are three, not two, organs of knowledge: perception, conception, and introception
.

These three tenets are explained in detail here: http://ow.ly/2uIb30bgMrm
"We do not see things as they are; we see things as we are." - Anaïs Nin
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Belindi »

Tamminem wrote:
Belindi wrote:
You say "subjectivity is the primus motor of the whole universe." That's true of a man's view from the relative world . But from the perspective of eternity the primus motor is irrelevant because eternity is changeless.

(Tamminem replied)The universe as a whole, seen from the point of view of eternity, as it is seen in modern cosmology, must have a cause or reason for its being, or then it is causa sui. I think the subject is causa sui and the formal cause, in the sense of Aristotle, for the being of the universe.
Indeed it's causa sui. By "universe" I presumed we were both referring to nature itself.

Belindi wrote:
The view from eternity does not contain subjects or objects as the view is absolute not relative: the view from the relative world contains subjects and objects.

(Tamminem replied)The universe, seen as a whole, has coordinates in space-time. This is called the history of the universe. And in history there surely are subjects and objects.
As I said, I had presumed that what we both meant by "universe" was nature itself. Nature causa sui as you suggested ;the unique substance that is the cause of itself.

Of course if by universe you mean the total of natura naturata (and excluding natura naturans) then I agree with your remarks about the universe.
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Tamminen »

Belindi wrote:Tamminem wrote:
Belindi wrote:
You say "subjectivity is the primus motor of the whole universe." That's true of a man's view from the relative world . But from the perspective of eternity the primus motor is irrelevant because eternity is changeless.

(Tamminem replied)The universe as a whole, seen from the point of view of eternity, as it is seen in modern cosmology, must have a cause or reason for its being, or then it is causa sui. I think the subject is causa sui and the formal cause, in the sense of Aristotle, for the being of the universe.
Indeed it's causa sui. By "universe" I presumed we were both referring to nature itself.

Belindi wrote:
The view from eternity does not contain subjects or objects as the view is absolute not relative: the view from the relative world contains subjects and objects.

(Tamminem replied)The universe, seen as a whole, has coordinates in space-time. This is called the history of the universe. And in history there surely are subjects and objects.
As I said, I had presumed that what we both meant by "universe" was nature itself. Nature causa sui as you suggested ;the unique substance that is the cause of itself.

Of course if by universe you mean the total of natura naturata (and excluding natura naturans) then I agree with your remarks about the universe.
I do not fully understand what Spinoza means by those natura's that he somehow connects with his concept of God, but if we speak of the Subject instead of God, I would say that the Subject is causa sui and the universe or nature in itself is not, and needs a cause for its being. And this cause, as I tried to say, perhaps not very unambiguously, is the Subject, which itself needs no cause for its being, but is the formal cause (Aristotle's causa formalis) for the being of the world or the universe or the totality of nature. This view probably differs a lot from yours, because I think, like Wittgenstein, that the subject does not belong to the world, but is like a point along which the world is coordinated, or a "limit of the world".

-- Updated April 29th, 2017, 3:22 am to add the following --
Felix wrote:The three fundamentals of his philosophy are as follows:
1. Consciousness is original, self-existent, and constitutive of all things.
2. The Subject to Consciousness transcends the object of Consciousness.
3. There are three, not two, organs of knowledge: perception, conception, and introception.
1. Consciousness is original, indeed, being always there already, as the precondition of all being, but it is not self-existent, because its being presupposes the being of the world and vice versa. Epistemologically it constitutes the way we see things and think of things, in the Kantian sense, and ontologically it constitutes the "things in themselves" in the sense of being the causa formalis of the totality of nature.
2. If he means that there is the transcendental subject "behind" the empirical subject, then I agree with him.
3. If by 'introception' he means a deeper reflective ability, consciousness of the being of the transcendental subject, then there is a point in this, because there certainly are steps in awareness of self and the world.
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Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021