Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

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Spectrum
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 12th, 2018, 4:19 am

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 10th, 2018, 5:01 pm
As with the definition of thing in the widest sense, the subject X is a thing-in-itself.
In that case, according to you, every subject is an illusion because a thing in itself is an illusion. The “subject itself” is the thing about which we say something, the thing about which we predicate something, but existence is not something we predicate about the subject, it is something we posit - a unicorn (subject) is (copula) a four legged animal with a horn (predicates) that exists (posit). What we say about the subject, its predicates, are the same whether we posit its existence or deny its existence.
Actually it is not according to me but according to the Philosophical Realists who insist every thing is representing its own thing-in-itself. There are others like the theological realists who insist the subject is also a thing-in-itself, i.e. the "I" of "I AM" as that independent soul that can survive physical death.
The subject X can be an object, a person or the "I".
Right, but the subject or object is not the thing-in-itself but rather the thing as we represent it to ourselves, assign predicates to, and posit the existence of.
As I mentioned above, the philosophical and theological realists do insist the subject or "I" is a thing-in-itself, i.e. the "I AM" is by itself as an independent soul that survives physical death.
For Kant, the idea of God is a logical illusion …
Where does he say this? It is not that God is an illusion but rather that the existence of God cannot be determined by pure reason or empirical evidence. The point of the antinomies is that we simply cannot make a correct determination regarding the existence of God. This leaves an opening for faith and secures it against rational criticism since reason cannot resolve the issue one way or the other.
In contrast to sensible empirical illusion, e.g. a broken stick in a cup of water, the idea of God is an illusion arising from a freak of logic.

Note I have quoted this very often where Kant claimed the idea of God is illusory and any reification of God is an illusion.
Kant in CPR wrote:There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.

They are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
Kant recognized the idea of God could land into an antinomy but he claimed to be able to resolve such antinomy with his sort of critical thinking.

Kant granted one can think of a God, but one cannot think of it as empirically real nor reified as something real which most theists would or has to do. From the rhetoric of claiming God is real, theists will claim a real God delivered his commands through God's messengers. What is most dangerous is when a God believed to be real delivered messages that contain evil laden commands that inspire believers to commit terrible evils and violence upon non-believers.

I believed this is the critical crunch of the idea of the thing-in-itself that lead to the insistence of a real God that condone evils and violence upon non-believers. Had there been no God [idealized] who condone evil but does all Good, no one would bother that much with the argument of God [thing-in-itself] whether it is true or not.

Another critical element re the thing-in-itself is related to the fundamentals of morality.
The point is whatever [God, soul, things, object, Being of beings] that is reduced to the thing-in-itself [philosophical realist, etc.], these are all ultimate illusions.
How is that the point with regard to Heidegger? He is not a philosophical realist.
Yes, Heidegger is not a philosophical realist.

Kant argued against the Philosophical Realists' claim of a real thing-in-itself and proved such a thing-in-itself is illusory and an illusion when reified for some purpose.

Heidegger on the other hand do not agree with the ideal of a reified thing-in-itself but transposed whatever as ultimate as Being [not a thing of substance] and made an attempt to search or explain that Being. This is a lost cause from the start, but fortunately uncovered various philosophical themes along the way.
Note "is" in this case implied 'existence' or existential in Heidegger's case.
Is rich with countless thalers does not imply existence. Existence is not a predicate and the predicate ‘is’ says nothing about the existence of the subject of the predicate. When I say that a unicorn is a four legged animal with a horn I am not saying anything about the existence of unicorns, that is, I am not positing its existence. I might say that a unicorn is a mythical four legged animal with a horn. I might say a Dodo "is" a flightless bird and Dodos do not exist, it 'is' not. The second ‘is’ is not a predicate but a positing of the existence of the thing of which is predicated: flightless bird.
I agree with your point.
Kant argument is against the Philosophical Realist or theological realist who insisted 'existence is implied to be a predicate' e.g. simply 'God exists'?
But by the philosophy of the philosophical realists and theists, their philosophy inevitably lead to what is God-as-it-is, i.e. the God-in-itself or generically thing-in-itself.
Kant demonstrated the thing-in-itself is an illusion, thus God-in-itself is an illusion.
Kant demonstrates that they are mistaken, that we cannot step outside our representational modes of knowledge and understanding to say what the thing itself is. The problem of noumena and the problem of God are not the same. Kant does not deny that there is something that is not of our making that we represent to ourselves. He affirms the distinction between noumena and phenomena. See above A389. He does not, however, posit the existence of God but rather leaves the question of God’s existence as beyond the realm of human knowledge.
The noumena versus phenomena is related to the beginning of his argument.
The next phase is that of the intellect [understanding] then to Pure Reason.
According to Kant one can think about God or anything, but the moment one reify God as real [which is an active primal instinct for the majority] then that is an illusion.
I read of one girl who had a sexual fantasy in private that God's dick must be very long and large enough to satisfy her. That is not a problem and the emphasis of illusion is not critical.
It is not the case when God is reified as real and sanction evil acts on non-believers which is very evident at present. In this case, the fact must be stressed the idea of God is an illusion to defang whatever evil mode that has brainwashed believers.
Kant agreed Hume and others were 'right' relative to the circumstances.
I don’t know what this means. What are the circumstances that makes their being right relative to those circumstances?
Hume was right, on the Problem of Cause and Effect as constant conjunction from habits and custom. I would not dispute that. Hume was also right we cannot get an ought from an is from certain qualified perspectives. But there are alternative views from different perspectives and Kant managed to reconcile an "ought" from "is" within his system of Morality.
As Philosophical anti-realists and phenomenologists, both Kant and Heidegger would not [consciously] view the thing-in-itself as real.
It is not a question of whether the thing-in-itself is real (Kant held that it was, see above) but that it is not something we have access to and not something we can say anything about that is not wholly of our imagination.
Nope, there is no way Kant would view the thing-in-itself as "real" in the empirical sense.
Ultimately we cannot assign an "it" at all to the thing-in-itself. From the Eastern Philosophy perspective the 'thing-in-itself' is nothingness or emptiness.
That is why he never had closure with his question and meaning of the Being of being.
The reason, once again, he never had closure is because Being is not a closed system. Its open-endedness is a fundamental feature of Being.
What I meant is 'closure' even for its open-endedness.
Example, from one perspective there are no final answers to the antinomies but one can rationalize and justify their existence and work with it.
Yin will never be Yang, but there is the concept of complementarity to it. That is the closure of the open-endedness.
For Heidegger the meaning of Being involves the opening of possibilities in time. Time is for Kant:
a “pure form of sensible intuition” (A31-2/B47)
Kant denies the existence of time as something independent of the human mind. According to Heidegger man is in time rather than time being in man.
Actually 'time' is such a loose fundamental term that anything goes. Time is most useful as an assumption.
We cannot compare whose use of the concept of time is better but whether the very loose concept time is used optimally within one qualified Framework, System and Model.

Heidegger has this habit of trying to fit square pegs in round holes, i.e. condemning Kant's and the vulgar use of the concept of time while standing within his own defined Framework and System. For example, Einstein cannot condemn Newton's view of gravity, motion and force in relation to his Framework of Relativity.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

Spectrum
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 12th, 2018, 5:46 am

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 10th, 2018, 5:01 pm
Heidegger realized the limitation of the language games [Wittgenstein] that is why he tried other means, i.e. poetry.
Poetry too is a language game. Language is disclosive. What has been disclosed through the history of philosophy is only a mode of Being’s disclosure. It is not simply the limits of language but temporal limits. This is why he deconstructs the history of philosophy. Through it we see what has been given to thought as well as glimpses of avenues of thought, possibilities that have not been developed through that history, including the question of the Being of being; a question that had become more and more remote as philosophy moved in other directions.
I believed History is one important factor but it is not very critical to understand the question of being.
Re history, if would be more effective to dig into the history of evolutionary psychology within the brain and mind plus bringing in the supporting fields of the neurosciences into the fray.

Note the paths taken by some of the Eastern Philosophers who started with the analytical paths, then understood the limitation of language then they move into poetry [a different form of the language game] then move into nonsensical Koans* and contradictions to understand the concept of Being.
* what is the sound of one hand clapping?
The problem is Heidegger in BT was entrapped in his association with Dasein thus seduced and deceived.
Dasein names our mode of being that takes Being as its theme. The question of Being is a question that is raised by Dasein/man. Man is the ineliminable locus of the question of Being - it is always a matter of what is disclosed to and through man. It is as if you complained that the associate with man seduced and deceived phenomenology.
From Kant perspective, man is also the locus, thus his first call was the Copernican Revolution, i.e. bringing back knowledge to man rather than an independent reality.
But then Kant in the following stages detach the transcendental "I AM" from the empirical "I Think."
Once Kant has explained away the illusory "I AM" there is no room for him to be lost on the question of being, and for Kant the question of being should not arise at all after all deliberation of beings and Being.
The effective way is one must eventually distance one from the self.
E.g. Buddha's simile of discarding the raft when one has reached the other shore.
Note Lin Chi's 'kill the Buddha if you see him on the road'.
First, it is Kant not Heidegger who insists on the universal categories of mind. Whatever is seen or felt or said always refers back to that structure. Both knowledge and experience are mediated according to Kant. Kant points to the limits of understanding. As far as I know, he did not hold out the possibility of escaping those limits, of arriving at the other shore. To kill the Buddha is to free oneself from conceptualizing enlightenment. It is not something to be thought of or correctly conceived of but to be experienced. No doubt Lin Chi would have hit Kant with his stick.
The categories are essential for Kant to explain his theories of knowledge and the thing in itself.
The categories when combined with understanding, sensibility and intuition give knowledge, but where the categories [causality] are used by Pure Reason without reference to sensibility and intuition, it give rise to ideas i.e. illusory ideas which are not grounded on reality. E.g. the idea of God arise because based on causation all creation must have a creator but where is the proof of a real creator?
Such an understanding of the above is partial enlightenment.
Or even 'kill oneself' [the ego not physically] metaphorically in the sense of detachment.
But Kant’s idealism is not detachment from self but rather points to the necessity of the conceptualizing self.
Nope, Kant explained away the "I" or "I AM" which is illusory thus no solid ground to be attached to something that is illusory.
A person who realize this will not be a theist who believe his independent soul will go to a heaven with eternal life upon physical death by believing in a God who can promise him that.
Thus Kant has provided the theory for enlightenment but he did not provide the practice to develop it like the Eastern philosophies.
I have done very extensive research on Kant.
So you have said, many times. That means nothing with regard to whether you have understood him. Based on what you have said it seems more like confirmation bias rather than insight. Consider that both Sheehan and Richardson (who was my teacher as well, although he should not be held responsible for anything I say) spend much of their professional lives reading Heidegger but come away with very different views. “Very extensive research on Kant” is a misguided attempt to assert an authority you have not demonstrated. An authority that at its best would stand alongside but not above the work of others who have earned that distinction and yet do not agree with each other.
Both Sheehan and Richardson are religiously inclined and I think their views would be more vulnerable to confirmation bias. If you are religiously inclined you are likely to be religiously bias as well. Btw, Heidegger did not have much sympathy for the religious and I think that has been problematic for Sheehan and Richardson to maneuver selectively around Heidegger's secular thoughts.

As for Kant I have taken the trouble to put in the necessary time to research [at least better that those who touch and go] because I see the similarity between Buddhism and Kantian Philosophy which is more analytical, systematic, rigorous and complete [model wise].
I have developed a master flowchart that encompassed all the elements of Kant, plus a flowchart for every chapter of the CPR and they flow nicely so I know I have reached somewhere.
I tried to do that for BT but faced problems and cannot connected many pieces into a master flowchart.

What else other than knowledge that is restricted to the human conditions.
If you think further beyond intuition and experience, you could be treading into the illusory thing-in-itself.
Knowledge that is restricted to the human condition is not knowledge of the whole, on the contrary, it is a recognition of the limits of human knowledge, that knowledge of the whole is not something we can attain.
Note Wittgenstein's
  • "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
    („Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen."
)
must be observed and respected in this regard.

There are two elements beyond the empirical world and human conditions, i.e.
  • 1. The empirical possibly - human-liked alien in another planet
    2. The empirical impossible - a square circle
I can speak of a human-liked alien in another earth liked planet somewhere in the universe because they are all related to empirical possible elements.

However there is no such thing as a square-circle which is not empirically possible at all, thus illusory if reification is attempted.
The thing-in-itself, e.g. God is an empirical impossibility, thus illusory and should not be spoken as real at all.
Searching for something does not mean one is lost, although one can get lost while searching for something. I agree with Sheehan that we can easily become lost when reading Heidegger, but I do not see how the quoted conversation implies that Heidegger became lost in his search. (I suspect that your claim is based on the assumption that there is nothing to be found hence to begin any search for it is to already be lost). Heidegger acknowledges the confusion that may arise when the same term ‘Sein’ is used to mean different things, but he also acknowledges that he knows the difference. In other words, he is not led astray by this ambiguity.
I said Heidegger is lost based on the fact he did not come up with anything conclusive regarding 'sein.' I agree he did disclose things on Dasein but not anything conclusively on sein.
Kant's Framework and System is represented with the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason …


An insightful answer, but the point I am getting at is that what all those dimensions have in common is that they are dimensions of the human mind. The problem is that I think Kant is wrong in claiming that this framework and system is the framework and system of the mind. As I see it, there is no framework and system of the human mind, but rather, multiple and not always precise frameworks, systems, and other things that lie outside the framework and would throw a monkey wrench into the system.

Kant Framework and System cover the A to Z of reality but that is the best we can reach within the constraint of the human conditions as far as we are human beings.
Kant did imply humans has evolved to think more i.e. seduced and deceived but the end result is an ending with illusions.
Humans can think of any thing and there is no forcing one to stop thinking of any thing, but what is critical is one must and differentiate what is illusory especially of ideas, e.g. God, independent soul and Whole Universe.

What I am saying, what is critical for Kant are the 'ideas of pure reason' which are beyond the 'categories of understanding'.

Yes, but a) the categories are necessary for experience, and b) pure reason is the source of metaphysical illusion.
The criticalness here is not the categories of understanding, but rather understand when the idea of pure reasons that crop up in thinking when driven by primal instincts are due to the categories of understanding and other function in the brain.
It is critical one need to understand they are groundless and one should not be influenced by them into evil and violence. Kant extended on this in condemning the evils of organized religions based on the insistent there is a real thing-in-itself called God.

The positive for humanity is when we prove there is no thing-in-itself, i.e. if it is illusory when reified, then there is no room for one to think and believe in a real God. Then there will be no theistic-based evils like those from the jihadists and some Christian clergy.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 » July 12th, 2018, 3:14 pm

Spectrum:
Kant in CPR wrote:
Thus it does indeed follow that all Possible Speculative Knowledge of Reason is limited to mere Objects of Experience.
But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these Objects as Things-in-Themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as Things-in-Themselves;* otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears. [..B xxvi]
This supports what I said.
In the empirical something cannot appear from nothing, but then he moved beyond the empirical [sensible] world to the transcendental world to study the noumenon as a thing-in-itself a priori, the synthetic a priori judgments.
Synthetic a priori judgments are not the study of noumenon. Noumena are not given a priori.
Thus in the beginning part of his argument, Kant will discuss in term of the unknowable noumenon and thing-in-itself but his ultimate argument is the thing-in-itself is an impossibility and thus an illusion if it is reified, e.g. God is an impossibility and an illusion when reified by theists.
The thing-in-itself is an impossibility as an object of knowledge. It is, as the quote above shows, what must be thought if there is to be appearance. It is not an impossibility that is necessary for appearance. God, like any other thing-in-itself cannot be an object of knowledge. To claim that the thing-in-itself is an illusion is to assume knowledge about what is impossible to know. The question of the existence of God is put out of bounds as something that can be known one way or the other.
Yes, Kant would agree there is an external object given to intuition but there no object-in-itself beyond intuition.
The object given to intuition, the transcendental object, is not what is given in intuition, the sensible or empirical object.
The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves [Sachen an sich selbst]. (A491/B519)
The realist’s mistake, according to Kant, is to make representations in things in themselves. The key word here is representations. The transcendental object, the thing in itself, is not the empirical object, that is, not the object as represented. Kant does not reject the thing in itself but rather rejects what the realist takes to be the thing in itself. The realist starts with the sensible object and makes it into things in themselves.
If you think there is something outside the mind for what appears in the mind, then you are on the side of the philosophical realists
As you quoted: otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears.
It is only view as an illusion when we accept the Philosophical Realists perspective in totality which is false in the first place.
And once again, to be clear, the realist’s perspective, according to Kant, is that sensible objects are things in themselves. Kant is not denying things in themselves but rather that sensible objects are things in themselves.
The point of truth is how do we justify the existence of "a-minded-apple" that emerges into cognition. Kant justified this view thoroughly.
Heidegger tried from another perspective but could not complete his objective.
Kant begins with the thing in itself as given - there is something external to the mind. Heidegger does not simply accept this but asks about the giving in what is given, that is, the exchange. ‘Es gibt’ means ‘there is’ but also ‘it gives’. But there is no ‘it’ in the sense of something that gives. Being is the giving, the temporal bringing into the open, making present in the presence of man. He was not interested in justifying the existence of "a-minded-apple" that emerges into cognition. His concern is more basic, the sense of awe and wonder that there is something rather than nothing.
Likely,
Critique of Pure Reason (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)
by Immanuel Kant (Author), Paul Guyer (Editor, Translator), Allen W. Wood (Editor, Translator)
https://www.amazon.com/Critique-Reason- ... 0521657296
Right. There is a free e-copy available here: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts ... bridge.pdf
Both Guyer and Allison I believe have studied, research and taught Kant for >50 years but they have disagreement on the thing-in-itself.
I am with the Allison's camp i.e. transcendental idealism which is more in alignment with Eastern Philosophy.
More than three years?
I believe Guyer [the CPR translation you are reading] is wrong on that contentious view re the fundamental of the thing-in-itself.
I do not know what Guyer says, only how certain passages have been translated. If there is another translation of the passages in question that run counter to his then please post them so we can compare them side by side. No doubt, interpretation informs translation, but this generality does not tell us where and how his translation of the text is wrong.
To get to his ultimate point, Kant had temporary agreed to the Philosophical Realists thing-in-itself and he called those beings of the empirical world, noumenon.
No! He saw this as the mistake of Philosophical Realists. Those beings of the empirical world are not noumenal, they are not things in themselves, they are things as they are for us, that is, phenomenal.
In Heidegger's phenomenology, he expected the Being "to show itself" phenomenologically but his project failed in the ultimate step.
As in the Tekuza interview, he admitted he was still searching for it [sein] and no news of any finding of the Being till his death.
It is not “the Being”. According to Sheehan:
The single issue that drove Heidegger’s work was not being-as-meaningful-presence but rather the source or origin of such meaningful presence—
what he called die Herkunft von Anwesen. (Forward, “Making Sense of Heidegger”).
He was not searching for sein, but as Tezuka says: the meaning of sein.
Heidegger: How can I give a name to what I’m still searching for? Finding it would depend on assigning to it the word that would name it.
This requires closer examination. The ‘meaning of sein’ does not name that meaning. One is reminded of the opening of the Daodejing:
The name that can be named is not the constant name.
From whence the giving of es gibt? One well known answer is God, but if God names the Supreme Being, then it cannot the source or origin of being because God is a being. Theologians influenced by Heidegger such as Paul Tillich call God the ground or source of being, but naming God the source or the source God, is not to assign the name to something found.
Kant dared to claim completeness for his model explicitly in his book.
I don't think any philosopher has done that?
Has done what? Dared claim completeness? Both Spinoza before Kant and Hegel after him did.
Generally my approach is always with the completeness principle. Analogy: If I go into the middle of the Pacific Ocean to catch tunas I will ensure my net is complete without any holes. When the fishes are surrounded by the nets, there is no chance of the fishes escaping tru holes in the net.
Yet your net will never catch all the tuna in the Pacific Ocean and if you fail to catch fish it is not because they are not there.
I understand there are camps within the Heideggerians, e.g. Dreyfus and his student [John Haugeland] on the concept of Dasein and the "I". But this difference is not very fundamental.
Well, Sheehan claims that his work is:
a paradigm shift in interpreting Heidegger. (Preface, "Making Sense of Heidegger")
A paradigm shift is a fundamental shift.

When it comes to any philosopher there are always significant differences with regard to interpretation.
They are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
Yes, Pure Reason itself leads to illusion. This does not mean that God is an illusion but rather that any attempt to prove the existence of God based on pure reason will not lead to knowledge of God but illusion. It leaves the question of God’s existence undetermined. Whether God exists or not is not something we can determine via pure reason. To say that God is an illusion is to assume the very thing Kant is arguing against - that one knows that God exist or does not exist. It is for the same reason that we cannot say that God exists we cannot say that God does not exist.
Hume was right, on the Problem of Cause and Effect as constant conjunction from habits and custom.
But that is not what Kant says. It is not a matter habit and custom but of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience. It is part of the structure of the mind.
Nope, there is no way Kant would view the thing-in-itself as "real" in the empirical sense.
I did not say in the empirical sense. Of course the thing in itself is not real in the empirical sense.
I believed History is one important factor but it is not very critical to understand the question of being.
Hegel and Heidegger and many others would not agree. I’ll leave it there.
… then move into nonsensical Koans*
There are two views on this: a) they are intentional illogical in order to show the limits of logical thought, b) they contain a coherent logic that can be understood on its own terms by a Zen master, that what appears as nonsense to us is not.
From Kant perspective, man is also the locus, thus his first call was the Copernican Revolution, i.e. bringing back knowledge to man rather than an independent reality.
But you are the one who faulted Heidegger for his focus on man.
Both Sheehan and Richardson are religiously inclined and I think their views would be more vulnerable to confirmation bias. If you are religiously inclined you are likely to be religiously bias as well.
And the same holds for the anti-theist. Reading God into a text is problematic but so is reading God out of the text. I try to follow a principle of hermeneutics that says: let the text lead and follow where it goes. I am atheist but not anti-theist, but atheism does not stand in the way of reading those who are not.
Btw, Heidegger did not have much sympathy for the religious and I think that has been problematic for Sheehan and Richardson to maneuver selectively around Heidegger's secular thoughts.
Any evidence to back up these claims? I knew Richardson personally and have read enough Sheehan to be skeptical of your facile dismissiveness.
Note Wittgenstein's
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
(„Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen."
Yes, I am well aware of that statement as well as how it has been misunderstood and misused.

Why must one remain silent? It is the question of the relationship between logic - which the early Wittgenstein thought was the “scaffolding of the world” that underlies both the facts of the world and what we can say about them, and ethics - which is the way the world as a whole is for me. The latter shows itself in my experience, but my experience is determined by me (my attitude - see what he says about the world of the happy man) not the facts of the world. Both logic and ethics are identified by Wittgenstein as transcendental conditions, the former the condition for the facts of the world, the latter for my experience of it.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 13th, 2018, 1:33 am

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 12th, 2018, 3:14 pm
Spectrum:
Kant in CPR wrote:
Thus it does indeed follow that all Possible Speculative Knowledge of Reason is limited to mere Objects of Experience.
But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these Objects as Things-in-Themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as Things-in-Themselves;* otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears. [..B xxvi]
This supports what I said.
You are right but only partial, there is still a long way to the completeness of Kant's whole argument.
As I had stated there are various phases of Kant's argument and the above is only the beginning phase restricted to the Objects of Experience.
In this phase of sensibility and appearance, Kant introduced [by thought] the concept of the noumenon [thing-in-itself] to represent "that which appears."
Note the term 'think' above and this noumenon is only a thought and a hypothesis.
At this point Kant used the phrase 'all Possible Speculative Knowledge of Reason.' In the later stages he will bring in "the impossible Speculative ideas of Reason [pure]."

Note Kant's specific use of the idea of the noumenon;
Kant in CPR wrote:The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.

The division of Objects into Phenomena and Noumena, and the World into a World of the Senses and a World of the Understanding, is therefore quite inadmissible in the Positive sense, 2 although the distinction of Concepts as Sensible and Intellectual is certainly legitimate. A255
Note this point is A255 where there is still a long way to the end of the book at A856.
You cannot assume this point of the noumenon is the same at the end of the book in its perspective as the thing-in-itself.
In the empirical something cannot appear from nothing, but then he moved beyond the empirical [sensible] world to the transcendental world to study the noumenon as a thing-in-itself a priori, the synthetic a priori judgments.
Synthetic a priori judgments are not the study of noumenon. Noumena are not given a priori.
In the case of the noumenon, it is placed at the boundary between and a posteriori [just after] and a priori thus not yet deliberated as Synthetic a priori judgments yet.
Thus in the beginning part of his argument, Kant will discuss in term of the unknowable noumenon and thing-in-itself but his ultimate argument is the thing-in-itself is an impossibility and thus an illusion if it is reified, e.g. God is an impossibility and an illusion when reified by theists.
The thing-in-itself is an impossibility as an object of knowledge. It is, as the quote above shows, what must be thought if there is to be appearance. It is not an impossibility that is necessary for appearance. God, like any other thing-in-itself cannot be an object of knowledge. To claim that the thing-in-itself is an illusion is to assume knowledge about what is impossible to know. The question of the existence of God is put out of bounds as something that can be known one way or the other.
You cannot generalize the quote above as applicable throughout his argument.
The thing-in-itself is like a hypothesis only and seriously, the thing-in-itself is merely assumed [as assumption] to allow the argument to proceed to its finality where the thing-in-itself is an impossibility as a speculative object of knowledge.
So yes, God as thing-in-itself is an impossibility to be known and an impossibility to be real.
The idea of God is illusory and to reify God in any way results in a transcendental illusion.
The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves [Sachen an sich selbst]. (A491/B519)
The realist’s mistake, according to Kant, is to make representations in things in themselves. The key word here is representations. The transcendental object, the thing in itself, is not the empirical object, that is, not the object as represented. Kant does not reject the thing in itself but rather rejects what the realist takes to be the thing in itself. The realist starts with the sensible object and makes it into things in themselves.
In this case Kant accused the realist of conflating 'appearance' and 'what that appear' as things-in-themselves.
Purely at this phase, Kant preference is [on a temporary basis] separate appearances [as objects] and what appears [as noumenon aka thing-in-itself].
At this phase of sensibility Kant is not rejecting the thing-in-itself [only temporarily], but as I had stated in the later phases of the argument Kant demonstrated the thing-in-itself [arose out of pure reason] is illusory.
If you think there is something outside the mind for what appears in the mind, then you are on the side of the philosophical realists
As you quoted: otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears.
Note I mentioned this refer to only the initial phase of sensibility not the final conclusions of the argument.
It is only view as an illusion when we accept the Philosophical Realists perspective in totality which is false in the first place.
And once again, to be clear, the realist’s perspective, according to Kant, is that sensible objects are things in themselves. Kant is not denying things in themselves but rather that sensible objects are things in themselves.
"ditto"
Note I mentioned this refer to only the initial phase of sensibility not the final conclusions of the argument.
The point of truth is how do we justify the existence of "a-minded-apple" that emerges into cognition. Kant justified this view thoroughly.
Heidegger tried from another perspective but could not complete his objective.
Kant begins with the thing in itself as given - there is something external to the mind. Heidegger does not simply accept this but asks about the giving in what is given, that is, the exchange. ‘Es gibt’ means ‘there is’ but also ‘it gives’. But there is no ‘it’ in the sense of something that gives. Being is the giving, the temporal bringing into the open, making present in the presence of man. He was not interested in justifying the existence of "a-minded-apple" that emerges into cognition. His concern is more basic, the sense of awe and wonder that there is something rather than nothing.
Kant personally did not begin, but report how the realists assumed a given thing-in-itself for every object or thing.
Yes, Heidegger was not into an "it' in the sense of an independent substance but he was into an "it" as possibility or potential. In the end he did not arrive at a real meaningful meaning of that "it."

Likely,
Critique of Pure Reason (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)
by Immanuel Kant (Author), Paul Guyer (Editor, Translator), Allen W. Wood (Editor, Translator)
https://www.amazon.com/Critique-Reason- ... 0521657296
Right. There is a free e-copy available here: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts ... bridge.pdf
Thanks. Actually I had downloaded this earlier. I have 7 English translations of the CPR for reference just in case I have problem with the Norman Kemp Smith translation I normally relied upon.
I believe Guyer [the CPR translation you are reading] is wrong on that contentious view re the fundamental of the thing-in-itself.
I do not know what Guyer says, only how certain passages have been translated. If there is another translation of the passages in question that run counter to his then please post them so we can compare them side by side. No doubt, interpretation informs translation, but this generality does not tell us where and how his translation of the text is wrong.
I was referring to this contentious issue;
wiki wrote:The dual-object and dual-aspect interpretations
Kantian scholars have long debated two contrasting interpretations of the thing-in-itself.
1. One is the dual object view, according to which the thing-in-itself is an entity distinct from the phenomena to which it gives rise.

2. The other is the dual aspect view, according to which the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears are two "sides" of the same thing. This view is supported by the textual fact that "Most occurrences of the phrase 'things-in-themselves' are shorthand for the phrase, 'things considered in themselves' (Dinge an sich selbst betrachten)."[32] Although we cannot see things apart from the way we do in fact perceive them via the physical senses, we can think them apart from our mode of sensibility (physical perception); thus making the thing-in-itself a kind of noumenon or object of thought.
I believe yours is view 1 above, i.e. Guyer & others while mine is view 2 [Allison and others]. That is the reason why we have disagreements thus far.
To get to his ultimate point, Kant had temporary agreed to the Philosophical Realists thing-in-itself and he called those beings of the empirical world, noumenon.
No! He saw this as the mistake of Philosophical Realists. Those beings of the empirical world are not noumenal, they are not things in themselves, they are things as they are for us, that is, phenomenal.
I have quoted this a few times;
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. A255
Suggest you reread the whole chapter surrounding A255 to get a better picture of this transition.
In Heidegger's phenomenology, he expected the Being "to show itself" phenomenologically but his project failed in the ultimate step.
As in the Tekuza interview, he admitted he was still searching for it [sein] and no news of any finding of the Being till his death.
It is not “the Being”. According to Sheehan:
The single issue that drove Heidegger’s work was not being-as-meaningful-presence but rather the source or origin of such meaningful presence—
what he called die Herkunft von Anwesen. (Forward, “Making Sense of Heidegger”).
He was not searching for sein, but as Tezuka says: the meaning of sein.
Heidegger: How can I give a name to what I’m still searching for? Finding it would depend on assigning to it the word that would name it.
This requires closer examination. The ‘meaning of sein’ does not name that meaning. One is reminded of the opening of the Daodejing:
The name that can be named is not the constant name.
From whence the giving of es gibt? One well known answer is God, but if God names the Supreme Being, then it cannot the source or origin of being because God is a being. Theologians influenced by Heidegger such as Paul Tillich call God the ground or source of being, but naming God the source or the source God, is not to assign the name to something found.
I understand the objective stated by H in BT is with reference to the Question and Meaning of Being [sein], not an "it" is the substance sense.

That H stated "I am STILL SEARCHING FOR IT" imply he is 'lost' in a way and Heidegger did not come up with anything that is seriously meaningful.

In the case of the Daodejing, one has to take it within its whole context. The danger is some taoist do engage in reification game with the Tao thus fell into the wrong path.

I am not sure with Paul Tillich ultimate view. Note Kant is a deist who accept a reasoned God as illusory but only for moral reason.
Kant dared to claim completeness for his model explicitly in his book.
I don't think any philosopher has done that?
Has done what? Dared claim completeness? Both Spinoza before Kant and Hegel after him did.
Did Spinoza and Hegel personally claim that? If possible, any quotes?
Note I am referring to a 'complete' model not complete knowledge [Godel's limited this].
I gave the analogy of how the completion of the edges of the jigsaw puzzle reflect that sense of completeness of the puzzle and oppose to completing the full jigsaw puzzle.
Generally my approach is always with the completeness principle. Analogy: If I go into the middle of the Pacific Ocean to catch tunas I will ensure my net is complete without any holes. When the fishes are surrounded by the nets, there is no chance of the fishes escaping tru holes in the net.
Yet your net will never catch all the tuna in the Pacific Ocean and if you fail to catch fish it is not because they are not there.
In theory it is possible when I lay nets that cover all the oceans in the world then pull them in. The requirement is the net must not have holes in it.
They are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
Yes, Pure Reason itself leads to illusion. This does not mean that God is an illusion but rather that any attempt to prove the existence of God based on pure reason will not lead to knowledge of God but illusion. It leaves the question of God’s existence undetermined. Whether God exists or not is not something we can determine via pure reason. To say that God is an illusion is to assume the very thing Kant is arguing against - that one knows that God exist or does not exist. It is for the same reason that we cannot say that God exists we cannot say that God does not exist.
Kant demonstrated it is impossible to prove the existence of God.
For Kant the only path to bring the thought or idea of God to mind is via pure reason and the resultant is always an illusion.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 » July 13th, 2018, 11:23 am

Spectrum:
The thing-in-itself is like a hypothesis only and seriously, the thing-in-itself is merely assumed [as assumption] to allow the argument to proceed to its finality where the thing-in-itself is an impossibility as a speculative object of knowledge.
Right, the thing in itself cannot be an object of knowledge.
So yes, God as thing-in-itself is an impossibility to be known and an impossibility to be real.
Here you jump from Kant’s claim that the thing in itself cannot be an object of knowledge to your own assertion that a particular thing in itself, God, is an impossibility to to real.
… as I had stated in the later phases of the argument Kant demonstrated the thing-in-itself [arose out of pure reason] is illusory.
Where does he say that the thing in itself arose out a pure reason or that it is illusory?
Note I mentioned this refer to only the initial phase of sensibility not the final conclusions of the argument.
And I am still waiting for you to identify where in the text he makes this claim. Your answer so far has been “it’s complicated”.
I was referring to this contentious issue …
Yes, I am aware of that interpretive difference, but what is at issue is the translation. You question the translation but have not shown where the translation of the passages cited is faulty. Unless you can do that, it is nothing more than an attempt to cast doubt on what the text says without warrant.
I believe yours is view 1 above, i.e. Guyer & others while mine is view 2 [Allison and others]. That is the reason why we have disagreements thus far.
As I see it, according to Kant, all we have access to is things as they are for us. This marks a limit.
I have quoted this a few times;
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. A255
It seems to me that this is what I just said. The problem is you want to make claims that go beyond this limit.
That H stated "I am STILL SEARCHING FOR IT" imply he is 'lost' in a way and Heidegger did not come up with anything that is seriously meaningful.
Those of us who do not believe they have found the holy (or unholy as the case may be) grail search. We inquire. We examine. We may even reject the notion of a grail to be found. We are not satisfied that all the answers have been given or that all the questions have been asked. There are many who do think that Heidegger came up with quite a lot that is seriously meaningful.
Did Spinoza and Hegel personally claim that? If possible, any quotes?
Spinoza Ethics:
The knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence that each idea involves is adequate and perfect (IIp46).
The human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence (IIp47).
For Hegel it is the dialectical movement from consciousness to self-consciousness culminating in ‘absolute idealism’ as traced in “The Phenomenology of Spirit”.
Note I am referring to a 'complete' model not complete knowledge [Godel's limited this].
How can we know a model is complete without complete knowledge of what is modelled? Godel’s incompleteness of a formal axiomatic system is a whole other ball of wax.
In theory it is possible when I lay nets that cover all the oceans in the world then pull them in. The requirement is the net must not have holes in it.
You miss the point. Your theoretical net that covers all the oceans can only collect what is in the oceans. The oceans are not the whole of what is. You might imagine that it is possible to lay a net that covers the whole but it would have to be retrieved from outside the whole. A net must have holes in it and so something always get left behind- the water and everything that is smaller than the net's holes. We may be able to retrieve tuna but not plankton. According to your net analogy we might claim that plankton are an illusion since they slip through the net. There can be no net in which nothing slips through.
Kant demonstrated it is impossible to prove the existence of God.
Right, but this leaves the question of God’s existence open:

I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith (Preface to Second Edition, CPR)

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 15th, 2018, 2:29 am

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 13th, 2018, 11:23 am
Spectrum:
The thing-in-itself is like a hypothesis only and seriously, the thing-in-itself is merely assumed [as assumption] to allow the argument to proceed to its finality where the thing-in-itself is an impossibility as a speculative object of knowledge.
Right, the thing in itself cannot be an object of knowledge.
But the thing-in-itself can be an intelligible object of reason which if reified is an illusion.
So yes, God as thing-in-itself is an impossibility to be known and an impossibility to be real.
Here you jump from Kant’s claim that the thing in itself cannot be an object of knowledge to your own assertion that a particular thing in itself, God, is an impossibility to to real.
That is what Kant claimed in his Critique of Pure Reason.
As we have agreed the thing-in-itself, e.g. apple-in-itself cannot be an object of knowledge.
Then Kant continued in the CPR, the thing-in-itself is reduced to ONLY 3 IDEAS, i.e.
  • 1. the independent human soul,
    2. God and
    3. the WHOLE Universe [as one thing].
These ideas [not concepts] are illusory when reified.
… as I had stated in the later phases of the argument Kant demonstrated the thing-in-itself [arose out of pure reason] is illusory.
Where does he say that the thing in itself arose out a pure reason or that it is illusory?
I have quoted this before;
Kant in CPR wrote:There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.

They [the 3 ideas] are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. A396
In the context of the whole CPR, 'they' above refer to the only 3 ideas I mentioned above, i.e. Soul, God, the Universe.
Note I mentioned this refer to only the initial phase of sensibility not the final conclusions of the argument.
And I am still waiting for you to identify where in the text he makes this claim. Your answer so far has been “it’s complicated”.
I was referring to this contentious issue …
Yes, I am aware of that interpretive difference, but what is at issue is the translation. You question the translation but have not shown where the translation of the passages cited is faulty. Unless you can do that, it is nothing more than an attempt to cast doubt on what the text says without warrant.
I don't have the exact passages re the dispute, I was making a general statement, i.e. Guyer has translated the CPR to suit his interpretation of the thing-in-itself, which I believe is the wrong view of the thing-in-itself. It is likely Guyer would have cited passages in his own translation to support the basis for the views he hold [in some article in the Web].

It is too tedious to reread the whole of Guyer's translation and compare it to the others but the main point is Guyer has a different view of the thing-in-itself from that of Allison's which I agree with.
I believe yours is view 1 above, i.e. Guyer & others while mine is view 2 [Allison and others]. That is the reason why we have disagreements thus far.
As I see it, according to Kant, all we have access to is things as they are for us. This marks a limit.
I think within your point you accept the thing-in-itself is still a thing, it cannot be nothing.
My point is the thing-in-itself is ultimately 'nothing'.
'Nothing' in this case is not in the sense of psychological solipsism nor nihilism.
'Nothing' in my case is the 'nothingness' or 'emptiness' from Buddhism.
I have quoted this a few times;
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. A255
It seems to me that this is what I just said. The problem is you want to make claims that go beyond this limit.
It is not me personally who want to go beyond that limit of the noumenon.
There is a philosophical need to discuss and understand why the Philosophical Realists and theists who has the impulse to go beyond the limit of the noumenon which has its pros [psychologically] and its cons [the consequential terrible evil acts].
Kant also went beyond the noumenon for his moral theories.

There is also the consideration where one think they are not going beyond the limit by are driven by an inherent primal impulse to go beyond the limit of the noumenon subliminally. Note Kant mentioned even the wisest are mocked and deceived into such an illusion. re A396

Here is another;
Kant in CPR" wrote:The outcome of all Dialectical attempts of Pure Reason does not merely confirm what we have already proved in the Transcendental Analytic, namely,
that all those conclusions of ours which profess to lead us beyond the field of Possible Experience are deceptive and without foundation;
it likewise teaches us this further lesson,
that Human Reason has a natural tendency to transgress these Limits, and
that Transcendental Ideas are just as natural to it [Human Reason] as the Categories are to Understanding -- though with this difference,
that while
the Categories lead to Truth, that is, to the conformity of our Concepts with the Object,
the Ideas produce what, though a mere Illusion, is nonetheless irresistible, and the harmful influence of which we can barely succeed in neutralizing even by means of the severest criticism.
A642
Kant repeated the same point re illusion in many other passages.
That H stated "I am STILL SEARCHING FOR IT" imply he is 'lost' in a way and Heidegger did not come up with anything that is seriously meaningful.
Those of us who do not believe they have found the holy (or unholy as the case may be) grail search. We inquire. We examine. We may even reject the notion of a grail to be found. We are not satisfied that all the answers have been given or that all the questions have been asked. There are many who do think that Heidegger came up with quite a lot that is seriously meaningful.
I was referring to 'meaningful' in the sense of the Question and Meaning of Being in general.

I believe H came up with something re Angst and various aspects of Dasein which are very meaningful to enable one to fill the gap left out by Kant within Kant's complete framework and system. I will be making use of these Heidegger points to justify why people are chasing those illusions [subconsciously] that Kant mentioned.
Did Spinoza and Hegel personally claim that? If possible, any quotes?
Spinoza Ethics:
The knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence that each idea involves is adequate and perfect (IIp46).
The human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence (IIp47).
For Hegel it is the dialectical movement from consciousness to self-consciousness culminating in ‘absolute idealism’ as traced in “The Phenomenology of Spirit”.
These quotes and point are not equivalent to Kant's claim, like 'my system of philosophy is complete..."
Note I am referring to a 'complete' model not complete knowledge [Godel's limited this].
How can we know a model is complete without complete knowledge of what is modelled? Godel’s incompleteness of a formal axiomatic system is a whole other ball of wax.
In theory it is possible when I lay nets that cover all the oceans in the world then pull them in. The requirement is the net must not have holes in it.
You miss the point. Your theoretical net that covers all the oceans can only collect what is in the oceans. The oceans are not the whole of what is. You might imagine that it is possible to lay a net that covers the whole but it would have to be retrieved from outside the whole. A net must have holes in it and so something always get left behind- the water and everything that is smaller than the net's holes. We may be able to retrieve tuna but not plankton. According to your net analogy we might claim that plankton are an illusion since they slip through the net. There can be no net in which nothing slips through.
One of my approach to work is always 'completeness control' i.e. to ensure ALL is covered by not necessary addressing all in practice.
For example in research one must understand the full population of the subjects involved but in practice only handle a justified sample to draw conclusions about the population identified.

Note in the case of nets, I was referring to tuna fishes;
In general we are referring to tunas of certain legal sizes, but if we want to include tuna fry and the smallest, it is a matter of getting nets with the smaller holes.

The water and planktons that go through is a different subject that need different approaches to deal with completeness in relation to an objective.
Kant demonstrated it is impossible to prove the existence of God.
Right, but this leaves the question of God’s existence open:
I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith (Preface to Second Edition, CPR)
One can think [via reason] of anything and rely on faith on the 'existence' of what is thought for whatever the reason.
If one has faith in a God, one cannot insist God is real to the extent of a real God delivering his message to his messenger or prophet that all humans must obey, e.g. the Christian and Islamic God.
In the case of Kant, he relied on God via reason [99%] plus faith [1%] to push through his theory on Morality. I do not agree with Kant's use of the God terminology but that can be easily converted and replaced by his non-theistic Ens Realissimum.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Burning ghost » July 15th, 2018, 3:07 am

We overextend in order to make mistakes and refine our understanding. I terms of Heidegger some find his “reaching” to be too far, imprecise or otherwise. Some find use and others find drivel. If you’re stuck in one camp without considering the other you’re likely mixed up in some personal dogma.

The issue with Heidegger is his approach is purposefully limited, yet he appears to extend his approach beyond there limits - with mixed, and often obscure, results. After reading Being and Time I suddenly realised my poor articulation, and things I previously held back from saying/thinking, were actually more refined than his winding maze of terminology.

Here is use in rying to prise apart the use of analogy from delineted bounds and limits placed by the terminology in use. It is, as ever, a constant struggle between experience, explication, and universal communication through which ever medium you decide to choose best suits your pursuits. No matter what the mathematician, theologian, physicist, linguist, or armchair “colloquial” philosopher is at the behest of common parse and is at odds with their felt position and how better to express it without making the whole thought seem mystical, trite, pretenious or needlessly complex - Grices maxims come to mind here.

Anyway guys, nice to see some actual philosophy discussed here for a change rather than the usual armchair musings. Keep it up :)
AKA badgerjelly

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 » July 15th, 2018, 11:36 am

Spectrum:
But the thing-in-itself can be an intelligible object of reason which if reified is an illusion.
More precisely, what one calls the thing in itself can be an illusion. The universe is not dependent on the mind of man.
Here you jump from Kant’s claim that the thing in itself cannot be an object of knowledge to your own assertion that a particular thing in itself, God, is an impossibility to to real.
That is what Kant claimed in his Critique of Pure Reason.
You keep asserting that but have not provided either primary or secondary support for that claim. Where does Kant deny the reality of God? The impossibility of knowing something means the impossibility of knowing that it is or is not real.
As we have agreed the thing-in-itself, e.g. apple-in-itself cannot be an object of knowledge.
We have not agreed on this. What I said was:
Part of the problem is that the concept of an empirical object, an object that stands in distinction from all else - the table, the bowl, the other apples, is an object whose distinction is based on time and space. But transcendental objects are not objects in time and space, and so, it is problematic to ask about the apple as a thing-in-itself without its being represented in time and space.
And:
... the object given to intuition, the transcendental object, is not what is given in intuition, the sensible or empirical object.
Spectrum:
I have quoted this before;
Kant in CPR wrote:

There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.



In the context of the whole CPR, 'they' above refer to the only 3 ideas I mentioned above, i.e. Soul, God, the Universe.
The illusion is that we can claim anything about an Objective Reality.
I was making a general statement, i.e. Guyer has translated the CPR to suit his interpretation of the thing-in-itself, which I believe is the wrong view of the thing-in-itself.
Without specifics this is just an attempt to discredit the textual evidence. You need to show how the passages in question say something different when translated by others.
It is too tedious to reread the whole of Guyer's translation …
That is not necessary. It is not the merits of the translation that is at issue but whether the few short passages cited are misleading as translated.
… the main point is Guyer has a different view of the thing-in-itself from that of Allison's which I agree with.
Yes, they hold different views, but you are alleging that the evidence I provided in support of my view is questionable because the translation is not reliable.
I think within your point you accept the thing-in-itself is still a thing, it cannot be nothing.
You have misunderstood. See above regarding the apple. A ‘thing’ might be mean what is distinguished and separate from all else, but this distinction is one made in time and space, that is, not a thing in itself. A ‘thing’ as used in ‘thing in itself’ does not identify a thing in the first sense of the term. It does not identify something specific, but rather points to the fact that the way things are for us is not something we can jettison. To say that it is still a thing is to conflate these different senses of the term.
'Nothing' in my case is the 'nothingness' or 'emptiness' from Buddhism.
This only serves to compound the problem by introducing something else subject to different interpretations.
There is also the consideration where one think they are not going beyond the limit by are driven by an inherent primal impulse to go beyond the limit of the noumenon subliminally. Note Kant mentioned even the wisest are mocked and deceived into such an illusion. re A396
The passage makes this important point:
One can place all illusion in the taking of a subjective condition of thinking for the cognition of an object.
The subjective condition means that both positive claims - God exists, and negative claims - God does not exist (God is an illusion), are an illusion for the same reason. God is not an object of cognition. This says nothing about what may be and everything about the subjective human condition that limits what we can know.
Here is another;
Kant in CPR" wrote:
… it likewise teaches us this further lesson, that Human Reason has a natural tendency to transgress these Limits …
That is a lesson you have yet to learn. To say that God is an illusion is to transgress the limits of what we can know.
I was referring to 'meaningful' in the sense of the Question and Meaning of Being in general.
The question of the meaning of Being is not distinct from the question of our being, not distinct from our quest for meaning in whatever form it arises.
These quotes and point are not equivalent to Kant's claim, like 'my system of philosophy is complete..."
Right, they go beyond Kant’s claim but necessarily include the claim that the system is complete. Kant’s critical philosophy cuts off questions of the whole as unknowable.
Note in the case of nets, I was referring to tuna fishes
You used this as an example of the completeness of the system. My point is that the system cannot be complete if there is anything that is not captured by the system. Kant’s system points to the limits of what human cognition is of, thus of what can be captured by the system.
If one has faith in a God, one cannot insist God is real to the extent of a real God delivering his message to his messenger or prophet that all humans must obey, e.g. the Christian and Islamic God.
God’s existence as real is taken as a matter of faith. It is not an epistemic claim (although many do mistake faith for knowledge and may invoke claims of “knowledge of the heart” or direct personal encounter with God). I agree with you regarding any claims imposed on others based on that faith.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 » July 15th, 2018, 4:51 pm

Burning Ghost:
Anyway guys, nice to see some actual philosophy discussed here for a change rather than the usual armchair musings.
I am glad to hear that someone else is reading this.

Since we have gotten on to the subject of the whole of philosophy:

Although books are an essential part of my philosophical endeavors, I do not think that it must be for everyone. We enjoy reading and discussing difficult texts, but for one reason or another most people do not. As I see it, hermeneutics, interpretation, and commentary on texts is not the whole of philosophy. I think a good case could be made that the focus on texts can be harmful to philosophy. All of life is not to be found in books.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 16th, 2018, 12:48 am

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 15th, 2018, 11:36 am
Spectrum:
But the thing-in-itself can be an intelligible object of reason which if reified is an illusion.
More precisely, what one calls the thing in itself can be an illusion. The universe is not dependent on the mind of man.
In this case you are alluding to the claims of the Philosophical Realist. I understand you are a philosophical anti-realist ??, so it is odd you are claiming the above independence between mind and universe.
Wiki wrote:Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
..
Realism can also be a view about the nature of reality in general, where it claims that the world exists independent of the mind, as opposed to anti-realist views
This is the primal instinct that Kant warned of, where even the wisest of men will be mocked and deceived re A339 B397.

Point is the Universe is not totally independent of mind and not totally dependent on mind. There is an element of interdependence between the Universe and Mind.

Here is one clue to the point of interdependence between the mind and the Universe;
Kant in CPR wrote:Thus the Order and Regularity in the Appearances, which we entitle Nature, we ourselves introduce. A125

Thus the Understanding is something more than a Power of formulating Rules through comparison of Appearances; it [the Understanding] is itself the Lawgiver of Nature. A126
What is the Universe is something that is emergent from spontaneity rather than something that is already there independent of mind and awaiting the mind to intercept it.

That is what Kant claimed in his Critique of Pure Reason.
You keep asserting that but have not provided either primary or secondary support for that claim. Where does Kant deny the reality of God? The impossibility of knowing something means the impossibility of knowing that it is or is not real.
I have quoted this before;
Kant in CPR wrote:

There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.
A339 B397


In the context of the whole CPR, 'they' above refer to the only 3 ideas I mentioned above, i.e. Soul, God, the Universe.
The illusion is that we can claim anything about an Objective Reality.
I have provided detailed supporting how Kant argued the idea of God when reified is an illusion in this forum quite sometime ago when I was in the midst of the Kant project. I am a bit rusty at present, but the B397 quote itself is the leading argument.

Re A339 B397 [see above] the gist is this;
  • 1. All transcendental ideas are illusory (& if reified are illusions)
    2. God is a transcendental idea
    3. God is illusory (& if reified an illusion)
The above is supported by the whole context of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Btw, according to Kant, the idea of God a logical illusion [contrast empirical illusion]. Many theists expect God to be empirical like all empirical objects/things but this is an impossibility. At best God is a transcendental logical illusion which is nevertheless an illusion.

Point is when P3 i.e. God is illusory, then whatever that follow re God is illusory or an illusion if reified.
As we have agreed the thing-in-itself, e.g. apple-in-itself cannot be an object of knowledge.
We have not agreed on this. What I said was:
Part of the problem is that the concept of an empirical object, an object that stands in distinction from all else - the table, the bowl, the other apples, is an object whose distinction is based on time and space. But transcendental objects are not objects in time and space, and so, it is problematic to ask about the apple as a thing-in-itself without its being represented in time and space.
And:
... the object given to intuition, the transcendental object, is not what is given in intuition, the sensible or empirical object.
The apple-in-itself is the 'real' apple claimed by Philosophical Realists [PR]. Apple-in-itself as claimed by the PR is the apple that stand by itself independent of human minds.
The PR also claimed time and space are independent of mind, so the PR apple-in-itself exists within independent time and space.
Note in this case, the PR apple-in-itself is a transcendental object [i.e. beyond the mind] which exists in transcendental independent time and space.

This is why Kant claimed the Philosophical Realists are actually Transcendental Realists and Empirical Idealists. This is one confusing point [we gone tru earlier] but need detailed elaboration to understand the point.

I was making a general statement, i.e. Guyer has translated the CPR to suit his interpretation of the thing-in-itself, which I believe is the wrong view of the thing-in-itself.
Without specifics this is just an attempt to discredit the textual evidence. You need to show how the passages in question say something different when translated by others.
It is too tedious to reread the whole of Guyer's translation …
That is not necessary. It is not the merits of the translation that is at issue but whether the few short passages cited are misleading as translated.
… the main point is Guyer has a different view of the thing-in-itself from that of Allison's which I agree with.
Yes, they hold different views, but you are alleging that the evidence I provided in support of my view is questionable because the translation is not reliable.
Actually I was not stating that specific reference you had provided earlier was questionable. When you mentioned your reference from from the Cambridge edition, i.e. Guyer's, my point was, if you had relied on Guyers' translation it is most likely [in general] you will arrive at a view [re the thing-in-itself] which I think is wrong.
This is based on the difference in views between Guyer and Allison (who I agree with).
I think within your point you accept the thing-in-itself is still a thing, it cannot be nothing.
You have misunderstood. See above regarding the apple. A ‘thing’ might be mean what is distinguished and separate from all else, but this distinction is one made in time and space, that is, not a thing in itself. A ‘thing’ as used in ‘thing in itself’ does not identify a thing in the first sense of the term. It does not identify something specific, but rather points to the fact that the way things are for us is not something we can jettison. To say that it is still a thing is to conflate these different senses of the term.
I think your view of 'thing' is not in accordance to Kant's view of 'thing' and thing-in-itself in the CPR.

In the CPR, Kant identify the thing-in-itself as an independent thing claimed by the Philosophical Realists [PR].
In the CPR, Kant denounced the thing-in-itself as an illusion idealized by the PR.
(nb. even the thing-in-itself is an illusion, Kant later relied on such an illusion for his Philosophy of Morality as an impossible ideal and standard to act as a guide.)

The PR claim the thing-in-itself is something specific like an apple-in-itself and things-in-themselves as independent of the human minds.
The apple-in-itself as thing-in-itself exists in time-in-itself and space-in-itself.

Kant did not recognize the thing-in-itself [within sensibility and understanding] but a 'thing' is never absolutely independent from mind [PR's claim], but a thing is independent from mind in one sense [empirical realism] and interdependent with mind in another sense [transcendental idealism].
'Nothing' in my case is the 'nothingness' or 'emptiness' from Buddhism.
This only serves to compound the problem by introducing something else subject to different interpretations.
I believe this is very necessary. Without Buddhism [a very sound philosophy - I spent years researching to near completeness] in the background it would be difficult for me to reconcile the issues within Kantian philosophy. If you agree with hermeneutics we have to bring in whatever philosophies that are relevant and justifiable.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Burning ghost » July 16th, 2018, 1:27 am

Again I find myself pointing toward Husserl without any subtlety. The “apple,” whether articulated in spoken language or not is still known by way of the senses. To break down the experience further we can only “know” an apple as an object that has mass and colour, and spacial relation. This is what Kant called inuition as you both know.

Husserl expanded this in his creation of phenomenology. He looked at what cannot be taken away from any give object of investigation without destroying it. In a way it can be looked at as a refinemern of Kantian intuition, but it’s a whole lot more than that and reaches beyond any exceptance of physical realism wholesale. Heidegger’s approach was merely one thread of Husserl’s phenomenology focusing mostly on relativism and lingual hermeneutics. The question of “being” is like asking what the meaning of “Heterantenhingtondespivelbits” is like. Heidegger, as far as I can see, was captured by this and consumed all his thinking within the bounds of possible interpretations whilst failing to consider it as a boundary.
AKA badgerjelly

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 16th, 2018, 2:15 am

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 15th, 2018, 11:36 am
There is also the consideration where one think they are not going beyond the limit by are driven by an inherent primal impulse to go beyond the limit of the noumenon subliminally. Note Kant mentioned even the wisest are mocked and deceived into such an illusion. re [..B]396
The passage makes this important point:
One can place all illusion in the taking of a subjective condition of thinking for the cognition of an object.
The subjective condition means that both positive claims - God exists, and negative claims - God does not exist (God is an illusion), are an illusion for the same reason. God is not an object of cognition. This says nothing about what may be and everything about the subjective human condition that limits what we can know.
Note some confusion re the reference, should be A339 B397 i.e.
Kant in CPR wrote:
There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.

They [the 3 ideas] are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. A339 B397
Fooloso4: This says nothing about what may be and everything about the subjective human condition that limits what we can know.

The above passages imply there is nothing beyond "the subjective human condition that limits what we can know."

The point is the theological realist has stretched beyond the point of possible objective reality to an illusion of God. The positive claim of 'God exists' is illusory. If God is illusory and impossible it is moot and non-starter deal with 'God does not exist'.
Here is another;
Kant in CPR" wrote:
… it likewise teaches us this further lesson, that Human Reason has a natural tendency to transgress these Limits …
That is a lesson you have yet to learn. To say that God is an illusion is to transgress the limits of what we can know.
When we understand [with justifications] a certain image of an oasis we see in desert is a mirage [empirical illusion], there is no question of transgressing limits. It is only the deluded in insisting the mirage is really real who has transgress the limit of empirical reality.
Thus when we understand the idea of God is illusory [logical], there is no question of transgressing any limits at all. We understand it is a logical illusion with logical justifications.
I was referring to 'meaningful' in the sense of the Question and Meaning of Being in general.
The question of the meaning of Being is not distinct from the question of our being, not distinct from our quest for meaning in whatever form it arises.
That it is a question itself, it has to do with our being. But at some point we have to step out of this subjective realm to an objective realm.

Heidegger stated Dasein is related to the "I" at times but ultimately Dasein is not the "I" at all?
For example Dreyfus did not make this distinction and most of his students are misled to interpret Dasein in an anthropomorphic mode in human terms.
These quotes and point are not equivalent to Kant's claim, like 'my system of philosophy is complete..."
Right, they go beyond Kant’s claim but necessarily include the claim that the system is complete. Kant’s critical philosophy cuts off questions of the whole as unknowable.
That is the point, the ultimate is cut one off from whatever was deemed as ground to groundlessness, i.e. nothingness or emptiness.
This is something the majority find it uneasy when one is left suspended with nothing to ground or stand on.
This is what Kant meant though some will get it [understand the illusion], even the wisest will find their way back to the illusion which mock and deceived them due to an inherent primal instinct.

Kant in the CPR stated determinedly and clearly it was his mission to make 'completeness' a critical factor to the approach in his philosophy so that nothing [principles] critical is left out. I don't read of philosophers making such a claim?
Note in the case of nets, I was referring to tuna fishes
You used this as an example of the completeness of the system. My point is that the system cannot be complete if there is anything that is not captured by the system. Kant’s system points to the limits of what human cognition is of, thus of what can be captured by the system.
Kant's system highlighted the various limits are each levels and presented what one will arrive at when one exceeded the limit. For example, when exceed typical Science, one is transgressing into Speculative Science, Science Fiction which scientifically possible but no evidence yet to support them.
But there are some who want to transgress further into pseudo-Science, then mysticism, the supernaturals, etc. without any potential possibility of such claims to be proven Scientifically.
The exceeding of the ultimate limit, i.e. to reify the thing-in-itself is an illusion.
Example, perfection [ultimate] is one of the ultimate limit and to expect perfection to be real is illusory and whatever perfection idealized is an illusion.
If one has faith in a God, one cannot insist God is real to the extent of a real God delivering his message to his messenger or prophet that all humans must obey, e.g. the Christian and Islamic God.
God’s existence as real is taken as a matter of faith. It is not an epistemic claim (although many do mistake faith for knowledge and may invoke claims of “knowledge of the heart” or direct personal encounter with God). I agree with you regarding any claims imposed on others based on that faith.
If we define something as real in terms of provable, justifiable with reason and evidence, whatever is by faith cannot be real.
I believe the critical issue with humanity is when what is faith is imposed and forced on others as real that result in terrible evils and violence.
If one keep one's faith in a God as a personal and private matter that would not be a serious issue to humanity.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 » July 16th, 2018, 11:11 am

Spectrum:
In this case you are alluding to the claims of the Philosophical Realist. I understand you are a philosophical anti-realist ??, so it is odd you are claiming the above independence between mind and universe.
Kant’s point is that the realist mistakes what is given in sensible intuition as something that subsists in itself. He did not think the universe is dependent on the mind of man. We do not have access to things in themselves unmediated by the mind. This is very different than the claim that the thing in itself is an illusion. The illusion is that we have access to the thing in itself, that we can say anything true of it.
This is the primal instinct that Kant warned of, where even the wisest of men will be mocked and deceived re A339 B397.
He is referring to the move from a priori syllogisms to claims about objective reality. To say that the universe is not dependent on the mind of man is not to say anything about objective reality.
Point is the Universe is not totally independent of mind and not totally dependent on mind. There is an element of interdependence between the Universe and Mind.
What is not totally independent of mind is anything we might say or know about the universe. This does not make the universe in any way dependent on the mind in the sense that without the human mind the universe would cease to exist.
Here is one clue to the point of interdependence between the mind and the Universe;
Kant in CPR wrote:
Thus the Order and Regularity in the Appearances, which we entitle Nature, we ourselves introduce. A125

Thus the Understanding is something more than a Power of formulating Rules through comparison of Appearances; it [the Understanding] is itself the Lawgiver of Nature. A126
A125 is about how nature appears to us. A 126 refers to this appearance of order and regularity, that this appearance forms the laws of nature. The laws of nature are descriptive of the appearance of order and regularity. This says nothing about the universe being dependent on or interdependent with the mind.
What is the Universe is something that is emergent from spontaneity rather than something that is already there independent of mind and awaiting the mind to intercept it.
The passages you have cited do not support this conjecture. What the universe is necessarily means what it is as it appears to us.
All transcendental ideas are illusory (& if reified are illusions)
The illusion is not the transcendental idea but that there is an object that corresponds to it that we can come in contact with:
But we would express ourselves better and with less danger of misunderstanding if we said that we can have no acquaintance with an object that corresponds to an idea, even though we can have a problematic concept of it. (A339 B397)
Kant points out that his idealism is merely formal: he has argued only that the form of objects is due to our minds, not their matter (cf. Kant’s Dec. 4 1792 letter to J.S. Beck (Ak. 11:395)). (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant ... -idealism/)
Spectrum:
In the CPR, Kant identify the thing-in-itself as an independent thing claimed by the Philosophical Realists [PR].
Kant’s use of the term thing in itself is not limited to his discussion of the mistake of the philosophical realists.
Without Buddhism [a very sound philosophy - I spent years researching to near completeness] …
The statement itself regarding near completion illustrates just how far you are from completion.
If you agree with hermeneutics we have to bring in whatever philosophies that are relevant and justifiable.
This takes as given the very thing that is in question, namely that the introduction of Buddhism is relevant and justified to a discussion of Kant. It ignores the problem of compounding questionable interpretation on questionable interpretation. But as a matter of course you do not see that as problematic since you studied Kant for three years and Buddhism to near completion.
The above passages imply there is nothing beyond "the subjective human condition that limits what we can know."
There is nothing beyond the subjective human condition of knowledge that can be known. That is very different than saying that beyond what we can know is nothing.
The positive claim of 'God exists' is illusory.
For the very same reason the negative claim of ‘God does not exist’ is illusory. That God exists or does not exist is not something we can know.
If God is illusory and impossible it is moot and non-starter deal with 'God does not exist'.
Once again, Kant is not claiming that God is illusory, but rather what is illusory is knowledge of God’s existence, and this cuts both ways. Neither reason nor empirical evidence can settle the issue, thus a space is opened for faith.
When we understand [with justifications] a certain image of an oasis we see in desert is a mirage [empirical illusion], there is no question of transgressing limits.
Whether or not there is an oasis is something that can be settled empirically. The question of God’s existence cannot, according to Kant, be determined empirically.
That it is a question itself, it has to do with our being. But at some point we have to step out of this subjective realm to an objective realm.
We have to step outside the subjective realm to an objective realm? How is it possible for a Kantian to do this?
Heidegger stated Dasein is related to the "I" at times but ultimately Dasein is not the "I" at all?
Dasein, as Heidegger uses the term, is a possible mode of human being.
For example Dreyfus did not make this distinction and most of his students are misled to interpret Dasein in an anthropomorphic mode in human terms.
I don’t know this means.
If we define something as real in terms of provable, justifiable with reason and evidence, whatever is by faith cannot be real.
This means simply that we cannot prove that God exists. But the term ‘real’ is not limited to what can be proven. ‘Reality’ is, according to Kant, one of the Categories, the first listed under Quality. (B106) It is not a matter of what can be proven.
I believe the critical issue with humanity is when what is faith is imposed and forced on others as real that result in terrible evils and violence.
I believe that your concern has led to your torturous reading of Kant.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 16th, 2018, 11:36 pm

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 16th, 2018, 11:11 am
Spectrum:
In this case you are alluding to the claims of the Philosophical Realist. I understand you are a philosophical anti-realist ??, so it is odd you are claiming the above independence between mind and universe.
Kant’s point is that the realist mistakes what is given in sensible intuition as something that subsists in itself. He did not think the universe is dependent on the mind of man. We do not have access to things in themselves unmediated by the mind. This is very different than the claim that the thing in itself is an illusion. The illusion is that we have access to the thing in itself, that we can say anything true of it.
This is the primal instinct that Kant warned of, where even the wisest of men will be mocked and deceived re A339 B397.
He is referring to the move from a priori syllogisms to claims about objective reality. To say that the universe is not dependent on the mind of man is not to say anything about objective reality.
Point is the Universe is not totally independent of mind and not totally dependent on mind. There is an element of interdependence between the Universe and Mind.
What is not totally independent of mind is anything we might say or know about the universe. This does not make the universe in any way dependent on the mind in the sense that without the human mind the universe would cease to exist.
What Kant introduced here is something like the Observer's Effect in Science, but Kant's view is related to reality rather than merely Science.

First there is no [none at all] absolute independent reality out there waiting to be perceived by humans and corresponded with to find the truth of it.
We also cannot say reality is totally dependent on the mind when the mind itself is part and parcel of reality.

Kant thus came up with the Middle-Way [nb: Buddhism] and complementarity [in Toaism as borrowed by Bohr for Quantum Physics].

This Kantian Middle-Way is fully explained in a very rigoristic, organized, logical, "complete" [as qualified] and systematic way by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. This is why I decided to invest so much time in the CPR and Kantian philosophy.

I am not sure how much time you have spent on reading and researching Kant, but you do not seem to have a good grasp this Kantian Middle-Way.


Re Illusion;
Here is a point from Russell in 'The History of Western Philosophy;'
Bertrand Russell wrote:Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is something intermediate between theology and science.
Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation.
All definite knowledge--so I should contend-belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology.
But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land, exposed to attack from both sides; this No Man's Land is philosophy.

There is also, however, a more personal answer. Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we become insensitive to many things of very great importance.
Theology, on the other hand, induces a dogmatic belief that we have knowledge where in fact we have ignorance, and by doing so generates a kind of impertinent insolence towards the universe.
Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of comforting fairy tales. It is not good either to forget the questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable answers to them.
To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it.
Kant in his CPR explained the above in greater details within his ability and confined to the knowledge available then. [We will be going further than this with the neurosciences, IT, AGI, etc.].

Kant's view of the idealization and reification of the thing-in-itself is this;
"Theologyinduces a dogmatic belief that we have knowledge where in fact we have ignorance.."

Your view that the thing-in-itself still have the potential for positiveness in some form is merely another degree [lesser] along the same continuum of the theological impulse to reify the thing-in-itself.
Here is one clue to the point of interdependence between the mind and the Universe;
Kant in CPR wrote:
Thus the Order and Regularity in the Appearances, which we entitle Nature, we ourselves introduce. A125

Thus the Understanding is something more than a Power of formulating Rules through comparison of Appearances; it [the Understanding] is itself the Lawgiver of Nature. A126
A125 is about how nature appears to us. A 126 refers to this appearance of order and regularity, that this appearance forms the laws of nature. The laws of nature are descriptive of the appearance of order and regularity. This says nothing about the universe being dependent on or interdependent with the mind.[/quote]Again, according to Kant, there are no independent Laws of Nature waiting out there for humans to discover.
These Laws of Nature within appearances also not man-made and imposed upon us.
Thus there has to be a way to reconcile the two conflicting views.
Kant did that in the CPR but it is not easy to reproduce his explanation in a few sentences.
As I had stated these Laws of Nature are sort of emergents along with evolution [within interdependent time not independent time].
What is the Universe is something that is emergent from spontaneity rather than something that is already there independent of mind and awaiting the mind to intercept it.
The passages you have cited do not support this conjecture. What the universe is necessarily means what it is as it appears to us.
Note 'appearances' are sort of relatively 'kindergarten' stuff on the issue of reality within the CPR. There loads more critical elements [yet to be cited] to take into account from sensibility -> appearance.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum » July 17th, 2018, 4:23 am

Fooloso4 wrote:
July 16th, 2018, 11:11 am
All transcendental ideas are illusory (& if reified are illusions)
The illusion is not the transcendental idea but that there is an object that corresponds to it that we can come in contact with:
But we would express ourselves better and with less danger of misunderstanding if we said that we can have no acquaintance with an object that corresponds to an idea, even though we can have a problematic concept of it. (A339 B397)
[
Note Kant stated 'we can have no acquaintance with an object that corresponds to an idea.'
This is because all transcendental ideas are illusory.

After the noumenon, all consideration relates to illusions;
Kant in CPR wrote:WE have already entitled Dialectic-in-General a Logic of Illusion. A293
What is available is merely a Problematic concept, i.e. a question to be dealt with. There is nothing positive [object or otherwise] at this point.
What we have is illusory and if reified [as soul, god or Whole Universe] is an illusion.

If you think it is at least 'something' you are still engaging in illusions because in this section of the logic of illusion, whatever that follows is illusory and any positive inference is an illusion.

Kant did leave room for 'faith' and this [illusion] for his use within his Philosophy of Morality and Ethics.
Kant points out that his idealism is merely formal: he has argued only that the form of objects is due to our minds, not their matter (cf. Kant’s Dec. 4 1792 letter to J.S. Beck (Ak. 11:395)). (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant ... -idealism/)
Not sure what is the full context of this point but there is no way Kant would leave any room for 'matter' to exists by itself.
In the CPR, Kant identify the thing-in-itself as an independent thing claimed by the Philosophical Realists [PR].
Kant’s use of the term thing in itself is not limited to his discussion of the mistake of the philosophical realists.
Kant critique the views of the Philosophical Realists totally and extended it to the theologians' mistake of an independent God-in-itself.
There is no other room for the thing-in-itself to be positive in reality.
Without Buddhism [a very sound philosophy - I spent years researching to near completeness] …
The statement itself regarding near completion illustrates just how far you are from completion.
Yes, my target is always completeness but in the case of Buddhism I humbly leave a 1% hole which is good enough than the average person's coverage of Buddhism. Note there are 3 main schools of Buddhism and most of these Schools are often bias to the texts/doctrines of their own school. Thus the best of a Theravadian Buddhist may cover only 60% completeness of Buddhism compared to the 99% I covered.
If you agree with hermeneutics we have to bring in whatever philosophies that are relevant and justifiable.
This takes as given the very thing that is in question, namely that the introduction of Buddhism is relevant and justified to a discussion of Kant. It ignores the problem of compounding questionable interpretation on questionable interpretation. But as a matter of course you do not see that as problematic since you studied Kant for three years and Buddhism to near completion.
Yes, there is not much problem for me re Kant and Buddhism. I can understand both are in parallel to each other, but the extra with Buddhism is the personal practices [meditation, etc.] that can change the wirings within one's brain. for the better.
The above passages imply there is nothing beyond "the subjective human condition that limits what we can know."
There is nothing beyond the subjective human condition of knowledge that can be known. That is very different than saying that beyond what we can know is nothing.
The impulse that drive one to say 'that beyond what we can know is something' is a psychological issue.
This is where Heidegger's view of Dasein especially on existential Angst and the likes can give a better explanation to why most are driven to that 'something' that hides and promotes denial of 'beingness' [the potential and possibilities not a thing of substance].
The positive claim of 'God exists' is illusory.
For the very same reason the negative claim of ‘God does not exist’ is illusory. That God exists or does not exist is not something we can know.
When we understand by whatever ways the idea of God is raised is illusory, there is no need to bother with 'God does not exist'. It is like being indifferent to the question of 'Square-circle does not exist'. It is unnecessary to raise such a question.
If God is illusory and impossible it is moot and non-starter deal with 'God does not exist'.
Once again, Kant is not claiming that God is illusory, but rather what is illusory is knowledge of God’s existence, and this cuts both ways. Neither reason nor empirical evidence can settle the issue, thus a space is opened for faith.
Point is by default any question raised with the idea of God, it is illusory.
As I had argued, ALL ideas [there are only 3] are illusory.
Thus whatever the resultant from ideas, they are illusions.
If the empirical and reason is not used what else is there for any reasonable consideration.
If we relied on faith, it is still an illusion regardless.
One can have faith in an illusion but there is no grounds for it to be 'something' other than it is an illusion.
When we understand [with justifications] a certain image of an oasis we see in desert is a mirage [empirical illusion], there is no question of transgressing limits.
Whether or not there is an oasis is something that can be settled empirically. The question of God’s existence cannot, according to Kant, be determined empirically.
Empirical verification is the most reliable and credible. The further we extend from the empirical, the less the credibility we have on the veracity of any thing or thought.
Empirical illusions is one thing but transcendental logical illusions [within sensibility and intuitions] are at the extreme end of delusion which require psychology to deal with it.
That it is a question itself, it has to do with our being. But at some point we have to step out of this subjective realm to an objective realm.
We have to step outside the subjective realm to an objective realm? How is it possible for a Kantian to do this?
Objectivity is intersubjectively shared consensus.
Note this intersubjectivity is not related to Husserl's intersubjectivity.
Heidegger stated Dasein is related to the "I" at times but ultimately Dasein is not the "I" at all?
Dasein, as Heidegger uses the term, is a possible mode of human being.
For example Dreyfus did not make this distinction and most of his students are misled to interpret Dasein in an anthropomorphic mode in human terms.
I don’t know this means.

wiki wrote:Hubert Lederer Dreyfus was an American philosopher and professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.

His main interests included phenomenology, existentialism and the philosophy of both psychology and literature, as well as the philosophical implications of artificial intelligence. Dreyfus was known for his exegesis of Martin Heidegger, which critics labeled "Dreydegger".
He wrote:
1991. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Dreyfus influenced many of his readers to take a very personal view of Dasein.
If we define something as real in terms of provable, justifiable with reason and evidence, whatever is by faith cannot be real.
This means simply that we cannot prove that God exists. But the term ‘real’ is not limited to what can be proven. ‘Reality’ is, according to Kant, one of the Categories, the first listed under Quality. (B106) It is not a matter of what can be proven.
The Categories are not proven empirically but as I had stated above, via justifiable with reason a priori.
I believe the critical issue with humanity is when what is faith is imposed and forced on others as real that result in terrible evils and violence.
I believe that your concern has led to your torturous reading of Kant.
It was VERY tortuous reading Kant but not anymore.

You will note from the quotes I have given, I had to parse every longer sentence [some go half a page long] to get a better picture of the point.
Now that I have flow-charted the CPR in full and included many accelerated learning features, it much easier [but still difficult to a degree] with reading and refreshing Kant's philosophies.
I did full time on Kant more than 3 years ago so I am bit rusty and thus is not able to give pin-point accurate references unless I reread the whole book again from beginning to end.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.

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