A Defence (?) of Kant's First Formulation of the CI
- Vanvulcj
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A Defence (?) of Kant's First Formulation of the CI
Kant, I. (2008). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. (M.J. Gregor, Trans. "Practical Philosophy"). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1785)
I struggle to see how Kant's First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, above, is anything but consequentialist. Kant himself blatantly uses two conditionals, "could" and "should", and then invites us to run thought experiments to see the consequences "if everybody else does it." (paraphrasing obviously).
I've been able to think of only one way Kant might plausibly defend his First Formulation as being non-consequentialist. Something along these lines:
"Although the universalization test does consider consequences, they are not the direct consequences of the action in question."
I'm sure he would have phrased it differently, if he would have said it at all.
But basically the defence I imagine Kant making is that the consequences he asks us to consider are outside the context of the situation. For example, Kant's false promises example doesn't look at the outcome for either the banker or the man who lies to get the banker to lend him money, he focuses on a world where, if everyone lied all the time, it would essentially be chaos.
Bullet Summary of my imagined Concession/Defence from Kant:
1. "Yes considering the outcomes of Universalizing an action is consequentialist."
2. "BUT the Universalization I'm asking you to do only looks at the outcomes of other people doing the action, not the results of the specific action in question".
Admittedly, it seems like a weak defence based on a technical loophole.
Comments / Critiques please!
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Re: A Defence (?) of Kant's First Formulation of the CI
Consequentialism is about whether the outcome is beneficial or harmful. Kant is asking whether what is universalized would involve a logical contradiction. It is not a matter of what would happen if everyone followed the maxim but whether it is logically possible for everyone to do so. So, while it is certainly possible for everyone to lie, it is not logically possible as a maxim because the term 'lie' would have no meaning, there would be no distinction between lying and not lying.I struggle to see how Kant's First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, above, is anything but consequentialist.
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