Truly, What Is Consciousness?

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Woodart
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Woodart »

Belindi wrote:
Woodart wrote:There is a lot of quibbling around here. Is that because people don’t understand the question at hand? Or perhaps it is a good way to avoid the question for lack of a distinct answer?


But those people who experience multiple selfs, or those demented persons who lose sense of self, are conscious.

One must have courage to face hard philosophical questions. It is not easy to know what I think. Some moments I am very conflicted to know for sure if I am angry and frustrated or just frustrated and sad. I guess there are two possible ME’s. Maybe there is a third – angry, frustrated and sad.

My picture of me is always moving. My awareness is a focus that moves, shifts, changes and sometimes transforms. Why does consciousness focus? What controls my focus? Where did my focus come from? Am I in charge of my consciousness?
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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Woodart wrote:Consciousness is fundamentally self-awareness.
No, it is not. Having consciousness is not the same as having psychological knowledge or understanding of one's mind; nor is it the same as innerly perceiving or observing, introspecting or contemplating one's mind; nor is it the same as thinking about one's mind.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Woodart
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Woodart »

Consul wrote:
Woodart wrote:Consciousness is fundamentally self-awareness.
No, it is not. Having consciousness is not the same as having psychological knowledge or understanding of one's mind; nor is it the same as innerly perceiving or observing, introspecting or contemplating one's mind; nor is it the same as thinking about one's mind.

Well what is consciousness - in your opinion?
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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Woodart wrote:Well what is consciousness - in your opinion?
See: http://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/ ... 51#p287351
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Woodart
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Woodart »

Consul wrote:
Primary or first-order consciousness is one thing and higher-order or self-consciousness is another. First-order consciousness is phenomenal consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness is subjective experience. And the state of being a subject of experience, of having or undergoing experiences doesn't require or depend on mental, psychological self-awareness, self-knowledge, or self-perception. It is not the same as cognitive, introspective, or reflective awareness or consciousness of one's own mind or consciousness, of one's own mental or experiential states.

"Phenomenal consciousness is the current presence of subjective experiences, or the having of subjective experiences. An organism possesses phenomenal consciousness if there is any type of subjective experience currently present for it. The mere occurrence or presence of any experience is the necessary and minimally sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness. For any entity to possess primary phenomenal consciousness only requires that there are at least some patterns—any patterns at all—of subjective experience present-for-it. It is purely about the having of any sorts of patterns of subjective experience, whether simple or complex, faint or vivid, meaningful or meaningless, fleeting or lingering."

Did you write this or someone else?

In either case - I do not find it clearly presented.

It is not clear what “first-order consciousness” is and the defining of “higher-order self-consciousness” seems omitted.

I suspect that is the intent.
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Present awareness
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Present awareness »

No point in arguing about definitions, since different words mean different things to different people. A dictionary will define words and each person will interpret those definitions.

Self awareness is just one aspect of awareness. Awareness in general, could be called consciousness, since any argument for consciousness without some form of awareness, would not make sense. Even a person whom we call unconscious, in a deep sleep, is still aware of sensations and sounds, as an alarm will jolt that person awake. When dreaming, there is awareness of the images that pass through our minds.

We are not conscious of the body temperature being regulated or of the secretion of insulin into the bloodstream, but there is an awareness on a chemical level, which responds to fluctuations in temperature or blood sugar levels.
Even though you can see me, I might not be here.
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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Woodart wrote:
Consul wrote:Primary or first-order consciousness is one thing and higher-order or self-consciousness is another. First-order consciousness is phenomenal consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness is subjective experience. And the state of being a subject of experience, of having or undergoing experiences doesn't require or depend on mental, psychological self-awareness, self-knowledge, or self-perception. It is not the same as cognitive, introspective, or reflective awareness or consciousness of one's own mind or consciousness, of one's own mental or experiential states.

"Phenomenal consciousness is the current presence of subjective experiences, or the having of subjective experiences. An organism possesses phenomenal consciousness if there is any type of subjective experience currently present for it. The mere occurrence or presence of any experience is the necessary and minimally sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness. For any entity to possess primary phenomenal consciousness only requires that there are at least some patterns—any patterns at all—of subjective experience present-for-it. It is purely about the having of any sorts of patterns of subjective experience, whether simple or complex, faint or vivid, meaningful or meaningless, fleeting or lingering."
Did you write this or someone else?
The text between quotation marks was written by someone else. You omitted the reference:

(Revonsuo, Antti. Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. p. 37)
Woodart wrote:In either case - I do not find it clearly presented. It is not clear what “first-order consciousness” is…
See above! (First-order or primary consciousness is subjective experience, and as such it is transitive "consciousness of nonconsciousness", i.e. consciousness of physical things or events in the subject's environment or of the subject's body.)
Woodart wrote:…and the defining of “higher-order self-consciousness” seems omitted.
It is not. See above! (Hint: "cognitive, introspective, or reflective awareness or consciousness of one's own mind or consciousness, of one's own mental or experiential states", i.e. "consciousness of consciousness".)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Woodart
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Woodart »

Present awareness wrote:
Self awareness is just one aspect of awareness. Awareness in general, could be called consciousness, since any argument for consciousness without some form of awareness, would not make sense.
I totally agree – consciousness and awareness go hand in hand. What I think Consol was trying to bring out is that there are different types of awareness. I would agree there are different types of consciousness. What are they?
1- Awareness of self – my body, volition and personal history.
2- Awareness of other than self – a dog, a table – the external universe.
3- Awareness without focus – a still/quiet mind.
All are contained in my consciousness. I don’t know if there are any more categories to consciousness. Please add your prospective here. I think what we want to know is why we have different consciousness? How do they come about?
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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Present awareness wrote:No point in arguing about definitions, since different words mean different things to different people. A dictionary will define words and each person will interpret those definitions.

Self awareness is just one aspect of awareness. Awareness in general, could be called consciousness, since any argument for consciousness without some form of awareness, would not make sense. Even a person whom we call unconscious, in a deep sleep, is still aware of sensations and sounds, as an alarm will jolt that person awake. When dreaming, there is awareness of the images that pass through our minds.

We are not conscious of the body temperature being regulated or of the secretion of insulin into the bloodstream, but there is an awareness on a chemical level, which responds to fluctuations in temperature or blood sugar levels.
For basic conceptual distinctions, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cons ... ss/#ConCon

* Sometimes "consciousness" and "awareness" are used synonymously, and sometimes they are not. For example:

"Awareness can be broadly analyzed as a state wherein we have access to some information, and can use that information in the control of behavior. One can be aware of an object in the environment, of a state of one's body, or one's mental state, among other things. Awareness of information generally brings with it the ability to knowingly direct behavior depending on that information. This is clearly a functional notion. In everyday language, the term 'awareness' is often used synonymously with 'consciousness,' but I will reserve the term for the functional notion I have described here. …
Consciousness is always accompanied by awareness, but awareness as I have described it need not be accompanied by consciousness. One can be aware of a fact without any particular associated phenomenal experience, for instance. However, it may be possible to constrain the notion of awareness so that it turns out to be coextensive with phenomenal consciousness[.]"


(Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 28)

Given Chalmers' distinction between functional/informational or objective awareness and experiential/phenomenal or subjective awareness, one can speak of nonconscious awareness of stimuli or signals (e.g. during sleep), with this being perception or information-registration without sensation.

* There's a distinction between transitive consciousness (consciousness-of-something) and intransitive consciousness (consciousness simpliciter, the state of subjecthood), whereas awareness is always transitive: it is grammatically correct simply to say "He is conscious", but not to say "He is aware" (without adding "…of x").

* What makes the situation more complicated is that "awareness" (like "consciousness") is ambiguous between a first-order and a second-order sense:

1. In the first-order sense, to be aware of an experience is simply to have, undergo, or "enjoy" it, with the awareness consisting in nothing more than the presence of the experience. This can be called "affective awareness" of one's experience.
2. In the second-order sense, to be aware of an experience is to know or to perceive that one is having it. This can be called "cognitive awareness" of one's experience.

My distinction between 1 and 2 corresponds to Searle's distinction between a "constitution/identity sense" and an "intentionality-sense" of "awareness":

"There are "two senses of 'aware of', which I will call respectively the 'aware of' of intentionality and the 'aware of' of constitution. You can see the difference if you contrast two common-sense claims. First, when I push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of the table. And second, when I push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.

(a) I am aware of the table.
(b) I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.

Both of these are true and though they look similar, they are radically different. (a) describes an intentional relation between me and the table. I had a sensation where the table was its intentional object. The presence and features of the table are the conditions of satisfaction of the sensation. But in (b) the only thing I am aware of is the painful sensation itself. Here the 'aware of' is the 'aware of' of identity or the constitution of the experience. The object I am aware of and the sensation are identical. I had only one sensation: a painful sensation of the table. I was aware of (in the sense of identity or constitution) the sensation, but I was also aware of (in the sense of intentionality) the table.

Applying this lesson the the Argument from Illusion, we get the following result. In the case of the veridical perception I am literally aware of the green table, nothing more. But what about the hallucination? In the sense in which I am aware of the green table in the veridical perception, in the case of hallucination, I am not aware of anything. In the ordinary sense, when you are having a total hallucination, you do not see anything, you are not aware of anything, you are not conscious of anything. But the source of the confusion is the following: In such a case you are having a conscious perceptual experience, and ordinary language allows us to use a noun phrase as the direct object of 'aware of'. In that sense I am aware of a visual experience, but this is a totally different sense from the intentionalistic sense because, to repeat, the visual experience is identical with the awareness itself; it is not a separate object of awareness. In the case of the hallucination, there was an intentional content but no intentional object; there was an intentional state where the conditions of satisfaction were not satisfied.

At the most fundamental level the entire argument rests on a pun, a simple fallacy of ambiguity, over the use of the English expressions 'aware of' and 'conscious of'. The proof that the same expression is being used with two different senses is that the semantics is different. Consider sentences of the form: 'Subject S has an awareness A of object O.' In the intentionality sense, that has the consequence: A is not identical with O. A ≠ O. In the intentionality sense: A is an ontologically subjective event that presents the existence and features of O as its conditions of satisfaction. But in the constitution or identity sense: A is identical with O. The thing that one is 'aware of' is the awareness itself (A = O)."


(Searle, John R. Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. pp. 24-5)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Woodart
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Woodart »

Consul wrote:
* What makes the situation more complicated is that "awareness" (like "consciousness") is ambiguous between a first-order and a second-order sense:

1. In the first-order sense, to be aware of an experience is simply to have, undergo, or "enjoy" it, with the awareness consisting in nothing more than the presence of the experience. This can be called "affective awareness" of one's experience.
2. In the second-order sense, to be aware of an experience is to know or to perceive that one is having it. This can be called "cognitive awareness" of one's experience.

My distinction between 1 and 2 corresponds to Searle's distinction between a "constitution/identity sense" and an "intentionality-sense" of "awareness":

"There are "two senses of 'aware of', which I will call respectively the 'aware of' of intentionality and the 'aware of' of constitution. You can see the difference if you contrast two common-sense claims. First, when I push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of the table. And second, when I push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.

(a) I am aware of the table.
(b) I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.

Both of these are true and though they look similar, they are radically different. (a) describes an intentional relation between me and the table. I had a sensation where the table was its intentional object. The presence and features of the table are the conditions of satisfaction of the sensation. But in (b) the only thing I am aware of is the painful sensation itself. Here the 'aware of' is the 'aware of' of identity or the constitution of the experience. The object I am aware of and the sensation are identical. I had only one sensation: a painful sensation of the table. I was aware of (in the sense of identity or constitution) the sensation, but I was also aware of (in the sense of intentionality) the table.

Applying this lesson the the Argument from Illusion, we get the following result. In the case of the veridical perception I am literally aware of the green table, nothing more. But what about the hallucination? In the sense in which I am aware of the green table in the veridical perception, in the case of hallucination, I am not aware of anything. In the ordinary sense, when you are having a total hallucination, you do not see anything, you are not aware of anything, you are not conscious of anything. But the source of the confusion is the following: In such a case you are having a conscious perceptual experience, and ordinary language allows us to use a noun phrase as the direct object of 'aware of'. In that sense I am aware of a visual experience, but this is a totally different sense from the intentionalistic sense because, to repeat, the visual experience is identical with the awareness itself; it is not a separate object of awareness. In the case of the hallucination, there was an intentional content but no intentional object; there was an intentional state where the conditions of satisfaction were not satisfied.

At the most fundamental level the entire argument rests on a pun, a simple fallacy of ambiguity, over the use of the English expressions 'aware of' and 'conscious of'.


Are you aware of how confusing and complicated your and somebody else’s explanation is?

Do you not want to be heard?

Isn’t the subject matter difficult enough already?

It sounds like you want us to read your reference books; in an attempt to validate your perspective.

What you show us is not clear and your explanations are not clear.

I lose motivation to engage.

Tell us your mind – clearly – slowly – not someone else.
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Consul
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Consul »

Woodart wrote: I totally agree – consciousness and awareness go hand in hand. What I think Consol was trying to bring out is that there are different types of awareness. I would agree there are different types of consciousness. What are they?
1- Awareness of self – my body, volition and personal history.
2- Awareness of other than self – a dog, a table – the external universe.
3- Awareness without focus – a still/quiet mind.
All are contained in my consciousness. I don’t know if there are any more categories to consciousness. Please add your prospective here. I think what we want to know is why we have different consciousness? How do they come about?
Types of awareness/consciousness are one thing, and objects of awareness/consciousness are another.

The statement that "consciousness and awareness go hand in hand" is confusingly ambiguous.
According to higher-order theories of consciousness, "a conscious mental state is simply a mental state one is aware of being in (Rosenthal 1986, 1996). Conscious states in this sense involve a form of meta-mentality or meta-intentionality in so far as they require mental states that are themselves about mental states. To have a conscious desire for a cup of coffee is to have such a desire and also to be simultaneously and directly aware that one has such a desire."
(Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/)

But according to first-order theories of consciousness, in order for a mental state to be conscious there needn't be any mental representations (perceptions or thoughts) of it. That is, conscious states needn't be accompanied by and don't depend on any cognitive (introspective or reflective) awareness of them.
As Dretske puts it aptly, conscious states aren't necessarily ones of which their subjects are conscious, but ones with which they are conscious:

"The dangers arise from a possible misconception of what it is for a state to be conscious. For if one thinks of a conscious experience—as many people do—as an experience one is, in some sense, conscious of, one necessarily accepts the conclusion that one cannot see a tree or hear a piano without being aware not only of the tree and the piano, but also of one's experience of the tree and piano. This conclusion is most peculiar. It is not to be accepted lightly. It is, in fact, not to be accepted at all. There are, to be sure, states in (or of) us without which we would not be conscious of trees and pianos. We call these states experiences. Since these experiences make us conscious of things (pianos, trees, French horns) the states themselves can be described as conscious. But we must be careful not to conclude from this that because the states are conscious, we must, perforce, be conscious of them. That doesn't follow. We are often aware that we occupy such states—that we are experiencing this and thinking that—but that no more makes the states (of which we are aware) conscious than it makes a cancer (of which we become aware) conscious. Conscious mental states—experiences, in particular—are states that we are conscious with, not states we are conscious of. They are states that make us conscious, not states that we make conscious by being conscious of them. They are states that enable us to see, hear, and feel, not states that we see, hear, or feel.

(Dretske, Fred. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. pp. 100-1)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Woodart
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Woodart »

Consul wrote:
Woodart wrote: I totally agree – consciousness and awareness go hand in hand. What I think Consol was trying to bring out is that there are different types of awareness. I would agree there are different types of consciousness. What are they?
1- Awareness of self – my body, volition and personal history.
2- Awareness of other than self – a dog, a table – the external universe.
3- Awareness without focus – a still/quiet mind.
All are contained in my consciousness. I don’t know if there are any more categories to consciousness. Please add your prospective here. I think what we want to know is why we have different consciousness? How do they come about?
Types of awareness/consciousness are one thing, and objects of awareness/consciousness are another.

The statement that "consciousness and awareness go hand in hand" is confusingly ambiguous.
According to higher-order theories of consciousness, "a conscious mental state is simply a mental state one is aware of being in (Rosenthal 1986, 1996). Conscious states in this sense involve a form of meta-mentality or meta-intentionality in so far as they require mental states that are themselves about mental states. To have a conscious desire for a cup of coffee is to have such a desire and also to be simultaneously and directly aware that one has such a desire."
(Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/)

But according to first-order theories of consciousness, in order for a mental state to be conscious there needn't be any mental representations (perceptions or thoughts) of it. That is, conscious states needn't be accompanied by and don't depend on any cognitive (introspective or reflective) awareness of them.
As Dretske puts it aptly, conscious states aren't necessarily ones of which their subjects are conscious, but ones with which they are conscious:

"The dangers arise from a possible misconception of what it is for a state to be conscious. For if one thinks of a conscious experience—as many people do—as an experience one is, in some sense, conscious of, one necessarily accepts the conclusion that one cannot see a tree or hear a piano without being aware not only of the tree and the piano, but also of one's experience of the tree and piano. This conclusion is most peculiar. It is not to be accepted lightly. It is, in fact, not to be accepted at all. There are, to be sure, states in (or of) us without which we would not be conscious of trees and pianos. We call these states experiences. Since these experiences make us conscious of things (pianos, trees, French horns) the states themselves can be described as conscious. But we must be careful not to conclude from this that because the states are conscious, we must, perforce, be conscious of them. That doesn't follow. We are often aware that we occupy such states—that we are experiencing this and thinking that—but that no more makes the states (of which we are aware) conscious than it makes a cancer (of which we become aware) conscious. Conscious mental states—experiences, in particular—are states that we are conscious with, not states we are conscious of. They are states that make us conscious, not states that we make conscious by being conscious of them. They are states that enable us to see, hear, and feel, not states that we see, hear, or feel.

(Dretske, Fred. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. pp. 100-1)

Consol I find your argumentation and logic unnecessarily complicated and confusing.

I do not wish to read your copious references ever.

You have now successfully degenerated this discussion into your plea for acknowledgement and recognition.

You are another version of Rr6 – a troll.

I hope someone else will continue this important subject in honest clear language – so that we may all learn.
RuleOnu
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by RuleOnu »

You are asking one of the most difficult questions in philosophy and one I am extremely interested in! Is there a universally accepted definition of consciousness?
Consciousness is the state of being aware.

Now, that may and may not include aware of self and of the selfs surroundings, if surroundings, outside the state of consciousness actually exist or even need too. Does consciousness require interaction and to what degree? Don't I have to think about moving the chair before actually moving the chair, and is there a difference? How do I know I'm thirsty?

This should be an interesting thread and I'l consciously wait for more comments before consciously commenting further, if I actually have to, or think I have.
Belindi
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Belindi »

Woodart, please try to think of what it would be for you to be not conscious. You would be asleep and not dreaming, or under a general anaesthetic, or dead.

On the other hand when you are conscious you are asleep and dreaming. Or you are in state of waking consciousness and very aware of the world going on around you. Or you may be rather less aware of the world and more aware of your own memories when you are day dreaming or ruminating sort of awake consciousness. Or you may be hallucinating and believe that what isn't there, is there; during hallucinating consciousness you are projecting your memories on to a real external backdrop.

I hope that you can see that the consciousness debate is about real conscious states which can be assessed by psychologists and clinicians. There is really no need for you to speculate about about what consciousness is as it is a physical process well known to scientists and clinicians.

There is , however, the question of qualia. The word 'qualia' is closely related to the word 'quality'. A quale (which is the singular form of qualia) is what a sensation feels like from inside oneself. Because subjective feelings are essentially private to oneself so qualia (e.g. headache, red, the sound of middle C ) are essentially private. There are actually anatomical reasons for this fact of subjective privacy, reasons which I will not go into at this juncture, especially as I'd have to do some serious revision in anatomy to do so.
Woodart
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Re: Truly, What Is Consciousness?

Post by Woodart »

RuleOnu wrote:You are asking one of the most difficult questions in philosophy and one I am extremely interested in! Is there a universally accepted definition of consciousness? Consciousness is the state of being aware.

I agree consciousness is one of the most difficult questions we will ever face. And I do not think there will be any definitive answers anytime soon. What I think philosophy is good for is to provide a working hypothesis; so that we can have a methodology to move down the road. In a funny kind of way – we don’t get smarter as a species – we get dumber because we discover more we do not know.

That being said, here is what I think consciousness is. It is awareness of self. There is awareness of things external to the self. Consciousness also has some special characteristic or circumstances. There is awareness without any focus – pure awareness – no thoughts. There is also a very special type of consciousness called lucid dreaming – being cognizant and active in your dream. There is the unconscious mind which, as Carl Jung noted, is connected to the collective unconscious. I believe there are more states of consciousness, but the above is quite a mouthful to begin with.

Any of these states are hard to define, if not impossible. What I think is somewhat easier, is to describe characteristics and/or attributes of a state of consciousness. Science is just now beginning to study consciousness – we are in preschool – not yet kindergarten. The primary attribute that I see in my consciousness is volition. I have a will to choose “things”. I not only have a will to choose things – but I am obligated to do so. I have to make a choice – sometimes against my own desire to choose something. The operative concept here is desire. Desire is inextricably linked to volition. Desire is emotion. My will to do something is connected to my desire – predilection. They seem always connected.

Now, sometimes my desires are very mild – like I think I will pick my nose. Some of my desires really fade into the background – like breathing. Some of my desires can be a bit more emphatic – I think I will kill that person. So emotions have a range from very negative through neutral to extreme positive. My volition is the implementation of my desires. So, the big question here is – what is emotion? Where do emotions come from in our consciousness?
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In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021