Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
Philosophy should also have its critics, and its critics also include philosophers.
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
- Ivan
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
In the later dialogues philosophical and methodological questions become much more interesting and profound, while the dialogical form itself becomes less important. Aristotle wrote some dialogues too, and he left this too.
Here is why there was a certain skeptic trend in Platonic Academy. And here is why we came to the philosophy as "a critique of language" in the XX-th century.
So I would not so readily oppose Academic Philosophy to Socratic Philosophy
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
Ivan –
I disagree with you on the latter. I have pointed out why several different ways on this string. Most of the responses I have received confirms the problems with academic philosophy. They debate whether or not to experience something new or different rather than allow themselves to experience it. The debate is a distraction and the end result is they don't allow themselves a learning experience. Thus, nothing new is learned.So I would not so readily oppose Academic Philosophy to Socratic Philosophy
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
I really believe those problems with modern academic philosophy might be traced to the Early Academy. And that is why it would be interesting not to oppose them, but rather to see some roots of those problems.
What is really interesting about Plato is that he realized those problems might appear sooner or later. Philosophy for Plato is a kind of ‘weaving’ words (names) with each other (see ‘Sophist’). But this knowledge how to ‘weave’ is not enough. The Sophist may be a much better ‘weaver’, than Socrates, but he lacks for something that is hard to describe. That is, he does not know (see) what his words (names) refer to.
That is the actual purpose of Plato’s dialectic: you should always do some preliminary work so you could really see just what you are ‘weaving’: anamnesis is what we could probably call a ‘nondiscoursive practice’. And that might be a real tragedy for Plato, that almost no one in the Academy could grasp this part of his dialectic. We can understand why Aristotle abandoned the Theory of Forms (from his own words), but it is so much harder to say why Speusippus, who inherited the Academy right after Plato’s death, rejected Ideas too.
I might offer this kind of explanation. Henri Poincaré differentiated between two different kinds of mathematical minds: intuitive and analytic. The mathematician of the first type may just see the solution (almost a priori): some of them see it almost literally as pictures, images or something like that. Then (s)he might just describe it. While the mathematic ‘logician’ does not see anything, but has to come to the decision only by the way of analysis.
The former kind is really rare. And I suspect it is even much more rare among philosophers. Plato was intuitive mathematician.
So the problem as I see it is that true philosophic mind is a rare gift. Plato called it a 'Gift of the Gods' (see 'Philebus'), but he could not even imagine how greedy those gods could be
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
Galileo invited the finest minds of Europe to see his telescope and witness for themselves what he saw. Eighteen people showed up for the event. No one looked through the telescope. Instead they debated whether they should look and the consequences of doing so. Likewise, I have presented several simple exercises which allow the reader to EXPERIENCE going beyond belief or disbelief. Rather than do any of them, they debated if it could be experienced and/or defended their perception.
-- Updated June 14th, 2017, 3:27 pm to add the following --
Many people do the same thing when they are seriously ill. One on hand they want to be cured or feel better. On the other hand, the doctor might tell them it is terminal, so they don’t see their doctor.
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
There is no way for you to show exactly what you experience. There is no way to make people experience the same.
The mental experiment, called “Mary’s Room”, might be of some interest for you (see 'Knowledge argument' in Wiki).
I will slightly change it to make it even more dramatic: Mary is a neuroscientist, she knows everything there is to know about the perception of color in the brain. But unfortunately she was born a color-blind person. So there is still something essential she does not actually know. And there is a huge gap between those two types of knowledge.
Just like Galileo, Plato could urge the academicians to look at the stars and ‘save those phenomena’ (that is, to describe them in terms of geometry and math). The Antikythera mechanism might well be the result of such ‘saving’.
What Plato could NOT do was to make them see either the Forms "themselves by themselves", or those ‘noematic’ Forms, existing in our souls (as he could describe that).
So Aristotle and Speusippus to Plato were just like Mary to any normal neuroscientist
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
- Ivan
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
But this is exactly what I tried to convey with the help of Mary. She knows everything about color perception (everything written in books). But at the same time she knows absolutely nothing about color perception, since she is blind to color.Eaglerising wrote:IVAN – You are missing the point. Intellectually examining something and experiencing it are two entirely different things. It is impossible for thought, knowledge, belief, or perception to examine itself, although it believes it can. That requires something other and different from what is being examined. Even Albert Einstein pointed that out.
What you seem to be missing is that it is absolutely impossible for you to make her experience colors.
You (and anyone else) cannot help anyone to experience what (s)he just cannot experience.
What you try to say is that this problem is essential to the modern Western philosophy. What I try to prove is that it is inherent to virtually any culture and period. It is true even for Indian philosophy, nevertheless its dependence on certain practices is much stronger. The problem is there are too few people in the domain of philosophy really capable of this kind of experience.
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
As I see it, zetetic skepticism is fundamental to the teaching of Plato. Like his teacher Socrates he knew that he did not know. The Forms are Plato’s philosophical poetry, intended to take the place of the myths of the poets. The Forms are themselves images. They are not seen by the mind noetically, but rather created by the imagination of Plato the image-maker.Here is why there was a certain skeptic trend in Platonic Academy.
This is not the conventional view but it is not idiosyncratic either. It is a view that is defended by contemporary commentators such as Seth Benardete, Stanley Rosen, and Laurence Lampert.
There are a couple of things worth mentioning in the Phaedo that speak to the problem of language. The first is what Socrates calls his “second sailing” (99d), his turn from beings to speeches. When there is no wind the sailors had to rely on their own power. Analogously, the philosopher must rely on speech, on those accounts that upon critical examination seem most likely. The second is the problem of “misology” (89d). The arguments of the Phaedo fail to prove the immortality of the soul, which can lead to misology. In other words, philosophy cannot lead to knowledge of those things Socrates says in the Apology he knows he is ignorant of.
Although the Parmenides is generally considered one of Plato’s later dialogues, it takes place when Socrates was a young man. Given that Plato was careful to present enough information in each of the dialogues to date them in terms of their dramatic chronology it seems significant that Parmenides is first. What this means is that as a young man Socrates had been shown by Parmenides that the theory of Forms is problematic. If Plato had changed his mind why would he have placed the dialogue that is most critical of the Forms at the beginning? He could easily have written another dialogue that represents the alleged critical juncture and change of view that took place much later in Socrates development. Leaving this aside, the obvious problem is how this can be reconciled with the Republic’s central emphasis on the Forms.
The central theme of the Republic is not epistemology but politics. In the Theaetetus, which is about knowledge, there is a conspicuous absence of Forms. The teaching of the Forms in the Republic is aimed at the aristocratic gentlemen, those like Glaucon and Adeimantus. It is part of the training of the Republic’s guardians, the philosophical dogs who would guard the city against injustice.
With regard to dialectic:
So tell what the character of the power of dialectic is, and, then, into exactly what forms it is divided; and finally what are its ways. For these, as it seems, would lead at last toward that place which is for the one who reaches it a haven from the road, as it were, and an end of his journey."
"You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon," I said, "although there wouldn't be any lack of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, but rather the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it is really so or not can no longer be properly insisted on. But that there is some such thing to see must be insisted on. Isn't it so?" (Republic 532d-533a)
Socrates gives an image of the Good as it “looks” to him. The look of a thing is the eidos of that thing (look is one of the terms that defines and translates eidos). The Form of the Good as presented by Socrates is an image of the Good given in speech. He goes on:
"And, also, that the power of dialectic alone could reveal it to a man experienced in the things we just went through, while it is in no other way possible?" (533a)
If the Good itself can be known it is only through dialectic, that is, reason. But, as the divided line makes clear, reason is not capable of grasping the Forms themselves. So, both the way of mystical transcendence and dialectic are rejected. This should not be surprising given Socrates skepticism. This skepticism is shared by Plato, and that is why the dialogues often end in aporia.
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
Panpsychism is one of the oldest philosophical theories, and has been ascribed to philosophers like Thales, Parmenides, Plato, Averroes, Spinoza, Leibniz and William James. Panpsychism can also be seen in ancient philosophies such as Stoicism, Taoism, Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism. During the 19th century, panpsychism was the default theory in philosophy of mind, but it saw a decline during the middle years of the 20th century with the rise of logical positivism. The recent interest in the hard problem of consciousness has revived interest in panpsychism.
Neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy whose central thesis was verificationism, a theory of knowledge which asserted that only statements verifiable through empirical observation are cognitively meaningful. The movement flourished in the 1920s and 1930s in several European centers.
Efforts to convert philosophy to this new "scientific philosophy", shared with empirical sciences' best examples, such as Einstein's general theory of relativity, sought to prevent confusion rooted in unclear language and unverifiable claims.
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
You are right, Plato uses verbs related to ‘seeing’ and ‘perceiving’ quite often when talking about the Forms. And the term ‘eidos’ is related to this too.Fooloso4 wrote: The Forms are Plato’s philosophical poetry, intended to take the place of the myths of the poets. The Forms are themselves images.
But it would not be enough to conclude that Plato really thought of them as of images. He uses many metaphors, and this is just one of them. If we would like to interpret them as some images (literally), then why would not we think of them as of some gamebirds, when he ‘hunts’ for them or urges us to cut them up at the natural joints as good butchers do (in the Phaedrus (265e))?
You may find what he really thinks of them in the same dialogue (247c). The Forms are ‘colorless, utterly formless, intangible essences’ (ousia achromatos, aschematistos, anaphes). That would be somewhat contrary to our notion of images, and aschematistos is almost directly antonymous to eidos.
That is why this ‘region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet’, and I believe Plato does not think he is the first one.
The Form-image metaphor is good for propaedeutic purposes: if you can see numerous beautiful things, then you might at least suggest that you might probably be able to ‘see’ the Beautiful ‘itself-by-itself’. But the problem is some Forms, actually the noblest and greatest ones, may not have any such sensible resemblances at all (Statesman 285e-286b). In this case, the Form-image metaphor would be rather misleading and useless.
If Plato conceived himself as an image-maker, that would have been a disaster for him. Since it is one of definitions of the Sophist (Soph. 235-236). It is also a part of Plato’s critique of poets in the Republic. And the difference between sophistic and truly dialectic ‘methodology’ is more than crucial for him.Fooloso4 wrote:They are not seen by the mind noetically, but rather created by the imagination of Plato the image-maker.
Plato really had to make those images, if he actually believed the Forms could not be seen by the mind (nous) noetically. But he did not think so, which is evident from his descriptions of anamnesis, especially in the Phaedo. Collection, which is a part of his later conception of the dialectical method, appears to be related to recollection in the Phaedrus (249 b-c). There is also a hypothesis of the Forms being noēmata in the Parmenides (132b). Of course you may say, it was refuted there. But 1) almost every hypothesis is refuted in the Parmenides, since it is just a part of the game, 2) what is refuted is that the Forms may be nothing but noemata (that is, the hypothesis of conceptualism), so they may still become noemata when being recalled by the mind (anamnesis).
So there is still a possibility for the Forms to be ‘seen’ (though not directly) by the mind (nous). The main problem for Plato is that they cannot be grasped by dianoia. The latter can be loosely translated as ‘discursive thought’. And this would include any acts of speech, including even some ‘inner’ speech, when the soul tries to talk to herself. There are many reasons why the Forms cannot be ‘seen’ by dianoia (our language is only good for describing ‘Heraclitean’ world and nothing more (Cratylus), it is based on the perpetual mix between one and many and nothing can be done here (Philebus)). It is here and only here, where Plato’s ‘skepticism’ resides.
And that is not the reason for Plato to reject dialectic, as you seem to assert. The Philebus is believed to be one of the latest dialogues. And the dialectical method is called the ‘Gift of Gods’ there. And even more: Socrates says that through this way “all the inventions of art and science have been brought to light” (16c). This really does not look like rejecting
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
Someone who has never been addicted to drugs see things differently than someone who has been both, addicted to drugs and who is now a recovered addict. Experiencing the difference between them provides additional insight and understanding. Likewise, until you experience the view of a panpsychist, you will not be able to see things differently or as I do. Thus, what I say will not make sense to you. This is the realization which needs to be seen.
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
But each Form is said to be one and thus indivisible.If we would like to interpret them as some images (literally), then why would not we think of them as of some gamebirds, when he ‘hunts’ for them or urges us to cut them up at the natural joints as good butchers do (in the Phaedrus (265e))?
What the immortal soul may know is not what moral men can know (246c). We are not disembodied souls and cannot take flight to the hyperuranian except in the imagination.You may find what he really thinks of them in the same dialogue (247c). The Forms are ‘colorless, utterly formless, intangible essences’ (ousia achromatos, aschematistos, anaphes). That would be somewhat contrary to our notion of images, and aschematistos is almost directly antonymous to eidos.
Plato’s images are not sensible images.But the problem is some Forms, actually the noblest and greatest ones, may not have any such sensible resemblances at all (Statesman 285e-286b). In this case, the Form-image metaphor would be rather misleading and useless.
The fact that there is no dialogue Philosopher is significant. The identify of the philosopher is problematic. The philosopher appears sometimes as a sophist, sometimes as a statesman, and sometimes as a madman. (Sophist 216c-d) The problem with the poets in the Republic is not that they are makers of images but with the images they make.If Plato conceived himself as an image-maker, that would have been a disaster for him. Since it is one of definitions of the Sophist (Soph. 235-236). It is also a part of Plato’s critique of poets in the Republic.
The myth of anamnesis hangs on the immortality of the soul. Without an immortal soul there can be no anamnesis of what is remembered while dead. The Phaedo fails to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. Death may be, as he says in the Apology, a dreamless sleep. He is about to find out, or not. There is also a temporal problem of just when what is recollected was learned. If we have all been born before, that is, if as Socrates said “the living come from the dead” then prior to each life there was already knowledge and there can be no time during which knowledge was acquired.But he did not think so, which is evident from his descriptions of anamnesis, especially in the Phaedo.
This is true of the dialogues in general. They end in aporia.… almost every hypothesis is refuted in the Parmenides …
You have misunderstood me. I do not think he reject dialectic. To the contrary, it is what we must rely on. It represents Socrates second sailing. It is the best we mortal creature can do.And that is not the reason for Plato to reject dialectic, as you seem to assert.
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Re: Academic Philosophy vs Socratic Philosophy
You are absolutely right. But there is no contradiction for Plato here. He may still say, that the Form per se, the Form itself-by-itself, is one and indivisible.But each Form is said to be one and thus indivisible.
But that would be laughable, if we said, that our thought (dianoia) occurs because of the Forms themselves-by-themselves mixing up together in our souls. It is evident from the Parmenides that such Forms in our souls would not be themselves-by-themselves. So it would be even more absurd to suppose, that the Demiourgos in the Timaeus (35-37) uses the Forms themselves-by-themselves to create the Soul (a mixture of the Same, of the Other, and of Being).
So if those Forms are not themselves-by-themselves, and even the Demiourgos has the right to mix them, we may do whatever we like with them too, including ‘mixing’, ‘weaving’, ‘cutting’ and so on.
But if there were no Forms themselves-by-themselves we could not have had any thoughts whatsoever. That is evident from the Parmenides too. So if we forget about them, we would either become totally thoughtless and speechless, or would rather ‘fall into some abyss of verbiage and perish there’.
Therefore, the only way to relate those noemata in our souls with the Forms themselves-by-themselves is by the use of anamnesis. So I just cannot see any reason for Plato to abandon it so easily.
I think you are not right when trying to identify Plato’s dialectic with the ‘second sailing’ and this latter with turning to speeches only. The ‘weaving’ of words (speech) is not an essential part of the dialectic. Collection is a dialectical procedure too. And it is related to recollection, as I have already said.You have misunderstood me. I do not think he reject dialectic. To the contrary, it is what we must rely on. It represents Socrates second sailing. It is the best we mortal creature can do.
So if we get back to Eaglerising’s intuition (as I understand it) and recall the ‘second sailing’ once more (now in your interpretation), then we would rather see the modern philosophy and science losing all their possible masts and sails and relying upon oars only, that is turning to speeches only.
Plato, as any good Greek sailor, knew all the risks of getting too far into the open sea (of speeches), pelagos logōn. We were too self-confident. Because there is no ‘other shore’ there, no new America to be discovered. Except the titanic abyss of verbiage in which we are going to perish. ‘Not with a bang but a whimper’
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