Philosophical Zombies

[Djacob7]

It seems to me that Chalmers' claim that P-Zombies are conceivable is in error.
A P-Zombie behaves exactly like a conscious agent, except that it doesn't have any subjective experience, i.e. no sentience.
If you prick a P-Zombie with a needle, it will say "Ouch!", but it won't feel anything.
If that's true, how does a P-Zombie know that it was pricked?

[Sy Borg]

How does a light switch know it's being turned on?

[Djacob7]

Could you elaborate?

[Consul]

It seems to me that Chalmers' claim that P-Zombies are conceivable is in error.
A P-Zombie behaves exactly like a conscious agent, except that it doesn't have any subjective experience, i.e. no sentience.
If you prick a P-Zombie with a needle, it will say "Ouch!", but it won't feel anything.
If that's true, how does a P-Zombie know that it was pricked?

The nervous system of a (phenomenally) nonconscious zombie is still processing sensory information, such that when e.g. its body is affected by tissue damage, causal processes take place which induce pain awareness/knowledge and pain behavior (without also causing feelings of pain).

"Being in pain is a complex condition. Suppose my finger is burned, and is painful in consequence. In my mental state there are at least two components: awareness that my finger has been overheated, as a result of which it is still damaged, and a peremptory desire that this awareness should cease forthwith. In this present discussion, both the awareness and the desire must be given a causal analysis.

'I am aware that my finger has been burned' is analyzed as 'As a result of having been burned on the finger, I have entered a new inner state apt to produce behavior wherein I discriminate the burned finger from others which are not burned.' In the discriminating behavior I not only favor the correct finger, I favor it in the burn-soothing way. That is, I give verbal and active expression to the belief that my finger has been burned.
…
Suppose a being very like us except that instead of feeling a pain when he burns his finger or breaks his toe, he has no locatable sensations at all. He just spontaneously gains a new belief, it just 'pops into his head' that he has burned his finger or broken his toe, as the case may be. Call this being an imitation man. His awareness of his own body would be like our awareness that the car we are driving in is getting a flat tire. Some change in our body, of which we are not conscious, has as a result that it just pops into our heads that the tire is going flat.

Awareness of the kind we have, that our finger is burned, ceases at the end of successful soothing operations. The bare belief of the imitation man that his finger has been burned could just disappear in the same way, as our belief that the tire is flat evaporates when we change the wheel.

The imitation man satisfies the analysis given above of 'I am aware that I have burned my finger.' But his pains do not hurt."
(pp. 99-101)

"Think again of the imitation man, who duplicates all of a typical man's acquisition, processing, and retrieval of information, and all his activity, but for whom there are no phenomenal properties. If the imitation man's finger is burned, he knows that something is going on in his finger. And he knows further that there is activity in him by which he knows this. The further activity is in fact activity of the C-fibers, but he does not know that that is what it is. He apprehends it imperfectly, as we do, but he does not apprehend it by suffering, as we do. He just knows it, as we just know when we are awake, for example, that whatever inner condition it is which marks off waking from sleep is present within us.

The imitation man can know sea and sky are alike in color, and even call them 'blue'. So can a blind man. Unlike a blind man, the imitation man can find it out for himself. When he looks at sea or sky he forms the belief that what he is looking at has the color which he has been taught to call 'blue'. Yet the imitation man does not see the sea or sky as blue. He is not able to enjoy their color, for they do not appear as colored to him. Similarly, he can tell when his finger is burned or crushed, and have a powerful drive to eliminate the condition by which he knows this. Yet he cannot suffer."
(pp. 108-9)

(Campbell, Keith. Body and Mind. 2nd ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.)

[Chili]

It seems to me that Chalmers' claim that P-Zombies are conceivable is in error.
A P-Zombie behaves exactly like a conscious agent, except that it doesn't have any subjective experience, i.e. no sentience.
If you prick a P-Zombie with a needle, it will say "Ouch!", but it won't feel anything.
If that's true, how does a P-Zombie know that it was pricked?

The phrase "behaves exactly like a conscious agent" assumes much.

From outside, you see a person's (or zombie's) behaviors - including reports like 'Ouch'.

We can make an increasingly better machine which can persuade more and more people that it is a conscious agent.

If we could look inside and see the pulleys and wires, perhaps we would think that it is not a conscious agent, even though it seemed to behave like one up to a point.

[Consul]

It should be mentioned that there are different kinds of zombies or different degrees of zombiehood:

"Behaviorally identical zombies make all the overt movements and utterances that conscious creatures do, but they may have any internal structure and may be composed of whatever material. Behaviorally identical zombies needn’t be hollow shells; they could be quite sophisticated. However, in considering behaviorally identical zombies their internal organization is left unspecified. Functionally identical zombies not only make the movements that conscious creatures do, they also have the same internal organization that conscious creatures do. Physically identical zombies are identical to conscious creatures cell for cell, molecule for molecule, or atom for atom."

(Polger, Thomas W. "Zombies Explained." In Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, edited by Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson, 259-286. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. p. 262)

The kind of zombies Chalmers invokes in his argument against (reductive) materialism are not only behaviorally or functionally, but physically identical to conscious agents. That is, they are perfect physical duplicates of conscious creatures.

[Chili]

It should be mentioned that there are different kinds of zombies or different degrees of zombiehood:

"Behaviorally identical zombies make all the overt movements and utterances that conscious creatures do, but they may have any internal structure and may be composed of whatever material. Behaviorally identical zombies needn’t be hollow shells; they could be quite sophisticated. However, in considering behaviorally identical zombies their internal organization is left unspecified. Functionally identical zombies not only make the movements that conscious creatures do, they also have the same internal organization that conscious creatures do. Physically identical zombies are identical to conscious creatures cell for cell, molecule for molecule, or atom for atom."

(Polger, Thomas W. "Zombies Explained." In Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, edited by Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson, 259-286. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. p. 262)

The kind of zombies Chalmers invokes in his argument against (reductive) materialism are not only behaviorally or functionally, but physically identical to conscious agents. That is, they are perfect physical duplicates of conscious creatures.

Does he address the question of how one knows that a creature is conscious vs simply a zombie ?

[Consul]

Does [Chalmers] address the question of how one knows that a creature is conscious vs simply a zombie?

See: viewtopic.php?p=296816#p296816

[Chili]

Does [Chalmers] address the question of how one knows that a creature is conscious vs simply a zombie?

See: viewtopic.php?p=296816#p296816

So "no" - certainly not to my satisfaction. Very much in the eye of the beholder. From here, comes much of the confusion about his work IMHO.

[Djacob7]

Consul wrote: "…but he does not apprehend it by suffering, as we do."

So, let's say a zombie mother lost a child in an accident. For days, or weeks, she would look like she's mourning. She would cry several times a day. She'd pick up a photo of her child, look at it and weep. She might even pray to her god, whispering "Dear god, why did you make me suffer like this?"
But she won't be suffering?

Does a zombie have knowledge? If so, does it know what it means to suffer?
Does a zombie have memory? If so does it remember its "state" when her baby died?
Does a zombie have states?

I very much doubt the possibility, or conceivability, of P-zombies unless we are them.

[Consul]

Consul wrote: "…but he does not apprehend it by suffering, as we do."

So, let's say a zombie mother lost a child in an accident. For days, or weeks, she would look like she's mourning. She would cry several times a day. She'd pick up a photo of her child, look at it and weep. She might even pray to her god, whispering "Dear god, why did you make me suffer like this?"
But she won't be suffering?

Does a zombie have knowledge? If so, does it know what it means to suffer?
Does a zombie have memory? If so does it remember its "state" when her baby died?
Does a zombie have states?

I very much doubt the possibility, or conceivability, of P-zombies unless we are them.

In psychology, knowledge and memories, and also beliefs and desires are usually regarded as dispositional mental states. Of course, if nothing has a mind unless it has consciousness, then nonconscious zombies are mindless, lacking mental states such as knowledge and memories. So if zombies are to have a mind and mental states at all, we need a consciousness-independent definition of these terms. (That zombies have nonmental, physical states at least is not in question.) For instance, if zombies have memories as a kind of dispositional mental states, these cannot manifest themselves experientially as occurrent rememberings, since zombies are nonexperiencing beings; so in zombies those dispositional states can only manifest themselves behaviorally or physically in a certain way.

I agree with you insofar as it is pretty problematic indeed to ascribe psychological states or properties to inherently nonconscious beings.

Of course, in computer science the term "memory" is used in a nonpsychological, non-consciousness-entailing sense, as defined in the Oxford Dictionary of Computer Science: "a device or medium that can retain information for subsequent retrieval." The Oxford Dictionary of Psychology defines "memory" as "the psychological function of preserving information, involving the processes of encoding, storage, and retrieval." But the question is: what's genuinely and distinctively psychological about a function that doesn't require (the capacity) for (phenomenal) consciousness/(subjective) experience?

[Djacob7]

Good question. I'll make it a bit more pronounced:
Is there anything psychological in what this zombie said: "When my baby died I experienced a feeling I've never felt before. It was horrible! I've felt pain before, but nothing like this experience."
Does the zombie know/understand what she just said?

[JamesOfSeattle]

I agree with you insofar as it is pretty problematic indeed to ascribe psychological states or properties to inherently nonconscious beings.

What if any system that appears to have a function (or any system that functions) has two kinds of descriptions: the physical description and the functional description? What if psychology is our attempt at getting the functional description of a human mind? What if qualia and consciousness are purely psychological, and thus functional, descriptions.

The thing is, if you have two systems that are physically identical, then their functional descriptions are identical. If you have a computer running a web browser showing a picture of Barack Obama [ah, for the good ol' days], then a complete physical copy of that computer will also be running a web browser showing the same picture, etc.

So if consciousness is part of the functional description -> no zombies.

*

[Consul]

What if any system that appears to have a function (or any system that functions) has two kinds of descriptions: the physical description and the functional description? What if psychology is our attempt at getting the functional description of a human mind? What if qualia and consciousness are purely psychological, and thus functional, descriptions.

Many philosophers and psychologists are convinced—rightly, I think—that purely functionalist conceptions and descriptions of the mind fail to capture the qualitative character of experience. Arguably, experiential states or properties (qualia) are not functionally reducible and completely describable in terms of cause-effect or input-output relations. (Note that "functionally irreducible" doesn't mean "functionless", because whether or not experiences are epiphenomenal, i.e. causally impotent, effectless, is another question.)

See Functionalism and the Problem of Qualia:

"Even for those generally sympathetic to functionalism, there is one category of mental states that seems particularly resistant to functional characterization. Functionalist theories of all varieties — whether analytic or empirical, FSIT or functional specification — attempt to characterize mental states exclusively in relational, specifically causal, terms. A common and persistent objection, however, is that no such characterizations can capture the qualitative character, or “qualia”, of experiential states such as perceptions, emotions, and bodily sensations, since they would leave out certain of their essential properties, namely, “what it's like” (Nagel 1974) to have them. The next three sections will present the most serious worries about the ability of functionalist theories to give an adequate characterization of these states. (These worries, of course, will extend to intentional states, if, as some philosophers have argued (Searle 1992, G. Strawson 1986, Kriegel 2003, Pitt 2008), “what it's like” to have them is among their essential properties as well. See also entry on Mental Representation.)"

By the way, Chalmers has drawn a distinction between a psychological or causal/functional concept of a mind and a phenomenological or experiential one:

"The Phenomenal and the Psychological Concepts of Mind

Conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. To see this, observe that although modern cognitive science has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, it has had much to say about mind in general. The aspects of mind with which it is concerned are different. Cognitive science deals largely in the explanation of behavior, and insofar as it is concerned with mind at all, it is with mind construed as the internal basis of behavior, and with mental states construed as those states relevant to the causation and explanation of behavior. Such states may or may not be conscious. From the point of view of cognitive science, an internal state responsible for the causation of behavior is equally mental whether it is conscious or not.

At the root of all this lie two quite distinct concepts of mind. The first is the phenomenal concept of mind. This is the concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental state. This is the most perplexing aspect of mind and the aspect on which I will concentrate, but it does not exhaust the mental. The second is the psychological concept of mind. This is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior. A state is mental in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in the production of behavior, or at least plays an appropriate role in the explanation of behavior. According to the psychological concept, it matters little whether a mental state has a conscious quality or not. What matters is the role it plays in a cognitive economy.

On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it does. There should be no question of competition between these two notions of mind. Neither of them is the correct analysis of mind. They cover different phenomena, both of which are quite real.

I will sometimes speak of the phenomenal and psychological 'aspects' of mind, and sometimes of the 'phenomenal mind' and the 'psychological mind.' At this early stage, I do not wish to beg any questions about whether the phenomenal and the psychological will turn out to be the same thing. Perhaps every phenomenal state is a psychological state, in that it plays a significant role in the causation and explanation of behavior, and perhaps every psychological state has an intimate relation to the phenomenal. For now, all that counts is the conceptual distinction between the two notions: what it means for a state to be phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way, and what it means for a state to be psychological is for it to play an appropriate causal role. These distinct notions should not be conflated, at least at the outset.

A specific mental concept can usually be analyzed as a phenomenal concept, a psychological concept, or as a combination of the two. For instance, sensation, in its central sense, is best taken as a phenomenal concept: to have a sensation is to have a state with a certain sort of feel. On the other hand, the concepts of learning and memory might best be taken as psychological. For something to learn, at a first approximation, is for it to adapt its behavioral capacities appropriately in response to certain kinds of environmental stimulation. In general, a phenomenal feature of the mind is characterized by what it is like for a subject to have that feature, while a psychological feature is characterized by an associated role in the causation and/or explanation of behavior.

Of course, this usage of the term 'psychological' is a stipulation: it arises from identifying psychology with cognitive science as described above. The everyday concept of a 'psychological state' is probably broader than this, and may well include elements of the phenomenal. But nothing will rest on my use of the term."

(Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 11-2)

[Chili]

Good question. I'll make it a bit more pronounced:
Is there anything psychological in what this zombie said: "When my baby died I experienced a feeling I've never felt before. It was horrible! I've felt pain before, but nothing like this experience."
Does the zombie know/understand what she just said?

This whole conversation arises in a world where reductionism plays a larger and larger role. In simple animals, many behaviors are known to be linked to particular genes, and as such become understood mechanically and without "conscious mind" per se. In terms of natural selection, the logic of urgently taking care of babies and other close relatives over remote relatives and strangers seems to explain a lot that "psychology" seems to fail at. Why is this person like this? Because in the times of their ancestors, those inclinations were more likely to result in having descendants than other inclinations.