Max:
Please tell me the difference between being qua being and ontology. They are by definition exactly the same.
There is different concepts of ontology, but in general we might define ontology as the question of what is, and the question of being qua being posed by Aristotle as the causes and principles of being, that is, of substance (ousiai). Substance is the “the what it was to be” of a thing. This was translated in Latin as, essentia, a term invented to translate the Greek, meaning “the what it is”. Substance, according Aristotle, is not matter or what stands under something, but rather, what it is to be what it is.
Whether you make a distinction between them or not is not the issue since ontology may be thought of as a metaphysical study.
That objects exists independent of our conception certainly is transcendent, if it cannot be experienced in nature, yet is said to exist, it must transcend nature and experience, because it must exist on a separate plane then our own.
Existing independent of our conception does not mean it cannot be experienced, it means that our experience of it is determined by what it is not by what we are. If we discover something previously unknown, that means, according to the realist, that it is already there in nature and its existence is what enables us to experience it.
The claim that objects do not exist in the world separate from from our experience is empiricism, which is not metaphysical.
The claim that objects do not exist in the world separate from from our experience is not empiricism it is idealism. Empiricism is the claim that knowledge comes from experience. This is generally thought of as a question of epistemology. The distinction between epistemology and ontology, however, blurs since we cannot talk about what is if we have no knowledge of it, and what it is, how we experience it, pace realism, may not be independent of how it is for us.In other words, questions of ontology lead to questions of epistemology and questions of epistemology lead to questions of ontology, and thus we return to metaphysics.
… existence monism is materialism which is not at all metaphysical.
Your claim is that it is not metaphysical because it does not involve transcendence. Rather than modify your concept of metaphysics, you deny that a metaphysical claim is metaphysical. Material monism is a claim about fundamental reality, and that is, as generally understood, metaphysics even if you insist on a different definition of metaphysics. Again, it is not a question of an arbitrary determination of the “correct” definition, but rather, of what philosophers and others mean when they use the term. So when Nietzsche scholars talk about his metaphysics you completely miss the point.
To say everything is fundamentally two doesn't even make sense, unless you are using metaphysics, e.g., body and soul.
That is correct, but first, ‘soul’ is not always a transcendent concept. Rather than a review of the history of the meaning of the term, we can consider other dualities such as the physical and mind or consciousness. This distinction does not involve transcendence but rather, the problem of reductionism - whether one can be reduced to the other.
A part is fundamentally the same as the whole of which it is a part.
If you cannot understand the difference between whole and part I do not think I can help you see it.
Fundamentally music is jazz.
Was there music before the advent of jazz? If someone does not understand what music is providing a sample of jazz may help, but they may conclude from this example that classical, hip hop, of even earlier or later examples of jazz are not music because it contains or does not contain sounds that are present in the example. Or they may conclude that a siren is music because it contains various combinations of pitch and sound duration. It is not simply a matter of what jazz has in common with other forms of music but what distinguishes it from other forms of music. Identity and difference.
In an attempt to get back on topic, this points back to the question you have not addressed of whether the natural world existed before man.
What passage was this? The last one? That's funny as I don't see time mentioned once in that entire passage. Time does not exist in this passage.
This passage:
In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum.
Max:
Then again, the concept of time cannot be applied to the eternal recurrence.
See Merriam Webster Definition
Meriam Webster is hardly a definitive source for Nietzsche’s discussion of time and eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence occurs within infinite time. Again, it is not because of the will to power but because in infinite time all possibilities have played out time and time again.