Are fictional characters real?

Use this philosophy forum to discuss and debate general philosophy topics that don't fit into one of the other categories.

This forum is NOT for factual, informational or scientific questions about philosophy (e.g. "What year was Socrates born?"). Those kind of questions can be asked in the off-topic section.
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote: December 19th, 2017, 7:03 pm
Gertie wrote: December 19th, 2017, 5:41 pmYou're just using a different way of saying 'Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character created by Conan Doyle'. We both understand that your set of words and my set of words mean the same thing, the rest is down to agreeing shared definitions of words like 'real' and 'unreal', when we already have a word 'fictional' which provides us with the appropriate and mutually understood distinction.
The Oxford Dictionary defines "to create" as "to bring (something) into existence", from which it follows that "x was created by y" implies "x exists/existed". Being an antirealist about fictional characters, I think that the sentence "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character created by Conan Doyle" is false, because Sherlock Holmes does/did not exist; and what never existed was never created.

Must antirealists about fictional characters reject the creation-talk in the context of fiction? It depends, because they could accept a distinction between "real creation" and "fictional creation". To really create something is to bring it into existence/reality, an example being Gustav Eiffel's construction of his famous tower in Paris, whereas to fictionally create something is not to bring it into existence/reality. But what is fictional creation then? It is mere excogitation, the mere thinking up of something, with "x was thought up by y" not implying "x exists/existed". Note that the fictional creation of a fictional person or object is always accompanied by the real creation of (mental or/and physical) representations of it!
In other words - Conan Doyle created the fictional character Sherlock Holmes.

A simple sentence which conveys my meaning and you understand. Job done.



Here Erk asks are fictional characters 'real', using mind-independent as the criterion for realness. And I pointed out the materials used to 'encode' the description of the character are 'real', but it requires a mind to create and decode the information (Holmes) represented by the materials. Pretty much what you're saying here, and again something we all understand.

If you happen to prefer a different definition of 'real', you might get a different answer. If you pick a definition which means it's impossible to 'create' a fictional character by definition, then you'll just have to come up with a different set of words which mean 'create a fictional character'. My question is, why bother, what are learning about the nature of reality?

The whole thing is just playing with words and definitions, rather than saying anything new or interesting about the intrinsic nature of what is real. And doesn't tell us anything a 10 year old doesn't know when they read about the adventures of Dora the Explorer.
User avatar
Sy Borg
Site Admin
Posts: 14992
Joined: December 16th, 2013, 9:05 pm

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Sy Borg »

One interesting aspect of fiction is its feedback impacts on physical reality. A pattern (the creation) is created and it is implanted into minds, which may reflect back that pattern, be it adopting mannerisms, idioms, ideas to the more overt mimicry such as may be found in fan art and conventions.

The flow of information is quite beautiful - one organism presents a pattern from its mind to another, which accepts the pattern into its own mind and then expresses the pattern in its own way (either intentionally or naturally) and so on creating a Chinese whispers-like chain of memetic evolution.

In that sense fictional characters occupy similar terrain to money, ideology and morality - a layer, a meta-reality of human society.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: December 19th, 2017, 8:27 pmIn other words - Conan Doyle created the fictional character Sherlock Holmes.

A simple sentence which conveys my meaning and you understand. Job done.
No, not "in other words", because this is a philosophy forum, and that sentence is simply false from my antirealist point of view concerning fictional characters: Conan Doyle did not really create Sherlock Holmes. What he really created are fictional stories about a detective called Sherlock Holmes. What I called "fictional creation" (= "excogitation") in my previous post is actually pseudocreation.
Gertie wrote: December 19th, 2017, 8:27 pmHere Erk asks are fictional characters 'real', using mind-independent as the criterion for realness. And I pointed out the materials used to 'encode' the description of the character are 'real', but it requires a mind to create and decode the information (Holmes) represented by the materials. Pretty much what you're saying here, and again something we all understand.

If you happen to prefer a different definition of 'real', you might get a different answer. If you pick a definition which means it's impossible to 'create' a fictional character by definition, then you'll just have to come up with a different set of words which mean 'create a fictional character'. My question is, why bother, what are learning about the nature of reality?

The whole thing is just playing with words and definitions, rather than saying anything new or interesting about the intrinsic nature of what is real. And doesn't tell us anything a 10 year old doesn't know when they read about the adventures of Dora the Explorer.
There is a "thin" concept of realness, which is synonymous with the concept of existence; and there is a "thick" one, which is synonymous with the concept of (mind-/thought-/language-/representation-)independent existence. When I say that fictional persons or objects are unreal, I don't mean to say that they exist mind-dependently, but that they don't exist at all.

"There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table's being square, the rock's being made of granite, and the moon's being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. Likewise, although there is a clear sense in which the table's being square is dependent on us (it was designed and constructed by human beings after all), this is not the type of dependence that the realist wishes to deny. The realist wishes to claim that apart from the mundane sort of empirical dependence of objects and their properties familiar to us from everyday life, there is no further (philosophically interesting) sense in which everyday objects and their properties can be said to be dependent on anyone's linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, or whatever.
In general, where the distinctive objects of a subject-matter are a, b, c, … , and the distinctive properties are F-ness, G-ness, H-ness and so on, realism about that subject matter will typically take the form of a claim like the following:

Generic Realism:

a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane empirical dependencies of the sort sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of anyone's beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on."


Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: December 19th, 2017, 8:27 pmIf you happen to prefer a different definition of 'real', you might get a different answer. If you pick a definition which means it's impossible to 'create' a fictional character by definition, then you'll just have to come up with a different set of words which mean 'create a fictional character'. My question is, why bother, what are learning about the nature of reality?
My point is that if fictional characters are (literally, really) created, they thereby become existing things, entities—which I think they are not. So what we have to come up with are alternative verbs which do not mean an act of making something exist or real.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: December 19th, 2017, 9:55 pmMy point is that if fictional characters are (literally, really) created, they thereby become existing things, entities—which I think they are not. So what we have to come up with are alternative verbs which do not mean an act of making something exist or real.
For example, instead of saying that Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes, we can say that he was the first to conceive or describe Sherlock Holmes, or that he was the first to think about/of Sherlock Holmes.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote: December 19th, 2017, 9:39 pm
Gertie wrote: December 19th, 2017, 8:27 pmIn other words - Conan Doyle created the fictional character Sherlock Holmes.

A simple sentence which conveys my meaning and you understand. Job done.
No, not "in other words", because this is a philosophy forum, and that sentence is simply false from my antirealist point of view concerning fictional characters: Conan Doyle did not really create Sherlock Holmes. What he really created are fictional stories about a detective called Sherlock Holmes. What I called "fictional creation" (= "excogitation") in my previous post is actually pseudocreation.
Gertie wrote: December 19th, 2017, 8:27 pmHere Erk asks are fictional characters 'real', using mind-independent as the criterion for realness. And I pointed out the materials used to 'encode' the description of the character are 'real', but it requires a mind to create and decode the information (Holmes) represented by the materials. Pretty much what you're saying here, and again something we all understand.

If you happen to prefer a different definition of 'real', you might get a different answer. If you pick a definition which means it's impossible to 'create' a fictional character by definition, then you'll just have to come up with a different set of words which mean 'create a fictional character'. My question is, why bother, what are learning about the nature of reality?

The whole thing is just playing with words and definitions, rather than saying anything new or interesting about the intrinsic nature of what is real. And doesn't tell us anything a 10 year old doesn't know when they read about the adventures of Dora the Explorer.
There is a "thin" concept of realness, which is synonymous with the concept of existence; and there is a "thick" one, which is synonymous with the concept of (mind-/thought-/language-/representation-)independent existence. When I say that fictional persons or objects are unreal, I don't mean to say that they exist mind-dependently, but that they don't exist at all.

"There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table's being square, the rock's being made of granite, and the moon's being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. Likewise, although there is a clear sense in which the table's being square is dependent on us (it was designed and constructed by human beings after all), this is not the type of dependence that the realist wishes to deny. The realist wishes to claim that apart from the mundane sort of empirical dependence of objects and their properties familiar to us from everyday life, there is no further (philosophically interesting) sense in which everyday objects and their properties can be said to be dependent on anyone's linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, or whatever.
In general, where the distinctive objects of a subject-matter are a, b, c, … , and the distinctive properties are F-ness, G-ness, H-ness and so on, realism about that subject matter will typically take the form of a claim like the following:

Generic Realism:

a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane empirical dependencies of the sort sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of anyone's beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on."


Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/
Thanks for the formal context of your argument given by the quote. But I'm unconvinced it directly refutes my position. It's a particular framing of 'realness' which divides stuff into categories using particular criteria, then defines one type of stuff as 'real', and the other as 'unreal'. It's a tool for filing, which may have handy applications. However, I could point out a bunch of problems with it, one being that it means you have to create new language (jargon) to say things we already have perfectly good language for, which everyone already understands.

We have words like 'fictional'. And when I say Conan Doyle created fictional stories/characters, you get it. We don't need to paraphrase or invent new words, (which you've done in a way which is perfectly fine), except to fit this particular filing system. So when erk asks the question in the OP, the only issue I can see is to negotiate the language, identify the criteria, and correctly file it.

As I say, as far as I can see...

Tho of course other philosophers have come up with far richer and more interesting approaches to the nature of reality, where new and challenging thinking might necessarily justify new language.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: December 21st, 2017, 7:22 pmThanks for the formal context of your argument given by the quote. But I'm unconvinced it directly refutes my position. It's a particular framing of 'realness' which divides stuff into categories using particular criteria, then defines one type of stuff as 'real', and the other as 'unreal'. It's a tool for filing, which may have handy applications. However, I could point out a bunch of problems with it, one being that it means you have to create new language (jargon) to say things we already have perfectly good language for, which everyone already understands.

We have words like 'fictional'. And when I say Conan Doyle created fictional stories/characters, you get it. We don't need to paraphrase or invent new words, (which you've done in a way which is perfectly fine), except to fit this particular filing system. So when erk asks the question in the OP, the only issue I can see is to negotiate the language, identify the criteria, and correctly file it.

As I say, as far as I can see...

Tho of course other philosophers have come up with far richer and more interesting approaches to the nature of reality, where new and challenging thinking might necessarily justify new language.
Philosophical communication is not just about "getting it" superficially and vaguely in the sense of "Yea, I sorta know what you mean". It is part of the ordinary-language meaning of "to create" that what is created is brought into existence; so if Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle, he was thereby brought into existence. But do fictional characters really exist? Are they part of the furniture of the real world? Are Harry Potter and Luke Skywalker existing persons like Donald Trump and Queen Elizabeth?

David Chalmers has drawn a pragmatic distinction between "ordinary and ontological existence assertions". Speaking ordinarily in the context of fiction, we can say relatively unproblematically and readily comprehensibly that there is such a fictional character as XY and the s/he was created by Z. But as soon as we start doing serious ontology, entering "the ontology room", things change, because then the questions arise as to whether fictional characters really exist, and whether they were really created by somebody.

"On Carnap’s view, questions about existence always involve linguistic frameworks: for example, the framework of mathematics, the framework of propositions, or the framework of commonsense objects. There are then two sorts of existence questions.

Internal questions are those posed within a framework, concerning the existence of certain specific entities within the framework. Examples include ‘Are there any odd perfect numbers?’ asked by a mathematician, and ‘Is there an apple on the table?’ asked by a child. Internal claims are answers to internal questions. On Carnap’s view, internal claims are typically true or false. In some cases, such as mathematics, they will be analytically true or false, with their truth-value determined wholly by the rules of the framework. In other cases, such as claims concerning ordinary objects, they will be empirically true or false, with their truth or falsity determined by the rules of the framework in conjunction with experience and perhaps with other aspects of the world.

External questions are those posed outside a given framework, concern the existence of the framework’s system of entities as a whole. Examples include ‘Do numbers exist?’ or ‘Do ordinary physical objects exist?’ asked from a purported neutral perspective. External claims are answers to external questions. On Carnap’s view, external claims are neither true nor false. For Carnap, the choice between frameworks is practical rather than factual. Any purported factual question about which framework is the ‘correct’ one is held to be a pseudoquestion, without cognitive content.

Even if one does not accept Carnap’s claims about the properties of internal and external questions, there is something natural about the distinction itself. The distinction between internal and external questions seems to reflect a distinction in our practice of raising questions about existence, if nothing else. At the same time, Carnap’s terminology is suboptimal. For a start, the terminology of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is too closely tied to Carnap’s theoretical apparatus involving frameworks to serve as a neutral starting point. If one rejects the idea of a framework, or of a question being internal to a framework, one will reject this version of the distinction. If possible, it is desirable to draw a relatively pretheoretical version of the distinction that almost anyone can accept, regardless of their theoretical inclinations.

In addition, ‘internal question’ and ‘external question’ may suggest two different sorts of sentence, whereas I think the most important distinction is between different uses of sentence (or perhaps, between different evaluations of sentences). For example, a sentence such as ‘Do prime numbers exist?’ might be used to pose an internal question (by a mathematician, say) or to pose an external question (by a metaphysician, say). The same goes in principle for sentences such as ‘Numbers exist’ and ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten.’

Instead, I will distinguish between two different sorts of existence assertions: ordinary and ontological existence assertions. Here an assertion is an utterance of an assertive sentence. An existence assertion is an utterance of a sentence that appears to assert or deny the existence of certain entities: for example, ‘Xs exist,’ ‘There are Ys,’ ‘There are no Zs.’ One can also straightforwardly extend the distinction to sentences that appear to involve universal quantification, and to sentences in which apparently quantified claims are embedded. For the purposes of this definition, sentences are individuated by surface structure. So it is compatible with the definition that ontological and ordinary assertions of the same sentence may have the same surface structure while differing in deep structure (perhaps involving a difference in covert variables, operators, and the like).

An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table.’

An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount. For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object that is their mereological sum.’

We can think of ontological existence assertions as those made inside the ‘ontology room’, and ordinary existence assertion as those made outside the ontology room. At the very least, there is a clear pragmatic difference between these two sorts of assertion. For example, given an ontological assertion of ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers,’ it is appropriate to respond ‘No, there aren’t, because if numbers exist, they are abstract objects, and there are no abstract objects.’ But given an ordinary assertion of ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers,’ it is not appropriate to respond in this way.

Correspondingly, it is natural to hold that ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness. The correctness of ontological existence assertions is sensitive to ontological matters, and indeed is obviously sensitive in this way. The correctness of ordinary existence assertions is insensitive to ontological matters, or at least is not obviously so sensitive. For example, the correctness of an ordinary assertion of ‘There are prime numbers’ is insensitive to whether Platonism or nominalism is true. Even if nominalism is true, so that strictly speaking there are no numbers, an ordinary mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’ is correct. (Note that correctness need not be the same thing as truth.) Likewise, the correctness of an ordinary assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’ is insensitive to the truth or falsity of nihilism. Even if nihilism is true, so that strictly speaking there are no macroscopic objects, an ordinary drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’ may be correct.

By contrast, the correctness of an ontological assertion of ‘There are prime numbers’ is sensitive to whether Platonism or nominalism is true. If nominalism is true, a metaphysician’s utterance of this sentence is incorrect. Likewise, the correctness of an ontological assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’ is sensitive to whether nihilism is true or false. If nihilism is true, then a metaphysician’s assertion of this sentence is incorrect."

(Chalmers, David J. "Ontological Anti-Realism." In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 77-129. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pp. 80-2)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Philosophical communication is not just about "getting it" superficially and vaguely in the sense of "Yea, I sorta know what you mean". It is part of the ordinary-language meaning of "to create" that what is created is brought into existence; so if Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle, he was thereby brought into existence. But do fictional characters really exist? Are they part of the furniture of the real world? Are Harry Potter and Luke Skywalker existing persons like Donald Trump and Queen Elizabeth?
There's a difference between Conan Doyle and Holmes, because Conan Doyle was a real person and Holmes is a fictional character.

If you understand the meaning of those words, then you understand the information about the state of affairs which I'm trying to convey, which I'm sure you do. Not just 'yea, vaguely', but just as specifically as the re-formulations you've offered.

And when I say Conan Doyle created stories about a fictional character called Sherlock Holmes, I'm confident you understand what I'm conveying. We have words like 'fictional' which perform the required function to convey a shared understanding of a state of affairs.

So my point is - what are you adding by re-phrasing that sentence using words like pseudo-created and unreal?

I understand that re-phrasing is associated with a particular type of Realism framing, but I don't think this adds anything of additional value, because the role of the framing itself simply seems to be a tool for categorisation, Or what exactly would Chalmers find of additional value?


Are you with me? So when we work our way through that, what we have is 'fictional' should be filed under Unreal using this particular 'internal' either/or categorisation system. That's it, right?





But by going through that process we bump into problems like needing to distinguish between different types of 'creating'. Which is in effect adding further divisions to our blunt either/or (Real/Unreal) categories by distinguishing 'pseudocreated' fictional characters! (Or Abstract Numbers, or whatever).

So you pop Holmes into this Real/Unreal formula, and it answers Unreal. But people can still think of fictional characters as having a role in the world, so we call them 'pseudocreated', the effect being to give us the information that... Holmes is a fictional character.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: December 21st, 2017, 11:22 pmThere's a difference between Conan Doyle and Holmes, because Conan Doyle was a real person and Holmes is a fictional character.
If you understand the meaning of those words, then you understand the information about the state of affairs which I'm trying to convey, which I'm sure you do. Not just 'yea, vaguely', but just as specifically as the re-formulations you've offered.
And when I say Conan Doyle created stories about a fictional character called Sherlock Holmes, I'm confident you understand what I'm conveying. We have words like 'fictional' which perform the required function to convey a shared understanding of a state of affairs.

So my point is - what are you adding by re-phrasing that sentence using words like pseudo-created and unreal?
I understand that re-phrasing is associated with a particular type of Realism framing, but I don't think this adds anything of additional value, because the role of the framing itself simply seems to be a tool for categorisation, Or what exactly would Chalmers find of additional value?


Are you with me? So when we work our way through that, what we have is 'fictional' should be filed under Unreal using this particular 'internal' either/or categorisation system. That's it, right?
But by going through that process we bump into problems like needing to distinguish between different types of 'creating'. Which is in effect adding further divisions to our blunt either/or (Real/Unreal) categories by distinguishing 'pseudocreated' fictional characters! (Or Abstract Numbers, or whatever).
So you pop Holmes into this Real/Unreal formula, and it answers Unreal. But people can still think of fictional characters as having a role in the world, so we call them 'pseudocreated', the effect being to give us the information that... Holmes is a fictional character.
Ordinary fiction-talk outside "the philosophy room" turns out to be semantically (concerning meaning, reference, truth-conditions/-values) and ontologically (concerning being/existence/reality, the existential quantifier, ontological commitment) problematic as soon as we enter it.
I think there are no fictional persons or objects, but quite a few philosophers—those endorsing fictional realism—think otherwise.

"Most fictions speak of real places and times (like nineteenth-century London in many novels by Dickens), and often of real people as well (like Napoleon in War and Peace). Most fictions also contain purely fictional characters, ones which are entirely “made up” like Kilgore Trout; some fictions similarly contain purely fictional places, like the planet Tralfamadore, or purely fictional weapons, clothing, and beasts. How should we think about these made-up people, places, and things? Should we think of them all in the same way? Should we include ideal gases and spatial points of zero size in a homogeneous category with Kilgore and Tralfamadore? Fictional objects don’t occupy space in our world, so we can never encounter them or visit them. Should we say that they are things that don’t exist? Or that they are merely possible things? Or that they are existent but abstract (and so non-space-occupying) things? Or should we simply deny that there are any such things? The first three options, according to which there really are fictional characters but they are nonexistent, or merely possible, or abstract, correspond to three ways to be a realist about fictional characters; the fourth option (there are no such things) I count as irrealism on this question. The realisms are so called because they say that there really are such things as fictional objects and they belong to our reality, though the objects are “exotic”: they are nonexistent, or nonactual or nonconcrete, unlike ordinary objects, tables and mountains, which exist, are actual, and are concrete. The exotic nature of a realist’s objects is demanded by the agreed datum that we can never literally encounter purely fictional characters or places, not in the way we could encounter George W. Bush or Timbuktu; as Peter Strawson said, you can’t spill your coffee on them."

(Sainsbury, R. M. Fiction and Fictionalism. New York: Routledge, 2010. pp. 22-3)

Remark: The author subsumes Meinongianism (named after Alexius Meinong)—the view that "there really are fictional characters but they are nonexistent"—under fictional realism. Meinong famously distinguished between being and existence, such that in his view "There are fictional characters" is not synonymous with "Fictional characters exist". But I strongly reject the conceptual separation of being and existence (and also the distinction between "subsistence" and existence), and so I do regard "There are fictional characters" and "Fictional characters exist" as synonyms. I think fictional objects/persons don't exist, and in my view to say so is to say that there are no such things.

"If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. Existence is not some special distinction that befalls some of the things there are. Existence just means being one of the things there are, nothing else."

(Lewis, David. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. p. 80f.)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 12:28 pm"…Should we say that [ficta] are things that don’t exist? Or that they are merely possible things? Or that they are existent but abstract (and so non-space-occupying) things? Or should we simply deny that there are any such things? The first three options, according to which there really are fictional characters but they are nonexistent, or merely possible, or abstract, correspond to three ways to be a realist about fictional characters; the fourth option (there are no such things) I count as irrealism on this question. The realisms are so called because they say that there really are such things as fictional objects and they belong to our reality, though the objects are “exotic”: they are nonexistent, or nonactual or nonconcrete, unlike ordinary objects, tables and mountains, which exist, are actual, and are concrete.…"

(Sainsbury, R. M. Fiction and Fictionalism. New York: Routledge, 2010. pp. 22-3)
So there are three versions of fictional realism:

1. Meinongianism: There are ficta (in the actual world), but they don't exist.

2. Nonactualism/Possibilism: There are ficta, but they are mere possibilia that exist in possible worlds different from the actual world.

3. Abstractism: There are ficta (in the actual world), but they are abstract entities (abstract artifacts) rather than concrete ones.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 12:28 pm
Gertie wrote: December 21st, 2017, 11:22 pmThere's a difference between Conan Doyle and Holmes, because Conan Doyle was a real person and Holmes is a fictional character.
If you understand the meaning of those words, then you understand the information about the state of affairs which I'm trying to convey, which I'm sure you do. Not just 'yea, vaguely', but just as specifically as the re-formulations you've offered.
And when I say Conan Doyle created stories about a fictional character called Sherlock Holmes, I'm confident you understand what I'm conveying. We have words like 'fictional' which perform the required function to convey a shared understanding of a state of affairs.

So my point is - what are you adding by re-phrasing that sentence using words like pseudo-created and unreal?
I understand that re-phrasing is associated with a particular type of Realism framing, but I don't think this adds anything of additional value, because the role of the framing itself simply seems to be a tool for categorisation, Or what exactly would Chalmers find of additional value?


Are you with me? So when we work our way through that, what we have is 'fictional' should be filed under Unreal using this particular 'internal' either/or categorisation system. That's it, right?
But by going through that process we bump into problems like needing to distinguish between different types of 'creating'. Which is in effect adding further divisions to our blunt either/or (Real/Unreal) categories by distinguishing 'pseudocreated' fictional characters! (Or Abstract Numbers, or whatever).
So you pop Holmes into this Real/Unreal formula, and it answers Unreal. But people can still think of fictional characters as having a role in the world, so we call them 'pseudocreated', the effect being to give us the information that... Holmes is a fictional character.
Ordinary fiction-talk outside "the philosophy room" turns out to be semantically (concerning meaning, reference, truth-conditions/-values) and ontologically (concerning being/existence/reality, the existential quantifier, ontological commitment) problematic as soon as we enter it.
I think there are no fictional persons or objects, but quite a few philosophers—those endorsing fictional realism—think otherwise.

"Most fictions speak of real places and times (like nineteenth-century London in many novels by Dickens), and often of real people as well (like Napoleon in War and Peace). Most fictions also contain purely fictional characters, ones which are entirely “made up” like Kilgore Trout; some fictions similarly contain purely fictional places, like the planet Tralfamadore, or purely fictional weapons, clothing, and beasts. How should we think about these made-up people, places, and things? Should we think of them all in the same way? Should we include ideal gases and spatial points of zero size in a homogeneous category with Kilgore and Tralfamadore? Fictional objects don’t occupy space in our world, so we can never encounter them or visit them. Should we say that they are things that don’t exist? Or that they are merely possible things? Or that they are existent but abstract (and so non-space-occupying) things? Or should we simply deny that there are any such things? The first three options, according to which there really are fictional characters but they are nonexistent, or merely possible, or abstract, correspond to three ways to be a realist about fictional characters; the fourth option (there are no such things) I count as irrealism on this question. The realisms are so called because they say that there really are such things as fictional objects and they belong to our reality, though the objects are “exotic”: they are nonexistent, or nonactual or nonconcrete, unlike ordinary objects, tables and mountains, which exist, are actual, and are concrete. The exotic nature of a realist’s objects is demanded by the agreed datum that we can never literally encounter purely fictional characters or places, not in the way we could encounter George W. Bush or Timbuktu; as Peter Strawson said, you can’t spill your coffee on them."

(Sainsbury, R. M. Fiction and Fictionalism. New York: Routledge, 2010. pp. 22-3)

Remark: The author subsumes Meinongianism (named after Alexius Meinong)—the view that "there really are fictional characters but they are nonexistent"—under fictional realism. Meinong famously distinguished between being and existence, such that in his view "There are fictional characters" is not synonymous with "Fictional characters exist". But I strongly reject the conceptual separation of being and existence (and also the distinction between "subsistence" and existence), and so I do regard "There are fictional characters" and "Fictional characters exist" as synonyms. I think fictional objects/persons don't exist, and in my view to say so is to say that there are no such things.

"If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. Existence is not some special distinction that befalls some of the things there are. Existence just means being one of the things there are, nothing else."

(Lewis, David. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. p. 80f.)
I don't feel this is engaging with my questions and critique, to simply introduce different ways of categorising, which is all I can see here.

The purpose of the categories ends up being so I can say fictional characters are real/unreal (which doesn't capture much information and is definition dependent so kinda circular), or another way of saying fictional. So I'm suggesting the philosophy room becomes problematic according to the way you choose to create your categories and definitions within it (your particular framing), rather than discovering anything intrinsically problematic with fictional characters which a certain type of framing elucidates.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Recommended reading:

FICTION: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fiction/
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 12:52 pmI don't feel this is engaging with my questions and critique, to simply introduce different ways of categorising, which is all I can see here.

The purpose of the categories ends up being so I can say fictional characters are real/unreal (which doesn't capture much information and is definition dependent so kinda circular), or another way of saying fictional. So I'm suggesting the philosophy room becomes problematic according to the way you choose to create your categories and definitions within it (your particular framing), rather than discovering anything intrinsically problematic with fictional characters which a certain type of framing elucidates.
Where do you stand in the philosophy room? Are you a fictional antirealist or a fictional realist?
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 12:59 pm
Gertie wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 12:52 pmI don't feel this is engaging with my questions and critique, to simply introduce different ways of categorising, which is all I can see here.

The purpose of the categories ends up being so I can say fictional characters are real/unreal (which doesn't capture much information and is definition dependent so kinda circular), or another way of saying fictional. So I'm suggesting the philosophy room becomes problematic according to the way you choose to create your categories and definitions within it (your particular framing), rather than discovering anything intrinsically problematic with fictional characters which a certain type of framing elucidates.
Where do you stand in the philosophy room? Are you a fictional antirealist or a fictional realist?
Depends on the criteria for 'real'

If the criterion is mind independent, then no I don't believe Holmes is real. Unless for example, mind is brain, in which case Holmes exists as patterns of neural connections.
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 12:54 pm Recommended reading:

FICTION: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fiction/
Thanks I'll have a look.
Post Reply

Return to “General Philosophy”

2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise
by John K Danenbarger
January 2023

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021