Are fictional characters real?

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Consul
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 1:04 pm
Consul wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 12:59 pm Where do you stand in the philosophy room? Are you a fictional antirealist or a fictional realist?
Depends on the criteria for 'real'
If the criterion is mind independent, then no I don't believe Holmes is real. Unless for example, mind is brain, in which case Holmes exists as patterns of neural connections.
I mean the thin definition of realness, according to which to be real is to exist. So I could use the label "fictional existentialism" instead. Do you believe that ficta such as Sherlock Holmes exist?

Holmes is an intentional object of thought, and if neuroreductionism about the mind is true, thoughts/thinkings are neural processes in the brain; but no Holmes-thought is called "Holmes". Holmes-thoughts, Holmes-concepts/-ideas exist in minds/brains, but Holmes himself doesn't. He doesn't exist at all and so he exists nowhere.

Of course, since all ficta are nothing but mere objects of thought, they are not real in the sense of being thought-independent.
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 1:19 pm
Gertie wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 1:04 pm Depends on the criteria for 'real'
If the criterion is mind independent, then no I don't believe Holmes is real. Unless for example, mind is brain, in which case Holmes exists as patterns of neural connections.
I mean the thin definition of realness, according to which to be real is to exist. So I could use the label "fictional existentialism" instead. Do you believe that ficta such as Sherlock Holmes exist?

Holmes is an intentional object of thought, and if neuroreductionism about the mind is true, thoughts/thinkings are neural processes in the brain; but no Holmes-thought is called "Holmes". Holmes-thoughts, Holmes-concepts/-ideas exist in minds/brains, but Holmes himself doesn't. He doesn't exist at all and so he exists nowhere.

Of course, since all ficta are nothing but mere objects of thought, they are not real in the sense of being thought-independent.
Again, my point is the answer depends on the criteria, in this case the criteria you use to categorise 'exist' . The answer depending on the criteria (we create) is a point I keep making and I don't think you've answered, hence it's an exercise in categorisation, rather than elucidation. If you're asking is Holmes a concrete entity located in the world, then no, he's not - because he's a fictional character!

The most elucidating answer to your question, imo, is that Holmes exists as mental experiences only.

Holmes is an intentional object of thought, and if neuroreductionism about the mind is true, thoughts/thinkings are neural processes in the brain; but no Holmes-thought is called "Holmes". Holmes-thoughts, Holmes-concepts/-ideas exist in minds/brains, but Holmes himself doesn't. He doesn't exist at all and so he exists nowhere.
If we discover mental experiences are identical to brain processes, then Holmes exists in the world as physical brain processes. And that would be a sound justification for creating a new framing of ontology, and new language to accompany it, because we'd discovered something new about the nature of reality. So we might call that fictional character 'neuro-Holmes', or somesuch, and 'neuro-Conan Doyle' would represent thoughts of Conan Doyle, but the pre-fix wouldn't in itself entail mind independence. And of course my thoughts-brain patterns and yours would be different, and change from moment to moment, so these terms would carry those implications.


And incidentally, identifying existing objects physically located in the world is itself a rather out-dated and problematic framing of what's real. Take a solid, square table, if that is actually an assemblage of tiny vibrating parts in space flashing in an out of existence (possibly dependent on being observed by a mind) - then it's neither solid nor square nor fixed in a location in space, and the notions of tables as such could be said to be mind-dependent (down to how we've evolved to experience our environment). But to talk of it as concretely existing in a fixed shape and place in space can be a very handy framing when you want to put your coffee mug down. And it's this utility, and that we've evolved to observe in a way which is useful rather than accurate/truthful/real, which underlies the way we naturally frame things.
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

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If I follow this right, or even if I don't, Consul seems to be aligned with the idea that in any given judgment of reals, abstractions, fictions, and all the rest of the, call them ontological terms, at a given occasion in which judgment is to be made, a decision turns on what is projected from (what Heidegger called) the preontological, a body of possibilities that find their application as circumstances arise. SInce these possibilities do not intrinsically privilege one interpretative mode over another, that is, since they include all kinds of designations as to what is real--fictions, abstractions, mathematical entities, virtual beings, essences, as well as sensory constructs that issue from empirical and cognitive sources, then talk about the real is not bound to any one. Such a binding can only occur through, I mean once the issue comes up, explicitly saying which applies.

In other words,assumptions about what real are just assumptions. And our everyday thinking that this couch, this cat in my lap are the foundation for what is really real are just a matter of privileging one possible construal of what is real over others. It may sound counterintuitive at first, but consider: that cat in my lap; do I really know what i am talking about when I say it exists? No, not really. It is an interpretation.
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Consul »

Gertie wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 2:14 pmAgain, my point is the answer depends on the criteria, in this case the criteria you use to categorise 'exist' . The answer depending on the criteria (we create) is a point I keep making and I don't think you've answered, hence it's an exercise in categorisation, rather than elucidation. If you're asking is Holmes a concrete entity located in the world, then no, he's not - because he's a fictional character! The most elucidating answer to your question, imo, is that Holmes exists as mental experiences only.
* Even if Sherlock Holmes existed as an abstract entity lacking a spatial location, he would exist in the same sense of "to exist" as Donald Trump, who is a concrete entity with a spatial location.

"I shall find no use for the narrow sense which some philosophers have given to 'existence', as against 'being'; viz., concreteness in space-time. If any such special connotation threatens in the present pages, imagine 'exists' replaced by 'is'. When the Parthenon and the number 7 are said to be, no distinction in the sense of 'be' need be intended. The Parthenon is indeed a placed and dated object in space-time while the number 7 (if such there be) is another sort of thing; but this a difference between the objects concerned and not between senses of 'be'."

(Quine, W. V. Methods of Logic. 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. p. 263)

* It doesn't make sense to say that "Holmes exists as mental experiences only." First of all, all (tokens) of experiences are concrete entities with a spatial location in animal nervous systems, which contradicts your above denial of Holmes' concreteness. What kind of experience do you think is Holmes: a sensation, an emotion, an imagination (thought)? Anyway, there are many different experiences in many different minds/brains, and Holmes as one thing cannot be identical to many different things.

* There is a crucial distinction between Sherlock Holmes (himself) and mental representations of him. No mental (or physical) Sherlock-Holmes-representation is called Sherlock Holmes. What exists as a mental representation (image, idea, thought) is one; and even if he existed, Sherlock Holmes wouldn't be a mental representation.

There is another crucial distinction between the content of thought/imagination and its (intentional) object. The (mind-internal) content of thoughts about Sherlock Holmes is constituted by mental representations of him, but the content isn't the (mind-external) object of thought. When I think about him, I use but don't think about mental representations of him. It's one thing to think about Sherlock Holmes and another to think about images or ideas of him.
Gertie wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 2:14 pmIf we discover mental experiences are identical to brain processes, then Holmes exists in the world as physical brain processes. And that would be a sound justification for creating a new framing of ontology, and new language to accompany it, because we'd discovered something new about the nature of reality. So we might call that fictional character 'neuro-Holmes', or somesuch, and 'neuro-Conan Doyle' would represent thoughts of Conan Doyle, but the pre-fix wouldn't in itself entail mind independence. And of course my thoughts-brain patterns and yours would be different, and change from moment to moment, so these terms would carry those implications.
Again, the point is that no name of a fictional character refers to a brain process, because no such name refers to a mental/neural representation of a fictional character. If Sherlock Holmes existed, he surely wouldn't "exist[.] in the world as physical brain processes." Anyway, which brain process in whose brain would Holmes be? As I already said, one thing cannot be identical to many different things.
Gertie wrote: December 22nd, 2017, 2:14 pmAnd incidentally, identifying existing objects physically located in the world is itself a rather out-dated and problematic framing of what's real. Take a solid, square table, if that is actually an assemblage of tiny vibrating parts in space flashing in an out of existence (possibly dependent on being observed by a mind) - then it's neither solid nor square nor fixed in a location in space, and the notions of tables as such could be said to be mind-dependent (down to how we've evolved to experience our environment). But to talk of it as concretely existing in a fixed shape and place in space can be a very handy framing when you want to put your coffee mug down. And it's this utility, and that we've evolved to observe in a way which is useful rather than accurate/truthful/real, which underlies the way we naturally frame things.
Yes, there is a difference between the manifest image of ordinary material objects such as tables and the scientific image of them. They are all fundamentally composed of elementary particles, and quantum physics teaches us that these do not have precise spatial locations. In contemporary physics, the ontology of particles, their spatial extension and location has become a tricky issue, especially as the ontology of quantum physics is generally a very tricky and highly contentious issue. That said, the concept of location or space-occupation still makes sense. Since this is off-topic here, I'll leave it at that.
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Gertie wrote: ↑Yesterday, 2:14 pm
Again, my point is the answer depends on the criteria, in this case the criteria you use to categorise 'exist' . The answer depending on the criteria (we create) is a point I keep making and I don't think you've answered, hence it's an exercise in categorisation, rather than elucidation. If you're asking is Holmes a concrete entity located in the world, then no, he's not - because he's a fictional character! The most elucidating answer to your question, imo, is that Holmes exists as mental experiences only.
* Even if Sherlock Holmes existed as an abstract entity lacking a spatial location, he would exist in the same sense of "to exist" as Donald Trump, who is a concrete entity with a spatial location.
OK, give me your preferred definition/criteria for 'exist', and I'll try to file Holmes appropriately under said definition - because as I keep saying, that's all I see going on here. Something you've repeatedly avoided responding to.
* It doesn't make sense to say that "Holmes exists as mental experiences only." First of all, all (tokens) of experiences are concrete entities with a spatial location in animal nervous systems, which contradicts your above denial of Holmes' concreteness.
Well that's one theory of consciousness, Identity Theory, which as you know I address later, when I say this answer applies unless mental experience and brain processes are the exact same thing. In other words, I addressed this point.
What kind of experience do you think is Holmes: a sensation, an emotion, an imagination (thought)? Anyway, there are many different experiences in many different minds/brains, and Holmes as one thing cannot be identical to many different things.
Right, Holmes can be all kinds of mental experiences, in different minds, or the same mind at different times, a point I make myself. If it doesn't happen to fit the labels on your chosen box, that doesn't change the fact of the matter, it just means your categories don't fully capture the actual state of affairs. Problematic for the 'philospher room' , right? But only if you prioritise your categorisation system over elucidation - which is again a point I keep making.
There is another crucial distinction between the content of thought/imagination and its (intentional) object. The (mind-internal) content of thoughts about Sherlock Holmes is constituted by mental representations of him, but the content isn't the (mind-external) object of thought. When I think about him, I use but don't think about mental representations of him. It's one thing to think about Sherlock Holmes and another to think about images or ideas of him.
We could discuss the finer points of these ideas, but my point is categorising as Real/Unreal, A or B, is an inappropriately blunt instrument for doing so. So to prioritise the categorising does a disservice to the complexity of the actual state of affairs. And a significant aspect of the state of affairs here, philosophy of mind, is not settled. Tho it is much more interesting and significant.
Gertie wrote: ↑Yesterday, 7:14 pm
If we discover mental experiences are identical to brain processes, then Holmes exists in the world as physical brain processes. And that would be a sound justification for creating a new framing of ontology, and new language to accompany it, because we'd discovered something new about the nature of reality. So we might call that fictional character 'neuro-Holmes', or somesuch, and 'neuro-Conan Doyle' would represent thoughts of Conan Doyle, but the pre-fix wouldn't in itself entail mind independence. And of course my thoughts-brain patterns and yours would be different, and change from moment to moment, so these terms would carry those implications.
Again, the point is that no name of a fictional character refers to a brain process, because no such name refers to a mental/neural representation of a fictional character. If Sherlock Holmes existed, he surely wouldn't "exist[.] in the world as physical brain processes." Anyway, which brain process in whose brain would Holmes be? As I already said, one thing cannot be identical to many different things.

As the quote you're replying to says, if we settled that mental experience is the exact same thing as brain processes (patterns of neurons exchanging chemicals and so on), then it strikes me that having learned something new about the nature of the relationship between the physical and mental, we might want to amend our ontological discourse to reflect that. Rather than see how we could jam the new square peg into one of the two old round holes. And, as I said, it would be sensible to reflect the actual state of affairs, rather than cling to the old framing, so the new framing would hopefully reflect the fact that mental experience about a subject happens in different ways in different people, and the same people from moment to moment. Whether it's an apple you and I look at, or thinking about Holmes, that's the nature of mental experience. And that's how people mentally experience Sherlock Holmes.
Gertie wrote: ↑Yesterday, 7:14 pm
And incidentally, identifying existing objects physically located in the world is itself a rather out-dated and problematic framing of what's real. Take a solid, square table, if that is actually an assemblage of tiny vibrating parts in space flashing in an out of existence (possibly dependent on being observed by a mind) - then it's neither solid nor square nor fixed in a location in space, and the notions of tables as such could be said to be mind-dependent (down to how we've evolved to experience our environment). But to talk of it as concretely existing in a fixed shape and place in space can be a very handy framing when you want to put your coffee mug down. And it's this utility, and that we've evolved to observe in a way which is useful rather than accurate/truthful/real, which underlies the way we naturally frame things.
Yes, there is a difference between the manifest image of ordinary material objects such as tables and the scientific image of them. They are all fundamentally composed of elementary particles, and quantum physics teaches us that these do not have precise spatial locations. In contemporary physics, the ontology of particles, their spatial extension and location has become a tricky issue, especially as the ontology of quantum physics is generally a very tricky and highly contentious issue. That said, the concept of location or space-occupation still makes sense. Since this is off-topic here, I'll leave it at that.
Right, but you brought up the example of a square table as something real which exists, in the philosophy room, based on these types of qualities, and made the point that outside the philosophy room things are problematic - inferring that we need to use such criteria to establish unproblematic definitions of 'real' and 'exist'. I'm pointing out these sort of criteria can also be problematic.
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

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Gertie wrote: December 23rd, 2017, 7:13 pm
Consul wrote:* Even if Sherlock Holmes existed as an abstract entity lacking a spatial location, he would exist in the same sense of "to exist" as Donald Trump, who is a concrete entity with a spatial location.
OK, give me your preferred definition/criteria for 'exist', and I'll try to file Holmes appropriately under said definition - because as I keep saying, that's all I see going on here. Something you've repeatedly avoided responding to.


There is a distinction between a semantic definition and epistemic criteria."What does it mean to say that x exists/Xs exist?" is one question and "How can we find out/know whether x exists/Xs exist" is another question.

I'm afraid I cannot give you any definition of "exist", because…

"The concept of existence is probably basic and primitive in the sense that it is not possible to produce an informative definition of it in terms that are more clearly understood and that would tell us something important and revealing about what it is for something to exist."

(Kim, Jaegwon, and Ernest Sosa, eds. Metaphysics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. p. 3)
Gertie wrote: December 23rd, 2017, 7:13 pm
Consul wrote:* It doesn't make sense to say that "Holmes exists as mental experiences only." First of all, all (tokens) of experiences are concrete entities with a spatial location in animal nervous systems, which contradicts your above denial of Holmes' concreteness.
Well that's one theory of consciousness, Identity Theory, which as you know I address later, when I say this answer applies unless mental experience and brain processes are the exact same thing. In other words, I addressed this point.
Even if mental entities are different from physical entities, the name "Sherlock Holmes" refers to a (fictional) physical person and not to some mental entity.
Gertie wrote: December 23rd, 2017, 7:13 pm
Consul wrote:What kind of experience do you think is Holmes: a sensation, an emotion, an imagination (thought)? Anyway, there are many different experiences in many different minds/brains, and Holmes as one thing cannot be identical to many different things.
Right, Holmes can be all kinds of mental experiences, in different minds, or the same mind at different times, a point I make myself. If it doesn't happen to fit the labels on your chosen box, that doesn't change the fact of the matter, it just means your categories don't fully capture the actual state of affairs. Problematic for the 'philospher room' , right? But only if you prioritise your categorisation system over elucidation - which is again a point I keep making.
I was talking about (unrepeatable) tokens of experiential/mental states, while you're talking about kinds (types) of experiential/mental states. Anyway, the name "Sherlock Holmes" refers neither to tokens nor to types of experiential/mental states.
Gertie wrote: December 23rd, 2017, 7:13 pm
Consul wrote:There is another crucial distinction between the content of thought/imagination and its (intentional) object. The (mind-internal) content of thoughts about Sherlock Holmes is constituted by mental representations of him, but the content isn't the (mind-external) object of thought. When I think about him, I use but don't think about mental representations of him. It's one thing to think about Sherlock Holmes and another to think about images or ideas of him.
We could discuss the finer points of these ideas, but my point is categorising as Real/Unreal, A or B, is an inappropriately blunt instrument for doing so. So to prioritise the categorising does a disservice to the complexity of the actual state of affairs. And a significant aspect of the state of affairs here, philosophy of mind, is not settled. Tho it is much more interesting and significant.
The basic issue to be settled is whether or not fictional objects or persons exist; and the question of their existence is not to be confused with the question of the existence of tokens or types of representations of them.

My contention is that ficta are non-entia. They do not exist, they are not part of Being. And since reality entails existence, nonexistent objects (of thought) are nonreal too.

There are philosophers who have drawn a distinction between "real existence" and "ideal existence", but the concept of ideality oscillates between a psychological meaning, which construes ideal entities as concrete mental ones, and a platonistic meaning, which construes them as abstract, nonmental and nonphysical entities.

Statements such as "A fictional person exists only as an idea in the mind" are ontologically misleading, since what really exists in the mind is the idea of the fictional person rather than the fictional person herself, who exists nowhere, not existing at all. And her name is not the name of my/our idea (individual concept) of her. The name of my/our concept of Cinderella isn't "Cinderella" but "my/our Cinderella-concept"; and attributes such as being a young girl that are ascribed to her in the fiction certainly aren't ascribed to the Cinderella-concept. No concept or idea is a young girl.
Gertie wrote: December 23rd, 2017, 7:13 pm…Whether it's an apple you and I look at, or thinking about Holmes, that's the nature of mental experience. And that's how people mentally experience Sherlock Holmes.
Nobody can (perceptually) experience, perceive Sherlock Holmes, since ficta as mere intentional objects of thought or imagination are imperceptible in principle. They are conceivable and imaginable, but not perceptible. What are perceptible are material representations (texts or pictures) of ficta.
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

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Consul wrote:Statements such as "A fictional person exists only as an idea in the mind" are ontologically misleading, since what really exists in the mind is the idea of the fictional person rather than the fictional person herself, who exists nowhere, not existing at all. And her name is not the name of my/our idea (individual concept) of her. The name of my/our concept of Cinderella isn't "Cinderella" but "my/our Cinderella-concept"; and attributes such as being a young girl that are ascribed to her in the fiction certainly aren't ascribed to the Cinderella-concept. No concept or idea is a young girl.
It's true that each person will conjure a different image of Holmes but, then again, they conjure different images of everything. One could say there are two Holmeses - one created by Doyle, and what is effectively a gestalt entity based on the original conception that appears in others' minds. The latter will still have essential Holmes qualities such as gender, occupation, time period, perhaps a pipe or a violin. One cannot think of Sherlock Holmes as a woman, a politician or a mediaeval burgher.

If Holmes is not at all real, then what are people's minds, including Arthur Conan Doyle's, actually doing when they think about Sherlock Holmes? Thinking about the non existent seems to bring them into being in the mental world, which of course is the first step leading from nothingness to physical being (although only a small proportion of fictions never achieve that).
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

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Greta wrote: December 25th, 2017, 5:32 pmIt's true that each person will conjure a different image of Holmes but, then again, they conjure different images of everything. One could say there are two Holmeses - one created by Doyle, and what is effectively a gestalt entity based on the original conception that appears in others' minds. The latter will still have essential Holmes qualities such as gender, occupation, time period, perhaps a pipe or a violin. One cannot think of Sherlock Holmes as a woman, a politician or a mediaeval burgher.
Sherlock Holmes is a public object of collective intentionality, which means that there is such a thing as our or the individual concept of him. As opposed to a general concept, an individual one is essentially such that it applies to one individual object or person only (no matter whether or not it/(s)he is fictional). An individual concept of something/somebody x is associated with a definite description of the form "the thing named x with the properties Y1,…Yn". There are some features which we consider as essential to or constitutive of our concept of Holmes such as being an Englishman, being a detective. So there is such a thing as a socioculturally shared core concept of Holmes, whose content excludes features such as being a woman and being a politician. Of course, you can think of or imagine a female politician and call her "Sherlock Holmes", but then we would have to differentiate between the fictional person Sherlock Holmes1 and the fictional person Sherlock Holmes2.

But beyond our common core concept of Holmes (as originally determined by Doyle and his stories), there is in- or underdetermination as to what further properties he has or hasn't, because he isn't represented in the Holmes stories in such ways that it is determinate or inferrable therefrom whether or not he has the properties in question. Fictional objects are "incomplete(ly determined) objects" (to use Meinong's term), because our cultural concepts of them (as based on the respective original fictional literature) specify only a set of core features or essential properties, beyond which variations e.g. of our image of Holmes are possible.

I said fictional objects are nonexistent objects, and an interesting and relevant question is whether they are still self-identical. But in the case of ficta, being is (nothing more than) being represented, so the (self-)identity of Holmes can consist in nothing more than the (self-identity) of our cultural (core) concept of him. All people using the same cultural (core) concept of Holmes think about the same fictional person.
Greta wrote: December 25th, 2017, 5:32 pmIf Holmes is not at all real, then what are people's minds, including Arthur Conan Doyle's, actually doing when they think about Sherlock Holmes? Thinking about the non existent seems to bring them into being in the mental world, which of course is the first step leading from nothingness to physical being (although only a small proportion of fictions never achieve that).
When we're talking about genuine, real relations, the following is generally true:

If x and y stand in the relation R to one another, then both x and y exist.

So, so-called intentional relations such as thinking about or imagining something are but pseudorelations in case the object of thought or imagination does not exist. Is that a big problem? Not, it's not, because it's an indisputable psychological fact that we can and do think about and imagine nonexistent things. One could say that thought about the nonexistent is objectless, but this wrongly sounds as if thinking about something nonexistent were the same as thinking about nothing, which means not thinking at all. (Of course, to think about nothingness is to think.).

Thoughts about nonexistent objects lack a real object, but they have a real content consisting of verbal/sentential or pictorial representations. For example, to imagine a winged horse is to have an image of one in one's mind; but note that to imagine a winged horse is not to imagine an image of one! That is, the (existent) winged-horse-image is not the intentional object but the representational content of the act of imagination.
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Gertie »

Consul

Apologies for being MIA. I think we'd reached a point where we're going round in circles anyway, but if there's anything you'd like me to address, I'll have a go
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Re: Are fictional characters real?

Post by Burning ghost »

You'll find all you need to know about "fictional figures" by studying Jung and the Occult. Basically we're dealing with what Jung called the "Collective Unconscious" and its "archetypes."
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by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021