But the answer you're looking for is not to be found in a post. And Husserl was a mystic. Just examine his phenomenological reduction and what he says about it.You've managed to convince yourself he is a mystic. So what?
You've also failed to present ONE quote from Heidegger on your own terms that backs up his "definition" of "dasein." I have not seen a single person able to give a coherent definition of "dasein" that refers directly to his own words - If you possess a library of Heidegger then please show his words prior to the use of the concept "dasein" and his first initial writings using the term "dasein". I have presented the VERY first instance (as far as I know) of him mentioning "dasein."
Anyway move the conversation here: http://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/ ... in#p292327
I am not interested in dragging Husserl, Kant, Descartes or any other person into the discussion. I want one thing; I want a solid and succinct definition of "dasein" that is not based on subjective opinion, but which is backed up by Heidegger's actual words as they were written by him.
A Question of Truth?
- Hereandnow
- Posts: 2839
- Joined: July 11th, 2012, 9:16 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: the moon and the stars
Re: A Question of Truth?
- Burning ghost
- Posts: 3065
- Joined: February 27th, 2016, 3:10 am
Re: A Question of Truth?
What are you talking about now? I am looking for a reply that refers to and provides quotes from Heidegger.
I'm not taking the bait about Husserl. I've been clear enough that my questioning for now is directly at the concept of "dasein". Take up or ignore it. You ignored/forgot about it the first time I asked nearly a year ago.
If you don't wish to share your professed knowledge of Heidegger you'll only arouse suspicion in anyone reading this thread.
The link is there, go for it ... or don't.
-
- Posts: 3601
- Joined: February 28th, 2014, 4:50 pm
Re: A Question of Truth?
I am not sure what you mean by this. Heidegger did think that there are a priori transcendental conditions of experience that shape and structure it. He did not, however, think of this as a fixed structure, but rather as hermeneutic and historically determined.… with no transcendental ego to insert into it …
I am not sure whether you are using world and Being interchangeably. I agree that the focus of Being and Time was the disclosure of Being vai Dasein, but with “the turn” he abandoned the term Dasein, turning from our mode of being to Being itself, which he formulates at one point as the giving of being (es gibt, which can also mean it exists and there is).What troubles me is that the disclosure of the world cannot be about anything but dasein about more dasein.
Burning ghost:
Consciousness does not address the ways in which dasein is in the world. Being in the world is not simply being conscious. Consciousness does not ask the question of Being. Being is not an object of consciousness and so it would be misleading to think of Dasein as consciousness of Being. Dasein’s way of being must be understood in the context of “thrownness”, of being in history and culture, of being historically and culturally conditioned. The analysis of Dasein is existential.I would ask, why not just say "consciousness" instead of "dasein"?
I don’t think it is what Heidegger does. Being is not an intentional object of consciousness.The objects of consciousness are things that are, that is, beings. Being, however, is not something that is. He distinguishes between objects in the world that are “ready to hand” and those that are “present at hand”. With the ready to hand there is no subject-object duality. The hammerer, the hammer, the nails, and the wood form an awareness within the activity of hammering. In other words, it is not a matter of a subject being conscious of an independently existing object but of a consciousness determined by the activity of hammering. Our conscious experience of a hammer would be quite different if we knew nothing of hammering. The hammer is not adequately understood as intentional, that is, an an object present to consciousness, we must see it in terms of involvement - as that for the sake of which it is a hammer, that is, hammering, which in term is for the sake of building or fixing something, which in turn is for the sake of shelter, etc. What is primary is the situatedness of our existence, which shapes our consciousness.It is easy enough to regard consciousness as being, because we consciously do this anyway.
Man’s mode of being is not simply a matter of objects present to consciousness, but rather of our constituting objects in terms of human activity. Our encounter with and in the world is an encounter with a world that is already of our making, which in not the same as of my making. Thus, “being - with” is an essential mode of Dasein’s being. Our world is a shared world. Consciousness of ‘X’ is of what is given to me by us, that is, via our involvement in the world shaped by our historical context and activities.
- Hereandnow
- Posts: 2839
- Joined: July 11th, 2012, 9:16 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: the moon and the stars
Re: A Question of Truth?
In a discussion of the self:Fooloso4
I am not sure what you mean by this. Heidegger did think that there are a priori transcendental conditions of experience that shape and structure it. He did not, however, think of this as a fixed structure, but rather as hermeneutic and historically determined.
As something selfsame in the manifold otherness, it has the character of self. Even if one rejects "soul substance" and the thinghood of consciousness, or denies that a person is an object , ontologically one is still positing something whose Being retains the meaning of present at hand....... Yet, presence at hand is the kind of Being which belongs to entities whose character is not that of Dasein
So the "a priori transcendental conditions of experience that "shape and structure" experience you mention in their apriority are never acknowledged in the Kantian sense as if they were some kind of foundation of human knowledge. They, the intuitions, are not understood at all as presence, only as ready to hand. Thus, this is as rejection of Husserl's absolute grounding of knowledge in the egoic center. Husserl means this center to be a direct intimation of Being in the world that is intuited and incorrigible. Kant meant the same in his transcendental Aesthetic about space and time. Heidegger rejects all of this.
Soul substance is Descartes', Kant's, and Husserl's (et al). Now, something whose being retains the meaning of present at hand, that requires scrutiny: is he saying there is presence at hand on subjective end, behind "mineness" that is acknowledged as present at hand, like spatial "apriority". It sounds like it,as he moves quickly to disavow its presence at hand. It is a Being that is not dasein, and hence only understood as ready to hand.
And as to the rejection of all "intuited" apriority, See Spaciality and the Ready to hand in the World (p 103 in the original): "A three dimensional multiplicity of possible positions which gets filled up with Things present at hand is never proximally given. This dimensionality of space is still veiled in the spatiality of ready to hand." Where Kant had the apriority of space as a working presence in the understanding, Heidegger denies this, and all attempts of this kind. "The above is what is on the ceiling, the behind is what is at the door." Apriority is acknowledged as a given/presence, but it is not understood at all as presence. It is being outside of dasein.
Granted, the apriority of space is a presence at hand, but this is not part of dasein's structure. Dasein's structure is in ready to hand, which is, re. space: over there, under the bad; re. time: the day before yesterday, in a minute; and so on. Those "insistances from logic and intuitions" are as presences, entirely beyond what dasein can say meaningfully. This why I call them transcendental.
- Hereandnow
- Posts: 2839
- Joined: July 11th, 2012, 9:16 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: the moon and the stars
Re: A Question of Truth?
But he says he never abandoned B&T. I'll look, though.I am not sure whether you are using world and Being interchangeably. I agree that the focus of Being and Time was the disclosure of Being vai Dasein, but with “the turn” he abandoned the term Dasein, turning from our mode of being to Being itself, which he formulates at one point as the giving of being (es gibt, which can also mean it exists and there is).
- Burning ghost
- Posts: 3065
- Joined: February 27th, 2016, 3:10 am
Re: A Question of Truth?
http://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/ ... 49#p304749
Fool -
I was trying to squeeze and explanation out of hereandnow with quotes direct from the text. Mostly there has been little more than evasion. Please chime in on the other thread ABOVE. I'm not posting here any more.
2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month
Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023
Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023