Causation in subjective distinctions

[Frost]

PS: You realise, I expect, that not all natural/physical processes we observe are part of a chain of determinate, point-to-point (Newtonian) mechanistic type cause and effect relationships. When a radioactive element like (210 ) Polonium, say, decays by emitting alpha particles, the emission of alpha particles from the radioactive Polonium nucleus is a totally random -( totally/purely indeterminate) - process. That we are currently unable explain this basic phenomenon scientifically is a humble fact which, nevertheless, demands strictly speaking) that we must scrap our entire current body of physical theory immediately and go back to the "drawing board" to re-start "Physics" again from scratch (!)

Regards

Dachshund

I would press this issue further. The Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical is taken as axiomatic, yet orthodox quantum formalism is NOT causally closed! It is an explicit, mathematical model of psycho-physical interaction. In philosophy when people ask how mind and matter could possibly interact, one just needs to point to the orthodox quantum formalism.

[Steve3007]

The Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical is taken as axiomatic, yet orthodox quantum formalism is NOT causally closed! It is an explicit, mathematical model of psycho-physical interaction. In philosophy when people ask how mind and matter could possibly interact, one just needs to point to the orthodox quantum formalism.

When you refer to a "psycho-physical interaction" I assume you mean an interaction between a sentient being - a person - and a non-sentient object. i.e. people doing and seeing stuff. You said this in relation to Dachshund's example of radioactive decay, which is an example of a random event whose characteristics are very precisely described (statistically) by the laws of quantum mechanics and fit into the standard model of particle physics. Are you saying that all such events are psycho-physical interactions? Isn't it just the point where a human being makes an observation which deserves this title?

I do not think that in the ontologically subjective mode of existence there are antecedent causally sufficient conditions.

You appear to be saying that subjects, i.e. human beings (and presumably other sentient beings) are "first causes". If so, why? The concept of causality/causation is a model that we have created to describe the correlation of various events with each other, is it not? So what is there in the behaviour of human beings which leads you to suggest that this model cannot describe our actions? Is it simply that human beings do things which are difficult to predict? How do you know that this lack of predictability is not simply due to extreme complexity? Clearly human beings' behaviour is predictable to at least some extent. Why not, in principle, to an arbitrarily great extent?

If this applies to human beings, does it apply to other animals? If so, at what point in the scale of complexity in the living world from human beings down to, say, viruses do we decide that we are no longer dealing with a "first cause" but are dealing with something that has antecedent causes? In your view, is there a hard dividing line? It seems to me that there cannot be such a thing. We cannot clearly and unambiguously divide sentient beings (or whatever you want to call us) from non-sentient objects. There is a quasi-continuous spectrum from one extreme of complexity to the other.

[Frost]

When you refer to a "psycho-physical interaction" I assume you mean an interaction between a sentient being - a person - and a non-sentient object. i.e. people doing and seeing stuff. You said this in relation to Dachshund's example of radioactive decay, which is an example of a random event whose characteristics are very precisely described (statistically) by the laws of quantum mechanics and fit into the standard model of particle physics. Are you saying that all such events are psycho-physical interactions? Isn't it just the point where a human being makes an observation which deserves this title?

In the case of radioactive decay there still must be an experimental setup of some sort. The quantum Zeno effect is a good example of how this can enter into the physical dynamics of radioactive decay. Another example would be in entangled photons where the axis of spin is determined by the experimenter. Any experiment will have an impact. Even acting in the world essentially has this effect. Process 3, or the choice on the part of nature, seems, in a way, to be an a-causal occurrence.

You appear to be saying that subjects, i.e. human beings (and presumably other sentient beings) are "first causes". If so, why? The concept of causality/causation is a model that we have created to describe the correlation of various events with each other, is it not? So what is there in the behaviour of human beings which leads you to suggest that this model cannot describe our actions? Is it simply that human beings do things which are difficult to predict? How do you know that this lack of predictability is not simply due to extreme complexity? Clearly human beings' behaviour is predictable to at least some extent. Why not, in principle, to an arbitrarily great extent?

No, I do not think conscious organisms are first causes. I think the arising of experiential states is a-causal and that causation is an emergent phenomenon. More precisely, causation is an emergent real pattern of quantum information transactions which has a spatiotemporal maximum. It is process 3 which permits causation to occur, but process 3 is not a causal process, so there are no first causes. The conception of causation you mentioned sounds Humean, and I think Hume was so far off on causation but unfortunately he still has wide influence. Conscious organisms are agents and can act. Their thoughts and reasons contribute to action, and action causes effects in the world, but thoughts and reasons do not cause action. It must be either willed through subconscious action or willed freely through conscious action requiring additional attention and effort. You can create models of prediction for man, but it must be understood that it can only be case probability, not class probability like in quantum theory. They will be unpredictable because the nature of the psycho-physical interaction in which an intrinsic information structure is interacting with the physical. It is not merely two physical systems that are just really complex, since qualitativeness enters into the dynamics.

If this applies to human beings, does it apply to other animals? If so, at what point in the scale of complexity in the living world from human beings down to, say, viruses do we decide that we are no longer dealing with a "first cause" but are dealing with something that has antecedent causes? In your view, is there a hard dividing line? It seems to me that there cannot be such a thing. We cannot clearly and unambiguously divide sentient beings (or whatever you want to call us) from non-sentient objects. There is a quasi-continuous spectrum from one extreme of complexity to the other.

All life has experiential states but the dividing line for the emergence of action is the emergence of consciousness. There are specific neurophysiological elements of consciousness which permit the emergence of knowledge and action in the proper sense. A bacterium has an experiential feeling state, but it reacts in a more mechanistic way to that state, while in conscious organisms the ability to act emerges, which is purposeful movement to reduce felt uneasiness (code for homeostasis). Free will exists on a spectrum, but is a phenomenon of consciousness.

[Maxcady10001]

thoughts and reasons do not cause action. It must be either willed through subconscious action or willed freely through conscious action requiring additional attention and effort

If thoughts and reason do not cause action, I do not know how you can say an action is willed freely through conscious action with additional attention and effort. This does not make sense because consciously, there are only thoughts, so if these thoughts are not causes, why would you say conscious action is a cause? Also, it does not make sense for you to say willed freely through conscious action, because all action is unconscious, thoughts form unconsciously, the signals that move body parts are sent unconsciously, just because you have a conscious thought, does not make the thought a sufficient cause for action, even with additional "attention".

[Frost]

If thoughts and reason do not cause action, I do not know how you can say an action is willed freely through conscious action with additional attention and effort. This does not make sense because consciously, there are only thoughts, so if these thoughts are not causes, why would you say conscious action is a cause?

Agents must act through attention and effort and that act functions causally.

Also, it does not make sense for you to say willed freely through conscious action, because all action is unconscious, thoughts form unconsciously, the signals that move body parts are sent unconsciously, just because you have a conscious thought, does not make the thought a sufficient cause for action, even with additional "attention".

We need to clarify the term "unconscious" here. The only unconscious action is in automisms that result from brain disorders or sleep walking. Action can be subconscious, but clearly not all action is subconscious. Thoughts certainly form as unconscious cognition, but most can only be expressed through consciousness subconsciously. It is conscious attention which can direct the organism to certain action, which may very well be against the impulses of subconscious influence. It can either bias the action in the desired direction or even create entirely novel action as a result of the function of imagination.

[Maxcady10001]

Agents must act through attention and effort and that act functions causally.

This is a definition of will, but certainly it does not imply that the will is free, as how much attention and effort is being paid to anything, is the result of stimulus, whether that be physiological or external, by our thoughts alone we do not pay more attention to anything, nor do we choose what to pay attention to.

It is conscious attention which can direct the organism to certain action, which may very well be against the impulses of subconscious influence.

Conscious attention does not direct the organism, as that implies what you are conscious of directs your attention, which is false, as it is only stimulus that directs attention. Consider what it means to "pay attention", to do that means to be conscious of whatever it is you are "paying attention" to. Are we able to direct what we are conscious of or "pay attention" to? No. What we are conscious of does not at all act against impulses, as that implies control over desires, which is not within our capability, it is only other, stronger desires that win out over impulses, not "conscious attention,"which is redundant. What we are conscious of is only the result of stimulus.

[Frost]

This is a definition of will, but certainly it does not imply that the will is free, as how much attention and effort is being paid to anything, is the result of stimulus, whether that be physiological or external, by our thoughts alone we do not pay more attention to anything, nor do we choose what to pay attention to.

The physical world is not causally closed. That gap is filled through action by the organism. Attention and effort can be increased due to thought. In other words, one can imagine of what may occur if one does not try harder, which creates a feeling state in the organism which prompts that attention and effort necessary to perform the action.

Conscious attention does not direct the organism, as that implies what you are conscious of directs your attention, which is false, as it is only stimulus that directs attention. Consider what it means to "pay attention", to do that means to be conscious of whatever it is you are "paying attention" to. Are we able to direct what we are conscious of or "pay attention" to? No. What we are conscious of does not at all act against impulses, as that implies control over desires, which is not within our capability, it is only other, stronger desires that win out over impulses, not "conscious attention,"which is redundant. What we are conscious of is only the result of stimulus.

When you say "Are we able to direct what we are conscious of or "pay attention" to? No." I am really at a loss because this seems rather obvious that we can from every day experience as well as research. To claim that we have no capability to control desires is just nonsense. Reasons can be the ground for a desire which motivates action, and people override their desires all the time due to reasons.

[Maxcady10001]

That gap is filled through action by the organism. Attention and effort can be increased due to thought. In other words, one can imagine of what may occur if one does not try harder, which creates a feeling state in the organism which prompts that attention and effort necessary to perform the action.

Attention and effort are not increased due to thought, as the imagining thought is not what is creating the feeling state, the thought is only the thought, it is the result of the feeling state, the thought is an effect, formed after one has the feeling. The thought is only the result of stimulus.

When you say "Are we able to direct what we are conscious of or "pay attention" to? No." I am really at a loss because this seems rather obvious that we can from every day experience as well as research. To claim that we have no capability to control desires is just nonsense. Reasons can be the ground for a desire which motivates action, and people override their desires all the time due to reasons.

How is it that we control our desires? Is it our thoughts that do this? I do not know thoughts to behave in this capacity, as they are only an effect, and not the cause of any action. Because the thought occurs that I should not throw a brick, does not mean I did not act out the impulse because of the thought. The impulsive thought to throw the brick, occurred because the brick was in my hand and I'd seen a million bricks thrown on t.v., or choose whatever stimulus you want, but the impulse to throw it occurred because of some stimulus. Then the brick was not thrown because of the felt anxiety over throwing a brick, again, choose whatever stimulus you believe to be the cause, but I certainly did not "control my desire," instead greater feeling won out, and I did not throw the brick because the anxiety of throwing the brick was greater than my impulse to throw it.

[Frost]

Attention and effort are not increased due to thought, as the imagining thought is not what is creating the feeling state, the thought is only the thought, it is the result of the feeling state, the thought is an effect, formed after one has the feeling. The thought is only the result of stimulus.

You're assuming causal closure of the physical, which is untenable. There is not an endless chain of causation; action must occur which can be motivated from thought alone.

How is it that we control our desires? Is it our thoughts that do this? I do not know thoughts to behave in this capacity, as they are only an effect, and not the cause of any action. Because the thought occurs that I should not throw a brick, does not mean I did not act out the impulse because of the thought. The impulsive thought to throw the brick, occurred because the brick was in my hand and I'd seen a million bricks thrown on t.v., or choose whatever stimulus you want, but the impulse to throw it occurred because of some stimulus. Then the brick was not thrown because of the felt anxiety over throwing a brick, again, choose whatever stimulus you believe to be the cause, but I certainly did not "control my desire," instead greater feeling won out, and I did not throw the brick because the anxiety of throwing the brick was greater than my impulse to throw it.

I should have posted this before to support the claims:

Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?
Choice, active response, self-regulation, and other volition may all draw on a common inner resource. In Experiment 1, people who forced themselves to eat radishes instead of tempting chocolates subsequently quit faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who had not had to exert self-control over eating. In Experiment 2, making a meaningful personal choice to perform attitude-relevant behavior caused a similar decrement in persistence. In Experiment 3, suppressing emotion led to a subsequent drop in performance of solvable anagrams. In Experiment 4, an initial task requiring high self-regulation made people more passive (i.e., more prone to favor the passive-response option). These results suggest that the self's capacity for active volition is limited and that a range of seemingly different, unrelated acts share a common resource.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/files/a ... al1998.pdf

F. Baumeister, Roy & Bratslavsky, Ellen & Muraven, Mark & M. Tice, Dianne. (1998). Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?. Journal of personality and social psychology. 74. 1252-65. 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252.

Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior?

Everyday intuitions suggest full conscious control of behavior, but evidence of unconscious causation and automaticity has sustained the contrary view that conscious thought has little or no impact on behavior. We review studies with random assignment to experimental manipulations of conscious thought and behavioral dependent measures. Topics include mental practice and simulation, anticipation, planning, reflection and rehearsal, reasoning, counterproductive effects, perspective taking, self-affirmation, framing, communication, and overriding automatic responses. The evidence for conscious causation of behavior is profound, extensive, adaptive, multifaceted, and empirically strong. However, conscious causation is often indirect and delayed, and it depends on interplay with unconscious processes. Consciousness seems especially useful for enabling behavior to be shaped by nonpresent factors and by social and cultural information, as well as for dealing with multiple competing options or impulses. It is plausible that almost every human behavior comes from a mixture of conscious and unconscious processing.

http://www.columbia.edu/~lbh3/Baumeister%202011.pdf

F Baumeister, Roy & Masicampo, E.J. & Vohs, Kathleen. (2011). Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior?. Annual review of psychology. 62. 331-61. 10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.131126.

The exact physical dynamics get more complicated since it requires a theory of consciousness. I can indulge if you would like, but there is a psycho-physical dynamics which is necessary for the action of the organism and is not determined entirely by the physical equations. There is no causal closure of the physical in contemporary physics, and the locus of that gap is found in conscious experience which is bridged through action.

[Maxcady10001]

Choice, active response, self-regulation, and other volition may all draw on a common inner resource. In Experiment 1, people who forced themselves to eat radishes instead of tempting chocolates subsequently quit faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who had not had to exert self-control over eating. In Experiment 2, making a meaningful personal choice to perform attitude-relevant behavior caused a similar decrement in persistence. In Experiment 3, suppressing emotion led to a subsequent drop in performance of solvable anagrams. In Experiment 4, an initial task requiring high self-regulation made people more passive (i.e., more prone to favor the passive-response option). These results suggest that the self's capacity for active volition is limited and that a range of seemingly different, unrelated acts share a common resource.

What does forced themselves mean? Did the experiment require they radishes? If the experiment required they eat radishes I don't see how this is at all related to what we are discussing, as why else would someone eat radishes over chocolate? And the it seems like the results of the second article you linked are inconclusive, when they say it depends on unconscious interplay. That could mean almost anything. Why don't you just answer my post with whatever you think the correct response would be?

[Maxcady10001]

Sorry for all of the grammatical errors in that post. If you can give a reason or an explanation of how thought influences action.

[Frost]

What does forced themselves mean? Did the experiment require they radishes? If the experiment required they eat radishes I don't see how this is at all related to what we are discussing, as why else would someone eat radishes over chocolate? And the it seems like the results of the second article you linked are inconclusive, when they say it depends on unconscious interplay. That could mean almost anything. Why don't you just answer my post with whatever you think the correct response would be?

Well I was trying to provide the evidence that conscious thought/effort is able to affect behavior, and that it is not just a matter of unconscious cognition acting subconsciously in action. Conscious thought is not independent of subconscious thought and unconscious cognition, but rather conscious cognition emerges as a way to improve the ability for the organism to act rationally and generate novel response. It depends on unconscious cognition and subconscious thought, but it can direct the organism in an increasingly free manner.

One way this occurs is through reasoning. In order to engage in reason there must be the ability to have representations with propositional content, and the organism can understand the meaning (semantics) of that propositional content. This meaning can then prompt other thoughts and feeling states, but semantics is not something that is a matter of physical causation. There is no way to get from the physics to the semantics and back to the physics in a purely physical system. The organism must understand and then act.

[Maxcady10001]

semantics is not something that is a matter of physical causation. There is no way to get from the physics to the semantics and back to the physics in a purely physical system. The organism must understand and then act

What about memory? What is semantics or meaning other than remembering? And this recall, causes the reappearance of feeling states associated with these memories, and those feeling states cause reoccurring thoughts or a combination of memories into a "new" thought. What is reason other than conscious recognition of a sequence of events? I still don't understand how things become increasingly free, as I believe you are saying a thought dictates the next thought, which dictates the next thought, but that is completely leaving out remembrance, and that each thought is the result of a memory and associated feeling state. There is the stimulus and then a stream of conscious thought that results from memory. Each occurring thought is only on the path "full recognition." I have a thought about a birthday party, then another about the people attending, then another about the cake, and then through some combination of memories, the thought occurs that I didn't have a good time at all.

[Maxcady10001]

Sorry, path to "full recognition."

[Frost]

What about memory? What is semantics or meaning other than remembering? And this recall, causes the reappearance of feeling states associated with these memories, and those feeling states cause reoccurring thoughts or a combination of memories into a "new" thought.

You have to understand the meaning of the memory, or understand its semantic content of the memory. This understanding can lead to action, but there is no physical causation in semantics.

What is reason other than conscious recognition of a sequence of events? I still don't understand how things become increasingly free, as I believe you are saying a thought dictates the next thought, which dictates the next thought, but that is completely leaving out remembrance, and that each thought is the result of a memory and associated feeling state.

No, each thought is not dictated by the previous thought. They certainly influence, and there is a ripple throughout the brain on connected neural nets, but it is not dictated in the sense of a causally closed physical system that is determined by physical causation. Conscious thought can redirect the course of the mind, which is not itself a matter of physical causation.