Is a determinist necessarily a realist?

[Eduk]

1. Reality is a conception.
What do you mean?

[Maxcady10001]

Well, a conception of the world. I didn't want to say our conception, it would seem to personal for a realist. I probably should have said the conception. But I meant reality is the way we conceive of the world. When I say something is not realistic or come back to reality or talk about the nature of reality, I am speaking based on a way I believe the world to be. Of course this is where a realist would run into problems, because how is a conception of reality not reality, but I am trying to think from the realists' pov.

[Maxcady10001]

I believe this is a better picture of the realists' viewpoint.

1. Reality is the world

2. We can perceive of reality, therefore the world

3. What is possible is what we can perceive of

4. What we can perceive of is not our perception

5. What we can perceive is unto itself, and what is perception is unto itself

6. Reality exists necessarily

7. Therefore, what we can perceive of exists necessarily

8. Therefore, what is possible exists necessarily

[Maxcady10001]

So if this is right (it might not be) a realist cannot believe in probability.

[Eduk]

I'm sorry. I was going to say reality both is and isn't a conception depending on definition. Much like the tree falling in a forest problem.
But now reality is the world? I don't get you? I would include the Sun and moon into reality for a start.

[Maxcady10001]

Sorry,you could substitute world for universe. I am only trying to understand the realist.

[Eduk]

It still doesn't work for me. It is not the case that the universe is reality. More that the universe is part of reality.
But if you are trying to understand a realist then I think you would do better to ask questions about what realists believe than tell realists what they believe.

[Maxcady10001]

You were going to say a reality is and is not how a realist cobceives it?

[Eduk]

I'm sorry I don't know how a realist conceives reality.

[Halc]

The word 'realist' is an adjective. It is not a stance unto itself. For instance, one might be a moral realist, believing that morals exist independent of the society to which they apply.
You seem to be talking about the physical world being real, so this would be a physical realist of sorts, and there are very many different variants of it, so to state what they must believe is to commit a strawman fallacy. Eduk points this out.

So a realist is more correctly identified as a realist about X, meaning they believe X is real. That leaves the definition of X very open indeed. I seem to have no stable stance myself, but I am finding holes in any form of objective realism, and find a relational approach to be more consistent. That would mean that being real is a relation to something. The moon is real to me, but the number 5 is abstract. A specific star 30 billion light years away is not real to me. Many physicists would disagree with that one. It may be undetectably distant, but they would say it is real, not that 'it is real to us'.

So if this is right (it might not be) a realist cannot believe in probability.

I do not follow your 8 points, and especially how you conclude lack of probability from it. I don't see how you can state that a 'realist' cannot believe in probability. Probability is the core of quantum theory, and the world is simply not describable without it.

[Maxcady10001]

Yeah, posting those points was not a good idea. If I meant only the physical world, the question of what constitutes the physical world would be a point of argument.
I used reality because the term encompasses everything that would be in dispute. And, if a person is any kind of realist, necessarily a reality exists independent from them. If I am a moral realist, a moral world exist independent from me, a physical or substance realist, these worlds exist independent from me. So it really doesn't make sense to say only something is real without a corresponding reality. I was only trying to include the views of all realists.
On probability, a realist cannot believe in probability because what is real to them is absolute. In what world is the absolute probable? Say I was talking about physical realism, where would probability fit in, how could something potentially exist? Or be potentially absolute? I never said the position of the realist made any sense, did I?
It is worth noting that if something exists independent of me, it exists absolutely or necessarily, since its existence is not contingent.
Also, why would you make a point about a star not being real, or the number 5 not being real, and then say quantum mechanics is real? The view about the star is inconsistent with what seems to be a view of physical realism. Why would you say the moon, something physical, is real, but a far off star, something physical, is not real? Both are detected through the same means, perception, so why would you say one is real and the other not? Because you don't believe you are in relation to it? So what you are not in relation to is not real? I do not believe you can be called a realist, not that you wanted to be, but your idea about my confusion of the realist position is probably because you may call yourself a realist but not actually adhere to the tenets of realism.

Another question is how could I be speaking about anything but the physical world, how would probability or determinism be applied to anything but such a world? How would any other realism matter? If there was a moral world, actions would be called moral or immoral based on what is moral or immoral. In a moral world, all actions would be good or bad, so necessarily all actions must exist, because they must be predetermined as moral or immoral. And the dertermination of morals in this world is obviously the cause of our moral determination, and what is moral or immoral is an action or phenomena, and so moral or immoral actions in this moral world cause actions in ours.

So can we say only actions are good or bad? No. If actions are good or bad, things are necessarily good and bad, because all things are described through action. A person is just a series of actions, a person thinks, or sleeps, or dreams, or just is.
All of these actions would necessarily include things, and these things would exist as physical (or not physical, I suppose if you want we could speak on it), and it would constitute some kind of reality.
It would work the same with truth or anything else you could think of, we would somehow get to things, and necessarily some kind of reality.

Now these, are points fixed for realism of any sort, since any form if realism includes a corresponding reality. I believe these prove any sort of possibility must be real and are easy to follow. Also, a denial of any one of these results in some contradiction, please if one does not work tell me.

1. Reality exists necessarily
2. What is called possible is a form of reality
3. Reality includes all of its forms
4. All forms of reality exist necessarily

[Maxcady10001]

[Halc]

I used reality because the term encompasses everything that would be in dispute. And, if a person is any kind of realist, necessarily a reality exists independent from them.

Not true. An idealistic solipsist is a realist about mind, or experience, and there is then no reality independent from them. It's all about that about which you are realist. I'm saying this because you seem to be using the word as a blanket term, when all you apparently mean is a non-solipsist. That is not a view, it is simply all views except one limited group.

On probability, a realist cannot believe in probability because what is real to them is absolute.

Strawman words. Please don't tell others what their own view must be. Belief in external reality does not entail that the reality must be either absolute or non-probabilistic.

In what world is the absolute probable? Say I was talking about physical realism, where would probability fit in, how could something potentially exist?

I buy a lottery ticket on the probability that it will make me rich. I am potentially rich. Or I potentially will get vanilla ice cream if I so choose, but I have not yet make up my mind.

I never said the position of the realist made any sense, did I?

No, the picture you paint makes little sense. Maybe you should let the adherents paint their own pictures, even if nobody paints it the same way. Let them state their view, and then you can take it apart. Telling them their view is not going to work.

[/quote]It is worth noting that if something exists independent of me, it exists absolutely or necessarily, since its existence is not contingent.[/quote]It's existent is just contingent on a different think than you. Doesn't mean it's not contingent.

Also, why would you make a point about a star not being real, or the number 5 not being real, and then say quantum mechanics is real?

Quantum mechanics is not a real object with a location relative to me. It is abstract to me much like the number 5 is.

The view about the star is inconsistent with what seems to be a view of physical realism. Why would you say the moon, something physical, is real, but a far off star, something physical, is not real?

Depends on your brand of physical realism. But the moon has a direct causal influence on me, and the distant star does not. So similar to the unicorn that exists in an alternate version of Earth in the reality of one who holds to multi-world quantum reality, the unicorn and the distant star both are nonexistent to a relative realist, despite both being different versions of physical realism.

Both are detected through the same means, perception, so why would you say one is real and the other not?

The distant star and the unicorn are both undetectable, at least from here. That's the point.

Because you don't believe you are in relation to it? So what you are not in relation to is not real?

That's true of relational realism at least, except the relative thing can be anything. 'I' am not special. The distant star doesn't exist in relation to anything in our galaxy. It very much does exist in relation to the objects it finds itself nearby. Other forms of realism typically take a more objective stance.

I do not believe you can be called a realist, not that you wanted to be, but your idea about my confusion of the realist position is probably because you may call yourself a realist but not actually adhere to the tenets of realism.

The one tenet of what you seem to call realism is that it is not solipsism (that reality is defined by 'me'). But even in a more traditional (not relational) view, the distant star is considered to be in an alternate universe (as is the unicorn), and thus nonexistent. Some realists might consider the number 5 to also be real. There is just not a single stance, despite your attempts to pigeon-hole it.

If there was a moral world, actions would be called moral or immoral based on what is moral or immoral. In a moral world, all actions would be good or bad, so necessarily all actions must exist, because they must be predetermined as moral or immoral.

Doesn't follow. Assuming littering is immoral, a potential litter action would be immoral, not just potentially immoral. The action need not exist for it to be a bad thing to do. In fact, in the case of morals, it must be potential, since if the action is predetermined, it is unavoidable, and thus no responsibility can be assessed for its existence. Also, I disagree about all actions being 'called' moral or not. Just because littering is wrong doesn't imply that we will call it wrong. Maybe we just don't know that it is wrong.

Now these, are points fixed for realism of any sort, since any form if realism includes a corresponding reality. I believe these prove any sort of possibility must be real and are easy to follow. Also, a denial of any one of these results in some contradiction, please if one does not work tell me.

1. Reality exists necessarily
2. What is called possible is a form of reality
3. Reality includes all of its forms
4. All forms of reality exist necessarily

These points came from you, not a realist. If they did come from a self-described realist, they would be his points, not necessarily those held by other self-described realists.

[Maxcady10001]

For an idealistic solipsist, the propositions I put forward still work, since their reality is absolute and exists necessarily in the mind. I do not believe these propositions can be refuted, but I would appreciate it if you could try instead of just saying they are invalid because they come from my viewpoint. Honestly though, even if someone is not a realist, these propositions exclude possibility. If any one of them is denied a contradiction results, and if the propositions are accepted a contradiction results, but since they are logically valid they must be accepted and so a contradiction results

On your examples, the propositions I put forward prove you are rich, and you have ice cream, since they are possible forms of reality, and these forms exist necessarily because their encompassing reality exists necessarily.

Your idea about the number 5 is very interesting. What if I were to shape a steel bar into the number 5? Is it just a steel bar or is it a steel bar shaped like the number 5? Can you think of it without considering the number 5?

Your use of the words direct causal influence is problematic, as mentioned before, there is no experience of a necessary cause only a sufficient cause, so how could a relational realist be in relation to any particular cause, because there are an infinite number of sufficient causes. How could they claim any cause at all?

And where do you get unicorn? The big dipper is 80 light years away, is that abstract? Is its existence, which you can physically see, abstract? (I googled the big dipper's distance) How can a relational realist deny how real the big dipper is, when what is used to verify the existence of everything else, perception, is used there? The only thing you may say in this area, is that the stars that have yet to be perceived, are not real. (Although it could very well be a huge mistake to assert the nonexistence of something, another problem for the relational realist)

Yes the action would need to exist, because how could it be immoral otherwise? Since no two actions are the same, for an action to be moral or immoral all actions must be labeled at once, so every action must exist and have been determined as moral or immoral. One act of murder is not the same as another, one act of littering is not the same as the other. Every action in a moral world is either moral or immoral and must be predetermined so. If there were potential (which is ruled out with the propositions I made up) there would have to be qualifying ruls for moral and immoral, and as already pointed out no action is the same so rules would not cover all action for moral or immoral determination unless every action had already been qualified as moral or immoral.

And it was a hypothetical I do not believe in morality but I was keeping with the moral realist example you used.

The point about contingency doesn't really make sense, what would any form of realism be contingent on except itself? Even a solipsist, contingent on itself. This is the meaning of absolute or necessary, not contingent. You can't be any kind of realist and consider what is real to be contingent on anything but itself.

These points came from you, not a realist. If they did come from a self-described realist, they would be his points, not necessarily those held by other self-described realists.

No they are my points, a realist would not be able to write logically sound propositions hence their realism.

[Halc]

For an idealistic solipsist, the propositions I put forward still work, since their reality is absolute and exists necessarily in the mind. I do not believe these propositions can be refuted, but I would appreciate it if you could try instead of just saying they are invalid because they come from my viewpoint.

If the idealistic solipsist is what you are representing, then it is valid to put out the points. If your view entails necessary existence of what you find real, then great. It is not invalid to say so. What it invalid is to say that all realists of any form must also hold to necessary existence (just to harp on your first point), without offering some sort of proof as to what presumptions and logic make it so. Your statements (of other people's view) is just assertions, with no premises even. Hardly necessary points then. If they must be, then show how a contradiction is reached if not-the-thing-asserted.

I gave some examples of things that potentially (or possibly) exist.

On your examples, the propositions I put forward prove you are rich, and you have ice cream, since they are possible forms of reality, and these forms exist necessarily because their encompassing reality exists necessarily.

They prove this? They just seem to assert it.

Your idea about the number 5 is very interesting. What if I were to shape a steel bar into the number 5? Is it just a steel bar or is it a steel bar shaped like the number 5? Can you think of it without considering the number 5?

Confusing 5 with a Arabic representation of it, a language reference. Not talking about a numeral, about language, or about a basket of five physical objects. Talking about number itself, the universal that can be independently known by isolated groups.

And where do you get unicorn? The big dipper is 80 light years away, is that abstract? Is its existence, which you can physically see, abstract? (I googled the big dipper's distance) How can a relational realist deny how real the big dipper is, when what is used to verify the existence of everything else, perception, is used there?

Excellent example. It is not abstract. The big dipper is quite real, even to you, since we all see it. A relational view is to say it is real from our solar system. But in relation to say Betelgeuse, the big dipper does not exist. Not that the stars that make it up don't exist, but they just don't form a constellation, despite the amazing proximity of the dipper stars to each other. They'd be still mostly grouped, too dim to be part of a constellation, and completely not arranged as a dipper or a bear.
The unicorn is abstract. I cannot interact with one. In relation to Alioth (one of the big-dipper stars), in the state we observe right now which is already 80 years in our past, I am abstract. I cannot be seen from that point, and I have but a low probability existence, meaning that if there was a perfect telescope and could see Earth from there, there is a very low chance that the observed state of Earth-2018 reaching them years later will have me in it. I have low probability existence in that relational view.

The only thing you may say in this area, is that the stars that have yet to be perceived, are not real.

That star will never be perceived from here. It is in a different universe, and many people are not realists about other universes. To them, reality is confined to the Event horizon, beyond which objects can never interact with us given even infinite time. As for stars that have merely not yet been perceived (perhaps because light from them has yet to reach us, or because they are obscured by something), most people do not deny their existence just because of that, but language actually is built around perception, not current state.
For instance, the news talked about a merger of two black holes that was about to happen. What they meant was that we were about to perceive it. Little mention was made of the irrelevant fact that it happened long ago and we're just now perceiving it. In language, 'now' is typically defined idealistically, meaning what is perceived now, not what is happening simultaneously with the current local state, which has little practical use for language. It has practical use in physics, which then must be careful about its language.

Yes the action would need to exist, because how could it be immoral otherwise?

Seems to be that we use language differently. I might say that littering is objectively immoral. It is wrong to litter. But you seem to state the same concept as an existing action. So littering is not immoral, but an existing act of littering is a property of that existing act.
You don't seem to deal with potential acts. I have dropped a cup on the ground by accident and I am considering whether to pick it up or not. By what means do I choose my action if neither choice is wrong? This seems to be a problem with this stance on potentials.

A realist would not be able to write logically sound propositions hence their realism.

Love this one.