Actually it is not according to me but according to the Philosophical Realists who insist every thing is representing its own thing-in-itself. There are others like the theological realists who insist the subject is also a thing-in-itself, i.e. the "I" of "I AM" as that independent soul that can survive physical death.Fooloso4 wrote: ↑July 10th, 2018, 5:01 pmIn that case, according to you, every subject is an illusion because a thing in itself is an illusion. The “subject itself” is the thing about which we say something, the thing about which we predicate something, but existence is not something we predicate about the subject, it is something we posit - a unicorn (subject) is (copula) a four legged animal with a horn (predicates) that exists (posit). What we say about the subject, its predicates, are the same whether we posit its existence or deny its existence.As with the definition of thing in the widest sense, the subject X is a thing-in-itself.
As I mentioned above, the philosophical and theological realists do insist the subject or "I" is a thing-in-itself, i.e. the "I AM" is by itself as an independent soul that survives physical death.Right, but the subject or object is not the thing-in-itself but rather the thing as we represent it to ourselves, assign predicates to, and posit the existence of.The subject X can be an object, a person or the "I".
In contrast to sensible empirical illusion, e.g. a broken stick in a cup of water, the idea of God is an illusion arising from a freak of logic.Where does he say this? It is not that God is an illusion but rather that the existence of God cannot be determined by pure reason or empirical evidence. The point of the antinomies is that we simply cannot make a correct determination regarding the existence of God. This leaves an opening for faith and secures it against rational criticism since reason cannot resolve the issue one way or the other.For Kant, the idea of God is a logical illusion …
Note I have quoted this very often where Kant claimed the idea of God is illusory and any reification of God is an illusion.
Kant recognized the idea of God could land into an antinomy but he claimed to be able to resolve such antinomy with his sort of critical thinking.Kant in CPR wrote:There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.
These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.
They are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
Kant granted one can think of a God, but one cannot think of it as empirically real nor reified as something real which most theists would or has to do. From the rhetoric of claiming God is real, theists will claim a real God delivered his commands through God's messengers. What is most dangerous is when a God believed to be real delivered messages that contain evil laden commands that inspire believers to commit terrible evils and violence upon non-believers.
I believed this is the critical crunch of the idea of the thing-in-itself that lead to the insistence of a real God that condone evils and violence upon non-believers. Had there been no God [idealized] who condone evil but does all Good, no one would bother that much with the argument of God [thing-in-itself] whether it is true or not.
Another critical element re the thing-in-itself is related to the fundamentals of morality.
Yes, Heidegger is not a philosophical realist.How is that the point with regard to Heidegger? He is not a philosophical realist.The point is whatever [God, soul, things, object, Being of beings] that is reduced to the thing-in-itself [philosophical realist, etc.], these are all ultimate illusions.
Kant argued against the Philosophical Realists' claim of a real thing-in-itself and proved such a thing-in-itself is illusory and an illusion when reified for some purpose.
Heidegger on the other hand do not agree with the ideal of a reified thing-in-itself but transposed whatever as ultimate as Being [not a thing of substance] and made an attempt to search or explain that Being. This is a lost cause from the start, but fortunately uncovered various philosophical themes along the way.
I agree with your point.Is rich with countless thalers does not imply existence. Existence is not a predicate and the predicate ‘is’ says nothing about the existence of the subject of the predicate. When I say that a unicorn is a four legged animal with a horn I am not saying anything about the existence of unicorns, that is, I am not positing its existence. I might say that a unicorn is a mythical four legged animal with a horn. I might say a Dodo "is" a flightless bird and Dodos do not exist, it 'is' not. The second ‘is’ is not a predicate but a positing of the existence of the thing of which is predicated: flightless bird.Note "is" in this case implied 'existence' or existential in Heidegger's case.
Kant argument is against the Philosophical Realist or theological realist who insisted 'existence is implied to be a predicate' e.g. simply 'God exists'?
The noumena versus phenomena is related to the beginning of his argument.Kant demonstrates that they are mistaken, that we cannot step outside our representational modes of knowledge and understanding to say what the thing itself is. The problem of noumena and the problem of God are not the same. Kant does not deny that there is something that is not of our making that we represent to ourselves. He affirms the distinction between noumena and phenomena. See above A389. He does not, however, posit the existence of God but rather leaves the question of God’s existence as beyond the realm of human knowledge.But by the philosophy of the philosophical realists and theists, their philosophy inevitably lead to what is God-as-it-is, i.e. the God-in-itself or generically thing-in-itself.
Kant demonstrated the thing-in-itself is an illusion, thus God-in-itself is an illusion.
The next phase is that of the intellect [understanding] then to Pure Reason.
According to Kant one can think about God or anything, but the moment one reify God as real [which is an active primal instinct for the majority] then that is an illusion.
I read of one girl who had a sexual fantasy in private that God's dick must be very long and large enough to satisfy her. That is not a problem and the emphasis of illusion is not critical.
It is not the case when God is reified as real and sanction evil acts on non-believers which is very evident at present. In this case, the fact must be stressed the idea of God is an illusion to defang whatever evil mode that has brainwashed believers.
Hume was right, on the Problem of Cause and Effect as constant conjunction from habits and custom. I would not dispute that. Hume was also right we cannot get an ought from an is from certain qualified perspectives. But there are alternative views from different perspectives and Kant managed to reconcile an "ought" from "is" within his system of Morality.I don’t know what this means. What are the circumstances that makes their being right relative to those circumstances?Kant agreed Hume and others were 'right' relative to the circumstances.
Nope, there is no way Kant would view the thing-in-itself as "real" in the empirical sense.It is not a question of whether the thing-in-itself is real (Kant held that it was, see above) but that it is not something we have access to and not something we can say anything about that is not wholly of our imagination.As Philosophical anti-realists and phenomenologists, both Kant and Heidegger would not [consciously] view the thing-in-itself as real.
Ultimately we cannot assign an "it" at all to the thing-in-itself. From the Eastern Philosophy perspective the 'thing-in-itself' is nothingness or emptiness.
What I meant is 'closure' even for its open-endedness.The reason, once again, he never had closure is because Being is not a closed system. Its open-endedness is a fundamental feature of Being.That is why he never had closure with his question and meaning of the Being of being.
Example, from one perspective there are no final answers to the antinomies but one can rationalize and justify their existence and work with it.
Yin will never be Yang, but there is the concept of complementarity to it. That is the closure of the open-endedness.
Actually 'time' is such a loose fundamental term that anything goes. Time is most useful as an assumption.For Heidegger the meaning of Being involves the opening of possibilities in time. Time is for Kant:
Kant denies the existence of time as something independent of the human mind. According to Heidegger man is in time rather than time being in man.a “pure form of sensible intuition” (A31-2/B47)
We cannot compare whose use of the concept of time is better but whether the very loose concept time is used optimally within one qualified Framework, System and Model.
Heidegger has this habit of trying to fit square pegs in round holes, i.e. condemning Kant's and the vulgar use of the concept of time while standing within his own defined Framework and System. For example, Einstein cannot condemn Newton's view of gravity, motion and force in relation to his Framework of Relativity.