Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

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Burning ghost
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Burning ghost »

“Ahead of itself.” I prefer how Husserl expresses this without the chicanery of obscure and ill/un-defined terms.

It should be understood that Heidegger’s work it an extension of one tiny part of Husserl’s outlining of phenomenology as a whole.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:
What I gathered from BT is Heidegger implied all prior Western Views of Being to his theory of Being are Wrong and inferior.
In line with the quote from Russell, Heidegger says that what has been neglected is the question of Being. It is not as if Kant or anyone else could have or should have raised the question of Being if only they had been as smart or insightful as Heidegger. It is not as if there is a timeless realm of truth that thinkers prior to him failed to access because they and/or their philosophy was inferior. Being, and not just man, play a role in aletheia. Being plays a role in what is revealed to and concealed from man. That others had not asked the question of Being since Aristotle is not the result of inferior philosophers. If Heidegger was a contemporary of Kant he would not have written Being and Time. It was necessary for the development of philosophy from Kant forward in order for thought to once again raise the question of Being. One crucial step was Hegel and the idea that philosophy is not timeless but historical, not simply in the sense of having a past but in the sense that the history of thought is a logical movement and development in time.
Kant and Heidegger have different definition for 'ontology'.
Good point. I agree.The term itself is problematic since it is used in several different ways.
For Kant, ontology means the study of being as restricted to an independent 'essence' or 'substance' as presented by the traditionalists and Descartes
.

One could start a topic: Kant: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!
To Kant, this reified thing-in-itsel [the Being of all beings] is an illusion.
The Being of being is not a thing-in-itself. I do not think Kant regarded the notion of a thing-in-itself as reified, only inaccessible to us. What is an illusion is the assumption that we can know a thing in itself. He are not passive observers of things as they are in themselves. Hegel and others have criticized him for retaining the term. It is always a matter of how things are for us, contingent upon the way are, that is, according to the architecture of the human mind. But the thing-in-itself is a question that arises at the level of things - beings, not Being.
As you can see, while Heidegger toyed with the idea of Being of beings and got lost, Kant argued soundly to dismiss this concept with his Copernican Revolution, i.e. turning towards the real life of human beings rather than the generated illusions by humans.
I do not think Kant argues against the concept of the Being of beings. It is not an issue that even arises for him. The problem of the Being of beings is not the problem of the thing in itself. It is for Heidegger, following Kant, always a matter of both Being and Dasein together. Phenomenology is for Heidegger the way things show themselves to us, not how they are in themselves. There are not two poles - observer and observed. The question of Being takes seriously the fact that there are observes and what is observed. Put differently, Heidegger takes seriously the question of why there is something rather than nothing. It is not a question he attempts to answer, but instead points to the mystery of existence.
Seeing things as they are is the same as seeing oneself as one is, i.e. nothing.
This is misleading. We do not see things as they are and see that they are nothing. We simply do not see things as they are in themselves. This is what his “Copernican revolution” is all about - we are not passive observes, we play an active role in constructing our reality.
I meant closure in terms of setting up a sound Framework and System to study the problem.
Any Framework and System allows us to see only what is framed and fits in the system. It does not account for what lies outside the framework. It is in this sense a closing off.
Kant like Science came up with a sound model of Framework and System that enable one to understand Being and its usefulness for morality and ethics.
Science employs many models, some of which are later rejected or modified. Kant’s morality is based on good will guided by practical reason and logic. I am not aware of any sense in which an understanding of Being becomes useful in this regard for him. I do, however, agree that there are serious moral problems with Heidegger, not only with regard to his philosophy but with regard to his actions.
Heidegger deconstructed the traditional system and generated useful leads but was unable to get back to anything systematic.
I agree, but do not see this as a defect. I am skeptical of systematic philosophy. It presupposes either a knowledge of the whole or a methodology by which one comes to knowledge of the whole.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 7th, 2018, 10:41 am Spectrum:
What I gathered from BT is Heidegger implied all prior Western Views of Being to his theory of Being are Wrong and inferior.
In line with the quote from Russell, Heidegger says that what has been neglected is the question of Being. It is not as if Kant or anyone else could have or should have raised the question of Being if only they had been as smart or insightful as Heidegger. It is not as if there is a timeless realm of truth that thinkers prior to him failed to access because they and/or their philosophy was inferior. Being, and not just man, play a role in aletheia. Being plays a role in what is revealed to and concealed from man. That others had not asked the question of Being since Aristotle is not the result of inferior philosophers. If Heidegger was a contemporary of Kant he would not have written Being and Time. It was necessary for the development of philosophy from Kant forward in order for thought to once again raise the question of Being. One crucial step was Hegel and the idea that philosophy is not timeless but historical, not simply in the sense of having a past but in the sense that the history of thought is a logical movement and development in time.
Kant did cover the Being of beings but he did not dig into greater details because he was onto a greater project, i.e. the focus on basic human dignity & Perpetual Peace for Humanity. With Kant's project i.e. his Framework and System, there is no way Kant would have ended with being a Nazi or the likes.

Kant did critique the traditionalists on their view of Being of beings, e.g. on Plato's fantasy world of being;
Kant in CPR wrote:Misled 1 by such a proof of the Power of Reason, the demand for the extension of Knowledge recognises no Limits.
The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty Space.

It was thus that Plato left the World of the Senses, as setting too narrow Limits to 2 the Understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the Ideas, in the empty Space of the Pure Understanding.
He [Plato] did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his Understanding in motion.
It is, indeed, the common fate of Human Reason to complete its Speculative Structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are reliable.
All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to reassure us of their solidity, or rather indeed 3 to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and so dangerous an enquiry. [A5] [B9]
I agree and appreciate Heidegger had made contributions especially on the being of human, i.e Dasein but he could not progress much with Being [das sein] of beings [das Siende] which justifiably is an illusion as demonstrated by Kant. This is why the later Heidegger abandoned the idea of Dasein in his search for the Being [das sein] of beings [das Siende].

Whilst Heidegger did not go far or has thorough closure with the Being of all beings, I appreciated his theories on Dasein especially those related to existentialism [H denied he is an existentialist] especially on the concept of Angst.
For Kant, ontology means the study of being as restricted to an independent 'essence' or 'substance' as presented by the traditionalists and Descartes
.
One could start a topic: Kant: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!
Kant did not claim All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!
Kant critiqued Descartes' error of an independent "I" and condemned the God of theology [organized Christianity].
Kant was initially a staunch rationalist [rationalism] in contrast to Hume's empiricism. Hume awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Subsequently Kant reconciled rationalism [Yin] with Empiricism [Yang] in complementarity as in Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.
To Kant, this reified thing-in-itsel [the Being of all beings] is an illusion.
The Being of being is not a thing-in-itself. I do not think Kant regarded the notion of a thing-in-itself as reified, only inaccessible to us. What is an illusion is the assumption that we can know a thing in itself. He are not passive observers of things as they are in themselves. Hegel and others have criticized him for retaining the term. It is always a matter of how things are for us, contingent upon the way are, that is, according to the architecture of the human mind. But the thing-in-itself is a question that arises at the level of things - beings, not Being.
From an Eastern philosophically background I can undertand the main essence of Kant's theories. But because it is rather complex most of the later german philosophers [Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, ] never grasped Kant's essential theory.

Per Kant's CPR, the thing-in-itself is claimed by many the ultimate thing. Since Being of beings is the ultimate thing, it is the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is claimed to be a transcendental thing beyond the empirical thing.
Kant never claimed the thing-in-itself is something reified, but accused others of reifying the illusory thing-in-itself as a reified thing, e.g. the independent soul, God and a Whole Universe by itself.
Kant [touted as the father of phenomenology by many] is with the phenomenologists' thing-with-ourselves rather than thing-in-itself
As you can see, while Heidegger toyed with the idea of Being of beings and got lost, Kant argued soundly to dismiss this concept with his Copernican Revolution, i.e. turning towards the real life of human beings rather than the generated illusions by humans.
I do not think Kant argues against the concept of the Being of beings. It is not an issue that even arises for him. The problem of the Being of beings is not the problem of the thing in itself. It is for Heidegger, following Kant, always a matter of both Being and Dasein together. Phenomenology is for Heidegger the way things show themselves to us, not how they are in themselves. There are not two poles - observer and observed. The question of Being takes seriously the fact that there are observes and what is observed. Put differently, Heidegger takes seriously the question of why there is something rather than nothing. It is not a question he attempts to answer, but instead points to the mystery of existence.
As I had explained above, Kant did cover the Being of beings within his own way, i.e. Framework and System.

Heidegger stated Being is found in the following, i.e. everywhere;
H in BT wrote:Being is found in
1)thatness and whatness,
2)reality,
3)the objective presence [presence-at-hand] of things [Vorhandenheit],
4)subsistence,
5)validity,
6)existence [Da-sein],* and in the
7)"there is" [es gibt]. BT-7
I believe one mistake of Heidegger was he zoomed too fast and focused too specifically on Dasein as the exemplary representation of Being when Being is illusory. This is why the later Heidegger has to abandon the idea of Dasein to understand the Being of beings.

This is the same mistake Schopenhauer did by trying to understand the ultimate WILL via the will of the individual person.

There is an inherent tendency [it facilitate survival] of humans to always look for something, thus the drive to reify something out of nothing, e.g. an independent soul or God as something real.

Point is while Kant explained [at least crudely] away why humans are always looking for something out of nothing, Heidegger kept searching and ended lost.
Seeing things as they are is the same as seeing oneself as one is, i.e. nothing.
This is misleading. We do not see things as they are and see that they are nothing. We simply do not see things as they are in themselves. This is what his “Copernican revolution” is all about - we are not passive observes, we play an active role in constructing our reality.
Agree “Copernican revolution” is related to 'we play an active role in constructing our reality.'
Humans cannot see or know things as thing-in-itself, but whatever human see or know things as they are, it is a conditional cognition where humans are inevitably involved.
Thus seeing oneself-as-one-is mean understanding oneself an an interdependent observer and creator rather than being an independent observer.
I meant closure in terms of setting up a sound Framework and System to study the problem.
Any Framework and System allows us to see only what is framed and fits in the system. It does not account for what lies outside the framework. It is in this sense a closing off.
That is the limit, i.e. there is no real way any human can stand outside the Framework and System it is part and parcel of.
Kant like Science came up with a sound model of Framework and System that enable one to understand Being and its usefulness for morality and ethics.
Science employs many models, some of which are later rejected or modified. Kant’s morality is based on good will guided by practical reason and logic. I am not aware of any sense in which an understanding of Being becomes useful in this regard for him. I do, however, agree that there are serious moral problems with Heidegger, not only with regard to his philosophy but with regard to his actions.
There maybe sub-systems but there is only one overall generic Framework and System for Science. E.g. there is only one generic general Scientific Method acceptable by scientists.

Kant's Morality is leveraged in the Ens Realissimum [aka the deistic God], the Being of beings with ultimate perfect qualities. I agree with Kant on the general aspects of this which is sufficient for my purpose but not on the idea of a deistic God.
Heidegger deconstructed the traditional system and generated useful leads but was unable to get back to anything systematic.
I agree, but do not see this as a defect. I am skeptical of systematic philosophy. It presupposes either a knowledge of the whole or a methodology by which one comes to knowledge of the whole.
I agree Heidegger did contribute greatly and further for Western philosophy but his philosophy is not sufficiently holistic and systematic like Kant's.

Kant's philosophy is holistic but is limited to the knowledge of his time and the no certainty of philosophy itself. Nevertheless Kant's philosophy is holistic enough for the future where gaps can be continually filled newly emerging knowledge.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:

Kant did cover the Being of beings …
Kant discusses the term ‘being’ but that is not Heidegger’s question regarding the Being of beings.

See Heidegger’s “Kant’s Thesis About Being”. He characterizes Kant’s inquiry as ontotheological.
The existent as the highest existent is the sufficient reason in the sense of that which allows all the existent to come into being.

Being [according to Kant] “is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in and of themselves.” (A598, B626)
… there is no way Kant would have ended with being a Nazi or the likes.
I agree.
Kant did not claim All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!
You seem to have missed the point. You pointed to his criticism of Descartes and Plato. He would not have done so if the did not think they were wrong.
Subsequently Kant reconciled rationalism [Yin] with Empiricism [Yang] in complementarity as in Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.
In other words, those before him got it wrong.
From an Eastern philosophically background I can undertand the main essence of Kant's theories.
The way you understand the "main essence" based on this background is not necessarily the way Kant understood it himself or the way others have.
But because it is rather complex most of the later german philosophers [Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, ] never grasped Kant's essential theory.
So, they were wrong. That is a subject for another topic which would involve how we interpret the way each of them interpreted Kant’s theory as well as how we might interpret that theory.
I believe one mistake of Heidegger was he zoomed too fast and focused too specifically on Dasein as the exemplary representation of Being when Being is illusory.
I assume your claim that Being is illusory is based on your claim that the thing in itself is illusory, but for Heidegger Being is not the thing in itself or a thing in any sense. Being is reality, what is.
This is why the later Heidegger has to abandon the idea of Dasein to understand the Being of beings.
What do you think was abandoned other than the use of the term? There is die Kehre or the Turn but he himself saw it as a continuation rather than repudiation of Being and Time. Also note how Dasein is necessary to understand the Being of beings. Understanding is always our understanding - human understanding. We are the being that raises the question of being, and so, any questioning of Being must involve as an essential element a focus on us and the history of philosophy. Dasein as not “the exemplary representation of Being” he is the being who represents Being to himself. But in no way did he think that this was the whole of it. When he says that the question of the meaning of Being has gone unasked he does not mean the question of meaning of Dasein. Even in the later works he held that there was a unique relationship between human beings and Being that he continued to explore.

One other thought on this - Kant’s Copernican turn was also toward man.
Point is while Kant explained [at least crudely] away why humans are always looking for something out of nothing, Heidegger kept searching and ended lost.
Interesting point but on what basis do you say he ended lost as a result of his search?
Thus seeing oneself-as-one-is mean understanding oneself an an interdependent observer and creator rather than being an independent observer.
This seems contrary to your claim that one sees oneself as one is as nothing. The observer observing and creating the observer is not nothing.
That is the limit, i.e. there is no real way any human can stand outside the Framework and System it is part and parcel of.
The question is: what is that framework? Kant thought that it was universal and unchanging - the categories of the understanding. But that is an inadequate understanding of the understanding. There are various ways in which we frame things and various systems. In Wittgenstein’s terms - the rules of the game are determined by the game. In other words, there is no Reason or Logic or Framework and System in the sense of universal, unchanging rules of thought.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 8th, 2018, 2:50 pm Spectrum:

Kant did cover the Being of beings …
Kant discusses the term ‘being’ but that is not Heidegger’s question regarding the Being of beings.

See Heidegger’s “Kant’s Thesis About Being”. He characterizes Kant’s inquiry as ontotheological.
The existent as the highest existent is the sufficient reason in the sense of that which allows all the existent to come into being.

Being [according to Kant] “is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in and of themselves.” (A598, B626)
I have not read Heidegger’s “Kant’s Thesis About Being.” I would like to have a copy, any link to download a free copy?

As I had mentioned Kant did cover the Being of beings. Kant stated,
Kant in CPR wrote:'Being’ is obviously not a real Predicate; that is, it is not a Concept of something which could be added to the Concept of a Thing.
It is merely the Positing of a Thing, or of certain Determinations, as existing in-themselves.
Logically, it [Being] is merely the Copula of a Judgment. (A598, B626)
The above relates to the issue of 'God exists' and Kant claimed 'existence' is never a real predicate.
Rightly the statement should be "God exists as X, Y or Z," i.e. X,Y or Z as the predicates and 'exists' or 'is" as merely the copula or connector between the subject and the predicates.

In the widest sense, the subject, the copula, the predicates are 'things'.
What Kant concluded is God the impossible-to-be-real subject as a thing-in-itself is an illusion.
The predicates [X, Y or Z] as 'things' assigned to God in terms of things-in-themselves are also illusions.
Now the copula [being, existence] is also a thing [in the widest sense], i.e. an abstract thing [process, possibilities]. The Being of these beings is the thing-in-itself in Kant's perspective, is also an illusion.

From Kant's perspective, Heidegger is merely exploring in greater details the copula [being or existence - existential]. But ultimately this copula, the connector, is a thing-in-itself, i.e. an illusion.

Credits for Heidegger exploring the copula in details and the forms but there is no substance to it at all.
As I had stated, Kant had a bigger project on hand thus he did not attend to 'being is not a predicate in detail'. He stated as if to brush it off ..
I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate Determination of the Concept of Existence, had I not found that the Illusion which is caused by the confusion of a Logical with a Real Predicate (that is, with a Predicate which determines a Thing) is almost beyond correction. -A598 B626
Kant did not claim All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!
You seem to have missed the point. You pointed to his criticism of Descartes and Plato. He would not have done so if the did not think they were wrong.
Note the term "All" above. Criticism of Descartes and Plato imply a few, some and not all.
Subsequently Kant reconciled rationalism [Yin] with Empiricism [Yang] in complementarity as in Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.
In other words, those before him got it wrong.
Only some but not all.
From an Eastern philosophically background I can undertand the main essence of Kant's theories.
The way you understand the "main essence" based on this background is not necessarily the way Kant understood it himself or the way others have.
The 'essence' or theme in this case is universal for all philosophies [humanity collectively] whether it is East, West or anywhere.
But because it is rather complex most of the later german philosophers [Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, ] never grasped Kant's essential theory.
So, they were wrong. That is a subject for another topic which would involve how we interpret the way each of them interpreted Kant’s theory as well as how we might interpret that theory.
Note Kant's predictions on this tendency to reify the illusion,
Kant in CPR wrote:They [ideas as illusions] are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
The above impulses are embedded in the human DNA. Even Kant himself was subtly caught off guard and is a victim to his own knowledge [knowing independent of doing] where is give in to a deistic god.
I believe one mistake of Heidegger was he zoomed too fast and focused too specifically on Dasein as the exemplary representation of Being when Being is illusory.
I assume your claim that Being is illusory is based on your claim that the thing in itself is illusory, but for Heidegger Being is not the thing in itself or a thing in any sense. Being is reality, what is.
Heidegger's Being of beings is a sub-set of the greater consideration of Being [thing (not substance) in the widest sense], i.e. the thing-in-itself.
This is why the later Heidegger has to abandon the idea of Dasein to understand the Being of beings.
What do you think was abandoned other than the use of the term? There is die Kehre or the Turn but he himself saw it as a continuation rather than repudiation of Being and Time. Also note how Dasein is necessary to understand the Being of beings. Understanding is always our understanding - human understanding. We are the being that raises the question of being, and so, any questioning of Being must involve as an essential element a focus on us and the history of philosophy. Dasein as not “the exemplary representation of Being” he is the being who represents Being to himself. But in no way did he think that this was the whole of it. When he says that the question of the meaning of Being has gone unasked he does not mean the question of meaning of Dasein. Even in the later works he held that there was a unique relationship between human beings and Being that he continued to explore.

One other thought on this - Kant’s Copernican turn was also toward man.
It is not a total abandonment but in a way, Heidegger had to move on because the idea of Dasein was no more effective to his theories.
Heidegger tried to shift to poetry to overcome the limitation of language, he should have tried Koans of Japanese Zen [nb: Eastern] instead to be more effective.

Heidegger objective was on the question and meaning of being. Dasein is inevitably the nearest and thus can act as the channel to understand the meaning of the whole being.
Point is while Kant explained [at least crudely] away why humans are always looking for something out of nothing, Heidegger kept searching and ended lost.
Interesting point but on what basis do you say he ended lost as a result of his search?
Analogy:
Kant's approach is like finishing the edges a jigsaw puzzle re the Question and Meaning of Reality while leaving the other parts [subsystem] to be filled up. Since Kant is aware of the full picture, he is not likely to be lost.

Heidegger did not focus on the overall edges of the master jigsaw puzzle but focus only a partial section of the master jigsaw, i.e. Being - the copula that connects the subject and the predicates.
Because Heidegger is not fully aware of the full picture and its complete terrain he was lost.
As highlighted by Thomas Sheehan,
https://www.amazon.com/Making-Sense-Hei ... 1783481196,
Heidegger admitted he was lost on the issue of Being.
Thus seeing oneself-as-one-is mean understanding oneself an an interdependent observer and creator rather than being an independent observer.
This seems contrary to your claim that one sees oneself as one is as nothing. The observer observing and creating the observer is not nothing.
In this case one has to toggle between various perspectives.

Note the seeming contradicting Buddhist saying;
Form Is Emptiness, Emptiness Is Form;
'Emptiness' is synonymous with 'nothingness' in this case.
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-s ... ss-is-form
That is the limit, i.e. there is no real way any human can stand outside the Framework and System it is part and parcel of.
The question is: what is that framework? Kant thought that it was universal and unchanging - the categories of the understanding. But that is an inadequate understanding of the understanding. There are various ways in which we frame things and various systems. In Wittgenstein’s terms - the rules of the game are determined by the game. In other words, there is no Reason or Logic or Framework and System in the sense of universal, unchanging rules of thought.
[/quote]Kant's initial Framework and System is represented by what is within his Critique of Pure Reason. His total Framework and System is represented by his 3 critiques and all other minor philosophies.

'The categories of the understanding' is merely one basic element of a complex web of interdependent elements.
The critical aspects of Kant theories are beyond the categories of understanding, i.e. the ideas of Pure Reason that lead to illusions, i.e. free floating thoughts without intuitions and experiences.
One has to draw up a complete flowcharts connecting the various element to understand the full picture.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:
I have not read Heidegger’s “Kant’s Thesis About Being.” I would like to have a copy, any link to download a free copy?
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154946?s ... b_contents
In the widest sense, the subject, the copula, the predicates are 'things'.
The ‘is’ of the copula is not another thing alongside the thing posited. Predicates are not things but what is predicated of things. Perhaps I do not understand your use of “the widest sense”.
Now the copula [being, existence] is also a thing [in the widest sense], i.e. an abstract thing [process, possibilities].
The 'is' of the copula is not the is of existence. See below. All things are for Kant representations. We do not have access to the thing-in-itself but only as we represent objects to ourselves. All things are in this sense abstract things. Just as representation is an essential part of Heidegger’s understanding of Being but not the whole of it.
The Being of these beings is the thing-in-itself in Kant's perspective, is also an illusion.
Neither Kant nor Heidegger thought of the Being of beings is the thing-in-itself. Heidegger saw Kant’s transcendentalism as a decisive step in the development of philosophy, but claims Kant did not ask the question of the Being of beings.
From Kant's perspective, Heidegger is merely exploring in greater details the copula [being or existence - existential]. But ultimately this copula, the connector, is a thing-in-itself, i.e. an illusion.
The copula is not a thing-in-itself. ‘Is’ is used in two ways: 1) as a logical connector between concepts, relating a predicate to a subject - X is y, and 2) to posit that X is.
In the logical use [being] is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition God is omnipotent contains two concepts that have their objects: God and omnipotence; the little word “is” is not a predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs), and say God is, or there is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my concept. (A 598–9/B 626–7.)
When Kant says “the subject in itself …” he does not mean the noumenal thing-in-itself, but rather the subject X itself of which y is predicated. But existence is not a predicate of X. When I say ‘X is’ I posit that there is an object X that corresponds to my concept X. In some cases we can affirm that X exists but cannot confirm it a priori. Kant did not hold that God’s existence is an illusion, only that it cannot be determined via pure reason. That is to say, proofs of the existence of God prove nothing. But in distinction from questions of the existence of sensible objects, we cannot confirm the existence of God via sensible intuition either. It remains for Kant a matter of faith that God exists.
I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate Determination of the Concept of Existence, had I not found that the Illusion which is caused by the confusion of a Logical with a Real Predicate (that is, with a Predicate which determines a Thing) is almost beyond correction. -A598 B626
What is the illusion referred to here? It arises out of a confusion of a logical predicate - the copula X is y with a Real Predicate - a predicate which determines a thing. The real predicates of a thing are the same whether the thing exists of not:
A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept. . . .

When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether it exists or not …

The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no more extend our stock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account.
Note the term "All" above. Criticism of Descartes and Plato imply a few, some and not all.
Did Kant think that any philosopher before him got it right? If so, he would have made no revolutionary contribution. Both Kant and Heidegger held that there were previous philosophers who got some things right, but other things wrong.
The 'essence' or theme in this case is universal for all philosophies [humanity collectively] whether it is East, West or anywhere.
We find both commonalities and differences within and between different traditions. There is, in my opinion, no way to reconcile Kant and Zen, for example, without distorting one or the other or both. One is a conceptualist philosophy the other abandons the concepts of the mind. In Daoism, as illustrated by Zhuangzi’s butcher, the way we divide things should be according to the natural divisions of the thing divided. The oxen is not a conceptual construct or representation. It is divided in accord with the way it is rather than the way we are or how we represent it to ourselves.
Heidegger's Being of beings is a sub-set of the greater consideration of Being [thing (not substance) in the widest sense], i.e. the thing-in-itself.
The thing in itself is a meaningless abstraction. This was fundamental for Kant as well as Heidegger. Being is not a subset of itself.
It is not a total abandonment but in a way, Heidegger had to move on because the idea of Dasein was no more effective to his theories.
Heidegger tried to shift to poetry to overcome the limitation of language, he should have tried Koans of Japanese Zen [nb: Eastern] instead to be more effective.
Poetry is another way in which Dasein discloses or brings to presence. The relationship between philosophy and poetry is not as clear cut as it may seem. No doubt Heidegger has played a role in reevaluating that relationship, particularly with regard to Plato. In simple terms, it was not philosophy versus poetry, but of a philosophical poetry. Much has been written on the connection between Heidegger and Japanese thought.
Dasein is inevitably the nearest and thus can act as the channel to understand the meaning of the whole being.
If not Dasien then who or what? Dasein is a mode of human being. It is with human beings that the question of Being arises. There is no understanding the meaning of Being without human being, that is, Dasein - the being that asks the question of Being.
Kant's approach is like finishing the edges a jigsaw puzzle re the Question and Meaning of Reality while leaving the other parts [subsystem] to be filled up.
Certainly not! Kant did not think he had gained knowledge of the whole. The jigsaw puzzle analogy is misleading. Man, according to Kant, does not fit the pieces of a pre-existing puzzle together. He in not passive, he is an active part in the creation of human reality.
Since Kant is aware of the full picture, he is not likely to be lost.
Kant was aware that the “full picture” is only a human picture and includes in that picture the limits of human knowledge, that is, the inability to see the full picture, only the picture we create.
Because Heidegger is not fully aware of the full picture and its complete terrain he was lost.
As highlighted by Thomas Sheehan,
https://www.amazon.com/Making-Sense-Hei ... 1783481196,
Heidegger admitted he was lost on the issue of Being.
Can you be more specific? Does Sheehan quote Heidegger? What did he say about being lost? If it is a matter of not being able to grasp the whole of Being, of not seeing the “overall edges of the master jigsaw puzzle “then yes, of course, the whole of Being has not revealed itself.
Kant's initial Framework and System is represented by what is within his Critique of Pure Reason. His total Framework and System is represented by his 3 critiques and all other minor philosophies.
That does not address the question. What is the framework that is represented in his work?
The critical aspects of Kant theories are beyond the categories of understanding, i.e. the ideas of Pure Reason that lead to illusions, i.e. free floating thoughts without intuitions and experiences.
The categories of the understanding are not the ideas of Pure Reason and do not lead to illusion. The categories are the transcendental conditions of experience. Experience is not an illusion. God is not, according to Kant, an illusion. The illusion occurs when one thinks he can say anything definitive about metaphysical questions such as the existence of God by the use of reason alone a priori, that is, via pure reason.
One has to draw up a complete flowcharts connecting the various element to understand the full picture.
The full Kantian picture is not the full picture of reality. At best it is the full picture of his philosophy. But given the differences in interpretation, I would never assume to have the full picture of Kant’s philosophy and do not think anyone else does either.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 9th, 2018, 1:17 pm Spectrum:
I have not read Heidegger’s “Kant’s Thesis About Being.” I would like to have a copy, any link to download a free copy?
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154946?s ... b_contents
That is not free. I have to access thousands of books and articles, thus cannot afford to pay since I am a poor guy from the East.
In the widest sense, the subject, the copula, the predicates are 'things'.
The ‘is’ of the copula is not another thing alongside the thing posited. Predicates are not things but what is predicated of things. Perhaps I do not understand your use of “the widest sense”.
We got to get it right re 'in the widest sense'.

'Thing' is any thing that can appear in the human mind, it is synonymous with 'entity' i.e.
An entity is something that exists as itself, as a subject or as an object, actually or potentially, concretely or abstractly, physically or not. It need not be of material existence. In particular, abstractions and legal fictions are usually regarded as entities. In general, there is also no presumption that an entity is animate, or present.

The word is abstract in intention. It may refer, for example, to Bucephalus, the horse of Alexander; to a stone; to a cardinal number; to a language; or to ghosts or other spirits.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entity
Thus any thing that a human can think of is a 'thing' in the widest sense.
In the above sense of entity, the copula "is" is a thing [in the widest sense] i.e. as a connector and representation of 'existence'. [re Heidegger existential not existentiell ].
Now the copula [being, existence] is also a thing [in the widest sense], i.e. an abstract thing [process, possibilities].
The 'is' of the copula is not the is of existence. See below. All things are for Kant representations. We do not have access to the thing-in-itself but only as we represent objects to ourselves. All things are in this sense abstract things. Just as representation is an essential part of Heidegger’s understanding of Being but not the whole of it.
We need to differentiate the transcendental idealism of Kant from the Philosophical realists' view.

The Philosophical Realists' view is 'all things are representations of the thing-in-itself' and this is argued via the corresponding theory of truth.

For Kant as a transcendental idealist, 'all things are "emergences" of "cognition" with no relation to thing-in-itself.' Kant introduced the thing-in-itself only because the the philosophical realists believe in it and not Kant. To Kant, the thing-in-itself is an illusion.
The Being of these beings is the thing-in-itself in Kant's perspective, is also an illusion.
Neither Kant nor Heidegger thought of the Being of beings is the thing-in-itself. Heidegger saw Kant’s transcendentalism as a decisive step in the development of philosophy, but claims Kant did not ask the question of the Being of beings.
As I had mentioned and quote, Kant did cover the Being of beings which is reduced to the thing-in-itself which is illusory.
Heidegger pursued the question of the Being of beings.
Had Heidegger understood Kant that his [Heidegger's] Being of beings is reducible to the thing-in-itself Heidegger would have understood he was chasing an illusion.
He did not understand Kant and that is why he never found any sound answer to the question and meaning of the Being of beings till is last day.
From Kant's perspective, Heidegger is merely exploring in greater details the copula [being or existence - existential]. But ultimately this copula, the connector, is a thing-in-itself, i.e. an illusion.
The copula is not a thing-in-itself. ‘Is’ is used in two ways: 1) as a logical connector between concepts, relating a predicate to a subject - X is y, and 2) to posit that X is.
As I had stated above, the copula in the widest sense is a 'thing' i.e. any thing the mind is capable of thinking.
That "is" is literally 'being' and 'beings' and thus the path to the 'Being of beings'.
Yes, in Heidegger's mind, the copula "is" as existential is not a thing-in-itself, but philosophically [humanly] he did not realize he was in reality trying to chase the thing-in-itself. Since the thing-in-itself is illusory, Heidegger never arrived at any reasonable answer to his original question of Being.

Note I quoted Kant where he warned the compulsion to end up with the thing-in-itself is very seductive where even the wisest of men will be deceived by it. To understand this we have to turn to existential psychology [this in my main interest in this forum - off topic here] that drives theology and its evils [especially with Islam].
In the logical use [being] is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition God is omnipotent contains two concepts that have their objects: God and omnipotence; the little word “is” is not a predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs), and say God is, or there is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my concept. (A 598–9/B 626–7.)
When Kant says “the subject in itself …” he does not mean the noumenal thing-in-itself, but rather the subject X itself of which y is predicated. But existence is not a predicate of X. When I say ‘X is’ I posit that there is an object X that corresponds to my concept X. In some cases we can affirm that X exists but cannot confirm it a priori. Kant did not hold that God’s existence is an illusion, only that it cannot be determined via pure reason. That is to say, proofs of the existence of God prove nothing. But in distinction from questions of the existence of sensible objects, we cannot confirm the existence of God via sensible intuition either. It remains for Kant a matter of faith that God exists.
As with the definition of thing in the widest sense, the subject X is a thing-in-itself. The subject X can be an object, a person or the "I".
The "I" can be noumenal i.e. the empirical self or a pure thing-in-itself, i.e. the independent "I" [soul] that survives physical death as claimed by theists.
For Kant, the idea of God is a logical illusion [contra empirical illusion] and it follows God's existence is illusory and God is an illusion.
The point is whatever [God, soul, things, object, Being of beings] that is reduced to the thing-in-itself [philosophical realist, etc.], these are all ultimate illusions.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate Determination of the Concept of Existence, had I not found that the Illusion which is caused by the confusion of a Logical with a Real Predicate (that is, with a Predicate which determines a Thing) is almost beyond correction. -A598 B626
Fooloso4 wrote: July 9th, 2018, 1:17 pm What is the illusion referred to here? It arises out of a confusion of a logical predicate - the copula X is y with a Real Predicate - a predicate which determines a thing. The real predicates of a thing are the same whether the thing exists of not:
A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept. . . .

When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether it exists or not …

The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no more extend our stock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account.
This is something like;

God is rich with countless thalers.
"rich with countless thalers" do not prove the thing-in-itself, God is, i.e. God exists.
Note "is" in this case implied 'existence' or existential in Heidegger's case.
Instead of proving God exists per se, theists only provide superficial predicates for God, e.g. God is omnipotent, omni-whatever, God is blah, blah, blah, therefore God exists.
But by the philosophy of the philosophical realists and theists, their philosophy inevitably lead to what is God-as-it-is, i.e. the God-in-itself or generically thing-in-itself.
Kant demonstrated the thing-in-itself is an illusion, thus God-in-itself is an illusion.

Did Kant think that any philosopher before him got it right? If so, he would have made no revolutionary contribution. Both Kant and Heidegger held that there were previous philosophers who got some things right, but other things wrong.
Kant agreed Hume and others were 'right' relative to the circumstances. What is revolutionary with Kant is his reconciliation between his rationalism and empiricism plus reconciling "ought" with "is" re morality and in that course demonstrated God is a necessary illusion.
We find both commonalities and differences within and between different traditions. There is, in my opinion, no way to reconcile Kant and Zen, for example, without distorting one or the other or both. One is a conceptualist philosophy the other abandons the concepts of the mind. In Daoism, as illustrated by Zhuangzi’s butcher, the way we divide things should be according to the natural divisions of the thing divided. The oxen is not a conceptual construct or representation. It is divided in accord with the way it is rather than the way we are or how we represent it to ourselves.
Obviously the forms between East and West and within themselves are different and diverse.
But the essence of East and West philosophies is the same and this can be reduced to the fact that all humans has a generic DNA base. A human head is not at its toes but in all normal cases the head is above the body and neck.
The thing in itself is a meaningless abstraction. This was fundamental for Kant as well as Heidegger. Being is not a subset of itself.
As Philosophical anti-realists and phenomenologists, both Kant and Heidegger would not [consciously] view the thing-in-itself as real.
But I am arguing Heidegger did not realize his pursuit of the Being of beings was subliminally and unconsciously diverted to the realists' thing-in-itself which is illusory. That is why he never had closure with his question and meaning of the Being of being.
Poetry is another way in which Dasein discloses or brings to presence. The relationship between philosophy and poetry is not as clear cut as it may seem. No doubt Heidegger has played a role in reevaluating that relationship, particularly with regard to Plato. In simple terms, it was not philosophy versus poetry, but of a philosophical poetry. Much has been written on the connection between Heidegger and Japanese thought.
Heidegger realized the limitation of the language games [Wittgenstein] that is why he tried other means, i.e. poetry. But poetry has its limitations.
If not Dasien then who or what? Dasein is a mode of human being. It is with human beings that the question of Being arises. There is no understanding the meaning of Being without human being, that is, Dasein - the being that asks the question of Being.
Dasein was chosen because it was the nearest and the most convenient. The problem is Heidegger in BT was entrapped in his association with Dasein thus seduced and deceived.
The effective way is one must eventually distance one from the self.
E.g. Buddha's simile of discarding the raft when one has reached the other shore.
Note Lin Chi's 'kill the Buddha if you see him on the road'.
In others, 'is necessary to kill reason after its use.'
Or even 'kill oneself' [the ego not physically] metaphorically in the sense of detachment.

Certainly not! Kant did not think he had gained knowledge of the whole. The jigsaw puzzle analogy is misleading. Man, according to Kant, does not fit the pieces of a pre-existing puzzle together. He in not passive, he is an active part in the creation of human reality.
I have done very extensive research on Kant. I know Kant had covered the knowledge of the 'whole' systematically and holistically but not the whole-of-knowledge.
Kant was aware that the “full picture” is only a human picture and includes in that picture the limits of human knowledge, that is, the inability to see the full picture, only the picture we create.
What else other than knowledge that is restricted to the human conditions.
If you think further beyond intuition and experience, you could be treading into the illusory thing-in-itself.

Can you be more specific? Does Sheehan quote Heidegger? What did he say about being lost? If it is a matter of not being able to grasp the whole of Being, of not seeing the “overall edges of the master jigsaw puzzle “then yes, of course, the whole of Being has not revealed itself.
Sheehan quoted from an interview Heidegger had with a Japanese professor.
based on a 1953–1954 conversation, Heidegger’s interlocutor, Professor Tomio Tezuka of the Imperial University of Tokyo, lays most of the blame for the muddle at Heidegger’s own doorstep.
  • Tezuka: [The problem is due] mainly to the confusion that was created by your ambiguous use of the word “Sein.”

    Heidegger: You are right. [Nonetheless, my thinking] knows clearly the distinction between “Sein” as the “Sein des Seienden” and “Sein” as “Sein” with regard to its own proper sense, which is dis-closedness (clearing).

    Tezuka: Then why didn’t you immediately and decisively hand back the word “Sein” exclusively to the language of metaphysics? Why didn’t you immediately give your own name to what you were seeking as the “meaning of Sein” on your path through the essence of time?

    Heidegger: How can I give a name to what I’m still searching for? Finding it would depend on assigning to it the word that would name it.

    Tezuka: Then we have to endure the confusion that has arisen.13
And indeed, for some eighty years Heidegger’s readers have had to endure an avalanche of confusion (needless confusion, as I hope to show) in trying to sort out exactly what Heidegger meant by Sein and its cognates. Consider the number of German terms that Heidegger himself gathers around the term “being.”
That does not address the question. What is the framework that is represented in his work?
Kant's Framework and System is represented with the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason. This one sub-part of it. Thus it is not easy for me to put that in a few words. It is stated the the CPR is one long argument from page one to the end of the Book.
Generally Kant presented his theories in the CPR is multiple dimensions.
In one dimension and theme, Kant linked intuitions, sensibility, experience, empirical, the understanding, the categories and pure reason.
In another dimension there is the a priori and the a posteriori.
In another dimension there is the common logic and transcendental logic.
There is another dimension of the "I" the empirical self, the transcendental self, etc.
It is not easy to understand the above unless they are presented in a flowchart with multiple dimensions.

The categories of the understanding are not the ideas of Pure Reason and do not lead to illusion. The categories are the transcendental conditions of experience. Experience is not an illusion. God is not, according to Kant, an illusion. The illusion occurs when one thinks he can say anything definitive about metaphysical questions such as the existence of God by the use of reason alone a priori, that is, via pure reason.
Note my point again. I did not say the categories of the understanding are the ideas of Pure Reason.
What I am saying, what is critical for Kant are the 'ideas of pure reason' which are beyond the 'categories of understanding'.
The full Kantian picture is not the full picture of reality. At best it is the full picture of his philosophy. But given the differences in interpretation, I would never assume to have the full picture of Kant’s philosophy and do not think anyone else does either.
We do out best and I believe I have do so.
The full Kantian picture is not the full picture of reality.
The above view is leading to the philosophical realist trap as if there is an independent reality, i.e. the full reality-in-itself.
Personally the Kantian picture is the most effective emergence knowledge for human kind that resonates with other philosophies [Eastern and others].
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:

That is not free.

I registered for free as an independent researcher, but can only access a limited number of articles. You might be able to access it through your public library as well.
We got to get it right re 'in the widest sense'.

'Thing' is any thing that can appear in the human mind, it is synonymous with 'entity' i.e.

But the ‘is’ of the copula is not an entity, it is a logical relation between object and predicate.

In the above sense of entity, the copula "is" is a thing [in the widest sense] i.e. as a connector and representation of 'existence'.
The copula ‘is’ is a logical connector. ‘Is’ as representative of existence is not the copula, it is a second and different use of the term ‘is’. If I say “X is” or “X exists”, I posit the existence of X. The ‘is’ as logical copula is or exists as a part of speech. When used in the second sense ‘is’ is not something that exists, it posits the existence of X. The ‘is’ of “X is” is not something that is, it refers to what is, namely, X. It’s existence is not something that exists, it merely posits the existence of X.
We need to differentiate the transcendental idealism of Kant from the Philosophical realists' view.
Kant clearly distinguishes the two different uses of ‘is’. No need to differentiate between the transcendental idealism of Kant and the Philosophical realists' view in order to see this.
Kant introduced the thing-in-itself only because the the philosophical realists believe in it and not Kant.
As I read it, it is not that Kant does not believe in the thing-in-itself but rather because whatever something is it never is for human beings something in itself but always as it is for us as we construct it. Objects of experience are the way in which we represent things to ourselves. We cannot step outside our representation of the objects of experience to say what that object itself is. The illusion is not that there are entities that exist independently of our representation but that we are able to say anything about them that is not a statement about that representation. It points to the limits of human knowledge not the limits of what is.
The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility. (A255/B311)

y applying the term noumena to things in themselves…[the understanding] sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these
noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something. (A256/B312)

Now according to the common concepts of our reason in regard to the community in which our thinking subject stands to things outside
us we are dogmatic, and regard these things as objects truly subsisting independently of us, according to a certain transcendental dualism that
does not count those outer appearances as representations of the subject but rather displaces them, as the sensible intuition that provides
them to us, outside us as objects, separating them entirely from the thinking subject. (A389)


So, as I read it, it certainly looks as though Kant dogmatically holds that these unknown something[s] truly subsist independently of us.


As I had mentioned and quote, Kant did cover the Being of beings which is reduced to the thing-in-itself which is illusory.


Yes, you have said it many times but repeating it does not make it true. You have not provided any quote confirming that he held that the Being of beings is reduced to the thing-in-itself which is illusory. The quotes above stand in direct opposition to your claim.

Had Heidegger understood Kant that his [Heidegger's] Being of beings is reducible to the thing-in-itself Heidegger would have understood he was chasing an illusion.


Your misunderstanding of Kant cannot serve as a defense of your misunderstanding of Heidegger.

That "is" is literally 'being' and 'beings' and thus the path to the 'Being of beings'.


The predicates of X say nothing about the existence of X. This is the point Kant makes about ‘thalers’ that I quoted. He concludes:

When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether it exists or not …


If X is a unicorn I can predicate such things as four legs and a horn - a unicorn is a four legged animal with a horn, but this does not say that a unicorn 'is' or exists in the sense of existence outside the imagination. Now you may say that God or a unicorn or anything else about which you predicate something that it exists as an object in the mind, but that is not what is being claimed when one says that God exists. This is what is at issue in Kant’s distinction between ‘is’ a predicate (X is y) and ‘is’ as positing. If I say “Santa is jolly” the predicate copula ‘is’ does not mean that Santa ‘is’ in the sense that Santa exists. It is Kant, not Heidegger, who points to the confusion engendered by the failure to make this distinction.

As with the definition of thing in the widest sense, the subject X is a thing-in-itself.


In that case, according to you, every subject is an illusion because a thing in itself is an illusion. The “subject itself” is the thing about which we say something, the thing about which we predicate something, but existence is not something we predicate about the subject, it is something we posit - a unicorn (subject) is (copula) a four legged animal with a horn (predicates) that exists (posit). What we say about the subject, its predicates, are the same whether we posit its existence or deny its existence.

The subject X can be an object, a person or the "I".


Right, but the subject or object is not the thing-in-itself but rather the thing as we represent it to ourselves, assign predicates to, and posit the existence of.

For Kant, the idea of God is a logical illusion …


Where does he say this? It is not that God is an illusion but rather that the existence of God cannot be determined by pure reason or empirical evidence. The point of the antinomies is that we simply cannot make a correct determination regarding the existence of God. This leaves an opening for faith and secures it against rational criticism since reason cannot resolve the issue one way or the other.

The point is whatever [God, soul, things, object, Being of beings] that is reduced to the thing-in-itself [philosophical realist, etc.], these are all ultimate illusions.


How is that the point with regard to Heidegger? He is not a philosophical realist.

"rich with countless thalers" do not prove the thing-in-itself, God is, i.e. God exists.


That is the point.

Note "is" in this case implied 'existence' or existential in Heidegger's case.


Is rich with countless thalers does not imply existence. Existence is not a predicate and the predicate ‘is’ says nothing about the existence of the subject of the predicate. When I say that a unicorn is a four legged animal with a horn I am not saying anything about the existence of unicorns, that is, I am not positing its existence. I might say that a unicorn is a mythical four legged animal with a horn. I might say a Dodo "is" a flightless bird and Dodos do not exist, it 'is' not. The second ‘is’ is not a predicate but a positing of the existence of the thing of which is predicated: flightless bird.

Instead of proving God exists per se, theists only provide superficial predicates for God, e.g. God is omnipotent, omni-whatever, God is blah, blah, blah, therefore God exists.


Right, the conflate they too ‘is’ as copula or predicate and ‘is’ as exists.

But by the philosophy of the philosophical realists and theists, their philosophy inevitably lead to what is God-as-it-is, i.e. the God-in-itself or generically thing-in-itself.
Kant demonstrated the thing-in-itself is an illusion, thus God-in-itself is an illusion.


Kant demonstrates that they are mistaken, that we cannot step outside our representational modes of knowledge and understanding to say what the thing itself is. The problem of noumena and the problem of God are not the same. Kant does not deny that there is something that is not of our making that we represent to ourselves. He affirms the distinction between noumena and phenomena. See above A389. He does not, however, posit the existence of God but rather leaves the question of God’s existence as beyond the realm of human knowledge.

Kant agreed Hume and others were 'right' relative to the circumstances.


I don’t know what this means. What are the circumstances that makes their being right relative to those circumstances?

What is revolutionary with Kant is …


What is revolutionary with Kant is his “Copernican Revolution” - we are not passive objective observers of the way things are. We do not simply observe but create what we observe. But we do not create out of nothing, but rather out of sensory intuitions.

But the essence of East and West philosophies is the same and this can be reduced to the fact that all humans has a generic DNA base. A human head is not at its toes but in all normal cases the head is above the body and neck.


This is a vast subject that extends far beyond the topic at hand. If you are talking about a fixed human nature then there are multiple examples in both the western and eastern literatures that do not fit that notion.

As Philosophical anti-realists and phenomenologists, both Kant and Heidegger would not [consciously] view the thing-in-itself as real.


It is not a question of whether the thing-in-itself is real (Kant held that it was, see above) but that it is not something we have access to and not something we can say anything about that is not wholly of our imagination.


That is why he never had closure with his question and meaning of the Being of being.


The reason, once again, he never had closure is because Being is not a closed system. Its open-endedness is a fundamental feature of Being. For Heidegger the meaning of Being involves the opening of possibilities in time. Time is for Kant:

a “pure form of sensible intuition” (A31-2/B47)


Kant denies the existence of time as something independent of the human mind. According to Heidegger man is in time rather than time being in man.

Heidegger realized the limitation of the language games [Wittgenstein] that is why he tried other means, i.e. poetry.


Poetry too is a language game. Language is disclosive. What has been disclosed through the history of philosophy is only a mode of Being’s disclosure. It is not simply the limits of language but temporal limits. This is why he deconstructs the history of philosophy. Through it we see what has been given to thought as well as glimpses of avenues of thought, possibilities that have not been developed through that history, including the question of the Being of being; a question that had become more and more remote as philosophy moved in other directions.

Dasein was chosen because it was the nearest and the most convenient.


So you have said, but once again, if not Dasein then who are what? Dasein was chosen because of our unique connection to Being.

The problem is Heidegger in BT was entrapped in his association with Dasein thus seduced and deceived.


Dasein names our mode of being that takes Being as its theme. The question of Being is a question that is raised by Dasein/man. Man is the ineliminable locus of the question of Being - it is always a matter of what is disclosed to and through man. It is as if you complained that the associate with man seduced and deceived phenomenology.

The effective way is one must eventually distance one from the self.
E.g. Buddha's simile of discarding the raft when one has reached the other shore.
Note Lin Chi's 'kill the Buddha if you see him on the road'.


First, it is Kant not Heidegger who insists on the universal categories of mind. Whatever is seen or felt or said always refers back to that structure. Both knowledge and experience are mediated according to Kant. Kant points to the limits of understanding. As far as I know, he did not hold out the possibility of escaping those limits, of arriving at the other shore. To kill the Buddha is to free oneself from conceptualizing enlightenment. It is not something to be thought of or correctly conceived of but to be experienced. No doubt Lin Chi would have hit Kant with his stick.

Or even 'kill oneself' [the ego not physically] metaphorically in the sense of detachment.


But Kant’s idealism is not detachment from self but rather points to the necessity of the conceptualizing self.

I have done very extensive research on Kant.


So you have said, many times. That means nothing with regard to whether you have understood him. Based on what you have said it seems more like confirmation bias rather than insight. Consider that both Sheehan and Richardson (who was my teacher as well, although he should not be held responsible for anything I say) spend much of their professional lives reading Heidegger but come away with very different views. “Very extensive research on Kant” is a misguided attempt to assert an authority you have not demonstrated. An authority that at its best would stand alongside but not above the work of others who have earned that distinction and yet do not agree with each other.

What else other than knowledge that is restricted to the human conditions.
If you think further beyond intuition and experience, you could be treading into the illusory thing-in-itself.


Knowledge that is restricted to the human condition is not knowledge of the whole, on the contrary, it is a recognition of the limits of human knowledge, that knowledge of the whole is not something we can attain.

Searching for something does not mean one is lost, although one can get lost while searching for something. I agree with Sheehan that we can easily become lost when reading Heidegger, but I do not see how the quoted conversation implies that Heidegger became lost in his search. (I suspect that your claim is based on the assumption that there is nothing to be found hence to begin any search for it is to already be lost). Heidegger acknowledges the confusion that may arise when the same term ‘Sein’ is used to mean different things, but he also acknowledges that he knows the difference. In other words, he is not led astray by this ambiguity.

Kant's Framework and System is represented with the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason …


An insightful answer, but the point I am getting at is that what all those dimensions have in common is that they are dimensions of the human mind. The problem is that I think Kant is wrong in claiming that this framework and system is the framework and system of the mind. As I see it, there is no framework and system of the human mind, but rather, multiple and not always precise frameworks, systems, and other things that lie outside the framework and would throw a monkey wrench into the system.

What I am saying, what is critical for Kant are the 'ideas of pure reason' which are beyond the 'categories of understanding'.


Yes, but a) the categories are necessary for experience, and b) pure reason is the source of metaphysical illusion.

The above view is leading to the philosophical realist trap as if there is an independent reality, i.e. the full reality-in-itself.


The only trap is the one you fall into when you begin labeling opposing camps. We cannot speak of an independent reality because its independence is contracted by the fact that we are talking about it. I said nothing about the “full reality in itself”, I said “the full picture of reality”. No picture can be the full picture of reality. Every picture leaves things out and distorts things in one way or another.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 10th, 2018, 5:01 pm Spectrum:
That is not free.

I registered for free as an independent researcher, but can only access a limited number of articles. You might be able to access it through your public library as well.
Unfortunately we do not good public facilities over here.
Kant introduced the thing-in-itself only because the the philosophical realists believe in it and not Kant.
As I read it, it is not that Kant does not believe in the thing-in-itself but rather because whatever something is it never is for human beings something in itself but always as it is for us as we construct it. Objects of experience are the way in which we represent things to ourselves. We cannot step outside our representation of the objects of experience to say what that object itself is. The illusion is not that there are entities that exist independently of our representation but that we are able to say anything about them that is not a statement about that representation. It points to the limits of human knowledge not the limits of what is.
Kant do not believe there is an "it" [thing-in-itself] which cannot be known and there are representations of that "it" which cannot be known independently. To believe there is an 'it' that cannot be known is illusory and that 'it' is an illusion.
E.g. there is no such thing as an apple-in-itself that cannot be known by human conditions.

What Kant believed is things are emergences that emerged spontaneously with the human conditions that enable its cognition.
Then we have representations of these emergences of cognition.
The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility. (A255/B311)

y applying the term noumena to things in themselves…[the understanding] sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these
noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something. (A256/B312)

Now according to the common concepts of our reason in regard to the community in which our thinking subject stands to things outside us we are dogmatic, and regard these things as objects truly subsisting independently of us, according to a certain transcendental dualism that does not count those outer appearances as representations of the subject but rather displaces them, as the sensible intuition that provides them to us, outside us as objects, separating them entirely from the thinking subject. (A389)


So, as I read it, it certainly looks as though Kant dogmatically holds that these unknown something[s] truly subsist independently of us.
If Kant had believe these unknown something[s] truly subsist independently of us, the whole of the existing Western philosophy would have turned upside down.

Re the quote from A389, Kant was criticizing the transcendental realist who insist there are object existing independent of the thinking subject.

The Transcendental Realist thus interprets Outer Appearances (their Reality being taken as granted) as Things-in-Themselves, which exist independently of us and of our Sensibility, and which are therefore Outside us the phrase 'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with Pure Concepts of Understanding.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 10th, 2018, 5:01 pm
The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility. (A255/B311)

By applying the term noumena to things in themselves…[the understanding] sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these
noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something. (A256/B312)

Now according to the common concepts of our reason in regard to the community in which our thinking subject stands to things outside
us we are dogmatic, and regard these things as objects truly subsisting independently of us, according to a certain transcendental dualism that
does not count those outer appearances as representations of the subject but rather displaces them, as the sensible intuition that provides
them to us, outside us as objects, separating them entirely from the thinking subject. (A389)
So, as I read it, it certainly looks as though Kant dogmatically holds that these unknown something[s] truly subsist independently of us.
Accidentally clicked "submit' earlier, here is the full reply.
I expect the points to get more complicated, so I will reply in parts.

Re A389 above, whose translation are you referring from?

If Kant had believed these unknown something[s] truly subsist independently of us, the whole of the existing Western philosophy would have turned upside down. Kant did believe the existence of independent objects but only as a subset perspective of 'reality'.
If a stone external to his body is thrown at Kant, he will surely step aside to avoid the stone.

Re the quote from A389, Kant was criticizing the transcendental realist [also philosophical realist] who insist there are objects existing independent of the thinking subject. Note the following;
The Transcendental Realist thus interprets Outer Appearances (their Reality being taken as granted) as Things-in-Themselves, which exist independently of us and of our Sensibility, and which are therefore Outside us the phrase 'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with Pure Concepts of Understanding. A369
Kant on the other hand in contrast is a Transcendental Idealist,
From the start, we [Kant and his likes] have declared ourselves in favour of this Transcendental Idealism; A370
Kant described the Transcendental Idealist as;
The Transcendental Idealist, on the other hand, may be an Empirical Realist or, as he is called, a dualist; that is, he may admit the Existence of Matter without going outside his mere Self-Consciousness, or assuming anything more than the certainty of his Representations, that is, the cogito, ergo sum. A370
Note Kant recognized himself as an Empirical Realist [not philosophical realist]. In this case, Kant recognized objects exist independent of the subject BUT this is only a subset of his transcendental idealism.

This is a very confusing area and one has to tread very carefully through this section.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 10th, 2018, 5:01 pm
We got to get it right re 'in the widest sense'.

'Thing' is any thing that can appear in the human mind, it is synonymous with 'entity' i.e.

But the ‘is’ of the copula is not an entity, it is a logical relation between object and predicate.

In the above sense of entity, the copula "is" is a thing [in the widest sense] i.e. as a connector and representation of 'existence'.
The copula ‘is’ is a logical connector. ‘Is’ as representative of existence is not the copula, it is a second and different use of the term ‘is’. If I say “X is” or “X exists”, I posit the existence of X. The ‘is’ as logical copula is or exists as a part of speech. When used in the second sense ‘is’ is not something that exists, it posits the existence of X. The ‘is’ of “X is” is not something that is, it refers to what is, namely, X. It’s existence is not something that exists, it merely posits the existence of X.
We agree 'The copula ‘is’ is a logical connector' as part of speech.

Btw, I am not personally defending the second sense of "is."
What I am trying to show is how the philosophical realist use of "is" e.g. "An apple is .." imply the "is" represent the existence of the apple-in-itself, not the empirical apple as experienced.
As I had mentioned and quote, Kant did cover the Being of beings which is reduced to the thing-in-itself which is illusory.
Yes, you have said it many times but repeating it does not make it true. You have not provided any quote confirming that he held that the Being of beings is reduced to the thing-in-itself which is illusory. The quotes above stand in direct opposition to your claim.
Note my explanation re A389 above in the earlier post.

It is not easy to explain, but here is another perspective comparing Kant and Heidegger's approach to the Being of beings.

1. Heidegger introduced the concept of 'ontic' to represent what is typically the empirical world, science and the likes. These are represented by beings [seindes] and their existence is existentiell.
For Kant, the beings of the empirical world is represented by the noumenon - contrasted to phenomenon.

2. To formulate the question and meaning of Being [sein], Heidegger introduced the concept of the ontological-existential to reflect the Being of beings, i.e. beyond the empirical ontic world.
Kant introduced the idea of the thing-in-itself [Ding an sich] to reflect the Being of beings.

Note Heidegger's "existentiell" [ontic- empirical] versus "existential" [ontological Being of beings]
is the same as;
Kant's noumenon [sensible empirical beings] versus 'thing-in-itself [transcendental Being of beings].

Therefore Kant did cover the Being of beings.
While Kant had completeness to his project, Heidegger left holes in his project.

Kant is very serious with "completeness" [btw not perfect knowledge] in terms of his Framework, System and Model;
Kant in CPR wrote:In this enquiry I have made Completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. Axiii
I can confirm Kant had achieved the completeness he set out to.
Had Heidegger understood Kant that his [Heidegger's] Being of beings is reducible to the thing-in-itself Heidegger would have understood he was chasing an illusion.
Your misunderstanding of Kant cannot serve as a defense of your misunderstanding of Heidegger.
I have tried to do my best to understand both Kant [3 years full time] and Heidegger [so far > 3 months full time]. I am very confident of my understanding of Kant's philosophy but not too confident with Heidegger's yet [having spent only 3 month on it].
I would welcome you to show me where I am wrong.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:
Kant do not believe there is an "it" [thing-in-itself] which cannot be known and there are representations of that "it" which cannot be known independently.
Kant held that there are things that cannot be known in themselves. I cited passages saying just that. What is known is the representation of those things, which, since they are representations, are not the thing itself, but the thing as we represent it to ourselves. There are, however, concepts such as God that we cannot know are things in themselves.
To believe there is an 'it' that cannot be known is illusory and that 'it' is an illusion.
E.g. there is no such thing as an apple-in-itself that cannot be known by human conditions.
If we see an apple on the table Kant does not doubt that there is a object there that we represent to ourselves, something given to intuition. We do not furnish the world out of nothing.
If Kant had believe these unknown something[s] truly subsist independently of us, the whole of the existing Western philosophy would have turned upside down.
To the contrary, he would have been firmly within the tradition and there would have been no Copernican Revolution in his thinking.
The Transcendental Realist thus interprets Outer Appearances (their Reality being taken as granted) as Things-in-Themselves …
Outer appearances of what? Something or nothing? They are mistaken in taking the appearance of things as the thing-in-itself, but this does not mean that there is only what appears in the mind without there being anything outside the mind. If it were the case that there is only what appears in the mind then every appearance would be an illusion, either a private or shared illusion.
Re A389 above, whose translation are you referring from?
The Cambridge edition.
Kant on the other hand in contrast is a Transcendental Idealist
Kant distinguishes between empirical and transcendental object:
Now one can indeed admit that something that may be outside us in the transcendental sense is the cause of our outer intuitions, but this is not the object we understand by the representation of matter and corporeal things; for these are merely appearances, i.e., mere modes of representation, which are always found only in us, and their reality, just as much as that of my own thoughts, rests on immediate consciousness. The transcendental object is equally unknown in regard to inner and to outer sense. But we are talking not about that, but about the empirical object, which is called an external object if it is in space and an inner object if it is represented simply in the relation of time; but space and time are both to be encountered only in us.

Further, we are now also able to determine our concepts of an object in general more correctly. All representations, as representations, have their object, and can themselves be objects of other representations in turn. Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that in them which is immediately related to the object is called intuition. However, these appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental object = X (A108-109)

But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself, exists distinct from us and sometimes merely something that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance - in which it is taken in the proper psychological question about the reality of our outer intuition - we will distinguish empirically external objects from those that might be called "external" in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them "things that are to be encountered in space.” (A372-373)
Spectrum:
What I am trying to show is how the philosophical realist use of "is" e.g. "An apple is .." imply the "is" represent the existence of the apple-in-itself, not the empirical apple as experienced.
I think we are basically in agreement here. That thing we call an apple is an empirical object, the object as we represent it to ourselves in time and space. But this does not do away with the problem of transcendental objects, objects as they are in the transcendental sense of external. Part of the problem is that the concept of an empirical object, an object that stands in distinction from all else - the table, the bowl, the other apples, is an object whose distinction is based on time and space. But transcendental objects are not objects in time and space, and so, it is problematic to ask about the apple as a thing-in-itself without its being represented in time and space. What is a transcendental object? Kant cannot say, it is an “unknown something”, but necessary if there is to be sensible intuition.
It is not easy to explain, but here is another perspective comparing Kant and Heidegger's approach to the Being of beings.

1. Heidegger introduced the concept of 'ontic' to represent what is typically the empirical world, science and the likes. These are represented by beings [seindes] and their existence is existentiell.
For Kant, the beings of the empirical world is represented by the noumenon - contrasted to phenomenon.

2. To formulate the question and meaning of Being [sein], Heidegger introduced the concept of the ontological-existential to reflect the Being of beings, i.e. beyond the empirical ontic world.
Kant introduced the idea of the thing-in-itself [Ding an sich] to reflect the Being of beings.

Note Heidegger's "existentiell" [ontic- empirical] versus "existential" [ontological Being of beings]
is the same as;
Kant's noumenon [sensible empirical beings] versus 'thing-in-itself [transcendental Being of beings].

I do not see why you would say that for Kant, the beings of the empirical world is represented by the noumenon - contrasted to phenomenon. The beings of the world are phenomenal - how they are for us. As explained above, it is incoherent to posit what they are in themselves.

Kant does not introduce the idea of the thing-in-itself [Ding an sich] to reflect the Being of beings. If that were true there could be no ontology, nothing that could be said about being since the thing-in-itself is not something we can say anything about.

Where does Kant define noumenon as sensible empirical beings? Sensible empirical beings are phenomenal beings.
Kant is very serious with "completeness" [btw not perfect knowledge] in terms of his Framework, System and Model;
Kant in CPR wrote:
In this enquiry I have made Completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. Axiii
I can confirm Kant had achieved the completeness he set out to.
Well, although you can confirm it the history of philosophy since Kant stands as a refutation of it. Systematic philosophers always claim completeness. Some think that Spinoza was more successful, others thing Hegel was, and some have characterized Hegel as Spinoza plus time.
I have tried to do my best to understand both Kant [3 years full time] and Heidegger [so far > 3 months full time]. I am very confident of my understanding of Kant's philosophy but not too confident with Heidegger's yet [having spent only 3 month on it].
I would welcome you to show me where I am wrong.
I have been trying to do just that, but suspect that your confidence stands in your way. There are scholars who have spent a lifetime studying Kant or Heidegger. Regardless of their level of confidence there are others who have also spent a lifetime at it who disagree. Such confidence is more a matter of temperament than knowledge. Did Kant get it all sorted out and are all differences between scholars simply a matter of their inability to understand Kant or was Kant’s system not as complete as he may have assumed? I suspect it is the latter, but that may be a reflection on my own temperament as a Socratic skeptic.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 11th, 2018, 12:13 pm Spectrum:
Kant do not believe there is an "it" [thing-in-itself] which cannot be known and there are representations of that "it" which cannot be known independently.
Kant held that there are things that cannot be known in themselves. I cited passages saying just that. What is known is the representation of those things, which, since they are representations, are not the thing itself, but the thing as we represent it to ourselves. There are, however, concepts such as God that we cannot know are things in themselves.
As I had mentioned Kant Framework, System and Model re the "thing-in-itself" is contained within the Critique of Pure Reason as one long argument. The point is the whole argument is presented within various different phases [section].
You may cite certain passages [points] within one section but the point would be presently differently in another perspective in a later section.
Therefore it is critical we view the points in the context of the whole book and not certain section.

Kant started with the noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] as an 'object' [being] to the empirical world. His reason is in the empirical world, there cannot be something from nothing.
Kant in CPR wrote:Thus it does indeed follow that all Possible Speculative Knowledge of Reason is limited to mere Objects of Experience.
But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these Objects as Things-in-Themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as Things-in-Themselves;*
otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears. [..B xxvi]
In the empirical something cannot appear from nothing, but
then he moved beyond the empirical [sensible] world to the transcendental world to study the noumenon as a thing-in-itself a priori, the synthetic a priori judgments.
Kant argued [soundly] synthetic a priori judgments are possible for mathematics and Science but not possible for ontology [study of Being].

Thus in the beginning part of his argument, Kant will discuss in term of the unknowable noumenon and thing-in-itself but his ultimate argument is the thing-in-itself is an impossibility and thus an illusion if it is reified, e.g. God is an impossibility and an illusion when reified by theists.

Since these ideas [not concepts] are illusory, there is no question of representations of illusions. What we speak of representations they must qualified according the contexts only and we cannot presume there is an ultimate object to any representations of the mind.
To believe there is an 'it' that cannot be known is illusory and that 'it' is an illusion.
E.g. there is no such thing as an apple-in-itself that cannot be known by human conditions.
If we see an apple on the table Kant does not doubt that there is a object there that we represent to ourselves, something given to intuition. We do not furnish the world out of nothing.
Yes, Kant would agree there is an external object given to intuition but there no object-in-itself beyond intuition.
Kant argument is against the Philosophical Realists who claimed there is an independent apple beyond intuition.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
The Transcendental Realist thus interprets Outer Appearances (their Reality being taken as granted) as Things-in-Themselves …
Outer appearances of what? Something or nothing? They are mistaken in taking the appearance of things as the thing-in-itself, but this does not mean that there is only what appears in the mind without there being anything outside the mind. If it were the case that there is only what appears in the mind then every appearance would be an illusion, either a private or shared illusion.
If you think there is something outside the mind for what appears in the mind, then you are on the side of the philosophical realists;
Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.

Realism can be applied to many philosophically interesting objects and phenomena: other minds, the past or the future, universals, mathematical entities (such as natural numbers), moral categories, the physical world, and thought.

Realism can also be a view about the nature of reality in general, where it claims that the world exists independent of the mind,
If we accept there are no objects outside the mind for what appear in the mind, there is no issue of illusion.
If we accept an apple that appear to mind as 'a minded-apple' that can be eaten there is no illusion about it.
It is only view as an illusion when we accept the Philosophical Realists perspective in totality which is false in the first place.

The point of truth is how do we justify the existence of "a-minded-apple" that emerges into cognition. Kant justified this view thoroughly.
Heidegger tried from another perspective but could not complete his objective.
Re A389 above, whose translation are you referring from?
The Cambridge edition.
Likely,
Note there are two major camps on the understanding in interpretation of the fundamental of the thing-in-itself, i.e.
  • 1. Pual Guyer's camp
    2. Henry Allison's camp
Both Guyer and Allison I believe have studied, research and taught Kant for >50 years but they have disagreement on the thing-in-itself.
I am with the Allison's camp i.e. transcendental idealism which is more in alignment with Eastern Philosophy.

I believe Guyer [the CPR translation you are reading] is wrong on that contentious view re the fundamental of the thing-in-itself.

Btw, I do not agree with Kant on everything.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 11th, 2018, 12:13 pm
It is not easy to explain, but here is another perspective comparing Kant and Heidegger's approach to the Being of beings.

1. Heidegger introduced the concept of 'ontic' to represent what is typically the empirical world, science and the likes. These are represented by beings [seindes] and their existence is existentiell.
For Kant, the beings of the empirical world is represented by the noumenon - contrasted to phenomenon.

2. To formulate the question and meaning of Being [sein], Heidegger introduced the concept of the ontological-existential to reflect the Being of beings, i.e. beyond the empirical ontic world.
Kant introduced the idea of the thing-in-itself [Ding an sich] to reflect the Being of beings.

Note Heidegger's "existentiell" [ontic- empirical] versus "existential" [ontological Being of beings]
is the same as;
Kant's noumenon [sensible empirical beings] versus 'thing-in-itself [transcendental Being of beings].
I do not see why you would say that for Kant, the beings of the empirical world is represented by the noumenon - contrasted to phenomenon. The beings of the world are phenomenal - how they are for us. As explained above, it is incoherent to posit what they are in themselves.

Kant does not introduce the idea of the thing-in-itself [Ding an sich] to reflect the Being of beings. If that were true there could be no ontology, nothing that could be said about being since the thing-in-itself is not something we can say anything about.

Where does Kant define noumenon as sensible empirical beings? Sensible empirical beings are phenomenal beings.
As I had explained earlier, Kant argued his theory of thing-in-itself in different phases.

Generally there is no issues with the empirical world and empirical things.
Kant and Heidegger [ontic] agreed these things are the phenomenons.

The philosophical realists believed there exists the thing-in-itself [being] beyond the empirical phenomenons.
To get to his ultimate point, Kant had temporary agreed to the Philosophical Realists thing-in-itself and he called those beings of the empirical world, noumenon.
Then he proceeded step by step to prove the noumenon is also the thing-in-itself which is ultimately an illusion when reified.

Heidegger on the other hand did not break down his argument in more phases but merely divide reality into the ontic [beings] and the ontological [Being].
For Heidegger the ontic is phenomenon and the ontological is the phenomenal [fundamental ontology].
In Heidegger's phenomenology, he expected the Being "to show itself" phenomenologically but his project failed in the ultimate step.
As in the Tekuza interview, he admitted he was still searching for it [sein] and no news of any finding of the Being till his death.
Kant is very serious with "completeness" [btw not perfect knowledge] in terms of his Framework, System and Model;
  • Kant in CPR wrote:
    In this enquiry I have made Completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. Axiii
    I can confirm Kant had achieved the completeness he set out to.
Well, although you can confirm it the history of philosophy since Kant stands as a refutation of it. Systematic philosophers always claim completeness. Some think that Spinoza was more successful, others thing Hegel was, and some have characterized Hegel as Spinoza plus time.
Kant dared to claim completeness for his model explicitly in his book.
I don't think any philosopher has done that?

Generally my approach is always with the completeness principle. Analogy: If I go into the middle of the Pacific Ocean to catch tunas I will ensure my net is complete without any holes. When the fishes are surrounded by the nets, there is no chance of the fishes escaping tru holes in the net.

I am really in awe of Kant's completeness claim and that he did it within the CPR.

Heidegger unfortunately left a big hole in his nets to capture the [impossible and illusory] Being of beings. Fortunately along the way, Heidegger did manage to contribute much to extend Western Philosophy.
I have tried to do my best to understand both Kant [3 years full time] and Heidegger [so far > 3 months full time]. I am very confident of my understanding of Kant's philosophy but not too confident with Heidegger's yet [having spent only 3 month on it].
I would welcome you to show me where I am wrong.
I have been trying to do just that, but suspect that your confidence stands in your way. There are scholars who have spent a lifetime studying Kant or Heidegger. Regardless of their level of confidence there are others who have also spent a lifetime at it who disagree. Such confidence is more a matter of temperament than knowledge. Did Kant get it all sorted out and are all differences between scholars simply a matter of their inability to understand Kant or was Kant’s system not as complete as he may have assumed? I suspect it is the latter, but that may be a reflection on my own temperament as a Socratic skeptic.
The above is the case of the camps of Guyer vs Allison where both had studied and taught Kant for >50 years but disagreed on the fundamental principles of the thing-in-itself.
I understand there are camps within the Heideggerians, e.g. Dreyfus and his student [John Haugeland] on the concept of Dasein and the "I". But this difference is not very fundamental.

Point is I am not exercising blind confidence. I have managed to reinforce Kant's theory with Eastern Philosophies that has a lineage of 3000 to 10,000 years of studies.

Btw, Greek Philosophy [foundation of Western Philosophy] [2,500 years] was influenced by Eastern [Hindu] Philosophy [>3000 to 10,000 vedic]. This is not a fantasy and wish, note,
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

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First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

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Predictably Irrational

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