Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

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Spectrum
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 21st, 2018, 11:07 am
Note this point re external objects are Nothing
As the quote shows, he says that External Objects (bodies) are mere Appearances, and are therefore nothing but a Species of my Representations.

Guyer’s translation:
But now external objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a species of my representations, whose objects are something only through these representations, but are nothing separated from them.
Kant goes on to say:
The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter. (A380)
Note NKS re A380;
Kant in CPR wrote:A380
Neither the Transcendental Object which underlies Outer Appearances nor that which underlies Inner Intuition, is in-itself either Matter or a Thinking Being, but a Ground (to us Unknown) of the Appearances which supply to us the Empirical Concept of the former [Matter] as well as of the latter [Thinking Being] Mode of Existence.

If then, as this critical argument obviously compels us to do, we hold fast to the Rule above established, and do not push our questions beyond the Limits within which Possible Experience can present us with its Object, we shall never dream of seeking to inform ourselves about the Objects of our Senses as they are in-themselves, that is, out of all Relation to the Senses.

But if the psychologist takes Appearances for Things-in-Themselves, and as existing-in and by-themselves, then whether
  • he be a materialist who admits into his System nothing but Matter alone, or
    a spiritualist who admits only Thinking Beings (that is, Beings with the Form of our Inner Sense), or
    a dualist who accepts both,
he will always, owing to this misunderstanding, be entangled in Pseudo-Rational Speculations as to how that which is not a Thing-in-itself, but only the Appearance of a Thing-in-General, can exist-by-itself.
In NKS the phrase is
".. but a Ground (to us Unknown) of the Appearances ..."
The term "unknown" is in brackets () which downplay its significance.
Seemingly Guyer is trying subtle deception here in throwing away the brackets.

As I had stated Kant whole argument is done in various phases and this 'Ground' is merely a temporarily supposition, i.e. the noumenon which must be used in the negative sense and NEVER positive.

note the later points in A380 where Kant stipulated if anyone were to take the point further, then they are engaging in pseudo-rational arguments and ending with an illusion that deceived them no matter how wise they are. A339.

And:
This latter thesis implies that all possible speculative knowledge through reason is confined to objects of experience.
Still—and this is important—although we can’t know these objects as things in themselves, we must at least be able to think them as things in themselves. For otherwise we would be landed with the absurd conclusion that there could be an appearance without something that appears. (B xxvi-xxvii)
I think you are jumping to conclusion too fast from the above.

This point [note in the intro] is restricted to the limit of sensibility, appearance where Kant introduced the noumenon as limit to cater for the point; how can there be an appearance without something that appears.
Kant did explain the CPR why he has introduced such temporarily limit - I have to find it.

Just because Kant mentioned "although we can’t know these objects" you assumed there must be something that is knowable. If you read the whole context, the ultimate is an illusion.
Kant already stated at the stage of the noumenon, it is only a negative limit NEVER to be taken in the positive sense.
Kant in CPR wrote:The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.

The division of Objects into Phenomena and Noumena, and the World into a World of the Senses and a World of the Understanding, is therefore quite inadmissible in the Positive sense, 2 although the distinction of Concepts as Sensible and Intellectual is certainly legitimate.
Then Kant in the next phases remove the limit of the empirical moved on to the next phase to Pure Understanding then to the Home of Illusion;
Kant in CPR wrote:WE have now not merely explored the territory of Pure Understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place.
This domain is an island, enclosed by Nature itself within unalterable Limits. A236 B295
It is the land of Truth -- enchanting name! -- surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native Home of Illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive Appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.
A236 B295
Therefore,
even when Kant mentioned "although we can’t know these objects" you cannot assume there is 'something' unknown now but can be known somehow in any positive sense at all.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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Burning ghost
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Burning ghost »

Finally, it’s taken 5 pages to get here but it’s generally inevitable the issue is foudn right here.

The misunderstanding of Kant’s “noumenon” is one of the greatest problems I’ve come across on forums. It’s so cuttingly obvious that it slides by our attention far too often.
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Fooloso4
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:
I don't see A491 as directly relevant in this case.
It makes clear Kant’s criticism of the realist, that is, making things given in sensible intuition into things subsisting in themselves. This is an epistemological rather than ontological issue. It sets limits on what we can know not limits on what is. Once again: The realist’s mistake, according to Kant, is to make representations in things in themselves.
I had explained, in a meta-perspective both are the same and interdependent just as the very contrasting piece of charcoal and diamond are both pure carbon.
The conclusions we draw are not independent of us but this does not mean the correctness of that conclusion is dependent on us. If you murdered someone then the correctness of that conclusion is not based on me but on what actually happened. If the correctness of that conclusion cannot be determined it would be wrong to draw the further conclusion that whether you did murder someone is dependent on the person drawing the conclusion. Whether the moon existed before mankind is a determination we must make, but the correctness of that determination is not dependent on us even though the determination of its correctness is not independent of us.

The problem is complicated by the fact that we are, according to Kant, talking about an object given in sensible intuition. Another creature sufficiently different from us may not see the moon as we do. What is perceived is dependent on the way the creature perceives, but that there is something to be perceived is not dependent on the creature who perceives it.
I am introducing a meta-perspective but you cannot follow.
There is no “meta-perspective” only different perspectives and different descriptions based on those perspectives. Whether charcoal and diamond are the same depends on what we take to be the same. We might say that all words are the same since they are all made up of letters or sounds, but, of course, they are not the same. We can talk about the table from the perspective of where we put the plates and food or at the level of its atomic structure. When I put the plate on the table it does not crash to the floor because pace Russell “there is not table at all”. The table does not hold the plates because we are as we are but because it is the way it is. We can correctly describe this in terms of the table being solid or correctly say that the table is not solid because it is mostly empty space between atoms or the table may not be part of our description at all from the cosmological perspective within which tables play no part.
You may conclude [empirical idealism] a table exist out there independent of your physical self.
You have misunderstood what is at issue. It is not a matter of concluding a table exists out there independent of your physical self, but that what is given in sense perception differs from what is given in dreams. Neither is independent of us but they are not the same, although we might describe them in such a way that they are the same as, for example, something present in the mind.
Note the whole argument re the thing-in-itself stretches across the empirical to Pure Reason.
It was Kant who condemned Plato of muddying the water from empirical world to the
'Home of Illusion.'
We were talking about quarks, black holes, galaxies, and the moon. Plato’s Forms are not empirical things in themselves. He does not commit the error of taking empirical objects as things in themselves. You claimed:
But the ultimate Kantian view is whatever has existed or is existing is grounded on the human condition.
Kant makes no such claim. What he says is that what can be perceived and hence known by us is grounded on the human condition. With regard to the Forms Plato too held that objects of perception are not things in themselves. That the so called “theory of Forms” posits them as intelligible things in themselves is not relevant to your claim that of the existence of the moon is grounded on the human condition.
Exactly, and so, you cannot make any definitive claims about the existence of things in themselves for all we can know are things as they appear to us, that is, through our representations.
I agree with the above.
You may agree but what you have claimed says otherwise. You have claimed that there are no things in themselves, that what exists, rather than what can be known, is grounded on the human condition. Those are definitive claims about things in themselves.
While you state we cannot make any definitive claim of things-in-themselves, you seem to be very definite of the indefinite of something that cannot be known of the thing-in-itself.
I have made no claims about what can be known of things in themselves. Following Kant, I say that we can think of them (Bxxvi). But to think of them is not to know them. To say that we know that quarks, black holes, galaxies, and the moon existed prior to human beings is not to know them as things in themselves, but to think of them as things in themselves. That is how I read Kant. I do not agree with Kant, however, that space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects, but that is not relevant to the question of how Kant is to be understood.
I understand you are not an outright Philosophical Realist, but that remnant view you have resemble that of the Transcendental Realist, i.e. you believe there is some 'thing' underlying external objects or something cannot come from nothing.
Please stop telling me what I believe and stick to what I actually say.
I am inferring from your various post.
If I am wrong, then clarify what is your exact position.
I cannot be responsible for the erroneous inferences you have drawn. If what I have said lacks clarity then ask me to clarify what I have said. You would do well to consider the ambiguity of the term ‘external object’. I discussed this in a previous post.
In NKS the phrase is
".. but a Ground (to us Unknown) of the Appearances ..."
The term "unknown" is in brackets () which downplay its significance.
Seemingly Guyer is trying subtle deception here in throwing away the brackets.
Have you verified that the parenthesis is in the German edition? Here it is:
Das transzendentale Objekt, welches den äußeren Erscheinungen, imgleichen das, Was der inneren Anschauung I zum Grunde liegt, ist weder Materie, noch ein denkend Wesen an sich selbst, sondern ein uns unbekannter Grund der Erscheinungen, die den empirischen Begriff von der ersten sowohl als zweiten Art an die Hand geben.
I will not bother discussing the use of parentheses. The only one attempting to downplay its significance is you. The deception here is not subtle and it is not Guyer’s but you own self-deception.
note the later points in A380 where Kant stipulated if anyone were to take the point further, then they are engaging in pseudo-rational arguments and ending with an illusion that deceived them no matter how wise they are. A339.
I don’t understand how a reference to A339 is a later point in A380. In any case, it is not a question of taking the point further. The ‘unbekannter Grund der Erscheinungen’, the unknown ground of appearance, is the point.
Just because Kant mentioned "although we can’t know these objects" you assumed there must be something that is knowable.
Nonsense. I do not think that what is unknowable is knowable. What we can know is that Kant thought that these unknowable objects exist.
Therefore, even when Kant mentioned "although we can’t know these objects" you cannot assume there is 'something' unknown now but can be known somehow in any positive sense at all.
What seems clear is that when Kant asserts that there are these objects he is not denying that there are these objects. That they cannot be known is why Kant calls them “unknown”. This obviously raises problems which are not resolved by claiming they are an illusion. For that would mean that illusion is the ground of appearance. Now that idea may appeal to you but it is not what Kant is saying. It is not an illusion to think there is a thing in itself, it is, however, an illusion to think one knows the thing in itself.

Now, the underlying problem you are attempting to get at, as you stated early on, is the question of the existence of God. Your argument is that there is no thing in itself, it is an illusion, therefore there is no God as thing in itself, that God is an illusion. Once again, Kant does not deny the existence of the thing in itself or the existence of God, he is simply saying that they are not objects of knowledge, that the attempt to prove the existence of God via a priori reason leads to illusion. You have argued that Kant rejects the legitimacy of faith (except perhaps as a condition for morals (which would ground morality on illusion)(the parentheses is not to be construed as downplaying the significance of this)). As Kant’s essay “Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason” makes clear, he does not reject God as an object of faith, but rather rejected certain specific claims, beliefs, and practices of faith. Kant points to the limits of what can be known and puts the question of God’s existence beyond this limit. He accepts God as a matter of faith and guards this faith from criticism based on pure reason.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 22nd, 2018, 2:42 pm Spectrum:
I don't see A491 as directly relevant in this case.
It makes clear Kant’s criticism of the realist, that is, making things given in sensible intuition into things subsisting in themselves. This is an epistemological rather than ontological issue. It sets limits on what we can know not limits on what is. Once again: The realist’s mistake, according to Kant, is to make representations in things in themselves.
I don't agree with the above.
The realist's mistake is insisting there is a thing-in-itself that is independent of its representation in the mind.
see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
Kant point is there is no thing-in-itself out there or anywhere AT ALL in a positive sense.
At best what the realist's is insisting as an independent thing-in-itself is only their representation in mind, not a thing independent of mind, thus the illusion.
This is why Kant exposed so the called 'realists' as Empirical Idealists. [wonder you understand the reasoning behind this point?]
You have to take the whole context of the CPR into account to understand this.
I had explained, in a meta-perspective both are the same and interdependent just as the very contrasting piece of charcoal and diamond are both pure carbon.
The conclusions we draw are not independent of us but this does not mean the correctness of that conclusion is dependent on us. If you murdered someone then the correctness of that conclusion is not based on me but on what actually happened. If the correctness of that conclusion cannot be determined it would be wrong to draw the further conclusion that whether you did murder someone is dependent on the person drawing the conclusion. Whether the moon existed before mankind is a determination we must make, but the correctness of that determination is not dependent on us even though the determination of its correctness is not independent of us.

The problem is complicated by the fact that we are, according to Kant, talking about an object given in sensible intuition. Another creature sufficiently different from us may not see the moon as we do.
What is perceived is dependent on the way the creature perceives, but that there is something to be perceived is not dependent on the creature who perceives it.[/quote]
I have stated the conclusions we draw are interdependent with us.
A scientist [say Einstein] or a group of scientist can drawn an objective conclusion about a thing [object or principle of nature] that is independent of themselves or humans.
But however, the apparent objective independent conclusion by one scientist or a group is conditioned upon the Scientific Framework and System established and maintained by the whole community of scientists.
As you are aware, objective scientific theories are changed or are discarded all the time.
E.g. Pluto was concluded as a planet but is now reclassified as a dwarf planet.
But you could insist there is still something there.
But what is there that we conclude as Pluto the dwarf planet? rocks, sand and earth or a bundle of molecules or bundle of energy or God particles?
Ultimately there is no pluto-in-itself, there is nothing!

Whatever creatures who perceive will have their own self-dependent Framework and System.
According to the realists, where something exists independently and objectively as a thing-in-itself, its essence will be the same throughout regardless of whichever creatures perceives it.
Note Heidegger condemned such a theory that there is an independent "it" or "that" that is perceived.

Science do consider the thing-in-itself but the Scientific Framework and System merely introduce the thing-in-itself as an ASSUMPTION and assumptions are at best 'ass' intellectually. This is the meta-perspective or Philosophy of Science that I am talking about.

There is no thing-in-itself or that-which-is-there underlying whatever is perceived.
According to Kant's CPR, the thing-in-itself is an illusion. Note Kant mentioned 'Home of Illusion' where the thing-it-itself is sited.
I am introducing a meta-perspective but you cannot follow.
There is no “meta-perspective” only different perspectives and different descriptions based on those perspectives. Whether charcoal and diamond are the same depends on what we take to be the same. We might say that all words are the same since they are all made up of letters or sounds, but, of course, they are not the same. We can talk about the table from the perspective of where we put the plates and food or at the level of its atomic structure. When I put the plate on the table it does not crash to the floor because pace Russell “there is not table at all”. The table does not hold the plates because we are as we are but because it is the way it is. We can correctly describe this in terms of the table being solid or correctly say that the table is not solid because it is mostly empty space between atoms or the table may not be part of our description at all from the cosmological perspective within which tables play no part.
What you are claiming for the above is merely subjective truths. Such subjective truths are not objective.
This is why there is no table-in-itself and no things-in-themselves.
Yet, you still insist that there is something [positive] that is perceived within the various perspectives.
Note the holy grail of philosophy [re the traditionalists] was to look for the 'real' table that is independent of human conditons [philosophical realists].
You may conclude [empirical idealism] a table exist out there independent of your physical self.
You have misunderstood what is at issue. It is not a matter of concluding a table exists out there independent of your physical self, but that what is given in sense perception differs from what is given in dreams. Neither is independent of us but they are not the same, although we might describe them in such a way that they are the same as, for example, something present in the mind.
Are you now saying the table is only in mind [awake] or dream [also in mind -asleep].
What about the table we see outside/independent our mind everyday?
This is a dilemma of the table in the mind and outside the mind in different perspectives.
The whole of the CPR is focused on reconciling this dilemma and there is no absolute independent table-in-itself.
Note the whole argument re the thing-in-itself stretches across the empirical to Pure Reason.
It was Kant who condemned Plato of muddying the water from empirical world to the
'Home of Illusion.'
We were talking about quarks, black holes, galaxies, and the moon. Plato’s Forms are not empirical things in themselves. He does not commit the error of taking empirical objects as things in themselves. You claimed:
But the ultimate Kantian view is whatever has existed or is existing is grounded on the human condition.
Kant makes no such claim. What he says is that what can be perceived and hence known by us is grounded on the human condition. With regard to the Forms Plato too held that objects of perception are not things in themselves. That the so called “theory of Forms” posits them as intelligible things in themselves is not relevant to your claim that of the existence of the moon is grounded on the human condition.
Kant's Copernican Revolution implied whatever has existed or is existing is grounded on the human condition. The whole of the CPR support this point.
I agree with the above.
You may agree but what you have claimed says otherwise. You have claimed that there are no things in themselves, that what exists, rather than what can be known, is grounded on the human condition. Those are definitive claims about things in themselves.
This is actually a problem of the language games.
"That can be known, is grounded in the human condition"
Problem is we are conditioned to use 'that' which imply 'something' and dualistic.
I habitually do that, and often I am misinterpreted.

To counter the above I mentioned 'spontaneous emergent reality'.
Even then someone has asked, 'emerged from what?"
That is the problem when we are instinctly embedded with the Language Games.

It is the same problem for Kant because he has no choice but to play using the Language Games and many misunderstood him.

I think it is best just to say 'knowing' [being, realizing, and the likes] for the ultimate without any other predicates.
When we introduce any predicates it has to be related to human conditions. e.g. knowing scientific knowledge.
While you state we cannot make any definitive claim of things-in-themselves, you seem to be very definite of the indefinite of something that cannot be known of the thing-in-itself.
I have made no claims about what can be known of things in themselves. Following Kant, I say that we can think of them (Bxxvi). But to think of them is not to know them. To say that we know that quarks, black holes, galaxies, and the moon existed prior to human beings is not to know them as things in themselves, but to think of them as things in themselves. That is how I read Kant. I do not agree with Kant, however, that space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects, but that is not relevant to the question of how Kant is to be understood.
That is the problem of the Language Games when we have to use 'them' 'that' or 'what' which Heidegger condemned.

True Kant stated we can nevertheless 'think' of "them" [need to be careful here], so the 'thinking' is just a mental exercise and nothing more but ultimately there is "nothing" in "them" at all. Whatever is thought cannot be done in the positive sense in whatever ways.

One of the main reason why Kant put a limit to it is to stop theists [absolutely] from extending to reify 'that' 'it' 'what' as some entity, i.e. God so to prevent all the terrible evils [besides the pros] related to a God.
This is the same reason why the Buddhists and other Eastern religions are doing in promoting the same principle of [absolutely] no independent thing-in-itself.
This is how the Tibetan Buddhists always say, "Reality is from your-side not from outside."
I am inferring from your various post.
If I am wrong, then clarify what is your exact position.
I cannot be responsible for the erroneous inferences you have drawn. If what I have said lacks clarity then ask me to clarify what I have said. You would do well to consider the ambiguity of the term ‘external object’. I discussed this in a previous post.
I am not doing any personal attack but merely inferring your stance.
When I guess your stance, the default is an expectation to respond accordingly.

But I think I have explained the problem, i.e. due to the necessary Language Games we have to play with.
Every time we have to state 'that which cannot be known' 'that can be known but not known' the implication is there is still 'something' to the word 'that'.
Even when I say 'nothing can be known' that 'nothing' [empty air] is still something in a way.

Kant tried his best to avoid the above problem of the language games, that is why he emphasized the noumenon aka thing-in-itself cannot be used in the positive sense and he threw a ring of illusion around the thing-in-itself all over the CPR.
In NKS the phrase is
".. but a Ground (to us Unknown) of the Appearances ..."
The term "unknown" is in brackets () which downplay its significance.
Seemingly Guyer is trying subtle deception here in throwing away the brackets.
Have you verified that the parenthesis is in the German edition? Here it is:
Das transzendentale Objekt, welches den äußeren Erscheinungen, imgleichen das, Was der inneren Anschauung I zum Grunde liegt, ist weder Materie, noch ein denkend Wesen an sich selbst, sondern ein uns unbekannter Grund der Erscheinungen, die den empirischen Begriff von der ersten sowohl als zweiten Art an die Hand geben.
I will not bother discussing the use of parentheses. The only one attempting to downplay its significance is you. The deception here is not subtle and it is not Guyer’s but you own self-deception.
I am limited here because of the German language.

Overall in the context of the CPR, I believed you are deceived as in A339 by that illusion Kant was talking all over the CPR.
Note my point re the limitation of the inherent avoidable Language Games and I believe you are caught in that net and insisting that is something to "that" "it' or 'them" which is normally used in ordinary language.

Note the point to escape the above traps the Buddhists used Koans, contradictions, and Heidegger sort of leaning toward poetry.

Side Point:
From the evolutionary psychology perspective, the present humans has evolved from ancestors who had success with assuming 'that' or "it" must be something and not nothing. When our ancestors eons ago heard a sound in the bushes it MUST be something, e.g. a saber-toothed tiger or some dangerous beasts so that quickly run based on that assumption. Those who did not run would have a greater chance of being eaten by beasts. The present humans evolved from the survivals of the past and are thus instinctively prone to assume that is 'something' to any unknown situation. This I believe is the instinct you are caught with in this case re the ultimate unknown. I am weaned from it after much reading and thinking.
note the later points in A380 where Kant stipulated if anyone were to take the point further, then they are engaging in pseudo-rational arguments and ending with an illusion that deceived them no matter how wise they are. A339.
I don’t understand how a reference to A339 is a later point in A380. In any case, it is not a question of taking the point further. The ‘unbekannter Grund der Erscheinungen’, the unknown ground of appearance, is the point.
Note as in Science, to get to the bottom of the reality of the physical world, Science dug further [deeper] to get to the essence of that ultimate particle [assumed initially]. The truth is there is not particle-in-itself and Science will have to hang on to its assumption.
You quoted A380 but do not take into account Kant stated if one go further one will end up with illusions stated therein and where the warned in A339.
Just because Kant mentioned "although we can’t know these objects" you assumed there must be something that is knowable.
Nonsense. I do not think that what is unknowable is knowable. What we can know is that Kant thought that these unknowable objects exist.
No, Kant did not state what these unknowable objects exists in any positive sense.
Kant stated whatever [knowable and unknowable] if taken as positive [reified] ultimately is an illusion.
Note my point regarding the problem of the Language Games re the seduction of 'that' and 'it' that seduces one to imagine there is 'something' regardless.
Therefore, even when Kant mentioned "although we can’t know these objects" you cannot assume there is 'something' unknown now but can be known somehow in any positive sense at all.
What seems clear is that when Kant asserts that there are these objects he is not denying that there are these objects. That they cannot be known is why Kant calls them “unknown”. This obviously raises problems which are not resolved by claiming they are an illusion. For that would mean that illusion is the ground of appearance. Now that idea may appeal to you but it is not what Kant is saying. It is not an illusion to think there is a thing in itself, it is, however, an illusion to think one knows the thing in itself.
It is not an illusion in thinking for one can think of anything including illusions.
It is an illusion to insist there is something [positive] in relation to what one thinks when there is actually [justifiably] nothing.
One can think of a perfect circle, but to insist a perfect circle exists in reality is insisting on an illusion.
One can think of any God but to insist God exists as real and delivering a holy texts is an illusion.
One can think of a thing-in-itself [e.g. apple-in-itself] but to insist the thing-in-itself is ultimately real is an illusion.

In the CPR Kant argued in detail how the whole of reality is reduced from the empirical to pure understanding to pure reason and ultimate on one illusory thing-in-itself which the theists insist is God.
Now, the underlying problem you are attempting to get at, as you stated early on, is the question of the existence of God. Your argument is that there is no thing in itself, it is an illusion, therefore there is no God as thing in itself, that God is an illusion. Once again, Kant does not deny the existence of the thing in itself or the existence of God, he is simply saying that they are not objects of knowledge, that the attempt to prove the existence of God via a priori reason leads to illusion. You have argued that Kant rejects the legitimacy of faith (except perhaps as a condition for morals (which would ground morality on illusion)(the parentheses is not to be construed as downplaying the significance of this)). As Kant’s essay “Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason” makes clear, he does not reject God as an object of faith, but rather rejected certain specific claims, beliefs, and practices of faith. Kant points to the limits of what can be known and puts the question of God’s existence beyond this limit. He accepts God as a matter of faith and guards this faith from criticism based on pure reason.
To Kant the idea of God is an illusion if reified as the theistic God that delivers commands in holy texts or exists are real in whatever positive forms.

To Kant, the idea of God [as he defined it] is an illusion but it is only useful* a guide [note guide not some policemen] for a Framework and System of Morality and Ethics. I agree with Kant on this in principle but do accept his use of the term God [his definition] because the term 'God' already has a terrible negative baggage.
Note Kant discussion on Constitutive vs Regulative.

Kant did mention faith, but it is not a critical element in the CPR at all. The idea of faith was raised to counter and leave room against the 100% certainty of objective reality of the philosophical realists.

Note everyone [even scientists] rely on faith in various degrees in accordance to the circumstances. Since I am not a scientist I have to rely on certain degrees of faith to trust their accepted and agreed theories.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
Fooloso4
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:
The realist's mistake is insisting there is a thing-in-itself that is independent of its representation in the mind.
see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
This illustrates the problem of thinking via the indiscriminate use of labels. Kant is quite specific as to what he means when he uses the term ‘realist’. The broader use of the term does not require him to mean something other than he does.
Kant point is there is no thing-in-itself out there or anywhere AT ALL in a positive sense.
Yes, you have been quite clear as to what you believe he is saying, only what he actually says stands as evidence of your error. Instead of citing Wikipedia on the the term philosophical realist cite Kant making the claim that there is no thing-in-itself out there or anywhere AT ALL in a positive sense. You are attributing ontological claims to him (i.e., claims about what is and is not) with epistemological claims about what we can know.
This is why Kant exposed so the called 'realists' as Empirical Idealists. [wonder you understand the reasoning behind this point?]
Kant says:
One would also do us an injustice if one tried to ascribe to us that long-decried empirical idealism that, while assuming the proper reality of space, denies the existence of extended beings in it, or at least finds this existence doubtful, and so in this respect admits no satisfactorily provable distinction between dream and truth. As to the appearances of inner sense in time, it finds no difficulty in them as real things, indeed, it even asserts that this inner experience and it alone gives sufficient proof of the real existence of their object (in itself) along with all this time-determination. (A491/B519)
Specttrum:
But what is there that we conclude as Pluto the dwarf planet? rocks, sand and earth or a bundle of molecules or bundle of energy or God particles?
It is not a matter of it being one or the other but of the level at which we describe it. It is not simply a bundle of molecules or bundle of energy but a particular arrangement of molecules or energy that we call rocks, sand, and earth.
Ultimately there is no pluto-in-itself, there is nothing!
In that case there is “no satisfactorily provable distinction between dream and truth”, the very problem Kant finds in empirical idealism!
Yet, you still insist that there is something [positive] that is perceived within the various perspectives.
I have made no such claim. What is perceived is a representation.
Are you now saying the table is only in mind [awake] or dream [also in mind -asleep].
I have made no such claim. What is perceived in both cases is a representation, but what we see in dreams is not what we see when awake. The failure to know the difference can be fatal.
What about the table we see outside/independent our mind everyday?
We do not see tables outside/independent our mind. We see only what is conditioned by the mind.
Kant's Copernican Revolution implied whatever has existed or is existing is grounded on the human condition. The whole of the CPR support this point.
You keep repeating this claim but have not provided a single example of where he says this. I have provided several examples that contradict your claim.
You may agree but what you have claimed says otherwise. You have claimed that there are no things in themselves, that what exists, rather than what can be known, is grounded on the human condition. Those are definitive claims about things in themselves.
This is actually a problem of the language games.
It is actually a problem of failing to distinguish between what is or exists (ontology) and what we can know about what is or exists (epistemology).
I think it is best just to say 'knowing' [being, realizing, and the likes] for the ultimate without any other predicates.
Where does Kant say that knowing is being?
One of the main reason why Kant put a limit to it is to stop theists [absolutely] from extending to reify 'that' 'it' 'what' as some entity, i.e. God so to prevent all the terrible evils [besides the pros] related to a God.
You are painting Kant in your own image. Kant was not an anti-theist and as far as I know never denied the existence of God. On the contrary, another main reason why Kant put a limit was, as he said, to allow room for faith in God.
But I think I have explained the problem, i.e. due to the necessary Language Games we have to play with.
That is a dodge. The problem is that what Kant says is at odds with what you claim he says and rather than re-examining your claims you attempt to shift the focus to “Language Games”.
I am limited here because of the German language.
And yet you think it appropriate to accuse Guyer of “subtle deception” based on the fact that another translation put “to us unkown” in parentheses (whose use you apparently do not understand either).
You quoted A380 but do not take into account Kant stated if one go further one will end up with illusions stated therein and where the warned in A339.
As I said: the unknown ground of appearance, is the point. He posits the existence of this ground. That it is but not what it is (which if he could determine would not be unknown).
Kant did mention faith, but it is not a critical element in the CPR at all. The idea of faith was raised to counter and leave room against the 100% certainty of objective reality of the philosophical realists.
Not a critical element?
Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; (Bxxx)
He draws limits to what can be known in order to make room for faith and you claim that this is not a critical element?!

He continues:
and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic.
Your dogmatic unbelief is one of the “critical” (I assume you mean of central importance) elements in the CPR.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 23rd, 2018, 1:57 pm Spectrum:
The realist's mistake is insisting there is a thing-in-itself that is independent of its representation in the mind.
see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
This illustrates the problem of thinking via the indiscriminate use of labels. Kant is quite specific as to what he means when he uses the term ‘realist’. The broader use of the term does not require him to mean something other than he does.
I know very well Kant's definition of a 'realist' aligns very well with the 'Philosophical Realists' definition from Wiki.

Kant's definition and description is the same with principle of the PR [from wiki] - the basis of his Copernican Revolution - is mentioned all over the CPR and culminated in this [mine];
Kant in CPR wrote:However harmless Idealism may be considered in respect of the essential aims of Metaphysics (though, in fact, it is not thus harmless),
it [re realism] still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith,
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.
-Bxxxviii
This is why G E Moore took up the [failed] Challenge to Proof the External World ;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand

The above re Moore was countered by Wittgenstein in his 'On Certainty'.
re W's mentioned of 'hinges' and 'river beds'.
Kant point is there is no thing-in-itself out there or anywhere AT ALL in a positive sense.
Yes, you have been quite clear as to what you believe he is saying, only what he actually says stands as evidence of your error. Instead of citing Wikipedia on the the term philosophical realist cite Kant making the claim that there is no thing-in-itself out there or anywhere AT ALL in a positive sense. You are attributing ontological claims to him (i.e., claims about what is and is not) with epistemological claims about what we can know.
Note I have already cited B311 as an introductory, i.e.
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive BEYOND the Field of Sensibility. B311
Note the noumenon is also the thing-in-itself and note the term 'BEYOND' which is beyond the field of sensibility, i.e. empirical. Beyond the empirical is beyond understanding, pure reason to infinity [no where]. Thus there is no thing-in-itself in the positive [Constitutive] sense anywhere!

The whole context of the CPR support the above point.
My handicap is I am not in tip top intellectual condition with the CPR until I have spent time to reread the whole CPR to the point I can score 95% marks if I were to sit on an exam for it. Thus I cannot produce all the necessary addition quotes [many] besides the above at present. If the stakes are increased I will do it.
You are attributing ontological claims to him
I have stated my times, Kant condemned 'ontology' [his definition] so the issue of ontology should not be raised at all.
This is why Kant exposed so the called 'realists' as Empirical Idealists. [wonder you understand the reasoning behind this point?]
Kant says:
One would also do us an injustice if one tried to ascribe to us that long-decried empirical idealism that, while assuming the proper reality of space, denies the existence of extended beings in it, or at least finds this existence doubtful, and so in this respect admits no satisfactorily provable distinction between dream and truth.
As to the appearances of inner sense in time, it finds no difficulty in them as real things, indeed, it even asserts that this inner experience and it alone gives sufficient proof of the real existence of their object (in itself) along with all this time-determination. (A491/B519)
From what I gathered from your posting, your views are that of an Empirical Idealist.
Your belief of reality is this;
  • 1. Appearance is representation of that-which-appears
    2. that-which-appears is the real thing
    3. that which appears [thing-in-itself] is external and independent of the human conditions.
We can agree on 1 - no issue.
The issue is with 'that-which-appears' the realists' thing-in-itself.
You take the that-which-appears as external and independent of the human conditions, e.g. the table out there is external and independent of mind.
Kant had proven there is no 'that-which-appears' [realists thing-in-itself], i.e. a 'that-which-appears' out there is an illusion.

According to Kant's argument, the 'that-which-appears' of mental representation is STILL within the mind BUT from a meta-perspective, i.e. an inner experience that Kant mentioned in A491 above.

You think the that-which-appears of appearance [representation] is external of mind, but in reality [as proven by Kant] it is still within mind in another higher perspective.
This why your is the idea of the Empirical Idealist, i.e. what you think is external [empirical] is an illusion - when actually it is still within mind [idealism], thus empirical idealism, i.e. a fake empirical reality.

For Kant, there is an external reality [empirical realism] but this is encompassed by a higher perspective of mind [idealism], i.e. at the transcendental level, thus transcendental idealism.

Note sure if you get it, the above need a bit of heavy thinking.

Taking a break ...will address the rest of the point later.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 23rd, 2018, 1:57 pm
But what is there that we conclude as Pluto the dwarf planet? rocks, sand and earth or a bundle of molecules or bundle of energy or God particles?
It is not a matter of it being one or the other but of the level at which we describe it. It is not simply a bundle of molecules or bundle of energy but a particular arrangement of molecules or energy that we call rocks, sand, and earth.
Philosophically what we are more interested in 'substance' [not ontological] rather than the forms.
The critical pursuit has always been searching for the deeper meaning of things, .e.g. in Physics from the solid to the invisible matters with the illusory hope of the ultimate particle.
It is more realistic to state Pluto is a bundle of energy than to say Pluto is a dwarf planet.
Thus there is no such thing as Pluto-in-itself independent of its various forms of realities.
Ultimately there is no pluto-in-itself, there is nothing!
In that case there is “no satisfactorily provable distinction between dream and truth”, the very problem Kant finds in empirical idealism!
Note my explanation earlier.
Kant stated there is only a problem when one postulate the existence of a thing-in-itself as external to the human conditions [finer, not crude sensibility].
Thus when ultimately there is no pluto-in-itself and there is nothing is not a problem.
Yet, you still insist that there is something [positive] that is perceived within the various perspectives.
I have made no such claim. What is perceived is a representation.
As I had explained in the earlier post.
Yes, you claim and I agree 'what-is-perceived' is a mental representation.
To you 'what-is-perceived' is something external to the human mind in a positive[?] terms.
To you it has to be positive, else if negative then it would be an illusion which you disagree.

Now what Kant is claiming is your supposedly 'what-is-perceived' [not the appearance] as external of mind is actually within the mind but at the different meta-level. In other words;

-Appearance, i.e. perception is within mind, i.e. mind-1, but
-what-is-perceived-as-external-to-mind-1 is also within mind, i.e. mind-2.

Your problem is while you like everyone else can understand mind-1 [ordinary externalness], you have problem reflecting and comprehending the level mind-2.
Are you now saying the table is only in mind [awake] or dream [also in mind -asleep].
I have made no such claim. What is perceived in both cases is a representation, but what we see in dreams is not what we see when awake. The failure to know the difference can be fatal.
This is obvious, i.e. the difference in what is dreamt and what is perceive while awake.
What about the table we see outside/independent our mind everyday?
We do not see tables outside/independent our mind. We see only what is conditioned by the mind.
According to the Transcendental Idealist, we do see table outside/independent of mind-1 BUT this perception of externalness is encompassed within mind-2 [meta-perspective].
Kant's Copernican Revolution implied whatever has existed or is existing is grounded on the human condition. The whole of the CPR support this point.
You keep repeating this claim but have not provided a single example of where he says this. I have provided several examples that contradict your claim.
I had countered your examples as wrong interpretations of Kant's theories.

I stated Kant's Copernican Revolution is a starting point and implied there is nothing real except that which are conditioned by the human conditions.
Next I mentioned B311. i.e. the noumenon aka thing-in-itself cannot be asserted in the positive beyond the empirical;
Kant in CPR wrote:At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility. B311
I believe the above is sufficient to support my point that all of reality is interdependent with the human conditions.

The rest of the CPR support the above point to the extent Kant is talking about illusions when one attempt to reify the thing-in-itself in any positive sense, e.g. theists with a real existing God, the soul, the Whole Universe.
This is actually a problem of the language games.
It is actually a problem of failing to distinguish between what is or exists (ontology) and what we can know about what is or exists (epistemology).
As I had mentioned there is no question of ontology in this case as far as Kant is concerned.
The problem is the language games when we have no better alternative than to use 'what-is', that, it and words denoting 'something' that exists.
Note this is the same problem that Heidegger faced with 'it' 'that' "I" which Heidegger had to deconstruct the whole of its historical usage via hermeneutics and phenomenology.
I think it is best just to say 'knowing' [being, realizing, and the likes] for the ultimate without any other predicates.
Where does Kant say that knowing is being?
I did not imply 'knowing' IS 'being'.
Kant did not state that specifically, I am paraphrasing his views to such a point.

What I am trying to say is we do not conclude reality is that-which-appears as the word [language games] seduce on to 'something' i.e. something existing externally.
My point is when we refer to reality, we just state 'reality = knowing' or reality = being, without adding any predicate like reality =knowing that or knowing that which appears.

Note the Zen master when asked what is reality, the enlightened answer is merely 'Chop Wood Carry Water', i.e. do not try to be a smart alec to answer the what-is of reality.
One of the main reason why Kant put a limit to it is to stop theists [absolutely] from extending to reify 'that' 'it' 'what' as some entity, i.e. God so to prevent all the terrible evils [besides the pros] related to a God.
You are painting Kant in your own image. Kant was not an anti-theist and as far as I know never denied the existence of God. On the contrary, another main reason why Kant put a limit was, as he said, to allow room for faith in God.
Note I had claimed to study Kant full time for 3 years and gone through each word in the CPR [English translations] many times.
But I think I have explained the problem, i.e. due to the necessary Language Games we have to play with.
That is a dodge. The problem is that what Kant says is at odds with what you claim he says and rather than re-examining your claims you attempt to shift the focus to “Language Games”.
Dodge??
Note how Wittgenstein [basis of Language Games] came to defend Kant re this counter [re On Certainty] to G E Moore re the scandal of the external world.
I believe it is quite an achievement to understand and made all these linkages.

I can assure you whatever issues that had cropped up against Kant I had dug very deep to be informed that I have not missed anything.
I am limited here because of the German language.
And yet you think it appropriate to accuse Guyer of “subtle deception” based on the fact that another translation put “to us unkown” in parentheses (whose use you apparently do not understand either).
That is based on what is written by the various authors to the best of my knowledge. I can concede on that point which is not a critical one.
On the whole I know the Guyer's camp [realist inclined] had been dodgy from the time Strawson [P.F.?] introduced Kant [apparently as a supporter] to the Philosophical Realists community.
As I said: the unknown ground of appearance, is the point. He posits the existence of this ground. That it is but not what it is (which if he could determine would not be unknown).
As I had argued that unknown-ground-of-appearance is still within the human mind, albeit mind-2 i.e. higher level of consideration beyond mind-1 [which deal with appearance].
If you want to state any thing positive of this unknown-ground-of-appearance, then you are diving into a world of illusion.
If you understood this unknown-ground-of-appearance cannot be taken in the positive sense [B311] then you would have understood it is merely a limit for negative use and it is an illusion if reified in any way.
Not a critical element?
Kant wrote:Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; (Bxxx)
He draws limits to what can be known in order to make room for faith and you claim that this is not a critical element?!

He continues:
and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic.
Your dogmatic unbelief is one of the “critical” (I assume you mean of central importance) elements in the CPR.
Yes, 'faith' is mentioned but always in background of some main issue. Besides Bxxx, here is Bxl [wrong quoted as Bxxxviii earlier]
Kant in CPR wrote:However harmless Idealism may be considered in respect of the essential aims of Metaphysics (though, in fact, it is not thus harmless),
it still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith,
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.
[Bxl]
Yes, the central importance of the CPR is about how the thing-in-itself is idealized [dogmatically] as an external thing [knowable or unknowable] independent of mind.
To the theists [realists] the thing-in-itself is really real [dogmatically], the most real and thus 'known' to theists which is a hindrance to morality [Kant's].
To other realists, the thing-in-itself is something [not appearance] that is unknowable.

In your case, I note yours is the very [dogmatic] view of an empirical idealist who view that-which-appears [which is not the representation as appearance] as independent of mind-1.
As I had pointed out you have not reflected upon and taking into account the level of mind-2 at the transcendental level in deliberating on this unknowable.
Your view is also a hindrance to morality as it will lead to the eventuality of a real absolute ought-in-itself, i.e. real absolute moral laws.

In the case of Kant, his illusory thing-in-itself will lead to illusory [if one insist, ideal, impossible, fictional, whatever] absolute moral laws which are critical as very useful guide [nb: only as a guide] and having utility [very positive in this sense not ontological sense] within his System and Framework of Morality and Ethics.

This idea of morality is his premise and ground for possible empirical Perpetual Peace.

On the other hand, your views will lead to a potential continual evils on Earth, something like how Heidegger slipped when he lost awareness of it. note Kant A339 where even the wisest will be deceived by such an illusion.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Burning ghost »

Fool -
Yes, you have been quite clear as to what you believe he is saying, only what he actually says stands as evidence of your error. Instead of citing Wikipedia on the the term philosophical realist cite Kant making the claim that there is no thing-in-itself out there or anywhere AT ALL in a positive sense. You are attributing ontological claims to him (i.e., claims about what is and is not) with epistemological claims about what we can know.
It is not merely Spectrum’s “belief.” Kant says this. The confusion is most certainly one of ontological and epistemic conflation - which are inseperable and the root of many misunderstandings.

The strangest thing is the idea of “positive noumenon” is necessarily merely “negative noumenon” because to express it denial of the premise of such an “inexplicable” item.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:
I know very well Kant's definition of a 'realist' aligns very well with the 'Philosophical Realists' definition from Wiki.
The article lists seven distinct forms of philosophical realism. Kant’s use of the term cannot be the same as all of them.
Note I have already cited B311 as an introductory …
Yes, you have already shown your misunderstanding of what he is saying. It is a limiting concept employed to curb pretensions of sensibility, that is, employed to distinguish between the way things are for us, which is the only way we can know things, and the way they are in themselves, which we cannot know. Kant is a transcendental idealist, that is, with regard to the conditions that make experience possible.
Thus there is no thing-in-itself in the positive [Constitutive] sense anywhere!
That is correct, but the conclusion you draw from it is wrong. To say that it is not constitutive means that it is not something we constitute via our faculties as an object of knowledge. In other words, what is constituted as an object of knowledge is not a thing in itself. Once again, it is not a denial of things in themselves but of our possible knowledge of things in themselves. He marks a limitation on what can be known not on what is.
You are attributing ontological claims to him
I have stated my times, Kant condemned 'ontology' [his definition] so the issue of ontology should not be raised at all.
I am using the term ontology in the sense of claims about what is and is not, about what exists and does not exist. You are making claims about what is not, which is an ontological claim, and making the mistake of treating a negative concept as if it meant things in themselves are not, when all that it means is that things in themselves are not objects of knowledge.
From what I gathered from your posting, your views are that of an Empirical Idealist.
Your belief of reality is this;
1. Appearance is representation of that-which-appears
2. that-which-appears is the real thing
3. that which appears [thing-in-itself] is external and independent of the human conditions.
You keep retreating to an attack on a position I do not hold.
The issue is with 'that-which-appears' the realists' thing-in-itself.
As I have said several times, this is the realist’s mistake that Kant addresses.
Philosophically what we are more interested in 'substance' [not ontological] rather than the forms.
Philosophically both the concept of substance and forms are suspect.
It is more realistic to state Pluto is a bundle of energy than to say Pluto is a dwarf planet.
Thus there is no such thing as Pluto-in-itself independent of its various forms of realities.
You too are a bundle of energy but you are not Pluto. We can distinguish the one from the other. Energy is not a thing in itself either. You are spinning your wheels.
To you 'what-is-perceived' is something external to the human mind in a positive[?] terms.
A perception is not something external to the mind. What is perceived is a representation, but not a representation of nothing.
Your problem is while you like everyone else can understand mind-1 [ordinary externalness], you have problem reflecting and comprehending the level mind-2.
Your problem is that rather than address the serious problems with your interpretation that I have identified you falsely attribute things to me and then attack them as if it were a refutation of something I actually said. In addition to citing passages from Kant that you have ignored I have cited the work of well regarded contemporary Kantian scholars which you have also ignored
I stated Kant's Copernican Revolution is a starting point and implied there is nothing real except that which are conditioned by the human conditions.
It is not implied, that is what you incorrectly infer. It is your failure to heed the distinction between epistemology (claims about what is or can be known) and ontology (claims about what is) that has led to the mess you have made of Kant. Kant marks limits to what can be known in order to curtail illusory claims about what is, that is, what exists and does not exist.You fail to heed that distinction when you make claims about the non-existence of things in themselves.
Next I mentioned B311. i.e. the noumenon aka thing-in-itself cannot be asserted in the positive beyond the empirical
Yes, but you draw the wrong conclusion when you claim that there is no thing in itself.
Kant in CPR wrote:
At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility. B311
I believe the above is sufficient to support my point that all of reality is interdependent with the human conditions.
When you claim that all of reality is interdependent with the human conditions you are transgressing the limits Kant has established. There is an ambiguity to the term ‘reality’ that you have not addressed. It it is interdependent then there must be at least two factors - the human condition and something else that is not the human condition. It cannot be nothing for then there would be only the human condition without a co-dependent.
As I had mentioned there is no question of ontology in this case as far as Kant is concerned.
It would be more accurate to say that the question of ontology is put off limits my Kant. We cannot say what is, only how things are for us. When you say things in themselves do not exist you transgress that limit.
My point is when we refer to reality, we just state 'reality = knowing' or reality = being, without adding any predicate like reality =knowing that or knowing that which appears.
The question is whether Kant equates reality with knowing. This is just the kind of limit he claims is mistaken. See below regarding sensibility.
Note the Zen master when asked what is reality, the enlightened answer is merely 'Chop Wood Carry Water', i.e. do not try to be a smart alec to answer the what-is of reality.
And yet that is exactly what you are doing! Knowledge is the predicate of the copula 'is'.
Note I had claimed to study Kant full time for 3 years and gone through each word in the CPR [English translations] many times.
Yes, and I have refrained from commenting on how meaningless, clueless, and ridiculous this statement is.
Note how Wittgenstein [basis of Language Games] came to defend Kant re this counter [re On Certainty] to G E Moore re the scandal of the external world.
I believe it is quite an achievement to understand and made all these linkages.
It is not much of an achievement to compound your misunderstanding of Kant by appeal to your misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s language games stand in opposition to Kant’s categories. Knowledge is not determined in accord with fixed categories of the understanding. The “hinges” and “river beds” are not fixed, timeless, or universal. He is quite clear in saying that the river beds change over time. They are not transcendental conditions, but descriptive of how knowledge changes over time. Moore does not prove that he knows that he has hands, but this is not a reason to doubt that he does have hands. Our acceptance of the truth that he has hands is not grounded apodictically. He quotes Goethe:
In the beginning was the deed.
There are no “necessary Language Games we have to play with”. Logic, according to Wittgenstein, is arbitrary. There are no necessary rules of thought or language. Logic is descriptive of the language games we play.
I can assure you whatever issues that had cropped up against Kant I had dug very deep to be informed that I have not missed anything.
You may have convinced yourself, but your assurance means nothing. I prefer not to ignore what well regarded Kantian scholars who have been at it tenfold three years and much, much longer have said.
As I had argued that unknown-ground-of-appearance is still within the human mind …
And that is simply wrong. The unknown ground of appearance is not what is given in appearance, that is, it is not what the mind gives itself via the categories of the understanding. You have not cited a single scholarly source that supports your claims.

Kant says:

Further, this concept is necessary in order not to extend sensible intuition to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition (for the other things, to which sensibility does not reach, are called noumena just in order to indicate that those cognitions cannot extend
their domain to everything that the understanding thinks). (A 255)

Spectrum:
If you understood this unknown-ground-of-appearance cannot be taken in the positive sense [B311] then you would have understood it is merely a limit for negative use and it is an illusion if reified in any way.
And yet you go beyond this stricture when you say that it is nothing and does not exist in itself. Following a technique of Wittgenstein’s: suppose there were a tribe whose members were all blind. They would conclude that there is nothing to be seen because they cannot see. They mistakenly take their own limits as positive (even though stated negatively) claims about the world. Analogously, you are claiming that there can be nothing in itself (which is a positive claim) because we cannot know things in themselves.
In your case, I note yours is the very [dogmatic] view of an empirical idealist who view that-which-appears [which is not the representation as appearance] as independent of mind-1.
Once again you put words in my mouth in order to refute them rather than what I actually have said. We can only know what appears to us, but like the blind tribe, it would be wrong to conclude that there is nothing other than what appears.

Burning ghost:
It is not merely Spectrum’s “belief.” Kant says this. The confusion is most certainly one of ontological and epistemic conflation - which are inseperable and the root of many misunderstandings.
I have pointed out several times, twice here including in your quote, the confusion engendered by conflating ontological and epistemological claims. Kant is not making an ontological claim about things in themselves, for to do so would require knowledge of them. He puts such claims out of bounds. He denies that noumena are intelligible objects but does not deny noumena, for to do so would be to limit what is to what is knowable and thus make our limits, limits of the sensibility, limits of the world:
Now in this way our understanding acquires a negative expansion, i.e., it is not limited by sensibility, but rather limits it by calling things in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena. But it also immediately sets boundaries for itself, not cognizing these things through categories, hence merely thinking them under the name of an unknown something (A 256, B311).
Not limited by sensibility means that whatever is known through the senses does not limit what is. It is, rather, that sensibility is limited so as to not transgress its bounds and make false claims about what is (cf. the blind tribe). Beyond what can be known by sensibility is what he calls things in themselves, noumena, which are not cognized through the categories, but rather, name an unknown something. They are not objects of the understanding, but rather, not within the purview of the understanding. This raises obvious problems, but denying things in themselves does not resolve the problem. Noumena is not a “negative concept” in the way that a square circle is. It does not mark something that is not or cannot be because it is logically contradictory. Nor is a “negative concept” in the way that ‘flying pigs’ is a negative concept, that is, it is not a concept of something that is not. It is, rather, a concept without an object predicate, that is, it does not predicate anything about things in themselves. It should be kept in mind that for Kant existence is not a predicate.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 24th, 2018, 3:42 pm Spectrum:
I know very well Kant's definition of a 'realist' aligns very well with the 'Philosophical Realists' definition from Wiki.
The article lists seven distinct forms of philosophical realism. Kant’s use of the term cannot be the same as all of them.
I was referring the essential point i.e.
Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
Just like Heidegger, Kant was referring and critiqued this view as not tenable and Kant proposed his own view of empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
Note I have already cited B311 as an introductory …
Yes, you have already shown your misunderstanding of what he is saying. It is a limiting concept employed to curb pretensions of sensibility, that is, employed to distinguish between the way things are for us, which is the only way we can know things, and the way they are in themselves, which we cannot know. Kant is a transcendental idealist, that is, with regard to the conditions that make experience possible.
I believe the starting point is Kant's Copernican Revolution then B311, i.e.
Kant in CPR wrote:At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility. B311
Kant at this earlier phase did mention 'an unknown something' but the overriding point here is it cannot be anything positive.

Eventually [from B350 to B884] Kant proved in the later states from 'understanding' to 'pure reason' that 'an unknown something' which cannot be positive is a transcendental illusion.
For you, this "unknown something' is still something and because you do not accept it as an illusion, i.e. negative, then you are by inference accepting it as something 'positive' which Kant had rejected and warned in B311.

Note, there are still many detail complex arguments which Kant used to justify how that noumenon aka thing-in-itself eventually lead to an illusion, i.e. the Home of Illusion and transcendental "ideas."

My problem is how to present and explain those arguments to convince you what you are missing.
Your defense is based on B311 and thereabout but note the whole argument stretch to B884.

To counter your point and to present a decent short argument to justify my point, I will have to reread the whole of the CPR which I find is too tedious at present.

Since you admit you have not read the whole of the CPR, I would suggest you read the whole of the CPR a few times to justify your own view that there is 'something unknown' re the thing-in-itself. You can get the full picture from secondary sources.
Here is challenge; find me some quotes from B350 onward and nearer to B884 where Kant refer the thing-in-itself as 'something unknown' and/or possible in the positive sense.

It is getting too tedious as we are repeating the same issue over and over again thus I will give it a pass for now until I can find an effective presentation to justify my point, i.e. the thing-in-itself is ultimately an illusion [aka transcendental idea] and it is not something unknown in any positive sense. Looks like I will have to write a >20 page thesis to counter your view.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Correction from:
You can get the full picture from secondary sources.
to
You canNOT get the full picture from secondary sources.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Burning ghost »

Spectrum -

Tedious it may be. What needs to happen is to accept each has a different perspective of the text and explore both in earnest.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Fooloso4 »

Spectrum:
I was referring the essential point i.e.
Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Just like Heidegger, Kant was referring and critiqued this view as not tenable and Kant proposed his own view of empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
A “given object” is always an object given in sense perception. His criticism is based on taking things given in sense perception to be things as they are in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. Kant is not making an ontological claim about how things are in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. He puts such claims out of bounds. He is a transcendental idealist, that is, an idealist with regard to the conditions for the possibility of experience. What is necessary for the possibility of experience, says nothing about the way things are, only how they are for us.

From Strang’s Stanford Encyclopedia article “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”:
To this [transcendental] idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves [Dinge an sich selbst], which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. (A369)

Transcendental realism, according to this passage, is the view that objects in space and time exist independently of our experience of them, while transcendental idealism denies this. This point is reiterated later in the Critique when Kant writes:

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism. The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves [Sachen an sich selbst]. (A491/B519)[3]

Appearances exist at least partly in virtue of our experience of them, while the existence of things in themselves is not grounded in our experience at all (cf. A369, A492/B521, A493/B522). Kant calls transcendental realism the “common prejudice” (A740/B768) and describes it as a “common but fallacious presupposition” (A536/B564; cf. Allison 2004: 22). Transcendental realism is the commonsense pre-theoretic view that objects in space and time are “things in themselves”, which Kant, of course, denies.

...

Transcendental idealism is a form of empirical realism because it entails that we have immediate (non-inferential) and certain knowledge of the existence of objects in space merely through self-consciousness:

[…] external objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a species of my representations, whose objects are something only through these representations, but are nothing separated from them. Thus external things exist as well as my self, and indeed both exist on the immediate testimony of my self-consciousness, only with this difference: the representation of my Self, as the thinking subject is related merely to inner sense, but the representations that designate extended beings are also related to outer sense. I am no more necessitated to draw inferences in respect of the reality of external objects than I am in regard to the reality of my inner sense (my thoughts), for in both cases they are nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality. (A370–1)

Merely through self-conscious introspection I can know that I have representations with certain contents and since appearances are “nothing other than a species of my representations” this constitutes immediate and certain knowledge of the existence of objects in space.

Understanding transcendental idealism requires understanding the precise sense in which things in themselves are, and appearances are not, “external to” or “independent” of the mind and Kant draws a helpful distinction between two senses in which objects can be “outside me”:

But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself [Ding an sich selbst], exists distinct from us and sometimes merely that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance—in which it is taken in the proper psychological question about the reality of our outer intuition—we will distinguish empirically external objects from those that might be called “external” in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them “things that are to be encountered in space”. (A373)

In the transcendental sense, an object is “outside me” when its existence does not depend (even partly) on my representations of it. The empirical sense of “outside me” depends upon the distinction between outer and inner sense. Inner sense is the sensible intuition of my inner states (which are themselves appearances); time is the form of inner sense, meaning that all the states we intuit in inner sense are temporally ordered. Outer sense is the sensible intuition of objects that are not my inner states; space is the form of outer sense. In the empirical sense, “outer” simply refers to objects of outer sense, objects in space. Transcendental idealism is the view that objects in space are “outer” in the empirical sense but not in the transcendental sense. Things in themselves are transcendentally “outer” but appearances are not.
Spectrum:
Kant in CPR wrote:
At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility. B311

Kant at this earlier phase did mention 'an unknown something' but the overriding point here is it cannot be anything positive.
I discussed your misunderstanding of this in my last post. He did not say that the thing in itself cannot be anything positive but that we cannot affirm anything positive about it. Kant posits the existence of an unknown something but cannot affirm it. You can posit its non-existence but you cannot affirm it. What is at issue, however, is how we are to understand Kant’s position.
Eventually [from B350 to B884] Kant proved in the later states from 'understanding' to 'pure reason' that 'an unknown something' which cannot be positive is a transcendental illusion.
I ask for specifics and you respond by making a claim about what is said in 300 plus pages without any specifics from those pages.
For you, this "unknown something' is still something …
The unknown something is not hypostatized. He makes no claims about it. It is, as pointed out in an earlier post, a matter of humility. It is a rejection of the hubristic belief that what is must conform and is thus limited to the way we understand it. It is an unwitting form of anthropomorphism. Our limits are ours alone.
Your defense is based on B311 and thereabout but note the whole argument stretch to B884.
I have defended my position by citing not only the text but the work of highly regarded scholars, something you have not done.
… find me some quotes from B350 onward and nearer to B884 where Kant refer the thing-in-itself as 'something unknown' and/or possible in the positive sense.
Yes, let’s start with B350 and what is said about illusion:
Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only in judgments, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding. (B350)

A thing in itself, it should be obvious, is not a relation of an object to our understanding, it is not a judgment. No determination is possible of things in themselves. Nothing can be predicated of things in themselves (existence is not a predicate). Illusion arises when the “unknown something” is treated as if it were something known or knowable. Transcendental illusion is the result of:

“tak[ing] a subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts…for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves” (A297/B354).

Now one can indeed admit that something that may be outside us in the transcendental sense is the cause of our outer intuitions, but this is not the object we understand by the representation of matter and corporeal things; for these are merely appearances, i.e., mere modes of representation, which are always found only in us, and their reality, just as much as that of my own thoughts, rests on immediate consciousness. The transcendental object is equally unknown
in regard to inner and to outer sense. (A372)

But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself, exists distinct from us and sometimes merely something that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance - in which it is taken in the proper psychological question about the reality of our outer intuition - we will distinguish empirically external objects from those that might be
called "external" in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them "things that are to be encountered in space." (A373)

For that it should exist in itself without relation to our senses and possible experience, could of course be said if we were talking about a thing in itself. But what we are talking about is merely an appearance in space and time, neither of which is a determination of things in themselves, but only of our sensibility; hence what is in them (appearances) are not something in itself, but mere representations, which if they are not given in us (in perception) are encountered nowhere at all. (B522)
Now find me some quotes where he says that a thing in itself is an illusion.

Spectrum:
To counter your point and to present a decent short argument to justify my point, I will have to reread the whole of the CPR which I find is too tedious at present.
Translation: you either can’t or won’t justify your point. Anyone reading this is supposed to just take your word for it without supporting evidence from either the text or secondary sources.
You canNOT get the full picture from secondary sources.
I agree, but this does not mean that secondary sources should be ignored. They can be a useful tool as a check on our own interpretations. Unlike you I do not insist that my interpretation is right, but also unlike you I have shown, I am in good company.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Spectrum »

Fooloso4 wrote: July 25th, 2018, 1:28 pm Spectrum:
I was referring the essential point i.e.
Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Just like Heidegger, Kant was referring and critiqued this view as not tenable and Kant proposed his own view of empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
A “given object” is always an object given in sense perception. His criticism is based on taking things given in sense perception to be things as they are in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. Kant is not making an ontological claim about how things are in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. He puts such claims out of bounds. He is a transcendental idealist, that is, an idealist with regard to the conditions for the possibility of experience. What is necessary for the possibility of experience, says nothing about the way things are, only how they are for us.
What is contentious between our views is 'the way things are'.

Kant in the early phases of his argument, temporarily provide for things-that-appear, i.e. 'the way things are'.
But ultimately in the context of the CPR that supposed 'thing' or thing-in-itself is an illusion if reified.
It is still a thing nevertheless, but that thing is an illusion, albeit can be useful for psychological and moral reasons.

From Strang’s Stanford Encyclopedia article “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”:
...
Appearances exist at least partly in virtue of our experience of them, while the existence of things in themselves is not grounded in our experience at all (cf. A369, A492/B521, A493/B522).
Kant calls transcendental realism the “common prejudice” (A740/B768) and describes it as a “common but fallacious presupposition” (A536/B564; cf. Allison 2004: 22). Transcendental realism is the commonsense pre-theoretic view that objects in space and time are “things in themselves”, which Kant, of course, denies.
I understand Kant's Transcendental Idealism directly from the CPR.
Transcendental Realism is equivalent to Philosophical Reason which Kant critiqued against.
Transcendental Realism is also Empirical Idealism.

You may disagree, but what I gathered from my inference is your view is not tending toward Transcendental Idealism.
Since you are not a transcendental Idealist then you must be a Transcendental Realist, i.e. in essence a Philosophical Realist.

Kant in CPR wrote:
At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility. B311
Kant at this earlier phase did mention 'an unknown something' but the overriding point here is it cannot be anything positive.
I discussed your misunderstanding of this in my last post. He did not say that the thing in itself cannot be anything positive but that we cannot affirm anything positive about it. Kant posits the existence of an unknown something but cannot affirm it. You can posit its non-existence but you cannot affirm it. What is at issue, however, is how we are to understand Kant’s position.
Note my view of the above is in the context of the whole CPR.

Note my argument, the supposed "it' that cannot be positive is merely a temporary 'that-which-appear'.
'Cannot affirm any positive beyond field of sensibility' mean one cannot affirm anything positive till infinity.

However, note in your thinking there is still 'that-which-appear' is still there regardless is putting a 'positive' spin to it in contrary to Kant's "there is nothing positive beyond sensibility."

Btw, the 'that-which-appear' when shifted to the field of pure understanding can be labelled as 'that-which-appear' but should be identify as 'that-which-is-thought.'

Kant subsequent argued in detail the "that" within 'that-which-is-thought' is an illusion.

This is in line with Heidegger's argument, there is no 'it' 'that' or 'what' re Being of beings, to Heidegger, Being is merely a possibility and potential not an 'it' or 'that'.
As I had mentioned Kant and Heidegger are going along the same path on this but Heidegger got lost.
Eventually [from B350 to B884] Kant proved in the later states from 'understanding' to 'pure reason' that 'an unknown something' which cannot be positive is a transcendental illusion.
I ask for specifics and you respond by making a claim about what is said in 300 plus pages without any specifics from those pages.
It is a common claim among academicians, a serious full time researcher need 3 years full time or 5 years part time to understand [not necessary agree) Kant fully. To get a good grasp of Kant I had to do those necessary times.
I have said, it is not easy for me to condense the point in a few posts.

Note this point, which I think you are susceptible to:
Kant in CPR wrote:A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.

Few have the versatility of mind to familiarise themselves with a new System; and owing to the general distaste for all innovation, still fewer have the inclination to do so.

If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with any freedom of expression.

In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole.
Bxliv
(nb: the above took me >10 minutes to find it - thus my complain of searching for quotes being time consuming)

Note one need to master the idea of the Whole of the CPR.
My point is you are taking passages torn from the whole contexts of the CPR, thus it is difficult to align with the real theme of the CPR
For you, this "unknown something' is still something …
The unknown something is not hypostatized. He makes no claims about it. It is, as pointed out in an earlier post, a matter of humility. It is a rejection of the hubristic belief that what is must conform and is thus limited to the way we understand it. It is an unwitting form of anthropomorphism. Our limits are ours alone.
My point is this "unknown something' is ultimately an illusion [Kant expressed it in many ways].
Your defense is based on B311 and thereabout but note the whole argument stretch to B884.
I have defended my position by citing not only the text but the work of highly regarded scholars, something you have not done.
That is the point. Note Kant critiqued of reliance on partial knowledge.
I used to rely totally on 'highly regarded' scholars and I have read many of such books on Kant.
I find these supposedly highly regarded scholars are not sufficient to get to the 'ultimate'. Note even Guyer and Allison who both had studied Kant for more than 50 years each still disagree with each other on who is right on Kant.
If you google Kant Morality, most and even academician will label Kant's morality as 'deontological' which is wrong.
That is why I have decided to rely directly from the CPR based on some serious work in reference to a wider range of philosophy, e.g. Eastern philosophy.
… find me some quotes from B350 onward and nearer to B884 where Kant refer the thing-in-itself as 'something unknown' and/or possible in the positive sense.
Yes, let’s start with B350 and what is said about illusion:
Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only in judgments, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding. (B350)
A thing in itself, it should be obvious, is not a relation of an object to our understanding, it is not a judgment. No determination is possible of things in themselves. Nothing can be predicated of things in themselves (existence is not a predicate). Illusion arises when the “unknown something” is treated as if it were something known or knowable. Transcendental illusion is the result of:

“tak[ing] a subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts…for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves” (A297/B354).

Now one can indeed admit that something that may be outside us in the transcendental sense is the cause of our outer intuitions, but this is not the object we understand by the representation of matter and corporeal things; for these are merely appearances, i.e., mere modes of representation, which are always found only in us, and their reality, just as much as that of my own thoughts, rests on immediate consciousness. The transcendental object is equally unknown
in regard to inner and to outer sense. (A372)

But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself, exists distinct from us and sometimes merely something that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance - in which it is taken in the proper psychological question about the reality of our outer intuition - we will distinguish empirically external objects from those that might be
called "external" in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them "things that are to be encountered in space." (A373)

For that it should exist in itself without relation to our senses and possible experience, could of course be said if we were talking about a thing in itself. But what we are talking about is merely an appearance in space and time, neither of which is a determination of things in themselves, but only of our sensibility; hence what is in them (appearances) are not something in itself, but mere representations, which if they are not given in us (in perception) are encountered nowhere at all. (B522)
Note Kant's CPR is divided into three main stages, i.e.
  • 1. Sensibility and the empirical
    2. Pure Understanding
    3. Pure Reason
    • OK there are still quotes re something unknown after B350 but they are still related to the field of sensibility [stage 1].
      Note I mentioned nearer to B884 where Kant has shifted to the stages of the Pure Understanding and Pure Reason.
      Now find me some quotes where he says that a thing in itself is an illusion.
      There are many but note my complain about time required for me to produce them in a theme.
      But I have produced B397 which is a good point to link thing-in-itself as ultimately an illusion.
      Kant in CPR wrote:There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

      These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.

      They [thing-in-itself as ideas] are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
      B397
      Note my point, the temporary 'that-which-appears' is that-which-thought within Pure Understand and that-which-is-thought with inclination to reify is an illusion within Pure Reason.

      Kant has reduced the whole of sensibility as one object of the Pure Understanding as a thing-in-itself thus no more 'that-which-appears'.
      From there Pure Reason [pseudo_ly] generated only 3 ideas i.e. things-in-itself which is the supposedly false ontological God, Soul, THE Universe which are all illusions. There is nothing else for you to think of besides the above. The most is you can apply faith on these 'illusions' aka the thing-in-itself.
      To counter your point and to present a decent short argument to justify my point, I will have to reread the whole of the CPR which I find is too tedious at present.
      Translation: you either can’t or won’t justify your point. Anyone reading this is supposed to just take your word for it without supporting evidence from either the text or secondary sources.
      Note Kant's point;
      Kant in CPR wrote:In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others [i.e. secondary sources], such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole.
      Bxliv
      I am confident I have mastered the whole theme of the CPR but I am not in tip-top condition with all the details within at present unless I reread the CPR or the stakes are high.
      You canNOT get the full picture from secondary sources.
      I agree, but this does not mean that secondary sources should be ignored. They can be a useful tool as a check on our own interpretations. Unlike you I do not insist that my interpretation is right, but also unlike you I have shown, I am in good company.
      [/quote]
      Note I have done a thorough literature review of Kantian Philosophy and finding them insufficient and unsatisfactory, thus I have embarked to research Kant full time [nb:] for 3+ years. My 'Kant Directory' folder my PC has 1900++ files in 34 folders.
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Re: Heidegger: All Prior Western Views of Being Are Wrong!

Post by Burning ghost »

Spectrum and Fool -

Can we just simply sum this up and say what we can never know (lack the capacity to know) is no thing. What we do not know and have the potential to know (no matter how unlikely) we are still able to know given exposure.

If we can only know via Kantian intuitions then anything that lies beyond is no thing to us. The “illusion” is assuming we can know what we lack the facilities to comprehend.

Even a congenially blind person can appreciate to some small degree the meaning of colour without ever expereincing colour sensations. If all humans were born blind we’d still be able to appreciate the idea of “colour” without anyone experiencing colour.

“Noumenon” is the ter Kant uses to make distinctions about these ideas.
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Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021