Heidegger versus Husserl

[Spectrum]

What is the critical difference between Heidegger and Husserl?

We can easily understand the difference between the Philosophical Realist versus Philosophical Anti-Realists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

I understand Heidegger did not accept the specific concept of intentionality and intersubjectivity of Husserl but have not grasped the real issue involved.

Anyone can present a summarized version of the essential difference?

[Spectrum]

This is what I gathered from Heidegger's Being and Time on why he discounted Husserl's view and antithetic to his Question and Meaning of Being.

Here is where Heidegger commented on Husserl's views;

10. How the Analytic of Da-sein is to be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology
After a theme for investigation has been initially outlined in positive terms, it is always important to show what is to be ruled out, although it can easily become unfruitful to discuss what is not going to happen.

We must show that all previous questions and investigations* which aim at Da-sein fail to see the real philosophical problem, regardless of their factual productivity.
Thus, as long as they persist in this attitude, they may not claim to be able to accomplish what they are fundamentally striving for at all.

One of our first tasks will be to show that the point of departure from an initially given ego and subject totally fails to see the phenomenal content of Da-sein.
Every idea of a "subject" -unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character- still posits the subjectum (hupokeimenon) ontologically along with it, no matter how energetic one's ontic protestations against the "substantial soul" or the "reification of consciousness."

But along with Dilthey and Bergson, all the directions of "personalism" and all tendencies toward a philosophical anthropology influenced by them share these limits.
The phenomenological interpretation of personality is in principle more radical and transparent; but it does not reach the dimension of the question of being in Da-sein, either.
Despite all their differences in questioning, development, and orientation of their worldviews, the interpretations of personality found in Husserl and Scheler agree in what is negative.
They no longer ask the question about the "being of the person."

We choose Scheler's interpretation as an example, not only because it is accessible in print, 3 but because he explicitly emphasizes the being of the person as such, and attempts to define it by defining the specific being of acts as opposed to everything "psychical."

BT47-48

So it appears that Heidegger did not agree with Husserl because Husserl do not ask the question about the "being of the person"?
True or not?

Heidegger also accused Kant had also ignored the question of beings and Being of beings. I have argued in the other thread Heidegger has misunderstood Kant.

Did Heidegger misunderstand Husserl?
Any one from the Husserlian camp to dispute that and what are the justifications?

[Burning ghost]

Heidegger didn’t recognise the impossible task of reducing being to some content. He was concerned with the idea of reaching a final answer to his question which he appears to assume he could do by not answering it and merely interpreting it by playing aroudn with etymology.

Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and Heidegger is it’s Icarus. One was cautious in reaching too far and the other thought he was flying when he fell.

[Spectrum]

Heidegger didn’t recognise the impossible task of reducing being to some content. He was concerned with the idea of reaching a final answer to his question which he appears to assume he could do by not answering it and merely interpreting it by playing around with etymology.

Kant made the following daring claim;

In this enquiry [thesis of CPR] I have made Completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied.
Axii

I agree Heidegger got lost in his own Question and Meaning of Being and thus did not come near to Kant's claim.

Husserlian may claim Heidegger is way off in his critique of Husserl, but I don't think Husserl presented a complete system of metaphysics like that of Kant's.
If disagree what the justification?

Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and Heidegger is it’s Icarus. One was cautious in reaching too far and the other thought he was flying when he fell.

I understand Husserl brought phenomenology to prominence.

However there are some who claim Kant was in a way the Father of Phenomenology in this sense;

PHENOMENOLOGY
"Phenomenology" is a term that has been used in as many widely varying senses in modern philosophy as has the term that names the subject matter of this science, "phenomena."

Johann Heinrich Lambert, a German philosopher contemporary with Immanuel Kant, first spoke of a discipline that he called "phenomenology" in his Neues Organon (Leipzig, 1764). He took "phenomenon" to refer to the illusory features of human experience and hence defined phenomenology as the "theory of illusion."

Kant himself used "phenomenology" only twice, but he gave a new and broader sense to "phenomenon" that, in turn, resulted in a redefinition of "phenomenology." Kant distinguished objects and events as they appear in our experience from objects and events as they are in themselves, independently of the forms imposed on them by our cognitive faculties. The former he called "phenomena"; the latter, "noumena," or "things-in-themselves." All we can ever know, Kant thought, are phenomena.

https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities ... nomenology

[Spectrum]

Phenomenology, together with Marxism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, dominated philosophy in the twentieth century—and Edmund Husserl is usually thought to have been the first to develop the concept. His views influenced a variety of important later thinkers, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who eventually turned phenomenology away from questions of knowledge.

But in this significant new work, Tom Rockmore argues for a return to phenomenology’s origins in epistemology and does so by locating its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant.

https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/book ... 54821.html

[Burning ghost]

In the modern sense of the term, in philosophy, Kant is nowhere. Husserl is the person who started the phenomenological movement in the early 20th century. Kant used the same word, that is where the commonality ends.

Hussel isn’t in the same ballpark as either the kind of question Kant was posing about reason, or Heidegger’s obsession with interpretation; meaning nothing was nailed down. There are plenty of gaps in my understanding of Husserl because I’ve only read a minute of what he wrote. I believe his most acclaimed work was “Logical Investigatons”, which I bought recently, but haven’t had the time to study properly.

[Spectrum]

In
Being-in-the-World
A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I

Hubert L. Dreyfus contrasted Heidegger's BT as different from Husserl an antithetic to the study of Being.
Here are some points from his book;

• Basically he seeks to show that one cannot have a theory of what makes theory possible. If he is right about this, his analysis calls into question one of the deepest and most pervasive assumptions accepted by traditional philosophers from Plato to Descartes to Kant to Edmund Husserl, Heidegger’s own mentor.
  
  Heidegger developed his hermeneutic phenomenology in opposition to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.
  Husserl had reacted to an earlier crisis in the foundations of the human sciences by arguing that the human sciences failed because they did not take into account intentionality--the way the individual mind is directed at objects by virtue of some mental content that represents them.
  He [Husserl] developed an account of man as essentially a consciousness with self-contained meanings, which he called intentional content.
  According to Husserl, this mental content gives intelligibility to everything people encounter.
  Heidegger countered that there was a more basic form of intentionality than that of a self-sufficient individual subject directed at the world by means of its mental content.
  At the foundation of Heidegger’s new approach is a phenomenology of "mindless" everyday coping skills as the basis of all intelligibility.
  
  Thus Heidegger breaks with Husserl and the Cartesian tradition by substituting for epistemological questions concerning the relation of the knower and the known ontological questions concerning what sort of beings we are and how our being is bound up with the intelligibility of the world.
  
  But his critique of Husserl and the Cartesian tradition is more radical.
  Unlike the formalizers, Heidegger introduces an analysis of intentionality or meaning that leads him to question both meaningless formal models and the traditional claim that the basic relation of the mind to the world is a relation of a subject to objects by way of mental meanings.
  
  Heidegger is definitely not saying what Peter Strawson rather condescendingly finds "plausible" in Heidegger’s works, namely, that we each have an "unreflective and largely unconscious grasp of the basic general structure of interconnected concepts or categories in terms of which we think about the world and ourselves.” 6
  This would make our understanding of the world into a belief system entertained by a subject, exactly the view that Husserl and all cognitivists hold and that Heidegger rejects.
  
  Since, as Heidegger holds, getting the right approach is crucial, we must stop here to get the right approach to Dasein.
  "Dasein" in colloquial German can mean "everyday human existence," and so Heidegger uses the term to refer to human being.
  But we are not to think of Dasein as a conscious subject.
  Many interpreters make just this mistake. They see Heidegger as an "existential phenomenologist," which means to them an edifying elaboration of Husserl.
  
  Thus Heidegger rejects the methodological individualism that extends from Descartes to Husserl to existentialists such as the preMarxist Sartre and many contemporary American social philosophers.
  
  Heidegger, however, warns explicitly against thinking of Dasein as a Husserlian meaning-giving transcendental subject:
  "One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is primarily given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein (72) [46]

[Spectrum]

Phenomenology (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness.
As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany. It then spread to France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's early work.
-wiki

Based on what I have gathered of Husserl, it seem that Husserl's Phenomenology is very limited to human experience and consciousness, while Kant and Heidegger are interested in and addressed the ultimate of the Being of beings.

If Husserl did not made the attempt to explain the Being of beings, [did he?] there is no point in a serious comparison between Heidegger [or Kant] against Husserl.
Any comments on this view.

[Burning ghost]

If you can, or anyone else, explain what is meant by Being of beings with greater clarity it would be helpful.

Husserl wasn’t concerned with some ultimate answer. If you think we’re not “limited to human experience and consciousness” then explain how this is so in non-human terms please ... ergo whatever you meant sounds like drivel to me.

[Spectrum]

If you can, or anyone else, explain what is meant by Being of beings with greater clarity it would be helpful.

Husserl wasn’t concerned with some ultimate answer. If you think we’re not “limited to human experience and consciousness” then explain how this is so in non-human terms please ... ergo whatever you meant sounds like drivel to me.

Every phenomena has its 'noumena'
This it the same as every phenomena has it individual being [with small b].
For humans, it is claimed each individual being is its soul or dasein.
Thus the phenomena world [including humans] are represented by beings.

From an ontological point of view,
the quest is to find the ultimate being of all these beings,
thus the Being of all beings.

True as I have always maintain what is ultimate is there is no escape from the human conditions. This default is in the background and considered where relevant in context and one should not keep harping on it out of context.
This is why I argued [with Fooloso4], i.e. even if it is an empirically fact i.e. 'the moon pre-existed humans' in one perspective this cannot escape the above default of human entanglement in that factual empirical conclusion.

The question of "the Being of beings" is within this default but should not be conflated with the default while question is deliberated within a certain specific context.

If Husserl context is the same as Heidegger is proposing than Husserl's view is off.
Perhaps it was Heidegger who forced his own contexts upon Husserl's specific context thus a straw man.
I am not confident with my view on this since I have not read Husserl thoroughly to understand whatever the context he is using.

[Spectrum]

Arrhh .. cannot edit errors sighted.

[Burning ghost]

The thing is Heidegger forgets he is dealign with words, or thinks words are more than experience. He is obsessed with media of words as “being” and the word “being” as something unquestioned - the question of the “question” has been around since philosophy.

He stretches language too far.

[Burning ghost]

To add Husserl, as far as I can tell, wasn’t concrned with “noumena.” He was concerned with experience in an “about-ness” - that is where Heidegger’s terminological gymnastic come in handy for explicating some of Husserl’s more obscure writings.

What we know of some proposed “noumena” is known as a item we engage with - hence intentionality. Heidegger again helps explain this with his reference to car doors I believe. When you hear a car door slammed shut you don’t hear the sound of a car door being shut, you hear the car door shutting - “intentionality” is a frame of reference, “noumena” is presumed prior to in an ontological sense but not an experiential sense; and again the language really gets sketchy hee because as we step into this territory more and more explication through worded discourse are needed for precision (soemthing Kant remarked on) yet to go too far causes complete nonsensical drivel: Heidegger enters the scene here by presenting multiple terms and uses this problem as a weapon against the reader.

[Spectrum]

I have not put in the necessary amount of time and effort on Heidegger [3 months full time] and Husserl [scanning secondary sources] thus whatever views I state on their philosophy has to carry the above reservations.
Where I have put in the a reasonable amount of time and effort as with Kant, Buddhism, and Islam, I would dare to assert more confidently.

I am hoping anyone who has put in reasonable time and effort to understand Husserl reasonably will contribute something but I do not have to agree blindly. Rather it will be new perspective I can work on to increase my knowledge database.

[ThomasHobbes]

To add Husserl, as far as I can tell, wasn’t concrned with “noumena.” He was concerned with experience in an “about-ness” - that is where Heidegger’s terminological gymnastic come in handy for explicating some of Husserl’s more obscure writings.

What we know of some proposed “noumena” is known as a item we engage with - hence intentionality. Heidegger again helps explain this with his reference to car doors I believe. When you hear a car door slammed shut you don’t hear the sound of a car door being shut, you hear the car door shutting - “intentionality” is a frame of reference,

The car door has no intention. You hear the invisible person shutting the door.