Do you think some people would find it ironic to learn you were a hip hop MC considering the harsh criticisms you have for the popular music industry with particular mention of rap? Still, I assume that you were part of the more alternative style of the hip-hop scene, of which I am actually a fan.
I believe you have made some changes to the price or availability of your book? Can you update us on that?
Do you have any plans to write another book? If so, about what?
Before moving on, I do want to apologize for the delay in my response. Now I will ask you about some particular arguments, assumptions and parts of your book.
In part 3 of the book you address some topics to do with selfishness, selflessness and love that have been of great interest to me. I agree about--with what I feel is your point--so-called selfless action generally being indirectly motivated by self-interest. For illustration, consider the following from page 42: (All page numbers refer to the copy of book I have.)
Ben Houghton wrote:The feel good factor involved in selfless acts is also highly reported yet research by William Harbaugh and Ulrich Mayr (2007) used brain imaging to reveal the positive effects on the individual when donating to charities again showing that the personal gain from this euphoric feeling would be the dominant factor in charitable giving.
And on page 43 you sum it up:
Ben Houghton wrote:...for every perceived selfless deed there is an underlying dominant desire for personal gain.
However, from there you lose me. While the statement above may be true, it seems that you then argue from the premise that we are inherently selfish and thus in various forms and ways must accept, embrace or workaround our selfishness. Is that how you feel? But I believe that creates a false dichotomy between selflessness and selfishness. I have explained my thoughts on this before:
"Is selfishness compatible with kindness?" In this case, we may see that a kind person commended by others as "unselfish" is kind as a means to a personal end, namely the good feelings the do-gooder feels. However, we can still distinguish between kind and unkind people and between unselfish and selfish people, i.e. between people who have sympathetic reactions conducive to charitablity as opposed to people closer to sociopathy/psychopathy. As such, I think it is incorrect to say people are all selfish let alone inherently so. In other words, I agree that nobody is selfless in a literal sense of the word, but I do not think that means everyone is selfish. What do you think?
Moving on to the topic of love, you seem to take a skeptical or perhaps even cynical view on this--which of course is not a big leap from your comments on selflessness and selfishness. For instance, take this from page 46:
Ben Houghton wrote:Euphoria created by endorphin release for example, when understood loses the mysticism which surrounds the myth of love.
Please excuse me for not bothering to cite many of the specific things you say with which I agree or logic which I find valid, as this would be a boring piece to read if it was just me quoting sentence by sentence writing I agree between each. Anyway with the sentence quoted above I would accuse you of being at risk of making a fallacy of composition. Indeed the basic physics of love from a molecular or even evolutionary level may be understood to some degree, each part of it being not so special to most people. However, put it all together and look at it holistically and it is still no less special to me. Does your favorite food not taste good just because we can explain why and how the feelings occur biochemically? So it is I think with love. We can explain physically why and how it occurs, but that does mean it doesn't exist, we don't feel it or that it isn't just as special; I think.
Philosophically, I think love can be measured best by sacrifice. Put a loving husband in a situation where he must choose between saving his own life or his beloved wife's, for the sake of argument say he knows for sure he can save one and only one, and I believe it is not uncommon for him to choose to save his wife's. Do you not agree? If you do, then how does that fit in with your ideas regarding love and selfishness? For instance you write on page 47, granted in a particular, different context: "I claim that intimate partner relationships are ultimately selfish."
Ultimately, I still think overall I agree with your conclusions as I understand in that part of the book, part 3. For instance, you seem to advocate for a openly self-interested economy--and more broadly speaking society--in which people are not expected to act selflessly or be charitable, which, as many economic conservatives and libertarians have argued for centuries, arguably leads to voluntary and thus peaceful mutually beneficial interactions. Is that a fair representation of your views? If so, I very much agree and think as stated it is a very agreeable statement of political philosophy.
Moving on, you make an interesting point in part 4 of the book, more specifically on page 56. You argue that atheists generally want to have funerals, that they do so in a way that implies it isn't just for their family and friend's emotional sake, and that this is evidence atheists generally do believe in some spiritually supernatural thing, afterlife or a certain, in your words, "something else." Why do you believe atheists usually want to have funerals? What percentage of atheists do you estimate could care less what happens to their body after death save for their family and friend's emotional state. Your essay does not depend on these points, but they stuck out to me a little because I am an atheist, I have no desire for a funeral, ceremony or service about my death and my only concern about what's done with my body are that I am an organ donor and I want my family to occur as little expense as possible, hopefully none. Still, I know of no evidence that I am a fair representation of most, many or even just a few atheists. Maybe almost all do want funeral. But I am curious as to what made you believe that they do.
Later in this part of the book you address the problem of divorce. I do think there is some advantage to making it harder for people to get divorce, and thus making marriage/civil-union a more significant commitment. You also wisely point out some of the negative outcomes more prone to children of divorce. However, in addition to the general common risk of mistaking correlation for causality superficially, this error occur more fundamentally. For instance, you may be able to show that children of divorce tend to be worse off because they are children of divorce than children of parents who choose to stay together because there parents stay together. But the causality may stop there. It could still be the case that the children of divorce are worse off because they have been born to parents who will if they can choose to get divorced, but that does not mean they would be any better off if there parents were forced to stay together. In other words, it is not because in itself that their parents get divorced that they are worse off or because there parents are together that they are better off. Rather, it is because there parents have a relationship that is healthy enough that they would choose if given the choice to stay together. In fact, with the lack of evidence to the contrary, I think if anything the causal relationship is the opposite. Sure the children of parents who would choose to get divorced may do worse off than children of parents who would choose to stay together, but I suspect they would be even worse off if there parents are forced to stay together when they would choose to separate if they could than if there parents were allowed to separate. I imagine a lot of the causal, negative influences--like being exposed to their parents destructive fighting--on children of divorced parents are actually exacerbated by making them stay together. Of course, that is only a speculation or rough guess; I could be very wrong. But do you know of any evidence to the contrary, that shows a
causal relationship between parents getting divorced and negative outcomes for children--beyond even the possibility that the causal factor is that the parents want to get divorced with the actual divorce being correlated to that desire?
In most of your essays you intentionally refuse to address arguments pertaining to freedom. So I agree with many of your points and arguments in your essays insofar as we are not addressing the issue of freedom. But most of your suggestions I would not support because they would infringe on freedom. (This may be a testament to the accuracy of my compliments in regards to your organization.)
One of your biggest objections to modern democracy is that you believe it is more or less a disguised dictatorship, with power being given to one elected individual. Is that a correct paraphrasing of your beliefs? I'm not as familiar with the UK political structure as I am with the US, but I know this is not the case with the US. The United States uses a constitution and power is divided into 3 branches of government. If anything, I think the legislative branch has more power than the executive branch. For instance, George Bush campaigned on being opposed to gay marriage yet was unable to get it federally banned. Surely any kind of dictator could do something as simple as that.
Yet I question if even you are proposing a dictator despite saying that you are. For instance, consider this:
Ben Houghton wrote:There is a threat that each leader would only last the minimum term of governance as the next dictator would promise simply what the people want in exchange for the power of governance. This contradicts the definition that a leader is in power to provide the greatest good for the people and this threat can be countered by granting unlimited terms of governance based on continually falling rates in key areas of crime, unemployment and so forth.
Couldn't the dictator simply fudge the numbers? If the dictator couldn't, then isn't the dictator not a dictator?
In regards to government-enforced standardization of clothing and baby naming:
Ben Houghton wrote:To summarize the reduction of choice regarding identity and expression of personal identity is weighted against the potential for negative incorrect stereotyping which results in harmful social activity.
On this issue of freedom, I think this is borderline circular reasoning. Freedom advocates--such as myself--argue for freedom because it enables people to decide whether--in their view--the benefits of A outweigh B or vice versa. If the parents believe that choosing a certain name will cause more trouble for the children than help, then they presumably wouldn't give that name to their child. The issue of freedom deals greatly with the point that the government doesn't know best and what is best for one is not necessarily best for all.
Ben Houghton wrote:I do not believe that there are valid objections to the reduction of choice which provide a similar solution for the removal of these stereotypes. I am not arguing for removal of personal identity in its entirety but instead I am arguing that a restriction of the public expression of personal identity is of paramount importance to social reunification.
Why do we need to remove these stereotypes so much as to sacrifice the benefits of freedom? Aren't these sterotypes already on the way out? What exactly is social reunification and why is it more important than the benefits of freedom and the pleasure of personal choice and personal expression?
On page 97 in regard to freedom of entertainment, you acknowledge one of the negative impacts of restrictions on freedom: the black market. Why would we believe that such negative results of restricting freedom are worth it? Even if we agree with your arguments in the previous part of the book, for instance that consuming certain entertainment is psychologically unhealthy, how does that make it worth outlawing? Those who support freedom often do so because they believe that outlawing an allegedly unhealthy activity--from consuming violent, sex-ridden media to consuming drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, prostitution, and fast food. Proponents of freedom often hold one, two or all three of these ideas: (1) the government is worse than the individuals engaging in an activity at determining whether the cost/unhealthiness is greater or less than the gains/positive-effects of the activity for the individuals engaging in the activity, (2) one man's trash is another man's treasure meaning the pros may outweigh the cons for one person but not another depending on their subjective desires, and (3) letting people engage voluntarily engage in unhealthy activities is better then initiating violence by forcing our will on them. In other words, one could accept your arguments with such momentum that they believe giving a child a non-standard/non-traditional name or producing or watching violent, sex-ridden TV is as unhealthy or anti-social or dangerous as selling dope, gambling and sexually prostituting oneself. This still doesn't say anything towards why it warrants limiting freedom. For instance, I would maintain freedom is preferable regardless. Indeed, I have argued for the legalization of all those things (see:
prostitution,
homosexual civil unions,
marijuana,
alcohol,
all drugs,
paying employees poorly or choosing to work for low pay, and
gambling), so even if you convince me that violent music is as bad as cocaine, I won't want it generally outlawed by the government. Many others likely feel differently, and their support of your final conclusions would rest more on the degree to which they are convinced that the activity to be heavily regulated or outlawed is harmful, antisocial, dangerous or correlated to negative outcomes in society. But I am interested to here more on your ideas regarding freedom generally.
To paraphrase the man who first called himself an anarchist almost two centuries ago, I believe
liberty is the mother not the daughter of order and prosperity. Indeed, when free from the constraints of governance, dictatorship, the initiation of violence and offensive coercion, I believe people are prone to voluntarily engage in sophisticated systems of those
mutually beneficial interactions as referenced previously. It is this kind of freedom-supporting political philosophy on which I would love to have your comments in the context of your book.
I hope you don't mind me getting so much into some of the issues your book has raised.
Thanks very much!
Scott