Vitalism in Biology

[Quotidian]

'Vitalism' is a philosophical view which is generally rejected by modern biologists. It has a long history in philosophy and science, and is still encountered in various systems of thought. A brief definition is as follows:

Vitalists hold that living organisms are fundamentally different from non-living entities because they contain some non-physical element or are governed by different principles than are inanimate things. In its simplest form, vitalism holds that living entities contain some fluid, or a distinctive ‘spirit’. In more sophisticated forms, the vital spirit becomes a substance infusing bodies and giving life to them; or vitalism becomes the view that there is a distinctive organization among living things¹.

The above definition actually contains three very different descriptions of what vitalism consists of.

* The first is the idea of a 'non-physical element'. That might be comparable to ether or to phlogiston, which used to be thought to account for fire (which we now know doesn't exist).

* The second idea is a 'substance that infuses bodies' - which sounds rather similar to a 'non-physical element'. I personally don't think there is such a thing as a 'non-physical element'.

* The third idea is that 'there is a distinctive organisation among living things'.

Now, I think this third idea is obviously true - indisputable, in fact. The level of organisation in even single-celled life-forms is orders of magnitude more complex than the most complex inorganic substances. (This is *not* an argument for intelligent design, by the way.) So I posit that there is an ontological distinction between living and non-living things. That means that living things cannot be understood solely in terms of the rules governing non-living matter; there are principles or laws at work which are not found at the lower levels.

So in summary, I don't think there are 'vital spirits', but I also don't accept the mainstream scientific view that believes living things can be understood solely in terms of physics and chemistry; I think there another factor.

[A Poster He or I]

Now, I think this third idea is obviously true - indisputable, in fact. The level of organisation in even single-celled life-forms is orders of magnitude more complex than the most complex inorganic substances. (This is *not* an argument for intelligent design, by the way.)

This third principle is known in biology as autopoiesis (although this thread is the first time I've ever encountered it in terms of vitalism!). A fair number of contemporary biologists consider autopoiesis to be not only the principle of organization utilized by living systems, but in fact consider it the best definition for life itself. I agree with this myself.

(An easy but comprehensive layman's introduction to autopoiesis is Fritjof Capra's book The Web of Life. Capra adds his own subtle distinctions between autopoiesis as the organizing principle and dissipative capacity as the structural principle, but to me he is just splitting hairs).

So I posit that there is an ontological distinction between living and non-living things. That means that living things cannot be understood solely in terms of the rules governing non-living matter; there are principles or laws at work which are not found at the lower levels.

I agree with your 2nd sentence here, but I don't believe that it follows from your 1st sentence, which I disagree with. An ontological distinction is exactly what is NOT present in considering autopoiesis as the distinguishing organizational feature of living versus non-living things, because autopoiesis makes use only of the properties of physics > chemistry, just operating in highly complex interrelationships that can yield emergent feedback-based behavior. It is the property of emergence that is the distinction of autopoietic behavior. Its principles and laws --while not found at the lower component levels-- are nevertheless analyzable by complexity theory as emergent properties.

So in summary, I don't think there are 'vital spirits', but I also don't accept the mainstream scientific view that believes living things can be understood solely in terms of physics and chemistry; I think there another factor.

Physics and chemistry are traditionally reductionistic sciences so to that extent you are correct: they are insufficient in themselves for modeling autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is an emergent effect, so reductionism is not going to illuminate much. Complexity theory is not reductionistic, but holistic and well suited to modeling feedback-based open systems; so it is the formalism best suited for approaching autopoiesis scientifically.

[Quotidian]

Thanks! Good feedback. I read Tao of Physics in the first edition, Uncommon Wisdom much later, but seemed to have missed the Web of Life (parts online here. )

From the link above:

The first obvious difference between machines and organisms is the fact that machines are constructed, whereas organisms grow. This fundamental difference means that… understanding organisms must be process-oriented. For example, it is impossible to convey an accurate picture of a cell by means of static drawings or by describing the rate picture of a cell by means of static drawings or by describing the cell in static forms. Cells, like all living systems, have to be understood in terms of processes reflecting the system's dynamic organization. Whereas the activities of a machine are determined by its structure, the relation is reversed in organisms - organic structure is determined by processes.

(Emphasis added.)

Now, I would have thought that 'the fundamental difference' that is referred to in the second sentence does, in fact, constitute a difference in kind - or an ontological distinction! (Recall that 'ontology' is derived from the present participle of the verb εἰμί, eimi, i.e. "to be, I am'. So strictly speaking, 'ontology' is not simply the study of 'what exists', but of the nature of being - a difficult distinction to draw in contemporary English, but a real distinction nonetheless.)

The problem I have is that rejection of the notion of an ontological distinction implies a return to the one-dimensional model of beings as simply 'a configuration of molecules'. Elsewhere, Capra rejects this idea:

Life, then, is not all about molecules. It is much more about patterns of relationships among specific processes. These processes of life include, most importantly, the spontaneous emergence of new order, which is the basis of life’s inherent creativity. Moreover, the life processes are associated with the cognitive dimension of life, and the emergence of new order includes the emergence of language and consciousness.

Where does the human spirit come into this picture? To answer this question, it will be useful to remember the original meaning of “spirit.” The Latin spiritus means “breath,” which is also true for the related Latin word anima, the Greek psyche, the Sanskrit atman, and the Hebrew ruah. The common meaning of these key terms indicates that the original meaning of “spirit” in many ancient philosophical and religious traditions, in the West as well as in the East, is “the breath of life.” ...

When we look at the world around us, we find that we are not thrown into chaos and randomness but are part of a great order, a grand symphony of life. Every molecule in our body was once a part of previous bodies–living or nonliving–and will be a part of future bodies. In this sense, our body will not die but will live on, again and again, because life lives on. Moreover, we share not only life’s molecules, but also its basic principles of organization with the rest of the living world. And since our mind, too, is embodied, our concepts and metaphors are embedded in the web of life together with our bodies and brains. Indeed, we belong to the universe, we are at home in it, and this experience of belonging can make our lives profoundly meaningful.²

(I wonder if this passage inspired the name for Kaufmann's 'At Home in the Universe'?)

Now this 'basic principle of organization' is of interest to me. I think there are parallels between that idea, and the ancient notion of 'logos'. Recall that 'logos' was one of the distinguishing characteristics of the sayings of Heraclitus (regarded as the first of the process philosophers). For Heraclitus, logos was the principle that animates and rules the world - although not from outside of it, as a demiurge, but from within, 'as the honey pervades the honeycomb'. Recall also that the logos was the very basis of the word 'logic'. So I think, as soon as you acknowledge that organising principle as fundamental, you have already moved away from materialism ³. And, I think, such principles exist on a different level to physical objects, as you obviouly can't see them directly, but only infer them on the basis of what you're observing. In that respect they're like the rules of logic, or the rules of a game: you 'observe' rules in a different way to 'observing' objects, as they constrain the kinds of moves you make, or the kinds of things you can say.

This also provides one with a useful basis for a theory of mind: because in this model, 'mind' is 'what recognizes patterns', with any kind of mind being able to recognize basic data (food! threat!) and rational minds being able to perceive the underlying patterns (ratio, logos.)

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3. Note that the materialist account does insist that the natural order can be understood in terms of molecules alone. Daniel Dennett: 'An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe'. ( Darwin's Dangerous Idea.) Richard Dawkins: “Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all.' (Blind Watchmaker.)

I think the emergence of 'systems theory' actually represents a move away from materialistic thinking in biology (in the same way that Tao of Physics represented a move away from materialism in physics.) If you look into it, you will find that Varela, Kaufman, Evan Thompson, and many others associated with such ideas, were members of a group called The Lindisfarne Association (also see The Lindisfarne Tapes).

-- Updated August 17th, 2014, 11:43 am to add the following --

Autopoiesis is an emergent effect, so reductionism is not going to illuminate much. Complexity theory is not reductionistic, but holistic and well suited to modeling feedback-based open systems; so it is the formalism best suited for approaching autopoiesis scientifically.

I think that 'emergence' has implications for ontology. If it refers to the appearance of radically different qualities as a consequence of the combination of particular elements, the question can still be asked, where do such qualities emerge from? If I see a bear emerge from a cave, it would be reasonable to assume that it only did so because it was already inside. I wouldn't presume that caves spontaneously generate bears (although it is true that prior to Louis Pasteur, it was widely thought that damp cloths spontaneously generated mice!)

When I studied Hindu philosophy under a charming and erudite Indian scholar, one of his frequently-used aphorisms in regard to Vedanta philosophy was that 'what was latent, becomes patent'. In other words, according to Vedanta the qualities of the manifest world are precisely those that are latent within Brahman, who emanates the world 'as a spider spins a web'.

So whilst I agree that none of this might be necessary for the scientific study of biology, I think that it is quite fair to make such philosophical inferences on the basis of these later developments in the biological sciences.

[Alan Masterman]

"The first obvious difference between machines and organisms is the fact that machines are constructed, whereas organisms grow."

An exceedingly provocative hypothesis. Do you mind if I borrow it for a doctoral thesis?

[A Poster He or I]

The problem I have is that rejection of the notion of an ontological distinction implies a return to the one-dimensional model of beings as simply 'a configuration of molecules'. Elsewhere, Capra rejects this idea:

Life, then, is not all about molecules. It is much more about patterns of relationships among specific processes...

That the juxtaposition of molecules and processes automatically implies an opposition is an artificial distinction. Capra should know better. Molecules (and everything else in existence too) are only "things" to the extent that it is convenient to talk about them as such. In our universe, everything is dynamically interrelated to everything else, so of course material physicality is actually a process.

...These processes of life include, most importantly, the spontaneous emergence of new order, which is the basis of life’s inherent creativity. Moreover, the life processes are associated with the cognitive dimension of life, and the emergence of new order includes the emergence of language and consciousness.

Where does the human spirit come into this picture? To answer this question, it will be useful to remember the original meaning of “spirit.” The Latin spiritus means “breath,” which is also true for the related Latin word anima, the Greek psyche, the Sanskrit atman, and the Hebrew ruah. The common meaning of these key terms indicates that the original meaning of “spirit” in many ancient philosophical and religious traditions, in the West as well as in the East, is “the breath of life.” ...

When we look at the world around us, we find that we are not thrown into chaos and randomness but are part of a great order, a grand symphony of life. Every molecule in our body was once a part of previous bodies–living or nonliving–and will be a part of future bodies. In this sense, our body will not die but will live on, again and again, because life lives on. Moreover, we share not only life’s molecules, but also its basic principles of organization with the rest of the living world. And since our mind, too, is embodied, our concepts and metaphors are embedded in the web of life together with our bodies and brains. Indeed, we belong to the universe, we are at home in it, and this experience of belonging can make our lives profoundly meaningful.2

So I think, as soon as you acknowledge that organising principle as fundamental, you have already moved away from materialism.

Maybe the materialism of the 18th century; but certainly not the materialism of today. Materialism today recognizes the capacity for the spontaneous emergence of high-level organization from lower-level component phenomena operating in highly-complex interrelationships. So the molecules alone cannot explain the natural order but the molecules together can.

I think the only part of Capra's quote at odds with materialism is the paragraph about spirituality. Elsewhere I do not see even one sentence that is at odds with a materialist view of existence.

I think that 'emergence' has implications for ontology. If it refers to the appearance of radically different qualities as a consequence of the combination of particular elements, the question can still be asked, where do such qualities emerge from? If I see a bear emerge from a cave, it would be reasonable to assume that it only did so because it was already inside. I wouldn't presume that caves spontaneously generate bears (although it is true that prior to Louis Pasteur, it was widely thought that damp cloths spontaneously generated mice!)

The question "where do such qualities emerge from?" (my emphasis added) implies a reductionistic motivation in its asking. But emergence cannot be correctly appreciated from a reductionistic paradigm because emergent phenomena don't exist as "latent" or "potential" forms within lower-order component phenomena. Emergence is best appreciated from holistic analysis. In a holism, the whole is manifest in the parts and it is only by understanding of the whole that the parts exist QUA their identity as parts.

For example, a bicycle pedal would not be a bicycle pedal in a world where the epiphenomenon "bicycle" was never invented. The FUNCTIONAL behavior/capacity/identity of the bicycle pedal exists only as an attribute of the whole (bicycle). You cannot examine the pedal by itself and find "latent" or "potential" qualities of locomotion that give the pedal its purpose. It is the implicit acknowledgement of the whole that allows the part's functionality to emerge into existence.

As another example, the wetness of water is emergent. There is no "latent" or "potential" wetness inside hydrogen or oxygen waiting for the opportunity to emerge. Wetness is nothing but a feature of the interaction of hydrogen and oxygen vis-a-vis an environment where an epiphenomenon (namely, surface tension) can be sensed relative to that which isn't wet (or is less wet). In other words, the entire surrounding environment is a factor in the emergence of wetness. (This is also an example of what complexity theory calls downward causation, another feature of holisms).

Science, being reductionistic in its motivation, is only beginning to embrace holistic analysis. The scientific belief in phlogiston was a direct result of believing that fire had to have a "source" somewhere inside what was burning. Science' eventual recognition that fire is NOTHING BUT the emergent behavior of oxygen-reactive molecules in the presence of high energy and oxygen was a step toward holistic reasoning.

[Quotidian]

I think the only part of Capra's quote at odds with materialism is the paragraph about spirituality.

I think re-framing science so as to reconcile it with spirituality is Capra's life work, and is what inspired all of his books.

Holistic philosophies are not descended from materialism. They are much more characteristic of the idealist side of philosophy. 'Holism' was coined by Jan Smuts in his book Holism and Evolution, where he depicted holism as "the tendency in nature to form wholes that are greater than the sum of the parts through creative evolution" - the latter a direct reference to Henri Bergson.

I also notice that much of the work behind complexity theory, emergence, and the like, originated with the Santa Fe Institute. The Lindisfarne Institute, which I noted above, is probably more 'green' in its orientation but there is a lot of crossover in the ideas between those two. Stuart Kaufmann, Gregory Bateson and Evan Thompson (whose book Mind in Life is I believe highly regarded) are among the alumni of Lindisfarne.

So I think that what you're saying is 'modern materialism' is not actually materialism per se. It retains an emphasis on scientific analysis and methodology. But I think that the whole 'sciences of complexity' movement really amounted to a tacit acknowledgment of the failure of reductionism. The point about a reductionist program is to understand evetything in terms of something ultimately simple - and that goes all the way back to the beginning of science and philosophy. The atom (Greek for 'uncuttable') was believed to be that, up until the so-called 'splitting of the atom'. So subsequently science has had to develop much more complex models and ways of thinking. All well and good, but I don't agree that it can be really be described as 'materialist' any more.

If you had to choose between them, who do you think would be more representative of what you consider 'modern materialism': Dennett or Capra?

-- Updated August 19th, 2014, 12:02 pm to add the following --

From Capra's website: 'I have engaged in a systematic exploration of a central theme: the fundamental change of worldview, or change of paradigms, that is now also occurring in the other sciences and in society...

As I mentioned, I read Tao of Physics when it first came out. It is still in print, and although I understand it is often treated dismissively by mainstream scientists, I think it has also been incorporated in at least some curriculums in US Universities.

So what is Capra talking about with the 'change of paradigm'? From my recall of Tao of Physics, it was the move away from the classical worldview which he described as Newtonian/Cartesian, towards a holistic view. In doing so, it incorporated many ideas from Eastern philosophy - mainly Vedanta, Buddhist and Taoist (hence the name of the book). And such ideas have now become part of scientific discourse. For instance:

The FUNCTIONAL behavior/capacity/identity of the bicycle pedal exists only as an attribute of the whole (bicycle). You cannot examine the pedal by itself and find "latent" or "potential" qualities of locomotion that give the pedal its purpose.

is straight out of Buddhist philosophy, specifically, the passage in the ancient text 'The Questions of King Milinda' where the Ven. Nagasena demonstrates the non-reality of the chariot on which the King came to the meeting!^1.

[A Poster He or I]

...I think that the whole 'sciences of complexity' movement really amounted to a tacit acknowledgment of the failure of reductionism. ... subsequently science has had to develop much more complex models and ways of thinking. All well and good, but I don't agree that it can be really be described as 'materialist' any more.

I don't know why you call complexity theory a "movement." It is functional day-in day-out science that has increased the acuracy of weather prediction five-fold over what it was in my youth, plus got rid of those pesky antennae sticking out of our cell phones to boot. To my mind, saying that complexity theory is not materialist is like saying Mahayana traditions are not really Bhuddhist because they do not confine themselves to the Pali Canon. Science has simply discovered more characteristics exist to quanta than we originally conceived, because such characteristics only manifest when the interactions are hyper-complex (relative to a holistic perspective). But at the end of the day we're still dealing with NOTHING BUT the characteristics of interacting quanta --in other words, material reality.

If you had to choose between them, who do you think would be more representative of what you consider 'modern materialism': Dennett or Capra?

Dennet is not the best example to contrast with Capra because Dennet's "brain as computer" paradigm (at least in the 2 books of his that I read) is way off-base, in my opinion. A computer needs a program in order to operate but there is nothing to serve as such an instruction set" for a living brain. The real contrast to Capra would be arch-materialist Paul Churchland. His so-called "neurophilosophy" looks specifically to explain Mind via neuronic/synaptic activity. While I prefer Capra, I do NOT find him completely at odds with Churchland; simply much more comprehensive and holistic. But Churchland certainly acknowledges the emergent aspects of consciousness from base material reality, so he and Capra are just at different positions on the same spectrum.

So what is Capra talking about with the 'change of paradigm'? From my recall of Tao of Physics, it was the move away from the classical worldview which he described as Newtonian/Cartesian, towards a holistic view. In doing so, it incorporated many ideas from Eastern philosophy - mainly Vedanta, Buddhist and Taoist (hence the name of the book). And such ideas have now become part of scientific discourse. For instance:

A Poster I or He wrote: The FUNCTIONAL behavior/capacity/identity of the bicycle pedal exists only as an attribute of the whole (bicycle). You cannot examine the pedal by itself and find "latent" or "potential" qualities of locomotion that give the pedal its purpose.

is straight out of Buddhist philosophy, specifically, the passage in the ancient text 'The Questions of King Milinda' where the Ven. Nagasena demonstrates the non-reality of the chariot on which the King came to the meeting!1.

I agree but I'm not clear what your point is. That speculative philosophy (or religion) should prefigure the discoveries of science is the way things ideally should be rather than to have science blind-side us with something we are not prepared for culturally. As to the fact that science as an institution is conservative and resistant to new (or in this case, old) paradigms; that also is as it should be. It keeps science more responsible to walk its talk before its findings are accepted as mainstream knowledge.

[Quotidian]

Well, I generally agree with your perspective, as I have previously, except that what you're describing is 'materialism'. Capra is counter-cultural, has devoted his whole career to showing the falsehood of philosophical materialism and reductionism. (There's a good portrait of his early days in How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Counterculture, and the Quantum Revival by David Kaiser. Capra was trying to write a physics textbook, but inspiration struck - and he went from being a penniless, unemployed post-grad to world-famous author getting $45,000 for speaking engagements!) The Churchlands are arch-materialists, uber materialists, in fact.

The odd thing about today's world is that you will now get conferences, like the Tucson Science of Consciousness conference, where all of the various protagonists turn up and give talks, which might give the illusion of concord. But they're still chalk and cheese; there are the hard-core materialists, including Dennett and the Churchlands, Eastern Mystics, such as Deepak Chopra, pan-psychists (which nowadays includes Max Tegmark)....the list goes on. As for myself, I'm a Baby Boomer, so I feel right at home with Capra and his 'hippie metaphysics'.

-- Updated August 22nd, 2014, 11:09 am to add the following --

Churchland certainly acknowledges the emergent aspects of consciousness from base material reality...

I believe the correct terminology for Churchland's position is 'supervenience' - that mental qualities supervene on the physical activities of neurons, but are ultimately reducible:

Just as modern science has discarded such notions as legends or witchcraft, Churchland holds the belief that a future, fully matured neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" (see propositional attitudes). Such concepts will not merely be reduced to more finely grained explanation and retained as useful proximate levels of description, but will be strictly eliminated as wholly lacking in correspondence to precise objective phenomena, such as activation patterns across neural networks.

Against his view, I maintain that consciousness (actually, I prefer 'mind') is irreducibly subjective - that is, it can never be explained in objective terms, in principle. And why? Because the notion of 'objective' always implies an observing subject. There is no entity, thing, force, or energy which can be described as fully or only objective; objectivity is a construct. (Actually, Poster, I'm pretty sure that in the past I have read identical things in some of your posts!)

[A Poster He or I]

Capra is counter-cultural, has devoted his whole career to showing the falsehood of philosophical materialism and reductionism.

Capra is a scientist too, so he knows that reductionism is at the heart of the scientific method. Sorry, but he ain't talking out of both sides of his mouth. What Capra is really devoted to is spreading awareness of the need for science to evolve into something more than reductionism because reductionism is quite limited as a paradigm of empirical investigation.

Nevertheless, the idea that reductionism could somehow be "false" is patently ridiculous for the simple reason that it works on practical level and works better (on a strictly practical level) than any other product of human intellect ever invented, and it has the track record to prove it. What makes Capra's writings so valuable is that he reminds us (potentially) that the findings of science are limited to what reductionism is in a position to find, and that science' success is not a license to ontologize its findings. The ontologizing of science is one of the Western world's true tragedies, in my opinion.

As to materialism being false, that is an entirely separate argument from reductionism, and the two should not be conflated in any context. Reductionism implies methodology; whereas materialism implies interpretation (i.e., philosophy). There are certainly dramatic differences between Capra and the Churchlands in terms of their choice of focus and emphasis (and style too, I suppose). But at the core of their respective epistemological foundations, the only real difference I see is that Capra sees material reality as metaphorical (as do I, by the way) whereas the Churchlands are consistent Realists. I've never seen Capra deny the value of quanta as quanta (that is, their role in material interaction); he simply realizes that the INTERPRETIVE component of conscious is at least equal to any ontological component, so how we choose to look at things is as important as the things themselves (Here I differ in that to me ontology is irrelevant while how we choose to look at things is critically important).

I maintain that consciousness (actually, I prefer 'mind') is irreducibly subjective - that is, it can never be explained in objective terms, in principle. And why? Because the notion of 'objective' always implies an observing subject. There is no entity, thing, force, or energy which can be described as fully or only objective; objectivity is a construct. (Actually, Poster, I'm pretty sure that in the past I have read identical things in some of your posts!)

Yes, you're right. Essentially it is Goedel's Incompleteness theorem applied to consciousness itself: One cannot use the tools of consciousness to objectify consciousness. I have no doubt that Paul Churchland will never achieve an explanation of consciousness, though he should continue to try for all of the invaluable neurological knowledge to be had. However, you would posit an a priori existence for Mind (if I've understood anything from your prior posts) which, to my mind, merely obfuscates any attempt to understand Mind scientifically (and therefore philosophically). I admit the potential for insight into Mind on a spiritual front in this manner, but that must remain a subjective experience so there is little point in discussing it on a science forum.

[Quotidian]

This is, however, a philosophy forum.

However, you would posit an a priori existence for Mind (if I've understood anything from your prior posts) which, to my mind, merely obfuscates any attempt to understand Mind scientifically (and therefore philosophically).

This implies that the scientific is prior to the philosophical, whereas I think the other way around.

Interesting comments - your writing is always a model of clarity.

[A Poster He or I]

Ah, I can see how my wording conveys that, but I didn't mean to imply that philosophy follows from science. All I meant is that nowadays any reason-based philosophy should strive for consistency with the findings of science. Positing a priori Mind makes that impossible.

I can certainly see the argument for why that is science' shortfall, not philosophy's, but it really depends on what you believe is the purpose of philosophy. There you and I are in fundamental disagreement (based on past debates). Your past stance struck me as that of an Essentialist or a Platonist (which are of no practical value to me) while my past stance struck you as Utilitarian (which I gathered seemed more of a philosophical side-show to you).

Thanks for the compliment about clarity. I wish I could have been so clear back in our debate about dinosaur bones!

[Quotidian]

We live in a constructed world - constructed in the sense that we have tacit rules about the nature of things, the nature of self, the nature of meaning, what constitutes objective knowledge and what is to be considered private and subjective, and so on. That provides an evaluative framework, so to speak; it embodies assumptions about the meanings of certain fundamental terms, which act as axioms and constraints for the way we think. (This doesn't mean that we manufacture the natural realm; but notice that the natural realm is really like the background to what we understand as 'the world'.)

We see such underlying assumptions in the writings of people like Steve Pinker and the other champions of 'science as philosophy'. Physicalism emanates from them; but in order to criticise it, you have to accept their premisses as to what constitutes knowledge; in other words, you have to work within their construction - which which means at the point you enter the debate, it is already over.

Vitalism is a case in point. Pinker says:

The processes of life, for example, used to be attributed to a mysterious élan vital; now we know they are powered by chemical and physical reactions among complex molecules.

I dispute that science does know that; I think life, like mind, remains mysterious and elusive. (I am a little familiar with the efforts of Craig Venter to create artificial life, but I do understand that it starts with the modification of biological material; creation of a living organism de novo from the elements of the periodic table would be a different matter, I would think.) But the assumption that life is molecular, along with the assumption that mind = brain, is the key principle of physicalism; so it is precisely what I don't accept.

What I think has happened in this matter, is that scientific thinkers characterise élan vital as a kind of 'ethereal substance', like phlogiston, or indeed the aether, and then declare that it doesn't exist - because if it were real, then you would be able to detect it. But I don't think that the élan vital constitutes an hypothesis or a scientific theory about a substance in that sense. It really never was posited as something that actually exists; it is a philosophical idea, part of an interpretive framework, not an hypothesis about a substance.

I think interpretive frameworks precede hypotheses; they provide the background against which hypotheses are devised and tested. But that is just the kind of thing that scientists generally won't appreciate. Why? Because they wish to deal in terms of objective, quantifiable, testable entities, forces, relations. Speaking of 'interpretive frameworks' and 'guiding ideas' and the like is, after all, not science, but philosophy. I can imagine many scientists saying, 'If I wanted to ask those questions, I wouldn't be a scientist'.

That is why science tends to look, as it were, 'outwards and downwards' - outwards, towards the natural realm, and downwards, to what it sees as the fundamental or essential elements of it (which is again very much a legacy of Greek philosophy.) For any of the big questions of life, there is nowadays always believed to be an explanation in terms of 'chemical and physical reactions among complex molecules'. And why? Because that's the kind of thing that science is good for. If you start talking in terms of élan vital or 'mind' or 'life' or anything vague like that, you're not actually doing science. And if you're not doing science, you're part of the old order, the world that has been superseded by science. Pinker, again: 'the worldview that guides the moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is the worldview given to us by science'.

There is a deep circularity involved in all this - but it is so deep, so intrinsically part of the cultural construct of the modern West, that it is all but impossible to point it out. Because we're so deeply embedded in it, it is almost impossible to notice it; indeed, noticing it really requires, or is, a radical change of mind.

Pinker again: 'The facts of science, by exposing the absence of purpose in the laws governing the universe, force us to take responsibility for the welfare of ourselves, our species, and our planet. For the same reason, they undercut any moral or political system based on mystical forces, quests, destinies, dialectics, struggles, or messianic ages. And in combination with a few unexceptionable convictions— that all of us value our own welfare and that we are social beings who impinge on each other and can negotiate codes of conduct—the scientific facts militate toward a defensible morality, namely adhering to principles that maximize the flourishing of humans and other sentient beings.'

This sounds very reasonable, and I think, as far as it goes, it is probably a good basis for the material organisation of society. But note the reference to 'absence of purpose' - absence of purpose is not something 'proven by science', but a working assumption of the physical sciences, which can't, after all, envisage or measure anything like 'purpose' in any sense other than the purely functional. So the declaration that 'the Universe is purposeless' - which is widely assumed as axiomatic in the secular west - is now also taken as something 'proven by science', when, of course, it is nothing of the kind. But discussions about 'purpose' in this sense are metaphysical, and science, in the popular mind, has superseded metaphysics. So there's the circularity again.

Anyway, I think both life and mind precede anything that is discoverable by the physical sciences. They are not, properly, objects of analysis for science, as they are not 'outwards and downwards' but 'inwards and upwards'. Physicalism is the effort to explain everything in terms of its lowest level; although of course physicalists won't agree with that, because they don't recognize 'lower' and 'higher' (as the physicalist ontology is essentially one-dimensional.)

I know that's big claim, but consider facts such as: the enormous controversies about the brain~mind relationship (at the moment, a multi-billion dollar, multi-country project to emulate the brain in software is stalled because the principles can't even agree on what constitutes 'research'; the massive controversy over DSM 5 and what constitutes a 'psychological disorder'; and so on.)

I think it is precisely at the point where we look to science to tell us who we are, or what human nature is, that it becomes scientism rather than science per se - the exact claim that Pinker wishes to dispute. But seeing that isn't 'rocket science', or any science; simply an acknowledgement of the limitations of science, or of knowledge, as such. Remember Socrates saying 'All I know, is that I know nothing'; something hard to recall in the age of information overload. It's really very simple, in a way we have lost sight of.

-- Updated August 23rd, 2014, 12:07 pm to add the following --

Although I do wonder how far autopoesis is from a vital force; or, at least, a vital principle.

[A Poster He or I]

I agree with the bulk of your observations. Indeed, my earlier statement "The ontologizing of science is one of the Western world's greatest tragedies" is my own shorthand for at least two-thirds of what you have elaborated on. Of course, I can quibble about almost everything you have said but I won't because it is more valuable to confine debate to where argument would potentially be more productive. So I really only have 3 items of contention worth noting.

1. Your observations about science writing its own rules of evaluation is encountered in any epistemological framework, not just science. Evaluation is always by one's own premises, not those of the "Other." It is the reason why debates rarely produce consensus: it's apples fighting oranges so debaters are talking past each other. In my opinion, this is one of the primary reasons why humanity's long-term survival critically depends on pluralism as an ideal, and the exercise of relativism as a social paradigm instead of as a self-refuting pedantic exercise.

2. While I agree that science is misconstrued to support an assumed lack of innate purpose to the Universe, I vehemently disagree that science per se has anything to do with such misconstrual; rather, the misconstrual is a product of the thoroughly awful way in which the lay public is educated about science (exacerbated by the hopeless travesty of academic philosophy). Here is why Capra's calling is so valuable. My point is that science is potentially a marvelous vehicle for instilling a sense of purpose to the universe (which of course actually means a sense of self-worth in a given individual). It's all in how you spin it.

3. I'm construing from your post that the real upshot of your observations boils down to the cold purposelessness you see inherent in trying to reduce Life & Mind to chemicals. If I'm wrong, please correct me. If I'm right, then I don't perceive what your assertion of a priori Life & Mind before matter is really supposed to accomplish. If it is intended to instill a sense of individual purpose (any innate Purpose to Existence actually manifests as individual purpose after all), we have all of history to demonstrate the tragic consequences of religion's attempt to the very same thing. With absolutely no intention of trivializing your position, I nevertheless reject as naive any conception of a spiritually enlightened humankind for the simple reason that any means to enlightenment comes culturally-circumscribed (in other words, there are ten thousand versions of what constitutes spiritually enlightened). It seems to me your admirable sensibilities for things larger than yourself would be best served by leveraging science' success at bridging cultures (for better or worse) and helping in any effort at a new paradigm for science education (Too bad we can't expect much help from scientists in such an endeavor).

[Quotidian]

I'm construing from your post that the real upshot of your observations boils down to the cold purposelessness you see inherent in trying to reduce Life & Mind to chemicals. If I'm wrong, please correct me. If I'm right, then I don't perceive what your assertion of a priori Life & Mind before matter is really supposed to accomplish.

Materialist reductionism is the notion that beings are ulimately explicable in terms of objects. (I agree that it is useful from a methodological perspective, but here we're talking about philosophy.) According to it, we are not souls, minds or even, really, agents, but systems, animals, or computers. As noted, my view is that this is a consequence of the fact that systems and things and animals are what science is best suited to; it's the old Abraham Maslow statement, 'if the only tool you have is a hammer, the only problems you will be interested in are those involving nails'.

Pinker (and Dennett and the rest) all speak as though accepting the reality of the meaningless of the Universe is the enlightened stance, the natural consequence of seeing how things truly are. So it's a normative statement; but it ought to be recalled that science itself is not really concerned with norms of that kind, as ultimately it is a value judgement. I suppose it is a consequence of what might be called 'para-scientific thinking' and historical positivism; the notion that ideas of minds and souls are the archaic remnants of superstition and magical thinking which are to be dissolved in the acid of Darwin's dangerous idea.

-- Updated August 23rd, 2014, 6:28 pm to add the following --

If it is intended to instill a sense of individual purpose (any innate Purpose to Existence actually manifests as individual purpose after all), we have all of history to demonstrate the tragic consequences of religion's attempt to the very same thing.

But, do we? I think Western culture has played an indispensable role in the development of science and technology and a better social order, by lifting masses of people out of subsistence and agrarian poverty. In that respect, I agree with Steve Pinker; with the major qualification that this was very much a consequence of the Judeo-Christian revolution¹. The Judeo-Christian ethos was basic to such things as the creation of hospitals, universities, human rights, the dignity of the person, science, compassion for the poor, and even the separation of Church and state. I say that fully aware of the dark side of Christian history; but it remains a fact that the 'scientific revolution' developed out of the Christian society.

I reject as naive any conception of a spiritually enlightened humankind for the simple reason that any means to enlightenment comes culturally-circumscribed (in other words, there are ten thousand versions of what constitutes spiritually enlightened).

I like the idea of 'dharma' as both a law or principle, and also an individual's duty; the way you yourself fulfill or exemplify that. I don't think the form it takes is necessarily circumscribed or dictated, although I think that there is naturally a kind of ethic that comes out of that.

As for whether or not science has 'anything to do' with the so-called 'disenchantment of the world' - I think that is much more than just 'spin'. But then, I actually believe the philosophy of Western science has a genuinely spiritual element; I think the problem is that it has been diverted (some might say hijacked) by materialism.

[Felix]

"Pinker again: 'The facts of science, by exposing the absence of purpose in the laws governing the universe, force us to take responsibility for the welfare of ourselves, our species, and our planet."

If people will accept that the universe is purposeless, they'll be motivated to take responsibility for the health of the biosphere? Is he really that ignorant about human nature?!