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Indeterminancy in physics

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Seremonia

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Different Level (Layer) of Causalities

Post Number:#316  PostJuly 12th, 2012, 6:34 am

I am not an expert on physics but i try to understand the essence of assertion in this fields.

That the experiment assert no causality at all. Or at least, it asserts small portion or higher portion of randomness. Or at least for several people it asserts indeterminacy.

What is randomness? There are two possibilities:

- Lack of awareness to identify the details of the process of specific causality (In other words, still there is certainty), or

- It's real random, that there is no certainty at all


What is certainty?

Something has certainty if its function can be perceived twice or more (repeatedly).
Certainty is perceiving a function twice or more (repeatedly).


This certainty asserts limited consistency within specific boundaries. It may be considered as particular consistency or universal consistency (universal truth).

If a function can be eliminated, then "to where place" for a function can be eliminated? To absolute nothingness? No. Because anything can't be placed into nothingness, therefore eliminating must be considered as put a function into existence. Meaning, at least there is one universal truth, which is,

there is no place for a function to be eliminated, but there is only a function that can be hidden.


And because there is no function to go anywhere except to its own place (not nothingness), therefore,

all functions are still exist and there is no changing of the number of all functions that exist, but there are several functions of all functions that are not hiding.


This truth "all functions are still exist and there is no changing of the number of all functions that exist, but there are several functions of all functions that are not hiding" asserts consequences:
- there are fixed sources (not less not more) for fixed consistencies (not less not more), in other words, both for the sources (existences) and their consistencies are fixed (not less not more), THIS IS ABOUT FIXED SOURCES (FixedSource)

- there are fixed possibilities that are not beyond their selves (from one liter water can't be poured to something as much as 1 gallon water without additional water from others, in other words, anything can't exceed beyond itself without additional from anything else), THIS IS ABOUT FIXED BOUNDARIES (FixedBoundary)

- there are different existences that any of it has its own functions, THIS IS ABOUT FIXED RELATIONAL (in between a specific existence and its own possibilities (FixedRelational).

- events are constructed by functions, in other words, what we perceive as existences, process, activities, all of those within life are functions (meaning, we are not perceiving existences as it should be, but we are just perceiving functions), THIS IS ABOUT REALITIES AS FUNCTIONS (RealAsFunction), reality that has FixedRelational (something is different to something else because specific FixedSource is fully functional, in other words, there are differences because of different FixedRelational).


DIFFERENT LEVEL (LAYER) OF CAUSALITIES

In between one RealAsFunction (something) to another RealAsFunction (something else) creates causality through:

- How far for a RealAsFunction can be related to another RealAsFunction. There are one or more than one arrangements in between RealAsFunction to another RealAsFunction. Different arrangement would provide different scenario as different causality.

This is the only way to construct the first level of causalities. At this level, there are more possibilities to make more arrangements with wider possibilities than the second level of causalities

- The first level of causalities can create the second level of causalities


Again and again, from one level of causalities can be directed to (create) another level of causalities (another layer of realities).

ILLUSTRATION

- FixedSource(s) is the device(s) on computer peripherals.

- FixedBoundary(s) is the fact that wherever we are looking on any part of computer as totally it's computer

- FixedRelational(s) is the fact that for any of devices on computer has its own limitation, limited functions (display, hard disk, memory , each of these has its own functions that differ to another devices)

- RealAsFunction(s) at the first level is binary (zero or one, 0 or 1), at the second level of RealAsFunction(s) is ASCII code, further at the third level of RealAsFunction(s) is a binary file, and again, further, at the fourth level of RealAsFunction(s) is an image, a picture as we perceive as reality.

- On programming: RealAsFunction(s) at the first level is ASSEMBLER LANGUAGE, at the second level of RealAsFunction(s) is C++, further at the third level of RealAsFunction(s) is Operating System or another programming language, and again, further, at the fourth level of RealAsFunction(s) is application that compatible with operating system, again and again, further, at higher level of RealAsFunction(s) can be perceived (operated) by us, differently.


It's not about trying to find out why, when or what for double slit experiment, or where is the fallacy on double slit experiment, and many more. But it's about to see the farthest possibilities for causalities to see anything clearly. And further, we can put any events related to causalities at the correct place. This (hopefully) put this research at the correct point of view without over estimation and similar to this.

But this point of view related to different level of causalities, indeed asserts possibilities that there must be a specific (lower) level of causalities that can make higher level of causalities to be modified easily, but it doesn't mean that there is no lower level of causalities that supports the higher level of causalities.

What we don't know for sure is, on what level of causalities for macroscopic world either for what level of causalities for microscopic world.

The points are:

- For both microscopic world and macroscopic world, each of those layers has its own level of causalities.

- If we can understand, how the lower level of causalities (on quantum level) works, then perhaps it support an implementation of a device that can make a materialization of something or a device that has ability to unpack specific causality (scenario) from higher level of causalities (our macroscopic world) and reconstruct it at lower level of causalities (quantum level - microscopic world) to further encapsulated it as different causality (different scenario) at (previous) higher level of causalities (at macroscopic world).

- Last but not least, there are causalities and therefore assertion that there is no causality at all is wrong. And we have to understand the consequence of this experiment may be directed to understanding that human is processing one step ahead to be able to control our environment wider than before. But we can't direct this experiment to assert beyond reasonable.

Andlan wrote:It is perplexing to me why the indeterminacy exhibited by atomic and sub-atomic particles is deemed acceptable in the particle physics domain, but not in any other (or few other) domains of science. In almost any other field, we need scientific theories to make deterministic predictions about properties: 'if I wiggle this, I get this'. Is it because quantum physics is 'waiting' for a better deterministic unifying theory to come along and replace it, for example one that will also explain gravity?


Perhaps (not always), if someone is trying to relate this experiment to an assertion that may be considered as beyond reasonable estimation, it's because (not always) there is public opinion about an existence of "mind over matter" or "anything is illusion" or "possibilities are endless" and similar to these. And just by small appearance from this experiment, quickly it associated to those public opinions. May be it's because our thinking in line with analogy, inductive. And perhaps media promote this experiment beyond reasonable expectation.

Or may be, as you said:

Andlan wrote:Is it because quantum physics is 'waiting' for a better deterministic unifying theory to come along and replace it, for example one that will also explain gravity?


I am not sure, but one thing for sure that anything related to this experiment must be backed up with reasonable understanding.
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Re: Indeterminancy in physics

Post Number:#317  PostJuly 14th, 2012, 9:27 pm

"I'm with Poster and Prismatic in this debate. I'd only say that the clause 'Once we can theorize properly about what is behind the probability...' is to me an unnecessary step too far. The thing-in-itself, 'underlying reality' - why, if there are no gods, do we need to believe in such a possibility? Can't we settle for the multiplicity of our models, and the acceptance that there'll never be a theory of everything?"

Interesting point. That is settling for the acceptance that there will never be a theory of everything. I assume you are talking about that Kantian containment of human experience within the constituting apriori functions of space and time the categories and the empirical concepts. In case this is confusing, I will just say that it was Kant who, through his analysis of experience and judgment, concluded that we live in our own minds and cannot bring anything "in itself," or, noumenal, into the arena of perception. So, if a tree falls in the forest and there is no one around, does it make a sound? Well: no sound, no tree, no forest. It seems this kind of thinking, which is very problematic( I am reading a phenomenologist now, Levinas, whose Totality and Infinity is maddening but fascinating), makes issues in physics difficult to accept as being about the universe at all! Some say that science has never once made an observation beyond the contents of the mind. Is this not what Thomas Kuhn had in mind in his Structues of Scientifi Revolutions? For him, science is Not a matter of discovery at all; rather is, as with all knowledge/truth claims, made. Truth is made, not discovered. Pramatists like richard Rorty go this way with a considerable vengence. But then, regarding the question as to whether science will ever be about what is really real: The problematic recounted here can be trivialized by taking Occham's razor and simply cutting out the thing in itself! Then: what you see and feel etc., IS what is really real. So what if it is merely phenomena. THIS is the world! If you are looking for a philosphical response, then you have to look to what is problematic for philosophers. For one thing, one has give abandon the assumption that science has this iron grip on apprehending the world. Scientists tend to be metaphysical realists: They think that there really are stars and clouds and plants and animals "out there." For me, and for most interesting thinkers, this is very difficult to defend; not since Kant came along (and all of the succeeding phenomenologists) I don't buy it, though. To me, the issue as to what is under that rock miles below the sea where there are no perceivers is very interesting and I think we need to consult the Hindu and Buddhist mystics (NOT the scholars! Though, Jnana yoga does work to bring clarity at the perceptual level, I believe, most so enjoy there metal gymnastics oo much to "move to the other shore.") For it may be that, as Kierkegaard and others suggest, Reality with a Capital R can literally be approached through the subject only. Now that is interesting.
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