Does Science Discover or Create Reality?

I still maintain that to some extent perception of reality is part of reality.

Perception of is a part of cultural reality. This is true. But when science discovers new information the only part of reality that changes is the part that was inaccurately percieved. Nothing more changes.

Quantum mechanics does (IMO) not imply that there are multiple realities or no realities. All it can imply is that we do not have full knowledge of what is real. We can percieve unexpected phenomena in the quantum level, and that is real. Understanding the uncertainty will not change what is real, it will only clarify reality for us.

While it is possible that yes, there may be a hidden answer in there, you cannot attribute a 50/50 chance that such a discovery will occur. It may be more like 99/01 or even less.

Apparently this question has generated some controversy. And in philosophy controversy can often be desired. I also believe that if a controversy can be resolved to satisfaction of most that too can be desirable. So let me try this. I will re-phrase the question into what might be considered a questionable statement:

The discoveries of science create a new paradigm for reality which in effect changes the actual nature of that reality from the human perspective of it.

The question now is do you agree {or mostly agree} or do you disagree and why?

You respect the idea that if a statement is invalid the argument as a whole cannot be sound. Yet you show no respect for the much more fundamental fact of how the terms of a statement need consistent definitions to be coherently interpreted.

I disagree that, in philosophy, definitions are more fundamental than logical grammar (valid/invalid etc). This I think is central to the change Wittgenstein brought to philosophy. Philosophy deals with syntax, not semantics; with logical connectives like "possible", "view of", which are not given by definitions, but by how they are used in language - by rules. As such I haven't made clear what my definition of reality might be because it's not important, though I don't think my concept is that different from yours. So when I argue that it doesn't make sense to have a view of reality yet maintain reality doesn't exist, we can substitute "x" for the word "reality", because it's irrelevant. From this it should be clear that I am in absolute agreement that " the ontology of that reality is completely irrelevant". Where I disagree with you is in following that assertion with the statement "Reality is an immediate experience", because you've given us an ontology of reality, you've said what it is. At best that statement could be qualified "(but that's totally irrelevant)"!

What should be practised in philosophy (again this I think is Wittgenstenian) is not to say what it is we mean, but to show it, to show it in how we use language. The logic of grammar, or the rules of language, shows what is meant. As an example, what I mean philosophically by reality can be shown by saying "the ontology of reality is completely irrelevant. It is nonsense to say reality is an immediate experience. Rather reality is immediately experienced. This should not be taken as an ontology of reality, nor an ontology of experience, doing the latter has dogged philosophy with problems for centuries. It says nothing about reality, nothing about experience, but about how reality is experienced. This shows what we mean by reality."

-- Updated June 18th, 2012, 7:15 pm to add the following --

The discoveries of science create a new paradigm for reality which in effect changes the actual nature of that reality from the human perspective of it.

Ok here's my response - I'm sure you won't be surprised that I disagree!

Theories might be said to create new paradigms, discoveries don't. Neither the Michelson-Morley experiment, nor the discovery of Mercury's perihelion created new paradigms, though I think it would be fair to say Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity did. But neither theories, nor discoveries change the actual nature of that reality, even though they may be used to change it, e.g. by dropping an A-bomb. The human perspective on reality may change as the result of a new theory; Einstein's SToR is again an example.

-- Updated June 18th, 2012, 7:15 pm to add the following --

The discoveries of science create a new paradigm for reality which in effect changes the actual nature of that reality from the human perspective of it.

Ok here's my response - I'm sure you won't be surprised that I disagree!

Theories might be said to create new paradigms, discoveries don't. Neither the Michelson-Morley experiment, nor the discovery of Mercury's perihelion created new paradigms, though I think it would be fair to say Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity did. But neither theories, nor discoveries change the actual nature of that reality, even though they may be used to change it, e.g. by dropping an A-bomb. The human perspective on reality may change as the result of a new theory; Einstein's SToR is again an example.

I have a problem with the grounds for your disagreement. When you say "Theories might be said to create new paradigms, discoveries don't." By this logic if I have a theory that by picking certain magical lottery numbers I will win a multi-million dollar lottery I have created a new paradigm, but if I pick another set of numbers and discover I actually won the lottery I have not created a new paradigm? This is illogical. Theories un-proven are meaningless; Theories proven to be true can be called discoveries. So in fact if you do not consider a discovery to be capable of creating a new paradigm how can you refer to a theory? I have a theory that you will see the error of your thinking. If this proves wrong then the theory becomes one of many meaningless theories but if it proves to be correct then I can say a discovery has been made and a new paradigm will exist {at least in this post}.

The other problem I have is this. When you say "But neither theories, nor discoveries change the actual nature of that reality". What reality? And what reality where, why, and when? As you have criticized others for denying reality and then talking about reality, can you please give a definition of exactly what you are talking about when you use the word reality? I understand that my original question "Does Science Discover or Create Reality?" also refers to reality but since you are the critic of the referred to reality I just want to be sure we are talking about the same reality. If you find a problem with my request you may refer to my other current post: "There is No Provable Reality". And if my logic still appears to you to be ambiguous, so is so-called reality.

The discoveries of science create a new paradigm for reality which in effect changes the actual nature of that reality from the human perspective of it.

This statement doesn't ring true to me. Correct me if I'm wrong, but you seem to be equating the nature of reality with the theoretical part of the scientific law, and ignoring the importance of the empirical (observational) part. Perhaps this comes from Kuhn's contention that observation is entirely theory laden. The theoretical part is certainly indispensible, but invalidated laws in science (that were once successful) are never completed rejected, because the experiential data that they were originally derived from cannot be changed. Thus Newtonian gravitation is a low-mass approximation of general relativity and Coulomb's law is an approximation to quantum electrodynamics at large distances. Oxygen replaced Phlogiston because as a theory it better represented the observed data.

Theories proven to be true can be called discoveries.

Karl Popper argued, quite convincingly in my opinion, and in many people’s opinion, that we can’t prove scientific theories to be true. So there are no such things as theories proven to be true. The important point is that a scientific theory is a creation. Einstein’s SToR is Einstein’s theory – he created it – and please don’t jump to the conclusion that therefore the theory created reality, that doesn’t follow. A discovery is not a creation – it may, or may not, involve creating something, but that act of creation doesn’t make it a discovery.


Paradigm-shifts don’t alter reality. Neither are they dependent on a theory being well corroborated. If a theory is shown to be false, it may still have created a new paradigm, a new way of looking at reality, but that paradigm is of limited value, if not totally worthless – probably a theory of magical lottery numbers would be worthless. I was careful to say “Theories might be said to create new paradigms”. When the paradigm-shift is trivial, then you’d have to question why you’d want to call it a paradigm-shift.

I think I’ve made it clear in my post #33 why definitions aren’t helpful. As I’ve said, I agree with A Poster He or I that the ontology of reality is completely irrelevant. I would also say that it’s meaningless to say “reality exists”, but it doesn’t follow that therefore reality doesn’t exist. I’m not denying reality, just saying that existence isn’t something that can be an attribute of reality. Reality consists of that which exists, if something exists, we would say of it that in reality it exists. Trying to further say that reality exists, is nonsense – because you can then say in reality, reality exists. But does this reality, in which reality exists, itself exist in reality? etc ad infinitum This is just nonsense. And, ok, I’ve looked at your “There is No Provable Reality”, and you make just such a nonsensical claim:-

To prove the reality of reality [...]

“Is reality, reality?” is like asking “is a chicken, a chicken”. This isn’t about definitions, it’s about the logic of grammar; of what makes sense.

-- Updated June 19th, 2012, 8:01 am to add the following --

So where does this independence come from if there is nothing fixed about which we can agree/verify?

I think this is a very useful question. To answer it, I think we need start with the question, when we agree, what is actually fixed? The philosophical notion of the inverted spectrum, that when Mary sees a coloured object, the colour she sees it as being, is the complementary colour that John sees it as; so if Mary sees it as (what I would call) blue, John sees it as (what I would call) yellow. And there’s no physical explanation for this. And so on for the whole colour spectrum. When they look at this coloured object, they both say it’s the same colour – let’s say they both say it’s blue – they agree even though they don’t see it as the same colour. The point is that it’s irrelevant what colour they see it as; what’s important is that they agree. I think there is some worth in saying that independence arises, because that we agree is fixed. What we’re agreeing upon is irrelevant. Ultimately the agreement is that we’re all human; there is agreement within how we perceive, for instance. It needs a bit more thought, but that’s my idea.

I would say that we are forced to state that reality exists metaphysically, while not having to believe that any of our conceptions adequately describe it. Half-Six appears to be saying something similar.

Just to clarify, afraid I don't agree with either point

I think there is some worth in saying that independence arises, because that we agree is fixed. What we’re agreeing upon is irrelevant. Ultimately the agreement is that we’re all human; there is agreement within how we perceive, for instance. It needs a bit more thought, but that’s my idea.

This sounds like "structuralist” literary theory, in which meaning is enclosed entirely within a self-referential system of language, so that the very idea of truth in the real or experienced world is denied. Although we cannot define reality in referential terms, I think it is possible to say something about it. It is related to what is given to us; to what we find in the world, and that is why it has an independent character. (It is also related to truth and goodness, and great art embodies it, but we can put this to one side for the moment). Of course we also make our meanings as a community, but this does not negate the fact that there is a world there for us.

Apparently this question has generated some controversy. And in philosophy controversy can often be desired. I also believe that if a controversy can be resolved to satisfaction of most that too can be desirable. So let me try this. I will re-phrase the question into what might be considered a questionable statement:

The discoveries of science create a new paradigm for reality which in effect changes the actual nature of that reality from the human perspective of it.

The question now is do you agree {or mostly agree} or do you disagree and why?

Which discoveries of science are you referring to?

Half-Six says,

I disagree that, in philosophy, definitions are more fundamental than logical grammar (valid/invalid etc). This I think is central to the change Wittgenstein brought to philosophy. Philosophy deals with syntax, not semantics; with logical connectives like "possible", "view of", which are not given by definitions, but by how they are used in language - by rules. As such I haven't made clear what my definition of reality might be because it's not important, though I don't think my concept is that different from yours. So when I argue that it doesn't make sense to have a view of reality yet maintain reality doesn't exist, we can substitute "x" for the word "reality", because it's irrelevant. From this it should be clear that I am in absolute agreement that " the ontology of that reality is completely irrelevant". Where I disagree with you is in following that assertion with the statement "Reality is an immediate experience", because you've given us an ontology of reality, you've said what it is. At best that statement could be qualified "(but that's totally irrelevant)"!

Well, all I've really gleaned from these statements is that you have a different meaning for "ontology" than I do since the experience of reality connotes nothing about its ontology to me. I've encountered something like what you are saying among phenomenologist thinking, and it is certainly consistent with logical positivism, but I don't agree with either of those belief systems. I also give little creedence to any argument that presumes to treat reality as an abstracted "value" that can be plugged into the variable X of a logical formula. Cognitive science empirically demonstrates that logic is a product of cognition, not one of its elements. Seeing relations strictly in terms of syntax is just to be naive about how language works (Wittgenstein was no linguist and knew nothing about the empirical evidence of cognitive linguistics). Treating a symbolic representation of the superstructure that gives a relation meaning as something that can be subject to that relation tells us nothing about the superstructure other than that it supports the relation. This is just a display of Goedell's Incompleteness theorem.

What should be practised in philosophy (again this I think is Wittgenstenian) is not to say what it is we mean, but to show it, to show it in how we use language. The logic of grammar, or the rules of language, shows what is meant. As an example, what I mean philosophically by reality can be shown by saying "the ontology of reality is completely irrelevant. It is nonsense to say reality is an immediate experience. Rather reality is immediately experienced. This should not be taken as an ontology of reality, nor an ontology of experience, doing the latter has dogged philosophy with problems for centuries. It says nothing about reality, nothing about experience, but about how reality is experienced. This shows what we mean by reality."

In seeking to disambiguate meaning by demonstration via language, you merely expose the limitations of interpreting language by its syntactical relations with no creedence to semantics or the unconscious metaphors that underlie 90% of all language apprehension. I wouldn't be surprised to find out you are the only reader of my statement who mistakenly assumed I was making a pronouncement about ontology (especially since I had already qualified ontology as irrelevant!). You might consider reading up on cognitive linguistics research since the late 60s.

I wouldn't be surprised to find out you are the only reader of my statement who mistakenly assumed I was making a pronouncement about ontology (especially since I had already qualified ontology as irrelevant!).

As I read it, “Reality is an immediate experience” is an ontological pronouncement (though it’s not a pronouncement about ontology). It’s a pronouncement about the nature, I’m presuming the essential nature otherwise it’s trivial, of reality. It seems to be a priori or at least it doesn’t seem based on any a posteriori evidence.

If you don’t mean it in this ontological sense then ok, but if not, I’d be grateful if you would clarify what it is you do mean. Even as an ontological statement, as I read it, I don’t understand it – you say it has no ontological “backdrop”, so it’s not an experience of something, it’s in some way a pure experience (some form of idealism perhaps???)

If this is the ontology of reality, then of course it doesn’t need an ontological “backdrop”, since it is itself that ontology. And if you feel ontology is irrelevant, to then make this ontological pronouncement would, at best, be an irrelevancy, at worst a contradiction. Making a pronouncement on the irrelevance of ontology doesn’t entitle you to claim that anything else you say, won’t be ontological.

None of the above argument, whether it’s valid or invalid, needs an understanding of cognitive linguistics or any other theory of linguistics, to appreciate it, and to argue for or against. It needs a competence in the use of the English language (or whichever language is appropriate). We don’t arrive at such competence via theories of linguistics. They may or may not be helpful in philosophy, but they are in no way essential. Wittgenstein wasn’t a linguist, but he had a very deep mastery of the English, and German, languages.

What I would use in place of your pronouncement is “Reality is immediately experienced”, which I’ve argued is not ontological.

I also give little creedence to any argument that presumes to treat reality as an abstracted "value" that can be plugged into the variable X of a logical formula.

I wouldn’t do this if were I arguing specifically about what is meant by “reality”. I’m using it in an argument about whether definitions are more fundamental than logical grammar.

As I read it, “Reality is an immediate experience” is an ontological pronouncement (though it’s not a pronouncement about ontology). It’s a pronouncement about the nature, I’m presuming the essential nature otherwise it’s trivial, of reality. It seems to be a priori or at least it doesn’t seem based on any a posteriori evidence.

I'll try to disambiguate this based on what you explained about your interpretation of my post. By "reality is an immediate experience," I meant "reality is immediately experienced." I intended nothing about reality's essential nature, since I believe that reality's essential nature cannot be known; it can only be contrived as an a priori proclamation. Such an a priori statement is of no philosophical value to me since it illuminates nothing about the "essential nature" of reality; only about the particular epistemological choices of people. I don't believe humans can define what they mean by "essential nature" except in tautological or self-referential statements.

Even as an ontological statement, as I read it, I don’t understand it – you say it has no ontological “backdrop”, so it’s not an experience of something, it’s in some way a pure experience (some form of idealism perhaps???)

Idealism and phenomenology still depend on metaphysical commitments which must be accepted a priori. I am essentially an empiricist (of a sort). The ontology of experience is of no concern to me and I do not believe anyone can define what they are talking about to speak about the ontology of experience. What we can speak of and define and act upon is our conceptualization of experience.

And if you feel ontology is irrelevant, to then make this ontological pronouncement would, at best, be an irrelevancy, at worst a contradiction. Making a pronouncement on the irrelevance of ontology doesn’t entitle you to claim that anything else you say, won’t be ontological.

I don't think I understand what you mean here. If what I said is still ontological you'll have to show me how it is so.

By "reality is an immediate experience," I meant "reality is immediately experienced."

Ok, that I agree with, and it makes sense how that fits with the relevance, or otherwise, of ontology, which I'm mostly in agreement with. The only thing I'd dispute is that my discussion with UniversalAlien had anything to do with my opinion on the philosophical status of Reality. Like you I think, I feel it is relevant.

Let me try to sum-up and simplify the question, discussion, and meaning. No one yet has questioned what I meant by the words 'does science discover or create', so I will assume there is no problem there. But apparently there is a problem when I use the word reality. What is meant by reality? I admit I am not sure. The thing is and a point I will stress over and over neither are you. No one knows 'exactly' what reality is because there is not and probably will never be an 'exact' reality. When we talk about reality, or anything else for that matter, we are using words and symbols to communicate ideas and concepts which are assumed to be fixed and constant. That in itself can be opened to dispute but even more important these words and symbols are representative meanings and there exact interpretation, like reality, can have different meanings to different people. So reality is always relative to who, what, where, why and when. No two existent beings in this or any other universe have ever experienced reality exactly the same way at exactly the same time - all we have are symbols or words expressing a similarity of experience with no absolute that it is the same experience.

So 'Does Science Discover or Create Reality?' It does both. And more than that, that {shall I say ambiguous?} word reality both creates and discovers science. And for those who insist that science is only discovering what already is, you better be sure you know what already is, what that means, and can prove it is unchanging.

Science never created anything, it does however help us to change reality, if the information it obtains from the universe is understood by us within reason. Philosophy on the other hand, allows us to reason with the information at hand obtained by accurate observation, that which all science really is. The imagination is above all of this, something that truly is all inspiring, without which mysticism, that which spurs us on, could never be. I guess.

This seems correct. ^


Percieved reality =/= reality demonstated by phenomenon.