Can a man-made computer become conscious?

[Tamminen]

Belindi:

I think that a quale is not a concept but is a simple percept.

I think you are on the right track. When I perceice a particular yellow spot, for instance, the event of perceiving can be described on the physiological level as brain processes, but the content of that experience, the particular yellow spot, is on a fundamentally different conceptual level just because it is a content. Contents are not processes. Processes produce contents of consciousness, and these contents are in fact precisely what we call consciousness, at least how I understand that concept.

So consciousness and matter are necessarily ontologically separate levels of being, although they may express one and the same relation we have to to the world. What is fundamental is subjectivity, which is the point in the point of view to the world, also called consciousness, that subjectivity adopts by using material organisms for its being. And when I say "using" I use that word metaphorically to describe the basic ontological structure of reality. Concepts like 'using', 'willing' and 'intending' may be expressions of the same structure but come to the picture later on.

-- Updated September 15th, 2017, 10:00 am to add the following --

The fact that contents of consciousness are on a conceptually different level than brain events has nothing to do with the question of how the brain processes information: digitally or analogically. The levels are conceptually incompatible. We cannot even meaningfully speak about the analog/digital difference in the case of consciousness.

On the ontological structure of reality: I think we can speak of teleology or final causes when we speak of cosmology, but the words 'intention', 'purpose', 'will', 'motivation' etc. should be reserved to describe individuals.

-- Updated September 16th, 2017, 8:56 am to add the following --

Perhaps I have said this before, but I say it again: The being of consciousness needs no explanation, because consciousness is the ontological precondition of all questions and explanations. The being of matter needs explaining, because its rationality is not as self-evident as the rationality of consciousness. So we need not ask "Why is there consciousness?", but we should ask "Why is there matter?" and "Why is the material universe exactly such as it is?" Empirical science cannot answer these kinds of questions, so they are left for reflective science, i.e. philosophy. Physics, for instance, can make unbelievably accurate predictions in the world of elementary particles using the equations of the Standard Model, and it has good reason to be proud of its achievements, but it has not the faintest idea about why the elementary particles are such as they are and what their basic properties mean: what is spin, what is electric charge, what is time? But it is not its business to think about these questions if there is no empirical solution to them.

This is what I mean by an alternate horizon of seeing things. It is totally different from the materialistic horizon and produces different kinds of questions and answers. However, it leaves sciences where they are, if they do not make metaphysical presuppositions, for instance the presupposition that consciousness is a property of matter, because that only leads to confusion and endless debates of non-existent problems.

[Atreyu]

Perhaps I have said this before, but I say it again: The being of consciousness needs no explanation, because consciousness is the ontological precondition of all questions and explanations. The being of matter needs explaining, because its rationality is not as self-evident as the rationality of consciousness. So we need not ask "Why is there consciousness?", but we should ask "Why is there matter?" and "Why is the material universe exactly such as it is?"

I strongly disagree with this. So what if consciousness is the "ontological precondition of all questions and answers"? The property of awareness and consciousness are just as mysterious and inexplicable, if not more so, as the properties of matter. In fact, nothing could be less self-evident than how or why the property of awareness/consciousness exists.

So we definitely need to ask "why is there consciousness?", if for no other reason than the fact that it could explain why there is matter, and why the material universe is exactly such as it is. You cannot separate the two issues, or completely disregard the one or the other. Matter may only exist because of the peculiarities of consciousness, or vice versa, or both, and the properties of matter might also be the way they are because of the peculiarities of consciousness (ours or some other entity's), and again, or vice versa, or both.

You cannot really understand the material world without taking into account psychology, just as you cannot understand psychology without taking into account the material world. Both aspects must be studied, compared, contrasted, and the true relationship between them must be sharply delineated and defined, before any real understanding of either takes place...

[Tamminen]

There is definitely a parallelism between mind and body, so in this sense both are complex phenomena, but what I meant was that the reason for the being of consciousness is self-evident, because it is the realization of subjectivity itself, the relation of the 'metaphysical subject', or the Cartesian 'I am' to the material world. The self-evidence of the being of this I is as clear to me as it was to Descartes, and this must indeed be interpreted ontologically. In this sense I am an ontological idealist.

As I have said elsewhere, I see the subject-object relation fundamental and unbreakable. Secondly, I think that the subject is a not an emergent property of matter, nor is consciousness. And finally, the subject is more fundamental in the subject-object relation, being the clue of all reality.

[Ranvier]

I'm trying to decipher how it's possible that I agree with both Terminem and Atreyu posts. Is it because both are right or that there is a third "in between" option?
I have to read a few more times...

-- Updated September 18th, 2017, 5:29 pm to add the following --

I think I got it:

There is a difference between human consciousness and "the consciousness" with all the "questions and answers" already present. Matter is needed for the human consciousness to "find" questions in a "search" for answers. So yes, both are correct.

[Present awareness]

There is definitely a parallelism between mind and body, so in this sense both are complex phenomena, but what I meant was that the reason for the being of consciousness is self-evident, because it is the realization of subjectivity itself, the relation of the 'metaphysical subject', or the Cartesian 'I am' to the material world. The self-evidence of the being of this I is as clear to me as it was to Descartes, and this must indeed be interpreted ontologically. In this sense I am an ontological idealist.

As I have said elsewhere, I see the subject-object relation fundamental and unbreakable. Secondly, I think that the subject is a not an emergent property of matter, nor is consciousness. And finally, the subject is more fundamental in the subject-object relation, being the clue of all reality.

There can be no subject without an object or an object without a subject. The two rest on one reality, and they produce each other. "Me", may only be defined by everything which is not "Me".

Awareness or consciousness, has the object of it's awareness and a subjective experience of that object. It's like a continuous feedback loop which may not be divided, except through abstract thinking.

[Belindi]

Tamminem wrote:

-------consciousness is self-evident, because it is the realization of subjectivity itself, the relation of the 'metaphysical subject', or the Cartesian 'I am' to the material world. The self-evidence of the being of this I is as clear to me as it was to Descartes, and this must indeed be interpreted ontologically. In this sense I am an ontological idealist.

As I have said elsewhere, I see the subject-object relation fundamental and unbreakable

I agree that consciousness is self evident. It doesn't follow that there is some thing that is conscious. The 'I' in Cogito ergo sum is not a given.

The 'I' we take on faith. Me, I take 'I' on faith. I'm not an ontological idealist though because I can't accept that there is nothing 'out there'.

[Tamminen]

I agree that consciousness is self evident. It doesn't follow that there is some thing that is conscious. The 'I' in Cogito ergo sum is not a given.

Exactly my point. The 'I' is not a thing, material or any other kind of thing.

The 'I' we take on faith. Me, I take 'I' on faith. I'm not an ontological idealist though because I can't accept that there is nothing 'out there'.

There is something out there: the world, and it is material. Perhaps I should be more accurate with terms.

[Noobe-Noobe]

I don't believe a computer can become 'conscious', in the meaning that we give to this ward. On the other hand, Stephen Hawking believes that this is a great danger of technological advances so who am I to judge .

[Atreyu]

I'll just briefly re-state my position, to keep this endless thread going:

We can divide the Universe into 3 classes of entities, which I'll do here going from the "highest" or "most intelligent" or "more advanced", down to the "lowest", or "least intelligent" or "least advanced":

1. Conscious entities.

2. Living organisms which are not conscious.

3. Non-living matter.

My thesis is basically that in considering the "evolution" of going "up the ladder" in classes, you cannot skip a step. You cannot go from #3 straightaway to #1.

And in the case of a computer, I don't think it's even possible for it to get to #2. I would even argue that this should be a fairly obvious truth.

That is the incredibly simple version of my position.

[Belindi]

Atreyu wrote:

Living organisms which are not conscious.

What is your definition of ' living organism'?

[Atreyu]

What is your definition of ' living organism'?

In this context, you could define it the same way as ordinary science.

The stumbling block will be confounding "awareness" and "consciousness". All living organisms possess awareness, but not all living organisms are "conscious". Consciousness implies a certain intelligence which is not implied by the term "awareness". (See RJG's explanation of "recognition" and "memory" as a good example of what might be implied).

As a simple example, I usually refer to men who are asleep and dreaming, or men who are hypnotized, or men in a coma. We would agree that all three possess the property of awareness, but nobody would agree that either of them are conscious. To be conscious, they would have to wake up.

The same thing applies to living organisms. A simple amoeba may have some awareness. But nobody would argue they are conscious, at least certainly not in comparison to ourselves. Consciousness implies that a certain quantity and sophistication is present, along with the simpler property of "raw" awareness...

[JamesOfSeattle]

Atreyu, it seems you have some arbitrary measure of what counts as consciousness, as opposed to a definition or explanation of what consciousness is, which is fine. But it is not very helpful for explaining why computers can or cannot be conscious.

*

[Atreyu]

Atreyu, it seems you have some arbitrary measure of what counts as consciousness, as opposed to a definition or explanation of what consciousness is, which is fine. But it is not very helpful for explaining why computers can or cannot be conscious.

Consciousness cannot be adequately defined. We only know what it is when we experience it. But defining it seems to be impossible. However, it's not arbitrary to say that when we use the word "consciousness", we mean more than simple "awareness", as I've shown above. We all imagine conscious entities being able to recognize things around them, and being able to control itself in order to adapt and use those things around them for whatever aim it may have. In fact, "aim" and "goals" seem to be necessary attributes of a conscious entity.

All conscious entities possess the property of awareness. But not all beings which have simple awareness can be said to be "conscious". And if one can understand that a computer's awareness is much more simple than the awareness of even an amoeba (assuming that both have some kind of simple awareness), then perhaps one will understand why the augmented property of consciousness cannot arise from it.

It would be like trying to build a house on sand....

[Togo1]

(Nested quote removed.)

Only by building a computer that was *exactly* a human.

I respectfully disagree. If the computer follows every logical step that the human follows in determining a move, then it's playing exactly the same way a human is, without being a human.

Only if you presuppose that solving a problem like a human does involve only duplicating the logical steps and nothing else.

Or to put it another way, if T is total experience at a given time of being human, and P is the total experience at a given time of deciding on a chess move, what reason to you have to suppose that P<T?

Now of course you may not feel that all this detail is necessary to solve a chess problem, and I'd agree, but that doesn't mean it's not part of the conscious experience of solving a chess problem, or that it has no influence on it.


The thing that makes me uneasy about your approach to consciousness is that while challenging others to produce evidence that your conception is inaccurate, there doesn't appear to be any evidence that your conception is accuarate. Is it just an arbitrary stand, or is there a reason to hold the position that you do?

[Atreyu]

Only if you presuppose that solving a problem like a human does involve only duplicating the logical steps and nothing else.

Or to put it another way, if T is total experience at a given time of being human, and P is the total experience at a given time of deciding on a chess move, what reason to you have to suppose that P<T?

Exactly. A machine might be a very good replica or imitation of a conscious entity, in that for all appearances it might appear to "do" the same things as a conscious entity would. But it doesn't possess the psyche that a conscious entity has, nor even the psyche that an amoeba has. Therefore, it cannot be said to be conscious. It's not even aware of what it is "doing"...