And what trap would that be? That is, how would you characterize it? Can you say it? If you say it, you are in the trap, are you not?
The fly bottle refers to whatever it is that has caused philosophical confusion that once we see how we got into the problem we are able to get out of it. Many of the problems Wittgenstein dealt with had to do with the logic of language and the relationship between thought and being. Once we reject the notion of an independent logic that lies behind all that we say and all that is, we no longer get trapped in that bottle. There are, of course, others.
This would necessarily possess an element of ineffability.
It may be that ineffability is your fly bottle.
Not clear on the good man reference.
The good man is the “happy man”. From the Tractatus:
If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language.
In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man' (6.43)
He goes into more detail in the notebooks.
… the attempt to encompass what is not language with language.
No, just the opposite. It is, as he says, an attempt to set the limits of thought/language. What lies beyond those limits is not something he attempts to encompass in language, but rather, establish as something seen and experienced outside of language. Something that if we attempt to put it into words must be misrepresented because it is not about the logical relations of what is in the world.
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (Tractatus 5.6)
Here, I am asking what it means, and what is required for even acknowledging at all, something that is not language? This is the center of my thoughts here: the answer to this would be, of course, a proposition, or, in propositional form.
Wittgenstein (of the Tractatus) made a distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’. Sense refers to the logic of language and statements about what is within the limits of my world.
It is the way the happy man experiences the world that is meaningful. The attempt to put that into words must fail because that experience has nothing to do with the logical relations of facts or language.
My whole appeal to ineffability is the inescapablity of having to reference what is beyond language in order to make any case about the limits of language.
One can make a case about the limits of language simply by pointing to the inadequacy of language to say what it is to experience something. If you say that the taste of vanilla ice cream is ineffable I might agree. What is it issue is the move from the limits of language to the existence of god.
Again, how do you conceive of a there and refer to that which cannot be referred to at the same time? That is ineffability.
I can reference vanilla ice cream. I can reference the feeling of the sun warming my skin. The problem is the move from what cannot be said to the claim of the existence of something that cannot be referred.
Pardon me, did you say "stands out of logical framework"?
I am trying to explain the Tractatus. Once the misunderstanding is cleared away, you will find that you are closer to the early Wittgenstein than you think.
Please explain how this is possible to make this statement? Value is paramount, for when we talk about ineffability, it is all about presence, the given of the world.
He believed that value is not a logical relation. He believed the ‘I’ is not in the world.
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (6.44)
The difference would be,if it were presented as, the "as" would be a given
If all experience is mediated then there is nothing that is given AS, only what is taken AS.
It must be acknowledged that there is something in taking as that is unspeakable, otherwise it would be a vicious circle of self referentiality of language.
There must be something that is taken AS, but there are various ways in which it can be taken, although at any particular time those possibilities are historically and culturally restrictive. Heidegger emphasizes the importance of the way it is taken, that is to say, the way that it is spoken. Dasein is not the passive recipient of “the given”. To the extent that something is given AS it is given BY dasein To dasein. Alethea (truth) is a dynamic relationship between dasein and what becomes present to dasein. It's becoming present too is dynamic.
Not unmediated? It is here, in your reference to the way in which what is present to us is present: this is nonsense: to speak of not unmediated is to refer to that which is mediated. What would that be?
All that is present to us is present via the mediation of human physiology, psychology, history, and culture. If these were different what is present to us would be different, although the entity itself may be the same. This is what the different ages of man is about.
In part? What is this but two words, 'in' and 'part' concatonated in what we call time and presented as ready to hand projections into existence in my dasein?
In part because dasein is an active part-ner in the coming to be of what comes to be.
My thoughts are here: presence at hand cannot be removed from ready to hand.
I am not sure what you are getting at. We relate to an object that is present at hand differently than we relate to what is ready at hand. We cannot "remove" what is ready to hand but we can deliberately regard entities in other ways
If language is a tool, what is not a tool? That points to ineffability.
While language is used as a tool, I do not think this means that language is a tool. What is the relationship between thought and language? Is thought a tool?
If presence at hand is deemed part of the equiprimordial ontology of dasein ...
But it is not, it is a theoretical stance toward something. It is secondary, not primary.
… and there is no recognition IN this term of something Other than ready to hand …
The term is defined by Heidegger as what stands out or apart from what is ready to hand, what is other than dasein’s ready to hand relationship with entities.
'Dasein' most certainly must be such a particle, because all of language is ready to hand and 'dasein' belongs to language.
So, dasein, the maker and user of tools, is a tool of language, and language is a tool of dasein? Not all of language is ready to hand. Heidegger attempts to say what language has not yet made available to say. He attempts to move beyond ready to hand language by first regarding language as something present at hand, that is, by not simply using language, but by showing all that comes with our unreflective use of language, and second, by attempting to say what has gone unsaid, which because it has not yet been said does not fit our conventions of what is said. To the extent that this is successful and this language becomes the language of philosophy it becomes something ready to hand.
As to the presence of man, all the above applies. I just do not see any way out of this. Its like this, and I do labor this point: this migraine I am having can be recognized as not some kind of symbolic instrumentality, but presence itself, notwithstanding that such a recognition occurs within a matrix of ready to hand.
I would not say that your migraine is “presence itself”, but simply that you have a migraine. This does not mean that it must then be something ready to hand, as if that were the only alternative.
This point is made by Kant long ago: no concepts, then no knowledge, judgment or understanding. But the same matter could be brought to Kant: what do you mean by "sensory intuitions"? given that the the utterance itself is, if you will, always already conditioned by the synthetic powers of reason. Therefore, to "talk" about sensory intuitions as such is impossible. But there it is before: that which is not concepts at all.
The utterance “sensory intuition” is not a sensory intuition. Sensory intuition is conditioned and “made sense of” through the categories of the understanding. This does not make “talk” about sensory intuitions impossible, it simply means that such intuitions are mediated via the architecture of the mind.
As an interpretative entity, my interpretation is obviously limited. But it is limited before, as in standing before, Being in eternity.
“Being in eternity” is itself an interpretation. For all we know it is nothing more than a conceptual construct, something we create and then claim has been there, present, all along to behold. And this brings us full circle to where I came into this discussion. The acknowledgement that there is something does not legitimize the claim that there is god, or Being in eternity. The shift from the presence of something to “presence itself” to god and eternity is questionable and problematic.