Togo1 wrote:Ok, so when you say that two instances of representing the same word have "the common feature of being productions of the same word", that's what I'm getting at. What is this 'word' that you're referring to? Is it an object, a concept, what?
If I write the word 'dog' and then write the word 'dog', have I written the same word or a different word? I say I've written the same word. But we use the expressions 'is the same as' and 'is different from' in a variety of ways. We could get into a discussion of the supposedly mysterious thing we call identity: what ARE sameness and difference? Or we could resist the lure of the rabbit hole and say: the words 'dog' and 'word' are common nouns that we use to refer to real things: dogs and words. The word 'dog' is a word, and a dog is a real thing. And neither of them is a concept - unless you can show me why either is indeed a concept.
You say that explaining how we use a word and describing a thing are substantially the same operation. Please can you give a demonstration, perhaps with the word 'dog'? I hope you'll agree that these are different operations. We use the word to denote the thing, and we describe the thing by making falsifiable factual assertions listing its properties - a list which will change according to the nature of the description.
Togo1 wrote:What does it mean to you to claim that an abstract thing 'exists'? What's the difference between a concept and an abstract thing?
I think we can agree that a concept is more than just the thoughts in my head. If I talk about justice, for example, you'll recognise some aspects of what I'm talking about, but disagree with others. I'm not free to just think of anything, label it justice, and expect the concept to have changed in the wider world. So in the sense that a concept is shared between many many people, it has to have some form of independence from any one instance of justice. Whether that means it 'exists' or not depends on what you understand by the term.
I think a concept, like a proposition, is an example of an abstract thing. I think the phrase 'abstract thing' is an equivocation on the the word 'thing', because it smuggles in an equivalence or analogy between supposed abstract things and real things. Until we differentiate between the way we use the words 'abstract' and 'unreal', I think the words 'abstract' and 'unreal' are synonyms. So, do unreal things exist? If we want to say they do exist, we have to explain the way we're using the word 'exist' in this context.
You ask if a concept is more than just the thoughts (a thought?) in your head. So that means you suppose a concept is at least a thought in your head. So is a concept a thought, in which case why have two names for the same thing? And if they're different things, why say they're the same thing? And if they're different things, can you explain the difference between a concept and a thought? And in what way can a thing in your head be shared between many people anyway?
I'm just trying to show that we use words such as 'concept', 'idea' and 'thought', and 'justice', then fool ourselves into thinking they are the names of things - abstract things - which we can describe and even analyse - hence metaphysics. When you say 'a concept [such as justice]...has to have some form of independence from any one instance of justice', you're expressing almost unalloyed Platonism. We've been making the same mistake for at least two an a half thousand years.
Togo1 wrote:Well it's not a physical object. I destroyed it. It no longer exists. So if it's not a physical thing, and not an abstract thing, what is it?
A burnt photo is indeed a physical thing. It just isn't the original photo before it was burnt. A thing that is burnt doesn't become an abstract thing.
Togo1 wrote:I don't know where you've gotten the idea that metaphysics must involve the existence of abstract things, or even what you mean by that.
Please can you give an example of a metaphysical question or answer that doesn't involve an abstract thing. I remain resolutely open to persuasion.
Togo1 wrote:The position you appear to be taking is that statements can be divided into broadly sensible assertions about the real world that make sense, and absurd metaphysical contortions of metaphysical analysis. That is a metaphysical position. You alos appear to be suggesting a distinction between concepts and abstract things, between falsifiable statements and non-falsifiable statements, and between positions that assert the existance of abtract things and those that don't. All these would be metaphysical positions, assuming they're of any significance.
Not so. Among the many things we do with language, we make factual assertions about features of reality. If a factual assertion correctly asserts a feature of reality, given the way we use the words or other signs involved, it is true. If not, it is false. Why is that a metaphysical distinction? And why is the distinction between real and unreal things a metaphysical distinction? Genuine questions.
-- Updated July 25th, 2017, 12:57 pm to add the following --
This is the quintessential metaphysical mess: assume there is an abstract, immaterial thing, the mind, which we can describe or analyse; then puzzle over its relationship with a real thing, the body.
And poor old Einstein. Suppose he believed in fairies. Would that make it more likely that there are fairies?