Anything is possible

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Rr6
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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Rr6 » September 18th, 2016, 11:28 am

Marsh8472 wrote:I don't need a shred of evidence to show that something is possible. It's like claiming someone has an invisible undetectable dragon. That would be an example of a claim that is possible even if no evidence is offered. That's what we're talking about, what is possible.
Somethings are possible some are not. You have no evidence to substantiate those things that are not possible.

Anything is possible is false statement and you have offerred no rational, logical common sense to substantiate that anything is possible.

** does not equal *** , this absolute truth ergo finite set of possibility.

There can only exist five regular polyhedra of Universe, irrespective of multiverse scenarios. Absolute truth and a finite set of possibility.

Ergo anything is not possible and none have ever offerred rational, logical common sense to invalidate that truth. imho

r6
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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Marsh8472 » September 18th, 2016, 11:28 am

Burning ghost wrote:But by your "reasoning" or "non-reasoning" it does make it true if you so choose to define "true" as being it.

It is all well and good to pull language to peices. The question then is what "bits" are we left with?
In that sense just gibberish. Which I don't know what that means. So as far as I know it means something that is possible and is possible for that reason as far as I know. There are several different types of possible and I haven't heard anyone address that yet. I think all that's happening here is that you're using a version of possible that assumes something logically impossible is not possible and I'm using a version of possible that does not make that assumption. If we do not assume that something disproven logically is considered completely absolutely disproven then anything is possible.

The law of contradiction is an axiom. Axioms are true because they are assumed true by definition of axiom. But are they still true if we do not assume they are true? I would say it is possible for an axiom to be false. What's wrong with that?

-- Updated September 18th, 2016, 11:59 am to add the following --
Rr6 wrote:
Marsh8472 wrote:I don't need a shred of evidence to show that something is possible. It's like claiming someone has an invisible undetectable dragon. That would be an example of a claim that is possible even if no evidence is offered. That's what we're talking about, what is possible.
Somethings are possible some are not. You have no evidence to substantiate those things that are not possible.

Anything is possible is false statement and you have offerred no rational, logical common sense to substantiate that anything is possible.

** does not equal *** , this absolute truth ergo finite set of possibility.

There can only exist five regular polyhedra of Universe, irrespective of multiverse scenarios. Absolute truth and a finite set of possibility.

Ergo anything is not possible and none have ever offerred rational, logical common sense to invalidate that truth. imho

r6
You're trying to shift the burden of proof here. If you can prove that something is impossible then "anything is possible" is false. 2 does not equal 3 is your proof which only works if you consider this true. This begs the question of when is something proven true. If something proven logically true or logically false is considered truly true or truly false then yes, otherwise possibly no. I do not accept your proof. The only lingering issue I struggle with is whether "it is unknown if X is possible" can be considered the same thing as "X is possible". By using a definition of possible that says something could be true as far as we know by virtue of being unknown then I would say by my definition of possible "anything is possible" is a true statement.

It looks like the problem also is the word "possible" is subjective term and is dependent on what is considered known. When we know something how do we know that we know it, and how do we know that we know that we know etc...

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Locke J » September 18th, 2016, 7:46 pm

So the reason I do not agree to the statement "anything is possible" is because physical laws constrain what we can do, at least in the environment we live in. We cannot for instance, show our free will by walking on a ceiling. I do believe, however, that there are ways of over-coming the environment, and making things that, under normal circumstances, would be impossible, possible.

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Locke J » September 18th, 2016, 7:55 pm

Also, I will add that "matter cannot be created or destroyed" is a law of thermodynamics, and not a theory through the scientific spectrum. But, if we were to look at everything as theory, then it would seem that nothing can be proved or unproven.

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Burning ghost » September 19th, 2016, 2:16 am

The problem is using colloquial language to replace technical terms.

Is it possible that I am merely the dream of a banana? Yes, it is possible. It is possible as an aspect of something outside of my knowledge.

If you wish ro discuss different "possibles" we are essentially asking what is knowledge. We are in the realm of epistemology. Within this realm there are variable ways to view and define knowledge by terms such as true and false, real and unreal, etc.

In my experience there is no singular philosophical definition of knowledge. Knowledge itself need not be true knowledge nor real knowledge, in which case we are really asking what knowledge means and if meaning is knowledge and such things as that.

If you say anything is possible then I ask what you mean by anything. I understand the different uses of possible and how far it can be stretched to the point where belief and knowledge become a blurry unit.

It seems, like I said several posts back, that it is the same as saying possible is possible, anything being synomynous with possible. If it is not synomynous then express what is meant by anything. The "anything" is the static basis of your entire investigation. If it is not static then its meaning can be altered as much as "possible" can be. In which case when you say anything is possible then the answer is yes/no/maybe/I don't know/"possibly"/"definitively" depending on the meaning of "possible" and "anything". All of this is of course ignoring the use of "is" which is something existentalists like to focus on.

Anything is possible in some given sense of the meaning possible. If I say 1 is the same as 4 then I am saying there is no distinction between them yet I am making a distinction by referrig to two different terms. If I say a rabbit is the same as a banana and try and peel a rabbit in the same fashion as a banana I would, if I followed the rules set by my language ignorant of sensibility, find some difference between these banana/rabbits or rather cognitively disregard such a subtl difference and still refer to them as synomynous objects.

Then we questions like, is it possible to imagine a sound with no tone? A shape with no size? A light with no brightness? Without talking on riddles we cannot imagine these things.

As an example of misrepresenting colloquial use we find this in many riddles. "What runs around a house but doesn't move?". The use of "runs" has to be taken in the correct context in order for an answer to be applied that makes sense. It is always possible to interpret some meaning into a phrase.

Ask yourself if it is possible that you exist. Do you say you possible exist or simple that you do exist? If it is possible that you don't exist then in what sense or meaning is this possible?
AKA badgerjelly

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Kenhinds » September 19th, 2016, 2:41 am

I would like to reply to this in a way. How is it in a way that we all know what "one" is thinking yet "one" has never said

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Marsh8472 » September 19th, 2016, 11:29 am

Burning ghost wrote:The problem is using colloquial language to replace technical terms.

Is it possible that I am merely the dream of a banana? Yes, it is possible. It is possible as an aspect of something outside of my knowledge.

If you wish ro discuss different "possibles" we are essentially asking what is knowledge. We are in the realm of epistemology. Within this realm there are variable ways to view and define knowledge by terms such as true and false, real and unreal, etc.

In my experience there is no singular philosophical definition of knowledge. Knowledge itself need not be true knowledge nor real knowledge, in which case we are really asking what knowledge means and if meaning is knowledge and such things as that.

If you say anything is possible then I ask what you mean by anything. I understand the different uses of possible and how far it can be stretched to the point where belief and knowledge become a blurry unit.

It seems, like I said several posts back, that it is the same as saying possible is possible, anything being synomynous with possible. If it is not synomynous then express what is meant by anything. The "anything" is the static basis of your entire investigation. If it is not static then its meaning can be altered as much as "possible" can be. In which case when you say anything is possible then the answer is yes/no/maybe/I don't know/"possibly"/"definitively" depending on the meaning of "possible" and "anything". All of this is of course ignoring the use of "is" which is something existentalists like to focus on.

Anything is possible in some given sense of the meaning possible. If I say 1 is the same as 4 then I am saying there is no distinction between them yet I am making a distinction by referrig to two different terms. If I say a rabbit is the same as a banana and try and peel a rabbit in the same fashion as a banana I would, if I followed the rules set by my language ignorant of sensibility, find some difference between these banana/rabbits or rather cognitively disregard such a subtl difference and still refer to them as synomynous objects.

Then we questions like, is it possible to imagine a sound with no tone? A shape with no size? A light with no brightness? Without talking on riddles we cannot imagine these things.

As an example of misrepresenting colloquial use we find this in many riddles. "What runs around a house but doesn't move?". The use of "runs" has to be taken in the correct context in order for an answer to be applied that makes sense. It is always possible to interpret some meaning into a phrase.

Ask yourself if it is possible that you exist. Do you say you possible exist or simple that you do exist? If it is possible that you don't exist then in what sense or meaning is this possible?
Right, makes sense to me. I'd say then the answer to "anything is possible" is indeterminate because it's not specific enough until we break down "anything", "is", and "possible", add some constraints, definitions and assumptions before we can arrive at a yes or no answer.

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Rr6 » September 19th, 2016, 12:14 pm

r6--Somethings are possible some are not. You have no evidence to substantiate those things that are not possible.
Anything is possible is false statement and you have offerred no rational, logical common sense to substantiate that anything is possible.
** does not equal *** , this absolute truth ergo finite set of possibility.
There can only exist five regular polyhedra of Universe, irrespective of multiverse scenarios. Absolute truth and a finite set of possibility.
Ergo anything is not possible and none have ever offerred rational, logical common sense to invalidate that truth. imho
Marsh--You're trying to shift the burden of proof here.
Ive never offered any proofs. Ive only discussed rational, logical common sense derived from observations. If you want a "proof" of this or that, then yo may need a mathematician or whomever.
If you can prove that something is impossible then "anything is possible" is false.
** does not equal *** and never will it. This is rational, logical common sense. You apparently have no concern for rational logical common sense truth. Your hung on wanting a proof. You need to talk to some one else if you want proof of this or that or not this or not that.

There exist only five regular polyhedral of Universe, irrespective of multiverse exists. You have no evidence, no proof and least of all you have not rational, logical common sense that more than five exist.
2 does not equal 3 is your proof which only works if you consider this true.
Talking to you is like talking to a 2 year old who keeps saying 'no' irrespective of what the parent says. Waste of time. imho
This begs the question of when is something proven true. If something proven logically true or logically false is considered truly true or truly false then yes, otherwise possibly no. I do not accept your proof. The only lingering issue I struggle with is whether "it is unknown if X is possible" can be considered the same thing as "X is possible". By using a definition of possible that says something could be true as far as we know by virtue of being unknown then I would say by my definition of possible "anything is possible" is a true statement.
You have not proof that "anything is possible" and you certainly offer no rational, logical common sense much less any substantiating evidence. I cannot keep doing this with those who have mental block to obvious, rational logical common sense absolute truths.
It looks like the problem also is the word "possible" is subjective term and is dependent on what is considered known. When we know something how do we know that we know it, and how do we know that we know that we know etc...
The problem is with people whose ego wants to play loopy mind games, even after presented with rational, logical common sense truths as derived from observations over many years of consideration of these relatively simple issues.

r6
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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Marsh8472 » September 19th, 2016, 1:15 pm

** does not equal *** and never will it. This is rational, logical common sense. You apparently have no concern for rational logical common sense truth. Your hung on wanting a proof. You need to talk to some one else if you want proof of this or that or not this or not that.

There exist only five regular polyhedral of Universe, irrespective of multiverse exists. You have no evidence, no proof and least of all you have not rational, logical common sense that more than five exist.
Why are there only 5 regular polyhedral of universe? Why don't you say at least 5? why not 6? or 4? Is this a philosophical idea of that you invented that you are trying to push? I consider this an irrational claim on your part.
Talking to you is like talking to a 2 year old who keeps saying 'no' irrespective of what the parent says. Waste of time. imho
To a 2 year old it's possible that 2 does equal 3 then until persuaded otherwise usually from argument from authority. I could just say that it's so obvious that it's possible for 2 to equal 3 that even a 2 year old can see it.

If we take for example Fermat's last theorem
states that no three positive integers a, b, and c satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two

It was a theorem written in 1637. It was allegedly proven true in 1994. Between 1637 and 1994 people would say that it's possible the theorem could be wrong. After 1994 most would say it's not possible for the theorem to be wrong. What happened there? How can something be accepted as possible and then later accepted as not possible? I would take that to mean that everything is possible until proven otherwise. Proof is persuasion. Persuasion is relative and subjective.
The problem is with people whose ego wants to play loopy mind games, even after presented with rational, logical common sense truths as derived from observations over many years of consideration of these relatively simple issues.
Conclusions made from observations over many years is inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning is about probability, not absolutes. Can you tell the difference between something unlikely and something impossible?

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Mosesquine » September 20th, 2016, 12:03 am

There are logical possibility and metaphysical possibility. Logically, Donald Trump can be a fried egg. Metaphysically, however, Donald Trump cannot be a fried egg. The sentence 'Donald Trump is a fried egg' is grammatically and logically valid. However, the sentence is not metaphysically valid. The particles of Donald Trump and the particles of a fried egg are wholly different. Metaphysical possibility depends on physical elements to some extent, in this sense.

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Consul » September 20th, 2016, 12:48 am

Have you ever heard of dialetheism? (It has nothing to do with theism.)

"A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.

Dialetheism is the view that there are dialetheias. One can define a contradiction as a couple of sentences, one of which is the negation of the other, or as a conjunction of such sentences. Therefore, dialetheism amounts to the claim that there are true contradictions. As such, dialetheism opposes the so-called Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) (sometimes also called the Law of Contradiction). The Law can, and has been, expressed in various ways, but the simplest and most perspicuous for our purposes is probably the following: for any A, it is impossible for both A and ¬A to be true."


Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

In my view, the fatal logical problem with dialetheism is that if it is true, it is itself both true and false. That is, it is logically provable that a dialetheic logic of contradictions with a nonclassical semantics of negation is itself contradictory. Graham Priest, the godfather of dialetheism, is prepared to bite the bullet:

"It may be rational to accept that dialetheism is both true and false. In a sense, this is what I do accept: not only are some sentences of the form p & ~p true, but ~(p & ~p) is itself a logical truth. It is no refutation of one´s views to hold that it is false, i.e., has a true negation, if one´s view is precisely that some contradictions, in particular ones of this kind, may be true."

(Priest, Graham. Beyond the Limits of Thought. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 275n10)

I think it's not rational but blatantly absurd to accept that dialethism is both true and false. I fail to see how it could be rational to accept a contradictory logic of contradictions.

-- Updated September 20th, 2016, 12:03 am to add the following --

Anything is possible…unless it is impossible.
When someone denies that the law of non-contradiction is true, I see no possibility of replying with an argument.

"No truth does have, and no truth could have, a true negation. Nothing is, and nothing could be, literally both true and false. This we know for certain, and a priori, and without any exception for especially perplexing subject matters. …
That may seem dogmatic. And it is: I am affirming the very thesis that Routley and Priest have called into question and—contrary to the rules of debate—I decline to defend it. Furthermore, I concede that it is indefensible against their challenge. They have called so much into question that I have no foothold on undisputed ground. So much the worse for the demand that philosophers always must be ready to defend their theses under the rules of debate."


(Lewis, David. "Logic for Equivocators." 1982. Reprinted in Papers in Philosophical Logic, 97-110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 101)

"I'm sorry; I decline to contribute to your proposed book about the 'debate' over the law of non-contradiction. My feeling is that since this debate instantly reaches deadlock, there's really nothing much to say about it. To conduct a debate, one needs common ground; principles in dispute cannot of course fairly be used as common ground; and in this case, the principles not in dispute are so very much less certain than non-contradiction itself that it matters little whether or not a successful defence of non-contradiction could be based on them."

(Lewis, David. "Letters to Beall and Priest." In The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, JC Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, 176-177. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 176)

"As to the market: The reader thinks that the likely readership is limited to those who have the expertise and fancy true contradictions, plus a few who find the formal development interesting in its own right. I think this is quite wrong. And not just because there are many who do not fancy true contradictions but might readily be persuaded to. I think that there are many reasons for an implacable opponent of true contradictions—such as myself—to take great interest in what Priest and his allies are doing. If the book is a commercial success, as I think it might be, here is the form I think its success might take. The immediate, readymade market does indeed consist of the sympathizers, and is indeed small. After that, the book makes its own market. Some outraged defender of classical virtue (I have in mind here the very man for the part, but let me not name him) hears of this new heresy and decides to squash it once and for all—and it is apparent to all that his attempt is question-begging and worthless. Others set out to do the job properly: of course we all know that Priest is wrong, but you have to refute him this way. No, that won't work, it has to be this way… Then the difference splitters: you have to grant Priest this much but then you can't hold the line here… In short: a snow-balling, complicated debate among opponents about how the paraconsistent position might be resisted—and of course, the paraconsistent manifesto is required reading for participants in the debate. The increasingly obvious disarray of the opponents helps Priest to gather converts who themselves pitch in….
I premise this scenario on two beliefs. (1) Many people will think that it is an easy thing to refute Priest's position, decisively and in accordance with customary rules of debate. It is not an easy thing. I myself think that it is an impossible thing: so much is called into question that debate will bog down into question-begging and deadlock. (On this point, Priest disagrees with me: he thinks that shared principles of methodology might provide enough common ground.) I think this calls into question the very idea that philosophy always can and should proceed by debate—itself a heretical view, likely to be vigorously opposed. (2) Many philosophers hold an unprincipled and unstable position: they have been persuaded by Quine and Putnam that logic is in principle open to revision, they are prepared to contemplate revisions of logic that seem to them to require only small and esoteric changes, yet they still think it absurd to countenance true contradictions—some souls saved for staunch classicism, some lost to Priest, and doubtless some novel positions as well."


(Lewis, David. "Letter to the Publisher." Printed in: Graham Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pref. of 2nd ed., p. xix)

-- Updated September 20th, 2016, 12:09 am to add the following --

I wrote: "When someone denies that the law of non-contradiction is true, I see no possibility of replying with an argument."

Well, if it is an argument, the only possible argument I see is that this denial is absurd because the law of non-contradiction cannot be denied non-contradictorily.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Marsh8472 » September 20th, 2016, 7:59 am

Consul wrote:Have you ever heard of dialetheism? (It has nothing to do with theism.)

"A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.

Dialetheism is the view that there are dialetheias. One can define a contradiction as a couple of sentences, one of which is the negation of the other, or as a conjunction of such sentences. Therefore, dialetheism amounts to the claim that there are true contradictions. As such, dialetheism opposes the so-called Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) (sometimes also called the Law of Contradiction). The Law can, and has been, expressed in various ways, but the simplest and most perspicuous for our purposes is probably the following: for any A, it is impossible for both A and ¬A to be true."


Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

In my view, the fatal logical problem with dialetheism is that if it is true, it is itself both true and false. That is, it is logically provable that a dialetheic logic of contradictions with a nonclassical semantics of negation is itself contradictory. Graham Priest, the godfather of dialetheism, is prepared to bite the bullet:

"It may be rational to accept that dialetheism is both true and false. In a sense, this is what I do accept: not only are some sentences of the form p & ~p true, but ~(p & ~p) is itself a logical truth. It is no refutation of one´s views to hold that it is false, i.e., has a true negation, if one´s view is precisely that some contradictions, in particular ones of this kind, may be true."

(Priest, Graham. Beyond the Limits of Thought. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 275n10)

I think it's not rational but blatantly absurd to accept that dialethism is both true and false. I fail to see how it could be rational to accept a contradictory logic of contradictions.

-- Updated September 20th, 2016, 12:03 am to add the following --

Anything is possible…unless it is impossible.
When someone denies that the law of non-contradiction is true, I see no possibility of replying with an argument.

"No truth does have, and no truth could have, a true negation. Nothing is, and nothing could be, literally both true and false. This we know for certain, and a priori, and without any exception for especially perplexing subject matters. …
That may seem dogmatic. And it is: I am affirming the very thesis that Routley and Priest have called into question and—contrary to the rules of debate—I decline to defend it. Furthermore, I concede that it is indefensible against their challenge. They have called so much into question that I have no foothold on undisputed ground. So much the worse for the demand that philosophers always must be ready to defend their theses under the rules of debate."


(Lewis, David. "Logic for Equivocators." 1982. Reprinted in Papers in Philosophical Logic, 97-110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 101)

"I'm sorry; I decline to contribute to your proposed book about the 'debate' over the law of non-contradiction. My feeling is that since this debate instantly reaches deadlock, there's really nothing much to say about it. To conduct a debate, one needs common ground; principles in dispute cannot of course fairly be used as common ground; and in this case, the principles not in dispute are so very much less certain than non-contradiction itself that it matters little whether or not a successful defence of non-contradiction could be based on them."

(Lewis, David. "Letters to Beall and Priest." In The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, JC Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, 176-177. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 176)

"As to the market: The reader thinks that the likely readership is limited to those who have the expertise and fancy true contradictions, plus a few who find the formal development interesting in its own right. I think this is quite wrong. And not just because there are many who do not fancy true contradictions but might readily be persuaded to. I think that there are many reasons for an implacable opponent of true contradictions—such as myself—to take great interest in what Priest and his allies are doing. If the book is a commercial success, as I think it might be, here is the form I think its success might take. The immediate, readymade market does indeed consist of the sympathizers, and is indeed small. After that, the book makes its own market. Some outraged defender of classical virtue (I have in mind here the very man for the part, but let me not name him) hears of this new heresy and decides to squash it once and for all—and it is apparent to all that his attempt is question-begging and worthless. Others set out to do the job properly: of course we all know that Priest is wrong, but you have to refute him this way. No, that won't work, it has to be this way… Then the difference splitters: you have to grant Priest this much but then you can't hold the line here… In short: a snow-balling, complicated debate among opponents about how the paraconsistent position might be resisted—and of course, the paraconsistent manifesto is required reading for participants in the debate. The increasingly obvious disarray of the opponents helps Priest to gather converts who themselves pitch in….
I premise this scenario on two beliefs. (1) Many people will think that it is an easy thing to refute Priest's position, decisively and in accordance with customary rules of debate. It is not an easy thing. I myself think that it is an impossible thing: so much is called into question that debate will bog down into question-begging and deadlock. (On this point, Priest disagrees with me: he thinks that shared principles of methodology might provide enough common ground.) I think this calls into question the very idea that philosophy always can and should proceed by debate—itself a heretical view, likely to be vigorously opposed. (2) Many philosophers hold an unprincipled and unstable position: they have been persuaded by Quine and Putnam that logic is in principle open to revision, they are prepared to contemplate revisions of logic that seem to them to require only small and esoteric changes, yet they still think it absurd to countenance true contradictions—some souls saved for staunch classicism, some lost to Priest, and doubtless some novel positions as well."


(Lewis, David. "Letter to the Publisher." Printed in: Graham Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pref. of 2nd ed., p. xix)

-- Updated September 20th, 2016, 12:09 am to add the following --

I wrote: "When someone denies that the law of non-contradiction is true, I see no possibility of replying with an argument."

Well, if it is an argument, the only possible argument I see is that this denial is absurd because the law of non-contradiction cannot be denied non-contradictorily.
I ran into dialetheism before when I was searching for more about this. I would say asking whether it's possible for the law of non-contradiction to be wrong is different than denying the law of non-contradiction. What I'm questioning is whether something logically impossible is truly impossible. Our logic is a human invention. Maybe something is just wrong even if it's for reasons beyond our comprehension.

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Consul » September 20th, 2016, 11:56 am

Marsh8472 wrote:I ran into dialetheism before when I was searching for more about this. I would say asking whether it's possible for the law of non-contradiction to be wrong is different than denying the law of non-contradiction. What I'm questioning is whether something logically impossible is truly impossible. Our logic is a human invention. Maybe something is just wrong even if it's for reasons beyond our comprehension.
What is logically impossible is absolutely impossible. Logical impossibility entails both metaphysical impossibility and physical impossibility.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars

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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Marsh8472 » September 20th, 2016, 1:58 pm

Consul wrote:
Marsh8472 wrote:I ran into dialetheism before when I was searching for more about this. I would say asking whether it's possible for the law of non-contradiction to be wrong is different than denying the law of non-contradiction. What I'm questioning is whether something logically impossible is truly impossible. Our logic is a human invention. Maybe something is just wrong even if it's for reasons beyond our comprehension.
What is logically impossible is absolutely impossible. Logical impossibility entails both metaphysical impossibility and physical impossibility.
Right, if we assume this as an axiom then not anything is possible. But for someone who does not make this assumption, that makes it an unknown for them and possible that logically impossible does not mean absolutely impossible.

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Consul
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Re: Anything is possible

Post by Consul » September 20th, 2016, 2:18 pm

Marsh8472 wrote:
Consul wrote: What is logically impossible is absolutely impossible. Logical impossibility entails both metaphysical impossibility and physical impossibility.
Right, if we assume this as an axiom then not anything is possible. But for someone who does not make this assumption, that makes it an unknown for them and possible that logically impossible does not mean absolutely impossible.
Is it logically possible for contradictions to be true? No!
Logical possibility is the highest possible kind of possibility, so there can be no "hyperlogical" kind of possibility that is higher than logical possibility, such that logical impossibilities are "hyperlogical" possibilities.

-- Updated September 20th, 2016, 2:08 pm to add the following --

You might reply that there is no such thing as logical possibility simpliciter, but only logical possibility relative to some logical system L, so that what is logically impossible in L1 is logically possible in L2. My reply to this reply would be that a logical system lacking the law of noncontradiction and tolerating contradictions may be formally constructible, but that formal constructibility doesn't entail real possibility. Analogously, that I can create a story according to which pigs can fly doesn't mean that pigs can really fly. To have a particular logic according to which it is not the case that all contradictions are necessarily false is one thing, and to have a really possible world containing truthmakers for true contradictions is another.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars

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