Firstly, as Felix correctly pointed out, many religions believe in the transmigration of souls, implying that beings other than humans also have them.LuckyR wrote:Most (especially theists) would have a major problem with P3's implication that existence equals soul on a number of fronts. Not least of which that it implies that a dog, snail, bacterium and virus have a soul.
Secondly, a theist need not follow any other religious dogma and could, as a theist, believe that all living beings, including plants and animals, have souls.
Thirdly, how do you know that most people believe that only humans have souls?
For all that we know, human bodies, including their brains, obey exactly the same laws of physics as the bodies of other primates, dolphins, parrots, octopi, apple trees, ferns, as well as atoms, molecules, stones, rivers, clouds, mountains, computers, planets, stars and galaxies. Therefore, why should only human bodies be able to be inhabited by a soul?
But here is a problem. As I pointed out above:LuckyR wrote:if you change C2 to: "The body is not needed in order to become aware of existence", that would probably satisfy them.
,ChanceIsChange wrote:I accept C1.Aoh2010 wrote:the TE premises are:
(P1) The senses of the flying man are inactive.
(P2) The flying man is not aware of his body (from P1).
(P3) The flying man is aware of his existence/soul.
(P4) What the flying man is aware of is different from that which he is unaware of.
and its conclusions are:
(C1) The soul is different from the body (from P2, P3, and P4).
[(C2) The body is not needed in order to become aware of the soul (from P1/P2
and P3).]
However, I see a problem with C2. What P1/P2 and P3 imply is that awareness of the body or awareness of anything external or bodily experience is not needed to become aware of the soul. That does not necessarily mean that other bodily aspects or functions are not necessary to become aware of the soul. For example, if the brain of the floating man were to receive too little oxygen, he would be unconscious and could not become aware of his soul.
Consider a computer program running on a computer. The program neither needs cameras, sensors or any other means of input nor any information about the hardware to run. It might be capable of reflection independently of any external inputs or information about the computer (e.g. a reflective Java program running on the Virtual Machine). However, the program has to run on a computer; without one, it could not perform any calculations, including reflective ones. The program is software distinct from the computer hardware, just as the soul is distinct from the body. So, I accept C1. However, it needs the computer to run, so the soul may also need the body to think. So, I do not accept C2.
I accept that he would not affirm his brain (just as the program would not affirm the CPU). However, why would he not affirm his mind? I presume that if he affirms his essence, it is by reasoning along the line of something like “I think. Therefore, I am.” by which he can do that. If he can do that, wouldn’t it be even simpler for him to affirm his mind by the following reasoning: “I think. Therefore, I think.”?Aoh2010 wrote:he would not affirm anything external
about his members, anything hidden about what is inside him, neither his mind nor
his brain
C2 seems not to follow from the premises. I would be happy for support or criticism of my analysis.