Rr6 wrote:
You were concerned that my list does not apply to animals other than humans. I stated animals other than humans may also ascertain information from some signs or symbols in my list or others Ive not considered yet.
Humans smell decay and that is a sign or symbol of death. I'm sure other animals have olfactory communications.
I believe some animals other than humans have some degree of access to metaphysical-1, mind/intellect/concepts, irrespective of how small or seemingly insignificant the degree of access. An internet search may find others Ive not thought of above, that, were only posted in regards to human cognition, at the time.
In both continental and analytical traditions, there are usually un-natural causes assigned to human beings' capacity of interpreting events. Human will (or other variations such as free will or will to power) are usually used to explain why human beings can "make sense of" the external world. In fact, interpretation, as some believe, is an act of appropriation, which needs a willful agent.
Similarly, epistemic reality is another explanation normally used in rationalistic traditions. But what these ideas have in common is a "human" component not apparently existing in pure nature. As a result, the way an animal perceives physical elements (e.g. stars, light, heat, another running animal, water) seems to be a result of natural adaptation rather than (symbolic) interpretation.
This response, of course, is closely related to the OP, as it suggests that there might be an association between syntax and natural laws; an assumption I don't believe to be right.
-- Updated March 24th, 2017, 4:28 am to add the following --
JamesOfSeattle wrote:
First of all, for the purpose of the argument in the OP, it doesn't matter what we mean by "meaning" or "semantics", as long as we agree that it's produced by human brains, at least. For the purpose of the argument, we assume three things:
1. Meaning/semantics comes from the human brain.
2. Everything the brain does follows the rules of physics
3. The rules of physics is a syntax. (A syntax is a set of rules which explicitly determine the order of events in a process)
Therefore,
4. Meaning/semantics comes from syntax.
Searle expressly accepts the first two premises. If he accepts the third, he should accept the conclusion. Right?
In post #15, I viewed the question from the perspective of a constructivist sociologist. Syntax, then, in this view, is a simple social construct. Yet, even if we wanted to see the OP the way Searle did in his argument, I'd say something was missing (or left implicit) in the OP. We'd at least need a proposition about "intentionality" or better said "artificial intentionality". I agree with Searle about the implausibility of a "thinking CPU", because it would lack will to power. The computer is itself an accumulation of codes formulated by its designers. Even if it can make decisions, it is bound to the logic of its originators.
As for the idea of physics and syntax, I'd say preposition 2 (e.g. Everything the brain does follows the rules of physics) is not exactly what Searle says. He obviously talks about "causal features", but I didn't find any physical rules in his discourse. But what seems to be against Searle's theory is preposition 4 (Meaning/semantics comes from syntax). In fact, I believe he started the whole story to strongly oppose proposition 4. He most clearly explains that semantics shapes mental content, while syntax cannot constitute nor constrain semantics. If he defended preposition 4, then his theory of human intentionality would be wrong, which would ultimately contradict his entire argument.