Realism Cannot Be Realistic

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Spectrum
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Spectrum »

Burning ghost wrote:Spectrum -
It is not easy for most to view things in new or different perspectives.
If it is too tough, I will adopt your recommendation to use a scale of 1-100 and I will divide it into 10 major bands and define them appropriately.
This is a poor attempt at humility. I now class you as possessing an "evil" rating of 3,000,000.

Like with rain we can say "drizzle", "spitting", or "down pour". We would never say "7% rain", "10% rain" or "90% rain". We use adjectives to describe the extent and force of the rain. If we were to use empirical measurement most people simply wouldn't quite understand what it meant (ie. 3 inches of rain in 3 hours), With other natural phenomenon such as hurricanes or earthquakes we use a particular scale that is guided by actual empirical force and damage effect. The empirical measure is taken exponentially to tie into the scale model so it is easier to understand.
I am no saint nor angel, I can agree if my evil rating is 3,000,000 /1,000,000,000 i.e. 0.3%.

Note the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale;
The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is a 1 to 5 rating based on a hurricane's sustained wind speed.

Category 1:
74-95 mph
64-82 kt
119-153 km/h
Very dangerous winds will produce some damage: Well-constructed frame homes could have damage to roof, shingles, vinyl siding and gutters. Large branches of trees will snap and shallowly rooted trees may be toppled. Extensive damage to power lines and poles likely will result in power outages that could last a few to several days.

Category 2 -5 [details like above in different degrees provided]

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php
As I said it is not a norm, but if I were to say 'X was a 60% hurricane' a person that is familiar with the scale will know is I refer to a Category-3 hurricane.
As for 'evil' if I were to explain clearly I am sure people will understand evilness %. If is not the norm then I can start something like evilness-% so that it will be a normative when there is a critical mass using it.
If I say some one is 10% evil in contrast to another who is 90% evil, I believe they will get the general idea and if they need precision then we can go into the details.
We could most certainly come to some vague agreement about a scale of evil. The scale would not be based on hard empirical data. We already have this model represented in LAW. Laws differ from country to country, but we have a reasonably obvious pattern that agrees on crimes such as murder and theft (albeit similar in democratic countries than in authoritian countries).
My intent is to use the existing implied scales used in various Laws to come up with a universal scale for humanity.
The most "evil" crimes would be those considered worthy of life imprisonment (with ZERO chance of release) and execution. Simply killing a person cannot be considered as an outright evil act, there are numerous circumstances where killing is actually "legal", in war or if protecting your family and such.

Then there is theft. If someone's family is starving to death then they tried to steal an loaf of bread to feed them I would not regard this act as evil at all, desperate yes, but not evil.
Note I defined the worst possible evil as the extermination of the human species via nukes or otherwise then I defined the least and petty evils. These two extremes will enable one to adjust in all other evils in between. This is why I need a 100 point scale.
It is obvious that I will provide to mitigate the relevant points in the scale in certain justifiable circumstances.
Say if I rate killing another human at 75%, I can add various mitigating adjustments where there are justifications. If it is crime of passion, we may reduce it by 50%, thus the net point will be 37.5% instead of 75%. So this will be a two-column computation, one for the basic evil and another to adjust for mitigation or increase where necessary.
To create a scale set up a level playing field or an imagined group of people of equal standing. From there you can build a general scale. Making one that has 100 parts is utterly futile, other than simply as an exercise to condense it down to a more manageable number, like 10 or 20, in order to show you've put a great deal of effort into exploring the obvious pitfalls of introducing such a self-made system of measure.
Note as I had stated, the most critical step in solving a problem is to break it down into smaller units and quantify the critical variables and make it a easy to apply guide.

These numbers are merely useful objective guides and we will provide subjective judgments for various circumstances.
For example, Irma was rated in various categories but it has so many other different features that differentiate it from other category 4+ hurricanes.

I will work towards a 100 point scale for evilness with band of 10 and I will provide sufficient details to ensure it is rational to enable most people to understand it easily.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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Burning ghost
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Burning ghost »

Spectrum -
Say if I rate killing another human at 75%, I can add various mitigating adjustments where there are justifications. If it is crime of passion, we may reduce it by 50%, thus the net point will be 37.5% instead of 75%. So this will be a two-column computation, one for the basic evil and another to adjust for mitigation or increase where necessary.
No, you mean from a scale of 1-100 of "evilness" you rate killing as being 75 on that scale. To say it's 75% evil is a colloquial term and serves no purpose ias a scientific measurement without hard objective data.
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Londoner
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Londoner »

Spectrum wrote: Note this which is fundamental to Philosophical Realism;

["Wiki"]Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.[1]

Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.
That's right and the word to focus on there is correspondence. Your pointing out that there is a gap between whatever the apple might be in itself and our seeing it shows that the apple and our perception of it are not 'identical' - but that is not the claim.

As it happens, if you look up the meaning of 'correspondence' on the online dictionary, it gives an example to do with sight:

"there is a simple correspondence between the distance of a focused object from the eye and the size of its image on the retina"

It is not saying 'size of its image' and 'distance of a focused object' are the same thing. It only means the two are 'related'.

The passage you quote goes on, not to talk about perception but 'what we believe'. As others have pointed out, we do not simply believe our perceptions. This is because our perceptions can be inconsistent and because some things can only be understood if we posit the existence of things we cannot sense directly. So, if 'the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved' it is because we have come to realise that the nature of that apple is more than what we can see of it.
"approximation of reality" this imply there is a more realistic reality existing out there independent of the subject. This also imply there exist nano 'time' and 'space' between the cognition and that-which-is-cognized.
Again, that's right, although I'm not sure about this 'realistic reality'. It is not the notion that I can fully describe the apple as it might be 'in itself' but rather the notion that some descriptions of that apple are better than others. For example, if I said 'the apple is eternal' this would be an inferior description to 'the apple will rot'. And we think the second is better because we find it is a reliable predictor of what happens to apples. And it assumes that the apples is 'real' in that they exist outside my thoughts (as opposed to 'imaginary apples' which I can decide will be eternal).

Certain perceptions have this sort of predictability. Certain perceptions are forced upon us whether we want them or not (fire always feels hot). And so on. These seem different in kind to 'imagination'. 'Real apples' behave differently to 'imaginary apples'. So we posit that our perceptions of the 'real' type of apples have some sort of an external source. That is Realism.

(Of course, we cannot prove it is the case. Everything may be in my mind. Or God's mind. Or we may be deceived by an evil demon etc.)

It is plainly a bit more subtle than this, since what we are really interested in is the 'understanding' bit. You were given an example of how the way we might understand atoms, as tiny planets with electron moons, does convey an aspect of their nature but at the same time is fundamentally misleading. So we might ask if all human understanding might be of the same kind, that the way we understand the universe is determined not by how the universe is, but by the way human minds work. This is the level at which philosophical discussions of 'Realism' operate, not 'Is what an apple looks like the same as that apple?'.
Kant presented this reality as the thing-in-itself, e.g. the realistic apple-in-itself or apple-by-itself independent of the subject. Correction to above:
Kant presented and argued against this 'reality' as the thing-in-itself, e.g. the realistic apple-in-itself or apple-by-itself independent of the subject.
Yes, he referred to whatever a thing might be in-itself as the 'noumena', as distinct from our perceptions of it, the 'phenomena'. The main point in Kant being that in order to make sense of any phenomena we have to already have the concepts of space and linear time. (I have to convert those electrons entering my eye into thoughts, as representations of something outside my own head). Yet space and time are not observable in themselves. Our understanding of phenomena depend on concepts that are necessary but cannot be proven. It would also seem to follow that because we have to work with these mental concepts we can never grasp the noumena as it might be in itself, (except that Kant had other ideas). And of course, others took the next step and argued that we could do away with the noumena altogether - if we can never grasp the noumena why posit it exists?

Again, my point here is to indicate the levels at which discussions about Realism and Idealism etc. actually take place. That they are really not about optical illusions or whether what an apple as it looks like to me is the same as the totality of that apple.
Kant asserted the idea of the thing-in-itself or noumenon is an illusion. In other words, what Kant claimed is that 'reality' [supposedly and assumed] that is claimed by the Philosophical realists is illusory.
I think you only confuse things if you use the word 'illusory'. We cannot have an 'illusion' about the noumenal - because we can never see it. We can only see 'phenomena'.

When we do science we are dealing with 'phenomena'. The question of the noumenal does not arise. If you ask a scientist about apples they will tell you about the phenomena associated with apples, how they relate to other phenomena and so on. But if you kept asking the scientist; 'But what is the apple 'in itself'?' they would (rightly) not understand the question.

Realism is an explanation for the possibility of science. We can do science because to some degree, certain phenomena exhibit a persistence and regularity. They are predictable. Our 'fullness of understanding' of phenomena 'can be improved'. We posit that this is the case because they have some sort of origin outside our own heads.

Once again, we can never prove this. But we can never disprove it either.
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Spectrum »

Burning ghost wrote:Spectrum -
Say if I rate killing another human at 75%, I can add various mitigating adjustments where there are justifications. If it is crime of passion, we may reduce it by 50%, thus the net point will be 37.5% instead of 75%. So this will be a two-column computation, one for the basic evil and another to adjust for mitigation or increase where necessary.
No, you mean from a scale of 1-100 of "evilness" you rate killing as being 75 on that scale. To say it's 75% evil is a colloquial term and serves no purpose as a scientific measurement without hard objective data.
I agree 75% is in a way colloquial to give a general idea of the degree of evilness.
For details and precision then we refer to the defined chart of descriptions, like that of the one for Hurricane or Earthquake.

Note this scale of evil [1 to 22 ] which is specific to murder and torture by murderers.
https://en.wik1pedia.org/wiki/Most_Evil ... _criminals
(note: wik1pedia to wikipedia)
Though not the norm, I don't think it is wrong if I use 75% in reference to this scale [16+/22]. It may be inconvenient, i.e. we need to compute. This is why I use a 100 point scale which allow for the easier use of % if need to.

In any case, regardless it is 75-of-100 or 75%, we should arrive at the similar understanding when we refer to the chart of scale and its detail descriptions.

-- Updated Sat Sep 16, 2017 10:12 pm to add the following --
Londoner wrote:Realism is an explanation for the possibility of science. We can do science because to some degree, certain phenomena exhibit a persistence and regularity. They are predictable. Our 'fullness of understanding' of phenomena 'can be improved'. We posit that this is the case because they have some sort of origin outside our own heads.

Once again, we can never prove this. But we can never disprove it either.
Noted the points in your posts and I will address this which summarize your views;

Re the OP my emphasis is not Scientific Realism but rather Philosophical Realism.
The subsets of Philosophical Realism are;
1. Philosophical Realism
2. Scientific Realism
3. Common Sense realism.

Scientific Realism is not full-fledged Philosophical Realism.
Scientific Realism is ultimately conditioned upon a man-made Scientific Framework and System. Thus at its ultimate, Scientific Realism cannot claim things are absolutely independent of the self. In a way, the external reality is merely an assumption by Science.
You cannot use Scientific Realism to represent Philosophical Realism as in OP.

Philosophical Realism claims there is an external world that is absolutely and unconditionally independent of the subject. Note the link on Philosophical Realism wiki link I provided earlier.
We posit that this is the case because they have some sort of origin outside our own heads.
That is my point with Philosophical Realism it is eternally "some sort of" and no human will ever know till eternity what is that really real origin out there.
Worst its consequences are the manifestations are the worst terrible evils committed by SOME evil prone theistic believers. [explained before, i won't go further]

As Russell lamented;
Such questions are bewildering, and it is difficult to know that even the strangest hypotheses may not be true. Thus our familiar table, which has roused but the slightest thoughts in us hitherto, has become a problem full of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a community of souls: Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God; sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion.
Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all.
My point is the philosophical anti-realist [e.g. Kant] do not has to face the above dilemma as its philosophy explain how the subject is interdependent with reality per se.

-- Updated Sat Sep 16, 2017 10:27 pm to add the following --
I think you only confuse things if you use the word 'illusory'. We cannot have an 'illusion' about the noumenal - because we can never see it. We can only see 'phenomena'.
It is not only that the noumenon cannot be seen, it does not exists as real in the first place.
Since it is non-existing absolutely, it is illusory to claim the noumenon [that which is corresponded with] as existing in reality at the level of sensibility.
At the level of understanding, the noumenon is interpreted as 'thing-in-itself' where it is reified by thiests [driven by the zombie parasite] as God. This is why God is an illusion [albeit psychologically useful].
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Londoner »

Spectrum wrote: You cannot use Scientific Realism to represent Philosophical Realism as in OP.
I didn't. What I wrote and you quoted was:
Realism is an explanation for the possibility of science. We can do science because to some degree, certain phenomena exhibit a persistence and regularity. They are predictable. Our 'fullness of understanding' of phenomena 'can be improved'. We posit that this is the case because they have some sort of origin outside our own heads.

Once again, we can never prove this. But we can never disprove it either.
First, imagine you have jumped out of a high window. Now, open a high window and actually do it.

I suspect you have not actually jumped. That is because your experience of life has taught you that jumping out of high windows will always result is some unpleasant feelings. Yet your imaginary jump went OK!

So what is your explanation for the different phenomena that accompany real jumps, and imaginary jumps? One possible explanation is that real jumps involve an encounter with things that have an existence outside our own imagination.
Philosophical Realism claims there is an external world that is absolutely and unconditionally independent of the subject. Note the link on Philosophical Realism wiki link I provided earlier.
Yes, in the sense that it is outside our heads. The effect of jumping out of high windows is not in our control.

But notice that in positing that there is an external world, we are not saying it is identical to our experience. The pain we experience in our broken legs is not identical to 'the pavement'.
Such questions are bewildering, and it is difficult to know that even the strangest hypotheses may not be true. Thus our familiar table, which has roused but the slightest thoughts in us hitherto, has become a problem full of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a community of souls: Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God; sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion.
Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all.
Where is your quote from? It seems to be tacked together from various places. The first bit is from 'Problems of Philosophy'. In the original Russell continues:
In fact, almost all philosophers seem to be agreed that there is a real table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data—colour, shape, smoothness, etc.—may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing, perhaps, completely from our sense-data, and yet to be regarded as causing those sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the real table. Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed—the view that there is a real table, whatever its nature may be—is vitally important, and it will be worth while to consider what reasons there are for accepting this view before we go on to the further question as to the nature of the real table.
(My emphasis)
My point is the philosophical anti-realist [e.g. Kant] do not has to face the above dilemma as its philosophy explain how the subject is interdependent with reality per se.
I do not understand that sentence.
Me: I think you only confuse things if you use the word 'illusory'. We cannot have an 'illusion' about the noumenal - because we can never see it. We can only see 'phenomena'.
It is not only that the noumenon cannot be seen, it does not exists as real in the first place.
How do you know that? It is true I cannot know whether the world exists outside my own head - but I cannot know the contrary either.

If we think the external world does not exist, then we need an alternative explanation for why jumping out of high windows hurts.
Since it is non-existing absolutely, it is illusory to claim the noumenon [that which is corresponded with] as existing in reality at the level of sensibility.
At the level of understanding, the noumenon is interpreted as 'thing-in-itself' where it is reified by thiests [driven by the zombie parasite] as God. This is why God is an illusion [albeit psychologically useful].
You say 'God is an illusion' but if you think there is no external world, then everything is an illusion.
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Spectrum »

Londoner wrote:First, imagine you have jumped out of a high window. Now, open a high window and actually do it.

I suspect you have not actually jumped. That is because your experience of life has taught you that jumping out of high windows will always result is some unpleasant feelings. Yet your imaginary jump went OK!

So what is your explanation for the different phenomena that accompany real jumps, and imaginary jumps? One possible explanation is that real jumps involve an encounter with things that have an existence outside our own imagination.
My views of an external world is that of an empirical realist [note this]. From instinct, empirical evidences and experience I know it is dangerous and fatal to jump from a high window.

In your case, your view is that of an empirical idealist [note this]. Similarly from your own instinct, knowledge and experience within your mind only you know the consequence is fatal so you will also not jump from a high window.

In general there is no big issue between my empirical realism and your empirical idealism, the critical difference when we consider the question of metaphysics and ontology, i.e. the ontological god, soul-after-death, noumenon, thing-in-itself.
Philosophical Realism claims there is an external world that is absolutely and unconditionally independent of the subject. Note the link on Philosophical Realism wiki link I provided earlier.
Yes, in the sense that it is outside our heads. The effect of jumping out of high windows is not in our control.

But notice that in positing that there is an external world, we are not saying it is identical to our experience. The pain we experience in our broken legs is not identical to 'the pavement'.
That is what I had stated, your empirical realism is dualistic i.e. there is cognition and that-which-is-cognize.
Empirical realist and transcendental idealism posit that the external world within empirical realism is interdependent with the subject when combined with transcendental idealism.
Such questions are bewildering, and it is difficult to know that even the strangest hypotheses may not be true. Thus our familiar table, which has roused but the slightest thoughts in us hitherto, has become a problem full of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a community of souls: Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God; sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion.
Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all.
Where is your quote from? It seems to be tacked together from various places. The first bit is from 'Problems of Philosophy'. In the original Russell continues:
In fact, almost all philosophers seem to be agreed that there is a real table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data—colour, shape, smoothness, etc.—may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing, perhaps, completely from our sense-data, and yet to be regarded as causing those sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the real table. Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed—the view that there is a real table, whatever its nature may be—is vitally important, and it will be worth while to consider what reasons there are for accepting this view before we go on to the further question as to the nature of the real table.
(My emphasis)
Yes, it is from Russell's Problem of Philosophy.
Note the paragraph I quoted come after your paragraph.

So it is;
almost all philosophers seem to be agreed that there is a real table
note 'seem' above, thus he concluded in that chapter;
perhaps there is no table at all

Russell's raised the above question and in his subsequent views, he was philosophical realist and believe in an external world independent of the subject.

That there is no table-in-itself is taken up by Kant and other philosophical anti-realists.
Me: I think you only confuse things if you use the word 'illusory'. We cannot have an 'illusion' about the noumenal - because we can never see it. We can only see 'phenomena'.
It is not only that the noumenon cannot be seen, it does not exists as real in the first place.
How do you know that? It is true I cannot know whether the world exists outside my own head - but I cannot know the contrary either.

If we think the external world does not exist, then we need an alternative explanation for why jumping out of high windows hurts.
As philosophical realist or empirical idealist you insist an external world independent of the subject exists absolutely even though you have no way of knowing it.

I do not reject the existence of the external world, the difference is I view it [externality] as interdependent with the subject [myself] from an empirical realist and transcendental idealist point of view. Your view is opposite from mine.
Since it is non-existing absolutely, it is illusory to claim the noumenon [that which is corresponded with] as existing in reality at the level of sensibility.
At the level of understanding, the noumenon is interpreted as 'thing-in-itself' where it is reified by thiests [driven by the zombie parasite] as God. This is why God is an illusion [albeit psychologically useful].
You say 'God is an illusion' but if you think there is no external world, then everything is an illusion.
Note above, I claim there is an external world from an empirical realist POV. Thus the external world is very real to me from empirical realist POV.
As philosophical realist or empirical idealist you insist an external world independent of the subject exists absolutely even though you have no way of knowing it. That is an illusion.
In addition theists who reify and claim God exists independent of the subject in an external world, that is the mother of all illusion.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Londoner »

Spectrum wrote:In your case, your view is that of an empirical idealist [note this]...

As philosophical realist or empirical idealist you insist an external world independent of the subject exists absolutely even though you have no way of knowing it. That is an illusion.
If I was an empirical idealist I would say we can infer that there is an external world, but also that we cannot know this.

There is no 'exist absolutely' claim - whatever that would mean.
My views of an external world is that of an empirical realist [note this]
.

Empirical realism (in Kant) is not about the existence of an external world but rather distinguishes within what we mean by 'appearances'.
That is what I had stated, your empirical realism is dualistic i.e. there is cognition and that-which-is-cognize.
Empirical realist and transcendental idealism posit that the external world within empirical realism is interdependent with the subject when combined with transcendental idealism.
The external world, the 'thing-in-iteself' the noumenon, would indeed be be independent of the subject. That is what those words describe.

But we can also talk about the external world meaning 'as things appear to us'. And nobody confuses the two, we have invent words like 'noumenal' precisely to make it clear we are not talking about 'phenomena'.

The distinction is not dualistic, because we can never encounter the noumenal.

Nor does the decription 'phenomena' imply that you can have phenomena without an observer being involved, perceptions have to be perceived. And since you have a perceiver, then the nature of the perception will depend on the mind and senses of that perceiver.
That there is no table-in-itself is taken up by Kant and other philosophical anti-realists.
What we mean by 'table' and what we understand by 'table' and the mental image we get when we see a table are human constructs. From Kant, we learn that the very basic concepts (time, extension) through which we understand our experience of a table arise from us, they are not part of the sense data. All we have are 'mere representations'. Although, yet again, we can never know it. Extension may be a noumenal quality.

But they are 'representations'. So it is not the same as saying there is no table-in-itself, meaning that the thought 'table' arises from nowhere, it is entirely imaginary. If that was what Kant (or anyone else) thought, then they would have to explain why it hurts when we fall over the table.
In general there is no big issue between my empirical realism and your empirical idealism, the critical difference when we consider the question of metaphysics and ontology, i.e. the ontological god, soul-after-death, noumenon, thing-in-itself.
I do not see that there is any connection with those subjects.
Note above, I claim there is an external world from an empirical realist POV. Thus the external world is very real to me from empirical realist POV.
I think you are confused about what 'empirical realist' means (re Kant). It makes it very difficult if you just throw in all these names instead of explaining what you think and why.

However...you accept there is something you call an 'external world'. You accept that this external world is 'very real'. Its reality is why you don't jump out of high windows.

Yet you continue:
As philosophical realist or empirical idealist you insist an external world independent of the subject exists absolutely even though you have no way of knowing it. That is an illusion.
What is the difference? You think the external world is 'very real' But apparantly if I insisted there was an external world, this would be an 'illusion'!

The only difference seems to be you have attached the word 'insist' to me. No - I don't. I have already explained many times that nobody can claim to know an external world exists - or that it doesn't. We posit that it does exist because it would explain why experience is not all of the same kind - why there is difference between jumping off imaginary buildings and real ones.

And you conclude:
In addition theists who reify and claim God exists independent of the subject in an external world, that is the mother of all illusion.
I do not see how that remark is connected to the previous sentence, the rest of the post or the topic of this thread.
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Atreyu »

Spectrum wrote:
  • Atreyu: "there is something real, even if we cannot ever know"
The above premise is not rational. The ultimate is how can anyone claim something is 'real' when they do not know what that thing really is?
It's rational, you just don't get it.

Let's suppose that one day people find strange footprints, from some unknown animal, in the woods, and some scientists begin investigating what in the world caused these odd footprints, seemingly impossible given all known species of life. Realism is like a scientist asserting that ""something" made these prints, although we have no idea, at the present, of what it could be". Non-realism would be like one of scientists asserting that "perhaps the footprints themselves are illusion, therefore we should be investigating why we are perceiving these strange footprints, rather than assuming that our perception of the footprints has a true external cause". The non-Realist would say the chief reason why we see the strange footprints is because of some feature of our psychology (the cause is primarily internal), while the Realist would say the chief reason is because an previously unknown species traveled here (the cause is primarily external).

The Realist asserts that we perceive a chair because something is there, although it's ultimate reality cannot be known. The Non-Realist asserts that we perceive a chair because of the peculiarities of our psychic apparatus, and that the true reality is that, outside of ourselves, there is really nothing out there....
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Spectrum »

Londoner wrote:
Spectrum wrote:In your case, your view is that of an empirical idealist [note this]...

As philosophical realist or empirical idealist you insist an external world independent of the subject exists absolutely even though you have no way of knowing it. That is an illusion.
If I was an empirical idealist I would say we can infer that there is an external world, but also that we cannot know this.

There is no 'exist absolutely' claim - whatever that would mean.
Absolutely meant totally unconditional.
This mean you will claim there is a moon-in-itself in the external world and this moon-in-itself existed before there were humans or after the human species is extinct.
The non-realists [Kantian] claim there is no moon-in-itself before humans existed. Sound very weird to the empirical idealist but true [justifiable] to the empirical realist.
My views of an external world is that of an empirical realist [note this]
Empirical realism (in Kant) is not about the existence of an external world but rather distinguishes within what we mean by 'appearances'.
Nah, you are putting words into Kant's mouth.
Empirical Realism (in Kant) is comprised "externality" and "internality" which is part and parcel with the subject and not absolutely independent from the subject.
Nor does the description 'phenomena' imply that you can have phenomena without an observer being involved, perceptions have to be perceived. And since you have a perceiver, then the nature of the perception will depend on the mind and senses of that perceiver.
Yes, perception will depend on mind and sense of the perceiver.
But the philosophical realist differentiate between the perception and that-which-is-perceived, i.e. the thing-in-itself. What is really real to the philosophical realist is that thing-in-itself.
That there is no table-in-itself is taken up by Kant and other philosophical anti-realists.
What we mean by 'table' and what we understand by 'table' and the mental image we get when we see a table are human constructs. From Kant, we learn that the very basic concepts (time, extension) through which we understand our experience of a table arise from us, they are not part of the sense data. All we have are 'mere representations'. Although, yet again, we can never know it. Extension may be a noumenal quality.

But they are 'representations'. So it is not the same as saying there is no table-in-itself, meaning that the thought 'table' arises from nowhere, it is entirely imaginary. If that was what Kant (or anyone else) thought, then they would have to explain why it hurts when we fall over the table.
A Kantian, an empirical realist, understand and experience real pain when one fall over the real table because the subject is part and parcel of reality.
For a philosophical realist like you, when you fall over the table you will feel pain but you still do not 'know' the real table because it is external to you and separated by nano space and time.
In general there is no big issue between my empirical realism and your empirical idealism, the critical difference when we consider the question of metaphysics and ontology, i.e. the ontological god, soul-after-death, noumenon, thing-in-itself.
I do not see that there is any connection with those subjects.
Both are external things which cannot be known literally. There is the normal empirical things and God is the illusory thing.
Note above, I claim there is an external world from an empirical realist POV. Thus the external world is very real to me from empirical realist POV.
I think you are confused about what 'empirical realist' means (re Kant). It makes it very difficult if you just throw in all these names instead of explaining what you think and why.

However...you accept there is something you call an 'external world'. You accept that this external world is 'very real'. Its reality is why you don't jump out of high windows.
It is because you have not understood [not necessary agree] Kant thoroughly.
Yet you continue:
As philosophical realist or empirical idealist you insist an external world independent of the subject exists absolutely even though you have no way of knowing it. That is an illusion.
What is the difference? You think the external world is 'very real' But apparantly if I insisted there was an external world, this would be an 'illusion'!

The only difference seems to be you have attached the word 'insist' to me. No - I don't. I have already explained many times that nobody can claim to know an external world exists - or that it doesn't. We posit that it does exist because it would explain why experience is not all of the same kind - why there is difference between jumping off imaginary buildings and real ones.
Note philosophical realists claim the external world exists as real but cannot be known absolutely.

Note:
wiki wrote:Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.
Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.
To the Philosophical Realist, what is known is only an approximation of reality but what is that real reality cannot be known except to get [improved] closer to it.
So Philosophical Realists are merely chasing and trying to get closer to their supposedly real reality but will never ever get to know it 100%. This impossible to be known thing is an illusion.

Note Meno Paradox;
If a thing cannot be known with certainty, how can you know what you think you have known, is the thing you should be knowing in the first place.
And you conclude:
In addition theists who reify and claim God exists independent of the subject in an external world, that is the mother of all illusion.
I do not see how that remark is connected to the previous sentence, the rest of the post or the topic of this thread.
As I had explained, to the philosophical realists both empirical things [in general] and God [to theists] are external things, i.e. things-in-themselves. Both are illusions and God is the mother of all illusion.

-- Updated Mon Sep 18, 2017 10:32 pm to add the following --
[b]Atreyu[/b] wrote: It's rational, you just don't get it.
Let's suppose that one day people find strange footprints, from some unknown animal, in the woods, and some scientists begin investigating what in the world caused these odd footprints, seemingly impossible given all known species of life. Realism is like a scientist asserting that ""something" made these prints, although we have no idea, at the present, of what it could be".
In this case, its Scientific Realism, which will predict those footprints must be made by any of the known species of animals or some yet to be discovered animals [empirical]. I have no issue with Scientific Realism.

My beef is with Philosophical Realism who take the leap and claim the footprints must be made by a mystical Yeti, aliens from outerspace, or an omniportent entity.

To get an idea, note my reply to 'Londoner' above.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
Londoner
Posts: 1783
Joined: March 8th, 2013, 12:46 pm

Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Londoner »

Spectrum wrote: Absolutely meant totally unconditional.
This mean you will claim there is a moon-in-itself in the external world and this moon-in-itself existed before there were humans or after the human species is extinct.
The non-realists [Kantian] claim there is no moon-in-itself before humans existed. Sound very weird to the empirical idealist but true [justifiable] to the empirical realist.
Not 'claim'. The word I keep using is 'posit'. Or 'assume'. There is a big difference!

I do not think the labels you then list mean what you think they do.
Me: Empirical realism (in Kant) is not about the existence of an external world but rather distinguishes within what we mean by 'appearances'.
Nah, you are putting words into Kant's mouth.
Empirical Realism (in Kant) is comprised "externality" and "internality" which is part and parcel with the subject and not absolutely independent from the subject.
As far as I can understand your English, that is what I said. 'Appearances' are appearances to us. As you say, 'not absolutely independent from the subject'. Here is somebody's essay:

https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/20 ... l-realism/
Yes, perception will depend on mind and sense of the perceiver.
But the philosophical realist differentiate between the perception and that-which-is-perceived, i.e. the thing-in-itself. What is really real to the philosophical realist is that thing-in-itself.
It is not helpful to bring in phrases like 'really real'. I cannot tell what you mean.

Nor can I tell what you mean by 'differentiate'. Everyone gets that our perceptions, our mental images (colours etc.) are not the same as whatever the 'thing-in-itself' might be.

But they cannot 'differentiate' in the sense of pointing out the differences, because we only have our perceptions. We can never encounter the 'thing-in-itself'.
Kantian, an empirical realist, understand and experience real pain when one fall over the real table because the subject is part and parcel of reality.
For a philosophical realist like you, when you fall over the table you will feel pain but you still do not 'know' the real table because it is external to you and separated by nano space and time.
You seem to have constructed this mysterious category 'philosophical realist', putting me in that category, and then putting words in my mouth.

And you are still using words like 'real'. This is not helpful when we are discussing 'Realism cannot be Realistic', since the meaning of 'real' is the topic!

I will say it one more time. Nobody claims to know the 'real table' if that means the noumenal, the 'thing-in-itself'. All we have are phenomena.
Both are external things which cannot be known literally. There is the normal empirical things and God is the illusory thing.
Once again, in a discussion like this it is not helpful if you use phrases like 'known literally'. I would not understand that phrase in normal speech, let alone in philosophy.
Me: What is the difference? You think the external world is 'very real' But apparently if I insisted there was an external world, this would be an 'illusion'!

The only difference seems to be you have attached the word 'insist' to me. No - I don't. I have already explained many times that nobody can claim to know an external world exists - or that it doesn't. We posit that it does exist because it would explain why experience is not all of the same kind - why there is difference between jumping off imaginary buildings and real ones.


Note philosophical realists claim the external world exists as real but cannot be known absolutely.
I do not see how that remark is connected to what I wrote. And once again, what does 'absolutely' mean?
Note:
wiki wrote:Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.
Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.
To the Philosophical Realist, what is known is only an approximation of reality but what is that real reality cannot be known except to get [improved] closer to it.
So Philosophical Realists are merely chasing and trying to get closer to their supposedly real reality but will never ever get to know it 100%. This impossible to be known thing is an illusion.
Again, what do you mean by 'illusion'? Since these realists do not think the phenomena are 'real reality' what is their 'illusion'?

To put it another way, what wouldn't be an illusion? Solipsism? The belief that any description of the world is as good as any other? I honestly have no idea what you are saying here.
Note Meno Paradox;
If a thing cannot be known with certainty, how can you know what you think you have known, is the thing you should be knowing in the first place.
You have really got to work on your English, otherwise first I have to disentangle that sentence, then try to work out if it means the same as Meno, then reply.
As I had explained, to the philosophical realists both empirical things [in general] and God [to theists] are external things, i.e. things-in-themselves. Both are illusions and God is the mother of all illusion.
Still with 'illusions'. Again, I cannot face trying to work out what you mean by these un-philosophical terms. You seem to be simply using it as a synonym for 'mistake'. To keep saying somebody you disagree with is 'mistaken' is not to present an argument.

Once again I find myself pointing out that nobody thinks we can know 'things-in-themselves'. I certainly don't think religious types believe we can know God 'in-himself', or that he is an 'external thing' in the empirical sense.

You have got to be clearer about what you mean, and avoid using all this vague and colloquial language, especially words like 'illusion' which beg the question.

As it is, after all these exchanges, I still cannot understand your own position, and we seem to be stuck on some sort of 'straw man' where you keep telling me about some group you call 'philosophical realists' (and I cannot make out what you think they are either).
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Burning ghost
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Burning ghost »

To put this simply, science deals with phenomenon.

The strange thing about the term "noumenon" is that the very declaration of the term can only ever be noumenon in the negative sense. What many people make the mistake of doing is to regard noumenon in some POSITIVE sense, which is self-refuting.

In my experience this simple, and easy, misunderstanding leads to much confusion in regards to what Kant delves into in his Critique of Pure Reason. His initial question in that work was to ask "What can we know prior to experience?"

Spectrum -

Would probably be helpful if you outlined the various different uses of "illusion" Kant wrote, as opposed to appearances, dialectical illusions, and transcendental illusions and highlighted which applies to what you are saying in any particular instance.
AKA badgerjelly
Steve3007
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Steve3007 »

Atreyu to Spectrum in post #188:
The Realist asserts that we perceive a chair because something is there, although it's ultimate reality cannot be known. The Non-Realist asserts that we perceive a chair because of the peculiarities of our psychic apparatus, and that the true reality is that, outside of ourselves, there is really nothing out there....
If this is supposed to be a description of all non-realist positions then I don't believe it is correct. It sounds more like a specific description of some flavour of Idealism.

There are all kinds of names for all kinds of flavours of non-Realist positions (Instrumentalism, Anti-realism, Pragmatism etc) which seem to me to say slight variations of the same general idea. Namely: I don't care about questions of whether this ideal "real chair" actually exists or not. They do not correspond to a possible observation and they are not questions about our use of terminology so they are therefore meaningless. If the idea of a real chair is useful for getting me through my day/making sense of my sensations/formulating my theories then I will use it. This is not the same as concluding that the chair is a peculiarity of my psychic apparatus.

Personally, I think the nature of our observations of the world makes one of these non-realist positions unavoidable because if we stick to the realist notion of an ultimate reality that cannot be known we end up contradicting what is actually observed. Obviously I'm thinking of experiments with electrons diffracting through slits and photons bouncing off half-silvered mirrors and the like.

-- Updated Tue Sep 19, 2017 4:14 pm to add the following --

Atreyu, I'd be interested in your take on what a Realist would say about the results of this experiment:

onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/viewtop ... 85#p232485

Specifically: I'd be interested to know whether they think that in that experiment there is a "real photon" whose ultimate reality can never be known but whose existence is independent of any observations of it. You did contribute to that topic at the time, but not with any comments that addressed the OP, as far as I can tell. (Note: I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that. Just saying that it would be interesting to get your take on the OP, as I haven't had it yet.)
Spectrum
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Re: Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Post by Spectrum »

[b]Londoner[/b] wrote:As far as I can understand your English, that is what I said. 'Appearances' are appearances to us. As you say, 'not absolutely independent from the subject'. Here is somebody's essay:

https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/20 ... l-realism/
Apart from what is quoted from Kant's COPR, I do not agree with the blog's view, i.e.
Of course, Kant’s thesis is that things-in-themselves exist, but that we can never have knowledge of them.
Nope Kant did not state things-in-themselves exist, especially not in the positive sense. I have quoted Kant before on this, but I'll borrow Burning Ghost's point,
The strange thing about the term "noumenon" is that the very declaration of the term can only ever be noumenon in the negative sense. What many people make the mistake of doing is to regard noumenon in some POSITIVE sense, which is self-refuting.
As I had stated, my English is a limitation, but even if my English is very good, it will still be a problem if you have not understood [not necessary agree] Kant's COPR thoroughly. Note I can agree with Burning Ghost on the above because he is familiar with Kant. It is because of your limitation in understanding Kant, that we have a problem getting through.

I will address the rest of your post where I think there is no confusion.

-- Updated Tue Sep 19, 2017 11:22 pm to add the following --
Burning ghost wrote:Spectrum -
Would probably be helpful if you outlined the various different uses of "illusion" Kant wrote, as opposed to appearances, dialectical illusions, and transcendental illusions and highlighted which applies to what you are saying in any particular instance.
Kant differentiated the following;
1. Empirical illusions
2. Dialectical or transcendental illusions
Empirical illusions are the common typical illusions which are related to empirical elements and the senses. Note the usual optical illusions and illusion of the other senses.
http://list25.com/25-incredible-optical-illusions/

Dialectical or transcendental illusions are illusions that do not relate directly to the empirical but arise from abuses of the understanding and logic, e.g. God, soul, and the likes.

It is easy to understand empirical illusions of the senses and cognition because they are easy to experience and quite easy to explain.
However it is not easy to explain Dialectical or transcendental illusions to those who are not familiar with Kantian philosophy. To explain it is quite a long story.
Generally Dialectical Illusions are those ideas that are driven by extreme transcendental logic but do not has any empirical possibility at all, e.g. God which is illusory.
Kant wrote:we are concerned only with Transcendental Illusion, which exerts its influence on Principles that are in no wise intended for use in Experience, in which case we should at least have had a criterion of their correctness.
In defiance of all the warnings of criticism, it [Transcendental Illusion] carries us altogether beyond the Empirical employment of Categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive extension of Pure Understanding. -B352
Actually I have gone through the above in great details with Londoner when I was researching into Kant in previous posts. I have to admit I am a bit rusty at present since my focus is on Islam since the last 2 years + till the present.

-- Updated Tue Sep 19, 2017 11:39 pm to add the following --
"Londoner"]As it is, after all these exchanges, I still cannot understand your own position, and we seem to be stuck on some sort of 'straw man' where you keep telling me about some group you call 'philosophical realists' (and I cannot make out what you think they are either).
I had inferred your realist views are that of the 'Philosophical Realist' and I have provided a wiki link to support that.
Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
https://en.wik1pedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
In the above wiki link, change 1 back to i.

You can tick the main points in the link and tell me why you are not a 'philosophical realist' as explain therein?

To be more precise, from the Kantian perspective you are an Empirical Idealist and a Transcendental Realist. These terms are explained in the link you provided.
You are an empirical Idealist because all your empirical experiences are confined to your senses and mind, and never knowing what is the real thing-in-itself in the positive sense as claimed.

My position is philosophical anti-realist.
From a Kantian perspective, I am a Empirical Realist and a Transcendental Idealist.
An empirical realist experience the empirical directly as real and there is no other real thing to be corresponded with.
Not-a-theist. Religion is a critical necessity for humanity now, but not the FUTURE.
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