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It is impossible for Realism [Philosophical] to be realistic for the perceiver.

wiki wrote:Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.

[Philosophical] Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.[2] In some contexts, realism is contrasted with idealism.

If realists [philosophical] assume there are is an external world that is independent of their conceptual scheme and self, then there is always a gap [space and time] between what is supposed the real object and the self i.e. brain, senses and mind of the person.

Thus when one observe an apple on a table, there is a gap [distance] and time lag between the perceiver and the supposedly real apple.
Even if the perceiver feel the apple, there is still a nano distance and time lag between what is supposedly real apple.
In this case, the perceiver will never ever realize the reality of the real apple.

Therefore 'Realism Cannot Never Be Realistic.'
Philosophical realism [existence of an external world independent of the subject] is thus not tenable and generate illusions and giving the perceiver the false impression they understood or realized reality.

What is realistic is Spontaneous Emergent Realism [SER] which propose that reality emerges spontaneously as it is.

-- Updated Fri Aug 04, 2017 9:08 pm to add the following --

Correction:
My apologies, clicked too fast;

Correction to OP:
Realism Cannot Never Be Realistic
Should be
Realism Cannot Be Realistic

Earlier I had intended the OP to be:
Realism Can Never Be Realistic

It is kind of interesting to use some of the knowledge about the process and physiology of perception to deny their is really anything to perceive.
Yes, we do not perceive the world as it is, or instantaneously, but we seem have an accurate enough representation of it to survive, and deny that there is an independent external world to be "perceived" really is not helpful.

Prothero wrote:It is kind of interesting to use some of the knowledge about the process and physiology of perception to deny their is really anything to perceive.
Yes, we do not perceive the world as it is, or instantaneously, but we seem have an accurate enough representation of it to survive, and deny that there is an independent external world to be "perceived" really is not helpful.

Yes, there is a necessarily emergent reality to facilitate survival, as our sight [eyes] are always directed forward and outward. But there is no world-as-it-is that is absolutely independent of any human interaction.
As Kant has asserted there is no thing-in-itself but only there are things-by-ourselves including an emergent World and whatever there is.

It is very normal for humans to 'perceive' an external independent World and this facilitate survival as the basic level.

But it is very significant and of greater utility for humans in the higher levels of their self-development to understand and realize/actualize there is no independent external world as a reality.

When there is a concept of an independent external world, there is a psychological impulse of "dependency" which gives rise to great sufferings when the 'dependency' is grasp blindly.
When there is a concept of independent external world, people will naturally cling to external things [including their physical self] to feel psychological secure. Any separation, e.g. mortality is a threat and invoke insecurity and sufferings.

OTOH, a dependent external world or spontaneous emergent reality align directly with the existence of the physical and mental self. If there is no physical self and mental self, that's it and it does not generate any sense of separation but rather it is a spontaneous dissolution.

-- Updated Sat Aug 05, 2017 2:08 am to add the following --

[Philosophical] Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

Philosophically and rationally there is no 'reality' to be approximated with or be known in full because we cannot know what we do not know in the first place [Meno's Paradox]. The most one can do to know what real reality is [in this case] is merely to speculate and take a leap of faith.

What is more realistic is this;
Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality - Anil Seth
http://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/ ... =1&t=15004
Since there is no real independent external world, the world and reality that IS, is more likely to be hallucination-like. A schizo in one end will experience an illusory hallucination while the normal person on the other end will perceive a more realistic 'hallucination' that can be objectified rationally.

The realists [philosophical] will defend their position and accuse the alternative contra view as solipsism or nihilism. This defensive move is due to their cognitive dissonance and thus the need to defend their illusory position to maintain consonance.

What I had proposed, i.e. Spontaneous Emergent Reality is as real as it can be and which cannot be disputed.

Spectrum wrote:As Kant has asserted there is no thing-in-itself but only there are things-by-ourselves including an emergent World and whatever there is.

Some would say that is a misreading of Kant. Kant was a realist (there is a noumena) i.e. an independent external world, but our knowledge of it is only through categories of mind (space and time for example) and experienced phenomena. How well phenomena represent or correlate with the noumena we can never be certain of.

Spectrum wrote:But it is very significant and of greater utility for humans in the higher levels of their self-development to understand and realize/actualize there is no independent external world as a reality. .

So humans in the higher levels of self understanding and development are all Idealists? Or at least transcendental idealists? Idealism is a decidedly minority view even among professional philosophers.

Spectrum wrote:OTOH, a dependent external world or spontaneous emergent reality align directly with the existence of the physical and mental self. If there is no physical self and mental self, that's it and it does not generate any sense of separation but rather it is a spontaneous dissolution. .

I am part of the world. I have arisen from the world, I am dependent on the world. I am not the entire world, nor am I separated from the world (because of this belief) in the way you would imply. I am thrown into the world as Heidegger would say.

[Philosophical] Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

That would in fact, seem to be the case considering the remarkable efficacy of the scientific method and mathematical representations and empirical predictive value of science.

Spectrum wrote:Since there is no real independent external world, the world and reality that IS, is more likely to be hallucination-like. A schizo in one end will experience an illusory hallucination while the normal person on the other end will perceive a more realistic 'hallucination' that can be objectified rationally. .

There was a time when I did not exist. There was a time when no humans existed. Other creatures exist and they "see" the world differently than I do (other humans " see the world differently than I do). We are all (humans and other creatures) limited by our minds and our sensory apparatus. So one could say we all construct different "realities" or "representations" of the world but that is far different than saying the only "reality" is the one my mind constructs.
There is a real independent external world. There was a world before I was born, there will be a world after I am dead. True (my knowledge of that world is limited) by my mind (conceptions) and limited to experienced phenomena. I

Spectrum wrote:f realists [philosophical] assume there are is an external world that is independent of their conceptual scheme and self, then there is always a gap [space and time] between what is supposed the real object and the self i.e. brain, senses and mind of the person. .

There is no argument there. Yes, our experience "knowledge" of the world is always partial and incomplete. Our internal representations leave out lots of information (producing a gap) and highlight or color in other information that does not exist in the outside world (colors are in fact a good example of that).

Spectrum wrote:Thus when one observe an apple on a table, there is a gap [distance] and time lag between the perceiver and the supposedly real apple.
Even if the perceiver feel the apple, there is still a nano distance and time lag between what is supposedly real apple.
In this case, the perceiver will never ever realize the reality of the real apple. .

So? That does not negate the fact of an independent external world which is independent of our perceptions and conceptions. It does not mean that there was not a time when the sun did not exist, or when dinosaurs walked and experienced the earth without human presence.

Spectrum wrote:
As Kant has asserted there is no thing-in-itself but only there are things-by-ourselves including an emergent World and whatever there is.

[b]Prothero[/b] wrote: Some would say that is a misreading of Kant. Kant was a realist (there is a noumena) i.e. an independent external world, but our knowledge of it is only through categories of mind (space and time for example) and experienced phenomena. How well phenomena represent or correlate with the noumena we can never be certain of.

I had spent 3+ years researching Kant on a full time basis [some years ago] so I am reasonably familiar with this point.
Kant was an empirical realist and transcendental idealist. Kant introduced the concept of 'noumenon' to contrast with phenomenon.
Kant inferred the noumena exists for practical reason to deal with the concept of phenomena so that we do not get carried away too far beyond the phenomena.

[b]Kant[/b] wrote:The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility. A255 A311

One can read Kant's words literally above and there is no room for a misleading reading.

The concept of the noumena limits the extreme of the phenomena [sensibility].
The thing-in-itself is also the same as the noumena, i.e. a limiting concept but it is conceptualize to limit one from going beyond the transcendental, into something like a reified God or soul. It is like putting a stop to infinite regression otherwise it will be 'till the cow comes home'.

So there is no such things as a real noumena nor thing-in-itself. They are only limiting concepts as Kant asserted above.

So humans in the higher levels of self understanding and development are all Idealists? Or at least transcendental idealists? Idealism is a decidedly minority view even among professional philosophers.

Idealism was a minority views because the majority do not understand the what reality really is.

As I had claimed those who claimed to be philosophical realists are actually 'idealists' i.e. they are empirical idealists. What they claim to be real can only be in their mind and there is no way they can actualize and realize the 'real' reality they speculate and yearn for.

Kant's OTOH is he is a empirical realist [in one perspective] because to Kant there is no space and time gap between him, his perception and reality.
In another perspective Kant is a transcendental idealist where space, time and reality are all in one 'soup' where the self and reality emerges spontaneously.
Note the spontaneous emergence of empirical reality or a transcendental reality in contrast to the philosophical realist external world which is already there awaiting to be perceived by humans.

I am part of the world. I have arisen from the world, I am dependent on the world. I am not the entire world, nor am I separated from the world (because of this belief) in the way you would imply. I am thrown into the world as Heidegger would say.

You are conflating the two views and perspectives in this case.
You have to deliberate as an empirical realist [external world exists] but at the same time it is part and parcel of the transcendental idealist world.
Heidegger's "thrown" is misleading as in imply dualism, an independent subject is thrown into an independent object [the World]. What is most appropriate is 'spontaneous emergence' i.e. a togetherness. Example under certain temperature snow flakes emerge from the air. It is not a case of snow flakes were not thrown into the air from somewhere.

That would in fact, seem to be the case considering the remarkable efficacy of the scientific method and mathematical representations and empirical predictive value of science.

It is only a case as a condition for the Scientific Framework for it to work. We do not have to accept such a condition outside the Scientific Framework, e.g. within a realistic reality.
When we shift from the realist framework to deny an absolute independent external world, we resolve its dilemma [of nano space and time] of not being able to get in touch with real reality.

There was a time when I did not exist. There was a time when no humans existed. Other creatures exist and they "see" the world differently than I do (other humans " see the world differently than I do). We are all (humans and other creatures) limited by our minds and our sensory apparatus. So one could say we all construct different "realities" or "representations" of the world but that is far different than saying the only "reality" is the one my mind constructs.
There is a real independent external world. There was a world before I was born, there will be a world after I am dead. True (my knowledge of that world is limited) by my mind (conceptions) and limited to experienced phenomena.

Note 'before' and 'after' are time element. According to Kant, time is an intuition within transcendental idealism which is part and parcel of the human-reality system.
Therefore your "There was a world before I was born, there will be a world after I am dead" itself is not absolutely independent of the human system. This cannot be an absolutely independent conclusion.
Without humans there cannot be such a conclusion.

So? That does not negate the fact of an independent external world which is independent of our perceptions and conceptions. It does not mean that there was not a time when the sun did not exist, or when dinosaurs walked and experienced the earth without human presence.

• 'Before' and 'after' are human conceptions [intuitions].
  Sun existed before human.
  Sun existed is a human conception.

That the Sun existed before human beings is therefore a human conception.
Without humans there cannot be such a conclusion.

As I had stated there is an eternal time and space GAP between the perceiver and the perceived even with what is real in the empirical present. It would be worst with dinosaurs which existed in time so long ago.

Spectrum -

I get what you're saying. I am not really sure you're presenting the idea of "realism" in a fair light. It is possible that realism presents us with an ever, and infinitely, increasing accuracy of reality. We call it science.

I would say "realism" is merely one of many approaches. It is not saying that there is some absolute "thing in itself" it is merely grounded on the assumption that there is without committing. As an approach it has been quite successful regarding scientific investigation.

note: nice to see someone who actually understands Kant and his "noumenon" for a change! So many seem to think he was referring to some "absolute reality" when in fact he was warning against such assumptions. As will always be the case all we can work with is phenomenon.

To start describing this spontaneous reality and from the metaphysical perspective I propose that it has a will since I have it as well… and so, some properties more than others shine in me. In an analogy, the sun’s photons collapse around an object and the collapse of the wave is registered in my receptors as information (hallucination if you must). If I look directly into the sun, the energy will be too much for my receptors to handle. Much like the moon we shine with secondary light, the air around us shine objects as well. Darker or lighter… with very few eclipses. The big will of reality shines in my metaphysical receptors as I hallucinate the presence.

The Beast wrote:To start describing this spontaneous reality and from the metaphysical perspective I propose that it has a will since I have it as well… and so, some properties more than others shine in me. In an analogy, the sun’s photons collapse around an object and the collapse of the wave is registered in my receptors as information (hallucination if you must). If I look directly into the sun, the energy will be too much for my receptors to handle. Much like the moon we shine with secondary light, the air around us shine objects as well. Darker or lighter… with very few eclipses. The big will of reality shines in my metaphysical receptors as I hallucinate the presence.

The "big Will of reality" is merely an idealistic conception which is reified and it does not exist independent of the person nor the external world.
In a way, it is another form of hallucination.
This Will is discussed by Schopenhauer and in different forms within Hinduism and elsewhere.

The five senses are in a precognitive (intuition) operational mode. It is that the precognitive mode has evolve into Reason. Is there a separation and, if so, why call it a negative? Reason might just be another sense among the emergent capacities. A distinction between the sense Reason and the contents is the same as those of the other senses. The contents of Reason survive the operational mode of the sense Reason. Some of the contents are stored outside and are available to all. Some of the contents are discrete and permanent. The label identity cognizes the will of reason. The difference is the separation or not of the precognitive and cognitive level. Either way there is a will whether you call it precognitive or cognitive because Reason exist and the contents of Reason have a will and our personal will of our own private contents might embrace it or hallucinate another reality. There is only one Will of Reason.

Reason is not a sense per-se.

The brain/mind is represented by various modular units which are interconnected.

What we have for this point are;

1. The sense module refer to the five senses.
2. The reason module refer to intellect and understanding.

Note the difference between the sense faculties and the reason faculties.

When we see an orange and a lemon, then feel and taste them we are using our senses, i.e. the sense faculty. The sense faculty collect information of the empirical world.

Based on the information collected and deposited, we use our reason faculty to infer an orange and lemon has many common properties and group them as 'citrus' fruits.
In other situations, note how we use reason to relate causes to effects then use such principles to speculate other possible outcome.

The point here is, to be realistic the possible outcomes must be empirically-possible.

The WILL that supposedly drive the senses and reason is merely an inference but while it is based on the empirical it is not empirically-possible, e.g. God or any creative forces like Will, and the likes.
Note a watch to a watch-maker is empirically possible, but the whole creations to a creator or a Will is not empirically-possible.

Will is a hallucination but not an empirical based hallucination, rather is an illusory reason-based hallucination.

It is Evolution. It is the acquisition of new senses. It is true that my eyes function on photonic input. It is true that my sense of smell is a chemical laboratory. How the precognitive developed into Reason could be at large and not a definition by abstraction. An animal moves according to its senses input. This animal may acquire by experience the fact of life that animals go to water holes when they get thirsty. An animal may also follow the nose. Animal have secretions. The secretions produce unknown chemical reactions in the precognitive system. By extracting the chemicals, the animal lures his/her pray for the killing. This is all a basic relationship of how Reason emerges. With the emergence of Reason other capacities that might be senses emerge as well. What is right and what is wrong could be a feeling as well as a deduction by Reason. Is there a sense Divinatus or the creativity sense or even a math sense? Reason selects the capacities that may be developed into senses. The breeding of oracles is one example. Synesthesia exits in the diversity of the human genome. Hallucinating reality is not new. The contents of precognition might direct actions the same as the contents of Reason… and they might agree in whether it is right or wrong. In this case Reason is the same as precognition. Senses change and interpretations by Reason and precognition change and If the cosmological paradigm is true then Reality changes as well. It is then that we are what we want. In this moment of reality, It is Reason… and precognition same.
The function of reality depends on what is based upon. We might change the result of the function but not the variables of what is based upon. A photon is a quantum of energy with capabilities to become mass. The very small that is reality has within the variables of its origin. The function of the origin corresponds to the function of Reality. Energy into energy matter. How much of the original metaphysical (no matter) Energy do we have?
“It is not a paradox; it is an unsaturated function” - said Frege to Russell.
An example is: fighting for what is right. Fighting is wrong so we have a paradox. As a function, we all have a point in time (the life of the function). It is so that we can modify the original sentence to say to think what is right or to believe what is right or what I call the spectrum of reason. It is not a function but a spectrum. It is possible that what produced our Universe is here in an unsaturated function capable of the changes/Reason.

I accept there is a spectrum of reason i.e. from crude [primal] to highly refine reason.
Cooper highlighted how reason emerged from biology.

The formal systems of logic have ordinarily been regarded as independent of biology, but recent developments in evolutionary theory suggest that biology and logic may be intimately interrelated.

In this book, William Cooper outlines a theory of rationality in which logical law emerges as an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary biology. This biological perspective on logic, though at present unorthodox, could change traditional ideas about the reasoning process.

Cooper examines the connections between logic and evolutionary biology and illustrates how logical rules are derived directly from evolutionary principles, and therefore have no independent status of their own. Laws of decision theory, utility theory, induction, and deduction are reinterpreted as natural consequences of evolutionary processes. Cooper's connection of logical law to evolutionary theory ultimately results in a unified foundation for an evolutionary science of reason. It will be of interest to professionals and students of philosophy of science, logic, evolutionary theory, and cognitive science.
https://philpapers.org/rec/COOTEO-19

Kant label crude primal reason as Pure Reason, thus his Critique of Pure Reason.

It is this Pure Reason [as Kant postulated] that generates the Will [underlying reality] and an independent reality from the subject.

Spectrum wrote: Kant was an empirical realist and transcendental idealist. Kant introduced the concept of 'noumenon' to contrast with phenomenon.
Kant inferred the noumena exists for practical reason to deal with the concept of phenomena so that we do not get carried away too far beyond the phenomena.

[b]Kant[/b] wrote:The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility. A255 A311

One can read Kant's words literally above and there is no room for a misleading reading.

The concept of the noumena limits the extreme of the phenomena [sensibility].
The thing-in-itself is also the same as the noumena, i.e. a limiting concept but it is conceptualize to limit one from going beyond the transcendental, into something like a reified God or soul. It is like putting a stop to infinite regression otherwise it will be 'till the cow comes home'.

So there is no such things as a real noumena nor thing-in-itself. They are only limiting concepts as Kant asserted above.

I do not think it is at all clear what Kant meant. Not do I understand what sort of thing a 'limiting concept' is. If the noumena is a concept that can limit the extreme of phenomena, then phenomena must also be a concept. If phenomena is also a concept, then why isn't it equally the case that it is the 'concept of phenomena that limits the extreme of noumena'? And to conclude that there is no such thing as phenomema?

Londoner wrote: I do not think it is at all clear what Kant meant. Not do I understand what sort of thing a 'limiting concept' is. If the noumena is a concept that can limit the extreme of phenomena, then phenomena must also be a concept. If phenomena is also a concept, then why isn't it equally the case that it is the 'concept of phenomena that limits the extreme of noumena'? And to conclude that there is no such thing as phenomema?

Kant discuss the whole issue in phases and did not finalize the 'noumena' as a concept.
Kant has used noumena is a 'limiting concept' in the sensibility phase because the noumena begins where the phenomena is supposed to end. The noumena is used as a limiting element to stop the infinite regression else it will be 'till the cows come home'. This is only a temporary measure.

As a final point, Kant went on to cover everything [metaphysics] and state the noumena is an "idea" in the philosophical sense and conclude there is no thing-in-itself.

A 'concept' is associated with an empirical-thing [humans] or empirical-possible-thing [human liked aliens ] and the average intellect/reason.
An idea [philosophical -Kant] as generated by Pure Reason is beyond the empirical and not empirically possible, e.g. God, soul.

Spectrum wrote:

Londoner wrote: I do not think it is at all clear what Kant meant. Not do I understand what sort of thing a 'limiting concept' is. If the noumena is a concept that can limit the extreme of phenomena, then phenomena must also be a concept. If phenomena is also a concept, then why isn't it equally the case that it is the 'concept of phenomena that limits the extreme of noumena'? And to conclude that there is no such thing as phenomema?

Kant discuss the whole issue in phases and did not finalize the 'noumena' as a concept.
Kant has used noumena is a 'limiting concept' in the sensibility phase because the noumena begins where the phenomena is supposed to end. The noumena is used as a limiting element to stop the infinite regression else it will be 'till the cows come home'. This is only a temporary measure.

As a final point, Kant went on to cover everything [metaphysics] and state the noumena is an "idea" in the philosophical sense and conclude there is no thing-in-itself.

A 'concept' is associated with an empirical-thing [humans] or empirical-possible-thing [human liked aliens ] and the average intellect/reason.
An idea [philosophical -Kant] as generated by Pure Reason is beyond the empirical and not empirically possible, e.g. God, soul.

As far as I can understand that, it sounds more like Fichte than Kant, at least how Kant is normally understood.

In such a formulation I do not see what the word 'empirical' would mean.