Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?
- JamesOfSeattle
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?
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- Burning ghost
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?
So when you say "functional description" you just mean "put to use". To me it looks like you've just started added terms when your thinking comes across a problem. It looks a lot like you come across an obstacle and then create a new term (which is fine if there is a point to it.)
You are exposing a problem with the limits of language. If this I snot your intent then I would suggest, at least for my sake, establishing some better examples and definitions to which I can apply "functional system", "functional description" and "physical description". At the moment it appears to me they are all the same thing and its simply a matter of perspective what I choose to call "physical", "functional" or "functional system", or a "physical system".
As an attempt I can appreciate that something physical has multiple applications. I cannot untangle the physical description from the functional description though - (kind of an aside) I understand thers is a world of interactions and that some interactions are more viable under certain circumstances, where other interactions are either "unobservsed" or "impossible" (which from my perspective are two terms that are only untangled by applying rules of theory.) In this particular sense "unobserved" and "impossible" are synomynous, because that which I cannot observe directly/indirectly is an impossibility for me, which is not to say that what I have yet to observe is impossible.
So we can say some thing has multiple functions, yet it is more fitting for some functions than others. It makes no sense to talk about the function of a car (when trying to bracket out purpose) then turn around and say a rock has no function. The rock (if purpose is passed over) has the function of being part of the landscape, directing the flow of water down hill, being part of an avalanche, etc.,.
Descriptions are qualitative. I cannot have a description of something that has no quality to it. The physicality of the "something" is merely a qualitative feature.
-- Updated November 12th, 2017, 11:46 pm to add the following --
Just had a thought.
Would it be more helpful to think of this in terms of implicit and explicit memory? The implicit would be likely associated to your "physical description" where the explicit would be more associated to your "functional description"?
- Atreyu
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?
1. a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object.
2. a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.
I don't think you can elaborate on this standard definition. It's fairly simple.
A "quale" is basically the smallest unit which you can subdivide your subjective experiences. It's similar to the concept of an "atom" in the physical world. Only in this case it's the smallest subdivision one could make concerning a subjective experience (red, hot, fast) in which one would still have the same experience.
So just as you can imagine breaking down a physical substance into smaller and smaller parts, until you finally get to the atom - a part which, if subdivided, will give one an entirely different substance - so too can you imagine breaking down a subjective experience into smaller and smaller parts, until you finally get to single "quales", which cannot be subdivided without fundamentally altering the subjective experience (the particular color, sound, feel, smell, taste - will no longer be experienced).
I'm trying to understand why you would call them "functional descriptions of meaning". The quales themselves are already defined differently, and this definition is established. A quale has no more meaning than the underlying experience which it elicits (red, smooth, 'ring ring', pungent, bitter, etc)
No?
Because remember, the quale is not "red". That's how we describe the experience elicited by the quale. The quale itself is the smallest unit of perception which gives us the experience which we then describe as "red".
- JamesOfSeattle
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?
First, let's clarify where we agree.
Certainly not a physical object, so instead an abstraction, a concept.Atreyu wrote:quale
1. a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object.
I think we might have to further qualify this part of the definition, but let's leave that for later.2. a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.
Agreed, except I wish to point out that an experience can have more than one quale. The simplest experience would have exactly one quale, but a more complex experience could have qualia.A "quale" is basically the smallest unit which you can subdivide your subjective experiences. It's similar to the concept of an "atom" in the physical world. Only in this case it's the smallest subdivision one could make concerning a subjective experience (red, hot, fast) in which one would still have the same experience.
So just as you can imagine breaking down a physical substance into smaller and smaller parts, until you finally get to the atom - a part which, if subdivided, will give one an entirely different substance - so too can you imagine breaking down a subjective experience into smaller and smaller parts, until you finally get to single "quales", which cannot be subdivided without fundamentally altering the subjective experience (the particular color, sound, feel, smell, taste - will no longer be experienced).
I'm trying to leverage some of the ideas known to the philosophical community as functionalism. From the SEP article on Functionalism: "Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part."I'm trying to understand why you would call them "functional descriptions of meaning".
I would put it this way: Functionalism holds (approximately) that a mind can be described as the functions that a mental being/machine performs. Thus a brain has an abstract functional description. Sub-parts of the brain also have functional descriptions. Neurons have functional descriptions. Groups of neurons can have a functional description if they serve a function as a group.
Many functional systems (remember, a system is a the thing with both a physical and functional description) include sensory inputs. These inputs include a physical description and a functional description relative to the system in question. So, for example, a cone cell in the retina responds to red light and starts a chain of neural firings. At some point the system in question detects a burst of neurotransmitter as a result of the red light process. The neurotransmitter is the input to the system.
Now the functional description of inputs to the system will not include anything about neurotransmitters. All that goes into the functional description of the inputs is the meaning of that neurotransmitter, which is "red light", or perhaps just "red". So the functional description of the burst of neurotransmitter is "there is red light" . If you have a very intelligent complex functional system, the system might describe that experience by saying "I see red light".
Now this statement, I suggest, has some problems. In my understanding a quale is not separate from an experience, it is part of an experience. An experience is an event that has an input, an agent, and an output. The quale is the functional description (meaning) of the input. So in regard to your last statement, the quale is in fact "red", not in the sense that it would appear red if you looked at it, because it's not an object so you can't look at it, but in the sense that the quale is the meaning of the input, which is in this case, "red".The quales themselves are already defined differently, and this definition is established. A quale has no more meaning than the underlying experience which it elicits (red, smooth, 'ring ring', pungent, bitter, etc)
You may say that my my definition of quale does not match the standard definition of quale. In that case, we can call my definition shmale. But in that case, I suggest that when you are talking about quale, you're really talking about shmale without knowing it, just as when you talk about heat you are really talking about the kinetic energy of molecules.
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- Burning ghost
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?
No. we're not. You're not understanding "language" and what its limits are. You're pushing language far beyond its realm of meaning and inventing your own sense of reality.just as when you talk about heat you are really talking about the kinetic energy of molecules
"Quale" doesn't really mean anything. It is just another case of someone attempting to reconcile the history dualism embedded in our modern understanding. The atomization of non-physical items is a complete nonsense which you fall into by saying a "quale" can be a collection? Simply wrong and right at the same time due to the term being effectively meaningless. If we have singular and plural terms, which we do ("quale" and "qualia"), surely this should stop us in our tracks because we're already applying quantity so something that is meant to be immeasurable.
We can reduce the "experience" to its correlative physical processes. This helps us understand part of the picture.
As I have already stated this is based on an absurd use of language. No item of experience is a "stand alone" experience. The "quale" can be infinitely reduced and subdivided, this is the fallacy of the atomization of the psyche.The simplest experience would have exactly one quale, but a more complex experience could have qualia.
The biggest gun I can bring to the table here is Husserl. He referred to "moments" and "pieces". "Pieces" can be removed and stand alone, but "moments" cannot be removed and cannot stand alone. This is like saying I can remove the "leg" of a table but I cannot remove "size" from the table.
The "moments" can be said to "cover" experience, or be viewed as adumbrations. It is here that Husserl would share a common problem with you in reconciling the "piece" with the "moments". The moment by itself has no meaning it is only known "at-a-distance" (we're talking spatiotemporal AND/OR relationally.) Meaning, if we were to see the world as being different shades of "green" then we would not see "green" as some separate function, it would not be a function, it would be called "vision".
What is more, and where people like Wittgenstein, Foucault and Derrida went all out (more so for the latter two), this can be taken on as a linguistic problem and language is broken into these similar formal "correlations" and items of language are put into categories like "determiners", "conjunctions" and such.
What you appear to be doing is working from a dualistic perspective. You have taken into your frame both the subjective and objective view, the physical item and its description, then tried to cut the description from the physical, which is a lingual operation more than an experiential one because you're enclosing the idea in terms of "descriptions od experience" not realizing that experience is being held at a distance (and in explication so it must be so, but herein is the trap of falling past this realization and taking the "description" as separate from the experience due to the temporal nature of "being".)
Maybe this makes no sense to you? This can be reconciled easily enough if you can explain if there is any difference between "moment" and "quale" (by which you have to accept that "quality" has no quantity and if it does have quantity then it is just a quantity and not a quality! An obviousness it is strikingly easy to be blind to.)
If you are using the term "quale" synonymously with "moment" then you'll notice that you cannot say you have "numerous" quale for an experience, because you'd be saying nothing other than "I have a quale of quale", a group of quale, which is the same as saying a "size" of quale, only that it's more hidden in the depths of linguistics.
To apply my former use of "syntax" and "semantics", the Pieces are the semantics and the Moments are the syntax. It is damn hard for us to reconcile how we can talk about "moments" in neither a singular nor a plural sense. In this sense we can move back to the "quale", as meaning "moment", and say there are different "qualia" or different "moments", but they are only known as a family of plurals within a single "Piece" of experience. I can never break a "quale" or a "moment" off from an experience, yet the absence of a "quale"/"moment" from a Piece can seem "absent", and its "absence" is known "emptily". Meaning if I cannot register a sound I register that I cannot hear a sound, not that the "Moments" of sound (volume, pitch, tone, etc.,.) has ceased to exist, they are just being "negatively filled-in" (empty.) If it were not so we could not appreciate silence or absence of colour.
If there is anyway you can fit this into what you are saying then we can further the conversation. If it is too much then I guess I'll have to take a back seat and simply observe until what is being said slips further beyond use (at least use for me, I may well do nothing more than push you away from what you wish to discuss.)
Thanks and good luck.
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