Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

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Gertie
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Gertie »

JamesOfSeattle wrote:Gertie, this is very close, so let me quibble:
Gertie wrote:A quale is a phemonenal experience resulting from stimuli/input (eg seeing a blue sky, or the feel of a toaster 'wanting' to heat its element)
Okay,
which is an entity/system's description (representation?) of the associated physical processes involved
I would say descriptions of the meanings of the associated physical processes. The entity/system might have no access/knowledge of the physical processes.[/quote
I think this might boil down to the same thing.
which gives meaning/purpose to those physical processes (light hitting retina, interacting with visual cortex, or toaster lever being pushed down etc) for that entity/system,
I prefer to say meaning is inherent in the input (semantic information), and purpose determines which meaning is picked out.

*
Meaning is inherent in the photons which end up hitting my eye , in the apple I'm looking at, or...?


Nitpick of the quibbles -

I can see how your quibbles could apply to emotional type responses - pressing the lever makes the the toaster 'want' to get hot, or seeing an apple makes me 'want' to eat it.

But how about raw perception which doesn't inspire a physical response, isn't functionally significant. I perceive things all the time (my coffee cup in my peripheral vision now, the tree outside my window) which I don't respond to in a physical way (except in my brain) and don't give me purpose at the point the phenomenal experience arises?

I can see that this 'monitoring' of the environment overall has a purpose, but seeing or hearing something in particular which is functionally irrelevant in that moment is still an experiential state, still a quale.


And my larger point still stands, a functional description of consciousness is cool, and potentially very useful, but it shouldn't be confused with an explanation. Hence imo you can't extrapolate from saying 'this is how consciousness functions for known conscious creatures' to saying this is how it must be for toasters, especially when we have a known and testable alternative explanation for how toasters work which is purely physical. (We do for humans too of course, but that's part of the quandary, not an explanation)

-- Updated November 8th, 2017, 10:14 am to add the following --

keep messing up the quotes, sorry. trying again -

JamesOfSeattle wrote:
Gertie, this is very close, so let me quibble:
Gertie wrote:
A quale is a phemonenal experience resulting from stimuli/input (eg seeing a blue sky, or the feel of a toaster 'wanting' to heat its element)
Okay,
which is an entity/system's description (representation?) of the associated physical processes involved
I would say descriptions of the meanings of the associated physical processes. The entity/system might have no access/knowledge of the physical processes.
I think this might boil down to the same thing?
which gives meaning/purpose to those physical processes (light hitting retina, interacting with visual cortex, or toaster lever being pushed down etc) for that entity/system,
I prefer to say meaning is inherent in the input (semantic information), and purpose determines which meaning is picked out.


Meaning is inherent in the photons which end up hitting my eye , in the apple I'm looking at, or...?


Nitpick of the quibbles -

I can see how your quibbles could apply to emotional type responses - pressing the lever makes the the toaster 'want' to get hot, or seeing an apple makes me 'want' to eat it.

But how about raw perception which doesn't inspire a physical response, isn't functionally significant. I perceive things all the time (my coffee cup in my peripheral vision now, the tree outside my window) which I don't respond to in a physical way (except in my brain) and don't give me a functional purpose at the point the phenomenal experience arises?

I can see that this 'monitoring' of the environment overall has a purpose, but seeing or hearing something in particular which is functionally irrelevant in that moment is still an experiential state, still a quale.


And my larger point still stands, a functional description of consciousness is cool, and potentially very useful, but it shouldn't be confused with an explanation. Hence imo you can't extrapolate from saying 'this is how consciousness functions for known conscious creatures' to saying this is how it must be for toasters, especially when we have a known and testable alternative explanation for how toasters work which is purely physical. (We do for humans too of course, but that's part of the quandary, not an explanation)
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Kathyd
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Kathyd »

I think what's interesting in this discussion is our dualistic view concerning sentient beings versus non-living objects.

In the case of a human, we readily admit that our actions can be explained via psychological or physical constructs. So we can say we picked up the box because we chose to, or we can say we picked up the box because of a long series of physical facts (and that because of a set of known and unknown variables ultimately we had to pick up the box, it was inevitable). Which gives us the debate of free will versus predestination for human beings.

However, when it comes to a non-living object, such as a toaster, we admit nothing of the sort. The only explanation which is "reasonable" or "scientific" is to explain the toasting via the laws of physics, and if someone begins to posit a psychological explanation, such as the toaster "wanting" or "deciding" to toast, then we quickly dismiss such an explanation as "preposterous". No psychological explanation for the toasting, such as qualia, is acceptable, because, after all, toasters have no psyches. No mind, no intention, no feeling, means that only physical factors need be involved in explaining causation.

But is this really so? For we cannot draw a fine line between "life" and "non-life". Therefore, perhaps we also cannot really draw a fine line between the laws of physics and psychological considerations such as qualia when explaining causation.

What this all suggests to me is that perhaps the best explanation for phenomena lies in somehow combining or synthesizing the two basic explanations. As we do with light. We cannot explain light adequately unless we both view it as a wave and a particle. At one time, it was debated whether it was a particle or a wave, and which explanation was most "correct", until it was later realized that the best thing to do was to regard it as both. Perhaps the same is true when explaining phenomena. Maybe it's best to both consider living organisms as machines (which we already do in most branches of science) as well as considering non-living matter as "alive", at least in some kind of way.

And I believe that quite often the solution to many problems is to reconcile two apparently opposing explanations, i.e. turning a dualistic view (matter/spirit, matter/energy, life/non-life, existence/non-existence, mind/matter) into a singular one.
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JamesOfSeattle
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

Gertie,

I think you are missing the relationship between purpose and function, at least as I am proposing. So in regards to a machine (brain or toaster), purpose is just the explanation of how or why that thing came to be organized the way it is. Once the thing is extant, purpose does not have an ongoing relevance.

So when you talk about raw perception, say, visual perception, you're talking about function, not purpose. In the visual case, the function is collecting information about the environment. The functional description describes (at a functional level, not physical) how the information is stored, for how long, etc. You can go back to purpose to explain why the machine was organized for that function, but the operating of the function has no impact on the purpose. But I would not say experiencing the coffee cup is functionally irrelevant. If you are experiencing a real coffee cup, then the function is operating perfectly. It may be irrelevant to the purpose, but like I said, purpose only explained why the machine was created or organized. It doesn't specify how it works.

Think of a computer programming class of ten students. The teacher says "write a program that recognizes cats", and that's it. You will get ten different programs that have ten different functional descriptions, but all the same purpose. BTW, the programs will not experience cats. The computers running instances of the programs might, depending. The written programs are essentially part of the functional descriptions of the computers running the programs.

As to your larger point, you say I can't extrapolate from brains to toasters. What I'm saying is that the functional explanation of "raw feels" in brains looks a lot like a part of the functional explanation of a toaster (or anything that responds to the environment in a functional way). Then I invoke the duck theorem. If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's probably a duck.

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Burning ghost
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Burning ghost »

James -

You're ignoring the subjective view of the person comparing the toaster to the brain.

Maybe it would be better if you express what you mean by "function" and "purpose" and how these relate? There seems to be a circular pattern in your thinking regarding the teleology of this hypothetical.

I think we can at least be assured by your words that we're dealing with a teleological problem, I am just not sure what it is yet if you're planning to alter (in some slight fashion) how we're meant to interpret what you mean by "function" and "purpose".

This is no doubt going to be a tricky feat for you.
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Gertie »

James
but like I said, purpose only explained why the machine was created or organized. It doesn't specify how it works.
OK, so you're saying Purpose isn't necessary for qualia, Function alone is necessary and sufficient for consciousness. I can take Purpose out of the quale equation then.

The key question then must be how do you differentiate between functional active systems (involving qualia), and non-functional ones (no qualia present)? Eg -
The computers running instances of the programs might, depending.
On what? (Aside from your chosen way of defining it)


If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's probably a duck.
Hmmm. So you'd agree you're offering a functional description, with no underlying explanation, or counter to hypothetical explanations which would contradict your description and definitions?

If so, fair enough, cos that's my main gripe .

And I still think this question ought to have an answer -
I prefer to say meaning is inherent in the input (semantic information), and purpose determines which meaning is picked out.
Meaning is inherent in the photons which end up hitting my eye , in the apple I'm looking at, or...?
Because you're introducing Meaning here as a characteristic of the input/stimulus, and therefore presumably you're claiming Meaning can exist without Consciousness, presumably by saying a photon for example, has inherent semantic information? Where-as I'd say that if that photon is unconscious, there is no meaning to the photon, only in the response of the conscious person it interacts with. Hence meaning isn't a necessary feature of the input/stimulus, it's a feature of the conscious system, a la Chinese Room.
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JamesOfSeattle
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

Burning ghost,

1. I don't see the relevance of the subjective view of the person comparing the toaster to the brain.
2. I thought I explained the relation between "function" and "purpose" in my previous post. Gertie seems to have gotten it. Let me know if you need more.
3. Teleology is relevant, but I don't see a problem. Please elaborate.

Gertie,

Function is necessary but not sufficient for qualia. Qualia are specifically about input, namely the "meaning" of the input relative to the function. Thus, you can have a functional machine/computer that does stuff, but without semantic information as input. (You can also have computer programs that simply don't work.)
Gertie wrote:So you'd agree you're offering a functional description, with no underlying explanation, or counter to hypothetical explanations which would contradict your description and definitions?
I have to admit I don't understand this question.

As for meaning ...

I admit that I am using a different sense of "meaning" than you are using. Maybe I'm using a more folksy sense? When I say "this apple in my hand means there is an apple tree out there somewhere" I'm saying the meaning is associated with the apple, not my consciousness. Now you can say the apple means something else to a different conscious entity, say, one that is hungry. And I would say that meaning is also associated with the apple. Any physical system has an extensive causal history, and a conscious entity can (potentially) pick out the meaning of interest to itself. If the term "meaning" still causes a problem here, then please suggest another term.

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Burning ghost
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Burning ghost »

James -

I'll leave it to Gertie. I don't think I'd really help with the flow of the thread much because I am struggling to understand where its grounded.

I'll take a back seat for now.

Thanks for your time, I hope I can add something meaningful to the thread in the future.

-- Updated November 10th, 2017, 1:04 am to add the following --

James -

Just one thing. I think my translation may help me and others here:

Any machine that can be said to have a purpose or function has two types of descriptions: a physical description and a functional description. The physical description simply explains the physical parts at a given level. For our purposes we don't need to go to the level of quantum mechanics. The level of atoms will be fine.

The functional description describes parts by what they do or mean. So consider an automobile. Some of the functional description of the major parts have not changed in a hundred years or so. Turning the steering wheel clockwise turns the front wheels to the right. Headlights allow the driver to see at night. There is some indicator that means the fuel level is low. Etc.
The physical description is the SYNTAX, whilst the functional description is the SEMANTIC, or physical is the structure and the functional the variety of patterns possible within the structure.

In this sense the physical description is static, the cog in the clock will always be a cog in a clock, where as the functional description is dependent upon where the cog is in the clock and it can be used to perform various different tasks, or even remain inert doing nothing within the syntactical structure.

If this is correct then say so and I'll continue my translation. If not then please explain why if you can.

Thanks
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JamesOfSeattle
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

Burning ghost wrote:
Any machine that can be said to have a purpose or function has two types of descriptions: a physical description and a functional description. The physical description simply explains the physical parts at a given level. For our purposes we don't need to go to the level of quantum mechanics. The level of atoms will be fine.

The functional description describes parts by what they do or mean. So consider an automobile. Some of the functional description of the major parts have not changed in a hundred years or so. Turning the steering wheel clockwise turns the front wheels to the right. Headlights allow the driver to see at night. There is some indicator that means the fuel level is low. Etc.
The physical description is the SYNTAX, whilst the functional description is the SEMANTIC, or physical is the structure and the functional the variety of patterns possible within the structure.
Almost. The syntax/semantics idea may be in the right direction. I haven't thought much about syntax.

The second part, while in a sense true, is not the point I was making, and it brings purpose back into the picture. The point I was trying to make is that the functional is descriptionally (that's a word, right?) distinct from the physical, so you can have a functional description without knowing the physical description. That's what qualia are.

But to get back to your translation, I was thinking more that the functional machine was multiply realizable, which means you can have one functional description associated with multiple physical realizations. But it's also true that one physical system can have more than one functional description, and that's when purpose gets involved. I can have a computer running Word, and the functional description would include the program code itself. But you could use that computer (still running Word) as a doorstop. The functional description would probably include bulk, weight, friction, etc., but not programming code.

In this sense the physical description is static, the cog in the clock will always be a cog in a clock, where as the functional description is dependent upon where the cog is in the clock and it can be used to perform various different tasks, or even remain inert doing nothing within the syntactical structure.
This seems right. Regarding being "inert doing nothing", see doorstop reference above.

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Gertie
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Gertie »

James

Re Meaning



If we circle back for a bit, my original issue was that you were ascribing terms to physical processes we usually associate with conscious/experiential states without justification, and we've now established that your justification lies in being able to describe certain systems in terms of function.



And you're saying a functional system requires semantic information (information which means something - eg if I see an apple it means apple trees exist).



Where-as I've been referring to Searle's distinction, between 'syntactical' physical processes which have no apparent conscious elements and don't seem to require them. And what he calls 'semantic' meaning, where-by the system is consciously aware of what it's doing and the the symbols mean something to it. So a particular Chinese symbol might mean nothing to a computer, except this pattern of lines means it is programmed to respond with a specified other pattern of lines. Where-as a conscious system who understands the meaning of the Chinese word, would respond based on the meaning to them (eg if the Chinese symbol asks 'What's your name?', both might pick the symbol for 'Gertie', but only the conscious system would understand the exchange. The functional outcome would be the same, but the computer might be functioning only via physical processes, where-as I am understanding the meaning of what's happening, the underlying meaning of the symbol exchange and physical processes.



So for Searle, the 'meaning' of the apple lies in what it means to the experiencing Subject perceiving it. If toasters are conscious the 'meaning' of the input (lever pressed down) lies within the toaster, not the input/stimulus itself. So when its lever is pressed, this means 'I want to get hot' to the experiencing Subject toaster.

(My position is that Information is just a abstract way of describing physics, without an experiencing interpreter who it 'means something' to. And when you say the existence of an apple means there must be apple trees, you're invoking a 'God's-Eye Observer' Subject, to justify that claim - or in reality our observed/experienced knowledge, not the toaster's/computer's qualia).



Your formulation and use of 'meaning' might still work in the context of a functional description. But I can't see how it helps us recognise whether a system is conscious, because you're essentially using 'functional system' as synonymous with 'conscious system'. -

Being conscious makes it functional, and being functional makes it conscious.

That might be so, but it begs the question of what is it about functional systems which mean they are conscious, aside from you defining them as such? What's the underlying explanation, the Theory of the relationship between Functionality and Consciousness? Because otherwise, you're just relying on your own personal definitions to do the work of an explanation imo.
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

Gertie,

1. First let's jettison consideration of "understanding". That's a very high level intelligence capability not necessary for consciousness.

2. I have not said a functional system requires semantic information. I said that if a functional system has a physical input, then that input represents semantic information, and the functional description of that input is the equivalent of qualia. If the term semantic information causes a problem, then we can call it proto-semantic.

3. The syntax/semantics dichotomy is the same as the physical/functional dichotomy. But when speaking of the Chinese Room, Searle simply refuses to consider the functional description, just as he refuses to consider the functional description of when a computer is running a program. He sees the syntax of what the CPU is doing and he completely ignores the code. Somehow he thinks all of the functional description should be found in the CPU, i.e., the man in the room. No one expects the man in the room to understand Chinese. That's not his function in the room. (Dang, I brought back understanding.). And when confronted with that thought (the systems response) he thinks shrinking the room and moving it somewhere else changes things. It doesn't. Things just get confusing when you put one machine inside another, and the machine on the inside has a lot of capabilities that are completely irrelevant to the larger machine.

*
(I have to work now, will try to respond to more of your post later)
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Burning ghost
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Burning ghost »

James -

I already have issues with your view of "machine", but even letting that slide:
But to get back to your translation, I was thinking more that the functional machine was multiply realizable, which means you can have one functional description associated with multiple physical realizations. But it's also true that one physical system can have more than one functional description, and that's when purpose gets involved.
You are trying to remove the "purpose"? That is an interesting idea, but if you remove the purpose you leave a huge gap in how we can talk/think about this (which is interesting.)

What does "physical realization" mean? I am guessing, to keep in line with your definitions, you're saying something like "one function can have different physical descriptions", like a vehicle made from transporting people can take on many different forms from space-hoppers to cars, scooters to planes. Then we can just reverse the principle and say the exact same thing for a "physical description", and use a computer as a table, door-stop or to cut down a tree.

What I notice here is that some "physical descriptions" only have meaning if they fit the purpose (I cannot remove the "purpose" from what we're talking about), and equally so, the "functional description" only has meaning when it fits the context. We seem to have the very same thing here only in reverse.

A physical system always has degrees of applicability to different functions. If it didn't we'd not even notice it (or I cannot see how we could make sense of such a thing even if it could exist at all?)
House, are any lights on?
I feel there is a light on.
Which light?
I don't know, but I feel one is on.
What about the porch light.
I feel that light is off.
How do you know a light is on?
I have a feeling that a light is on.
We can also change this conversation to say:

House, are any lights on?
I banana there is a light on.
Which light?
I don't know, but I banana one is on.
What about the porch light.
I banana that light is off.
How do you know a light is on?
I have a banananess that a light is on.

What does this tell us? Not a great deal. My problem is still that I have to continually suspend disbelief and even then I arrive nowhere very useful. I would suggest you look at this example more closely and use syntax and semantics to further your investigation. Although within language "purpose" is necessarily embedded within it, I think it is as least less apparent than in what you're looking at. By doing this I see that you can establish a solid structure (which would be your "physical description", or rather rules of meaning, syntax) from which you could then interpret the "functional description" which would only work within certain set syntactical rules and even have completely different meanings.

All said and done I do find your investigation interesting. It touches on something that has been niggling at me for some years in regards to ontology.

Also, I hope you now see the issue I had before :
1. I don't see the relevance of the subjective view of the person comparing the toaster to the brain.
You should really think long and hard about this considering some of the claims you are making.

In your reply to other member here:
I have not said a functional system requires semantic information. I said that if a functional system has a physical input, then that input represents semantic information, and the functional description of that input is the equivalent of qualia. If the term semantic information causes a problem, then we can call it proto-semantic.
Here is where we need to untangle the difference between "functional system" and "functional description". I think Gertie introduced this problem so best to either cut this term "functional system" out, or realise that it means nothing more than SYNTAX. If it means syntax then we have ourselves a false dichotomy where we're comparing syntax with syntax, although I could argue the case for semantic meanings creating new syntactical rules ... guess no need to overcomplicate things just yet :)
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Gertie »

James
and the functional description of that input is the equivalent of qualia.
Sure, the phenomenal experience of qualia (seeing, hearing etc) might be framed as part of a functional description of a system, but as I've said we have physical functional descriptions of toasters which don't require invoking qualia. Hence the need for further justification/explanation.


1. First let's jettison consideration of “understanding”. That's a very high level intelligence capability not necessary for consciousness.
Agreed, but Searle's example shows, imo, that purely physical processes can explain the computer's functioning. That's my point. Unless you go all the way back to a known conscious source – the programmer. Same applies to a toaster, which is designed by a conscious person to follow the laws of physics to get hot when its lever is pressed - no toaster qualia required.

Therefore you need a more fundamental theory re the relationship between physics and consciousness in order to support the necessity of toaster qualia.

Otherwise it's just a guess as to whether a toaster has qualia innit, based on your personal selection of what similarities are relevant (you've chosen functional similarities, I could choose something else). The same prob all such hypotheses have, because subjective experience is inherently private, and we don't know the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness which might be testable with our empirical scientific toolset.
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

Gertie wrote:Sure, the phenomenal experience of qualia (seeing, hearing etc) might be framed as part of a functional description of a system, but as I've said we have physical functional descriptions of toasters which don't require invoking qualia. Hence the need for further justification/explanation.
We don't require invoking qualia for a toaster because no one cares what it feels like to be a toaster. But when someone defines qualia or consciousness as "something it feels like", we are forced to look at the toaster and say, yeah there is something it feels like. It feels like when you're supposed to toast, you toast. But comparing a toaster to a person is like comparing a water molecule to a glacier. No one describes the glacier by describing its water molecules. And we usually describe the water molecule by its physical parts, hydrogen and oxygen. But when we are talking about "things made of water" we are forced to look at the water molecule and say, yes, that's water.


Agreed, but Searle's example shows, imo, that purely physical processes can explain the computer's functioning. That's my point.
But purely physical processes can explain your brain's functioning as well. Does that mean your brain is purely syntactical and cannot therefore have consciousness? My point is that consciousness is not about the physical processes, even though the physical processes are absolutely necessary. Consciousness is about the functional processes, and both brains and computers-running-programs have those.
Unless you go all the way back to a known conscious source – the programmer.
The original programmer of the Room and the toaster provided the purpose, but then they went away. The original programmer of your brain, your genes, provided the purpose of your brain (to help make more genes), and then became irrelevant once your brain was in place.
Same applies to a toaster, which is designed by a conscious person to follow the laws of physics to get hot when its lever is pressed - no toaster qualia required.
But qualia is required. Your statement is like saying "rain falls from the sky when the air pressure gets low, no H2O required". You may not see why it is required, but it's there. You can't make a toaster without requiring some input mechanism that means "toast now". I'm saying you can't have qualia without having an input mechanism that "means" something, and wherever you have an input mechanism that "means" something, you have qualia.

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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by Burning ghost »

James -
The original programmer of your brain, your genes
Not really true. The brain is what it is due to environment and gene interaction, plus chance.
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Re: Are qualia functional descriptions of meaning?

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

The genes created a machine that could learn, just like the programmers of AlphaGo did not program a machine to play Go, they programmed a machine to learn how to play Go.
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In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021