Thanks for the link.As I have said, I think 'I' denotes both an empirical subject and the transcendental subject, and we usually confuse those two. Have you read this:Or if you're suggesting the experiential ingredients of individual self-ness exist independently of the recipe which creates each individual, why call the different recipes the same self, the same 'I'? Surely the term Subject/Self/I is there to differentiate between the individual who experiences a first-person pov, from those other individuals I can only experience as third-person Objects 'out there'. You seem to be using terms in an idiosyncratic way, so I think you need to define them.
http://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/ ... =2&t=15258
You end up pretty much agreeing that you 'feel' you're right, and that's the foundaation your internally consistent hypothesis ultimately rests on.
Which is the problem I pointed out. So I can come up with a contradictory hypothesis which feels right to me, as can a million other people, and there is no neutral testing ground, because the empirical world of objective/shared knowledge is enclosed within each contradictory hypothesis.
So you could be right, or one of a million other contradictory hypotheses could be right, or all could be wrong, we have no way of knowing. So why not say ''I don't know', but I like this idea or that one?
Meanwhile in the empirical world of (imperfect and limited) shared/agreed knowledge, we have science beginning to explain why particular types of hypotheses/world views might be more appealing to us, beginning to explain why you might find this particular world view appealing, which imo should give pause for thought.
Tho as you say, science can't (yet anyway) explain subjective experiential states themselves, in fact it looks like they might not be compatible with our scientific method (the hard problem). Hence philosophy of mind flourishes, with myriad contradictory hypotheses, so far all bumping into the same problem of testability. And imo the best response to that situation is -
'I don't know, nobody does, and nobody even knows how they can know if any particular hypothesis is the right one'.
So you're claiming that for every person who has ever had a uniquely particular experience of having an itchy toe, plus every person who ever will, there are billions of identical, discrete previously/independently existing experiential states of itchy toes continually happening over and over? Along with every other experiential event any conscious entity ever had or ever will? And your collective noun for these discrete experiential events is the 'transcendental subject'?Exactly. If you read the above post, it will perhaps become more clear, with some kind of proof included.Can you spell that out more clearly? I'm imagining a sea of experiential states (seeing a red apple, feeling sad, an itchy toe, etc) existing independently, somehow becoming embodied in an individual material state in a sequential manner which forms the history of a self's existence, then when that individual's brain dies, becoming re-embodied in a different combination as another individual. Is that what you mean?
And then these discrete independent experiential events are somehow sequentially appropriately slotted in to each of these people's lives, from birth, and stop at physical death and return to 'the experiential either' as discrete itchy toe,etc experiences?
How does this work?
What specific evidence/argument leads to this conclusion? Or If I've misinterpreted you, can you specifically say how, rather than rely on abstract terminology?