An Argument against Substance Dualism

[Sy Borg]

The quantum domain is the mental domain in the sense that quanta act as the "pixels" of reality, thus they are informational in nature from our perspective.

So we have the familiar physical domain and then we have an unfamiliar domain that effectively acts as a mental domain within the larger structures of which they are part. That is one viewpoint that I neither believe or disbelieve, but scientists of the calibre of Roger Penrose take the possibility of consciousness stemming from quantum effects seriously, so this angle is not off topic.

That's mainly my point - reality is logically one thing, but it's also all relative. What we call "thought" or the "mental domain" just looks like mechanistic quantum effects when observed at that scale. Thus, the "mental world" may be thought of as quantum fluctuations that are currently not directly within atoms - like the mess of energies, forces and flotsam floating around the solar system between the Sun, planets, asteroids and comets.

All speculative, of course, as the thread subject matter is necessarily speculative.

[Duckrabbit]

On another thread in this forum, someone wrote they could not be their body or memories or else they would not say they had their body or memories. Wittgenstein opined: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." Here is an example of where such battle needs to be waged.

I have a body, I have a mind, I speak of my spirit, my life, I have consciousness, I have awareness. So does that mean I must then be none of these things? So what am I? Stripped of body, soul, memories, consciousness, life, and so on, I would say I must be nothing. Nothing's left. No one's home. Unless saying I have these things does not necessarily mean they are personal possessions, but that "have", like most words, has varying meanings depending on context. This would be an instance of what's called "meaning blindness", similar to "aspect blindness" where one cannot see different images in the same figure where others may see different things depending on, for instance, switching of foreground and background.

Those who hold with substance dualism are not necessarily meaning blind. They may believe they do not possess bodies and minds but actually are their bodies and minds. They can be identified by either. But some go part way (this may actually be most people) and maintain that they have their bodies but are their minds. And then there are those who believe they have both bodies and minds, so they must be something else, i.e., the actual owner. But what this thing, the owner, actually is, must be shrouded in mystery because it cannot be anything we can conceive of. If it were physical or mental, objective or subjective, it would be mere a possession. But though it is inconceivable, it is argued, it must exist. Otherwise there would be nothing to stand in for the subject who owns his body and mind! Language has forced us to postulate things which cannot be conceived. Kind of like that fifth dimension: it's nothing we can possibly conceive of, but that does not mean it is not there! Really?

A lot seems to ride on confidence that science will eventually discover what kind of thing the person/self/subject actually is. That seems to be along the same lines as believing that because my subjectivity cannot be reduced to a brain state or seen, experienced, known by anyone who is not me, that science will eventually discover a way for this to happen. I would say no. By definition subjective experiences cannot be objective. It is not an empirical "problem."

[Tamminen]

On another thread in this forum, someone wrote they could not be their body or memories or else they would not say they had their body or memories. Wittgenstein opined: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." Here is an example of where such battle needs to be waged.

I have a body, I have a mind, I speak of my spirit, my life, I have consciousness, I have awareness. So does that mean I must then be none of these things? So what am I? Stripped of body, soul, memories, consciousness, life, and so on, I would say I must be nothing. Nothing's left. No one's home. Unless saying I have these things does not necessarily mean they are personal possessions, but that "have", like most words, has varying meanings depending on context. This would be an instance of what's called "meaning blindness", similar to "aspect blindness" where one cannot see different images in the same figure where others may see different things depending on, for instance, switching of foreground and background.

Those who hold with substance dualism are not necessarily meaning blind. They may believe they do not possess bodies and minds but actually are their bodies and minds. They can be identified by either. But some go part way (this may actually be most people) and maintain that they have their bodies but are their minds. And then there are those who believe they have both bodies and minds, so they must be something else, i.e., the actual owner. But what this thing, the owner, actually is, must be shrouded in mystery because it cannot be anything we can conceive of. If it were physical or mental, objective or subjective, it would be mere a possession. But though it is inconceivable, it is argued, it must exist. Otherwise there would be nothing to stand in for the subject who owns his body and mind! Language has forced us to postulate things which cannot be conceived. Kind of like that fifth dimension: it's nothing we can possibly conceive of, but that does not mean it is not there! Really?

A lot seems to ride on confidence that science will eventually discover what kind of thing the person/self/subject actually is. That seems to be along the same lines as believing that because my subjectivity cannot be reduced to a brain state or seen, experienced, known by anyone who is not me, that science will eventually discover a way for this to happen. I would say no. By definition subjective experiences cannot be objective. It is not an empirical "problem."

Good points. However, remember Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject in Tractatus. To say it is, is of course problematic, because we have many ways of speaking of being. I would say it is the transcendental condition of there being a world at all. And we can make metaphysical conclusions from it, although Wittgenstein did not want to go into such scenarios.

[BigBango]

Moving right along to Heidegger. I think we can all agree that we cannot let the customary use of language dictate the parameters surrounding our deeper thoughts about “being”. Even Aristotle’s metaphysics, which still guides our thinking in the formaation of scientific models clearly differentiates the substance of “being” as not something we have but is something that can have attributes. Still rather mysterious but does not fall victim to the sloppiness of our language.

[Sy Borg]

Those who hold with substance dualism are not necessarily meaning blind. They may believe they do not possess bodies and minds but actually are their bodies and minds. They can be identified by either. But some go part way (this may actually be most people) and maintain that they have their bodies but are their minds. And then there are those who believe they have both bodies and minds, so they must be something else, i.e., the actual owner. But what this thing, the owner, actually is, must be shrouded in mystery because it cannot be anything we can conceive of. If it were physical or mental, objective or subjective, it would be mere a possession. But though it is inconceivable, it is argued, it must exist. Otherwise there would be nothing to stand in for the subject who owns his body and mind! Language has forced us to postulate things which cannot be conceived. Kind of like that fifth dimension: it's nothing we can possibly conceive of, but that does not mean it is not there! Really?

It would seem to me that my "owner" is the environment (including culture) of which I am a part. The owner accepts that its individual parts don't last and need to be replaced.

Maybe the old trumvirate models of being have some merit all - owning, being and being owned?

[Gertie]

DuckRabbit

Mind/Body. Where exactly is the problem?

I have things. I have opinions. I have toes. I have a pet pig. I have patience. I have time. I have a watch. I have a body. I have a mind.

Our language - our use of words ("have", "thing", "facts") - tricks us into thinking we have a metaphysical problem here. My body can be seen; my mind cannot. My toes can be seen; my opinions cannot (necessarily). But aren't all these things? We are free to call them all things. There is a convention of our language that allows us to do so. But then we give up our freedom and allow the language, the word use, the grammar, to oppress us, to gain supremacy, control. What kind of things, we ask, are things that cannot be seen or observed with bodily senses? Much head-scratching has ensued over millennia. There must be two separate (perhaps equal) kinds of things. Then a move is made that is crucial though its importance seems mostly overlooked. We replace "thing" with "substance".

I don't think it's just a language issue. When you say ''I have things. I have opinions. I have toes. I have a pet pig. I have patience. I have time. I have a watch. I have a body. I have a mind.'' and they're all just things, the same type of 'substance', I think you're actually saying I have these experiences of having opinions and toes and a pig, which are all the same type of experience-substance.

But then the question arises do some of these things exist independently of your experiencing of them. Does your pig still exist when you die, independent of your experiencing of her? Or a rock? If so, then material substance exists. There is a real world of material substance, and you are within it. And unlike some of the material things in it, you have experiential states (consciousness). And experiential states seem to be a different type of thing to atoms and rocks, and brains.

That's the issue.

[Londoner]

But then the question arises do some of these things exist independently of your experiencing of them. Does your pig still exist when you die, independent of your experiencing of her?

I would say; No. My pig only exists - as it does exist - because of me. For example, the pig only has a colour because I have eyes, and these particular eyes. It makes no sense to ask what colour the pig is if it cannot be seen. If we deduct the colour of the pig, and then all the other ways I experience the pig, from 'my pig', there is nothing left to 'exist'.

Or a rock? If so, then material substance exists. There is a real world of material substance, and you are within it.

I am certainly in a world, but (like the pig) the world is what I am making of it. I do not ever encounter a material substance in the sense of a something independent of me. The world as always for-me.

And unlike some of the material things in it, you have experiential states (consciousness). And experiential states seem to be a different type of thing to atoms and rocks, and brains.

That's the issue.

I would say it is the other way round. We only ever have consciousness, the experiential state. The problem is with the abstract idea of material substance; atoms and rocks and brains as they might exist unobserved, un-experienced. We posit that they 'exist', but whenever we try to say how they exist we have no language.

[Halc]

On another thread in this forum, someone wrote they could not be their body or memories or else they would not say they had their body or memories. Wittgenstein opined: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." Here is an example of where such battle needs to be waged.

This is a good post. Everybody seems to be referencing it, including me now, even if delayed due to my noob status.

I have a body, I have a mind, I speak of my spirit, my life, I have consciousness, I have awareness. So does that mean I must then be none of these things? So what am I? Stripped of body, soul, memories, consciousness, life, and so on, I would say I must be nothing. Nothing's left.

This view of identity seems to resemble a cardboard box with an identity number scribbled on it, in which possessions can be placed, such as a mind, body, abilities, whatever. I think this is purely where one ends up if bewitched by the language. Why would a cardboard box be the thing for which your actions benefit if all the other things are replaceable? If the box goes to heaven, issued new contents, that just means there is a thing in heaven with my number scribbled on it somewhere. No, I don't think many people picture things this way, despite language suggesting something like this. What do I (the box) care for the continued existence of the empty box if it is to be eventually filled with all new stuff?

The Christian bible has the word 'soul' in it, which translates from a Hebrew word meaning 'all of you'. No dualistic meaning there, however much the word 'soul' is equated to 'mind'. The new testament has inconsistent descriptions of how that occurs, between instant salvation (Today you will be with me in the kingdom of heaven) and a delayed story where everybody is raised on judgement day and put with repaired <all of you> on a new Earth. I think the official line varies depending on the denomination. The bible also speaks of the 'spirit' of a person, which is a sort of dualistic reference.

Those who hold with substance dualism are not necessarily meaning blind. They may believe they do not possess bodies and minds but actually are their bodies and minds. They can be identified by either. But some go part way (this may actually be most people) and maintain that they have their bodies but are their minds. And then there are those who believe they have both bodies and minds, so they must be something else, i.e., the actual owner. But what this thing, the owner, actually is, must be shrouded in mystery because it cannot be anything we can conceive of. If it were physical or mental, objective or subjective, it would be mere a possession. But though it is inconceivable, it is argued, it must exist. Otherwise there would be nothing to stand in for the subject who owns his body and mind! Language has forced us to postulate things which cannot be conceived. Kind of like that fifth dimension: it's nothing we can possibly conceive of, but that does not mean it is not there! Really?

This seems to be trying to make sense of the cardboard box. Greta commented on this:

It would seem to me that my "owner" is the environment (including culture) of which I am a part. The owner accepts that its individual parts don't last and need to be replaced.

This doesn't seem to provide a personal identity. The environment's body and mind? How does one person have a different identity than the next. Perhaps I misunderstand your comment.

A lot seems to ride on confidence that science will eventually discover what kind of thing the person/self/subject actually is.

Science works under methodological naturalism, which means it will not address the questions posed above. It has pretty much already answered the question, but only in its own methodology, and even then quite open to interpretation. For instance, if identity starts at conception when there is yet no mental activity and barely a body, and the zygote splits into twins 20 minutes later, which is the original? Turns out there is no 'thing', possession or possessor that is the original, leaving the other to require a new one. There is no problem to be solved. Only the dualist need answer a question like that.

[Gertie]

Londoner

Gertie wrote: ↑
Today, 11:08 am
But then the question arises do some of these things exist independently of your experiencing of them. Does your pig still exist when you die, independent of your experiencing of her?

I would say; No. My pig only exists - as it does exist - because of me. For example, the pig only has a colour because I have eyes, and these particular eyes. It makes no sense to ask what colour the pig is if it cannot be seen. If we deduct the colour of the pig, and then all the other ways I experience the pig, from 'my pig', there is nothing left to 'exist'.

Or a rock? If so, then material substance exists. There is a real world of material substance, and you are within it.

I am certainly in a world, but (like the pig) the world is what I am making of it. I do not ever encounter a material substance in the sense of a something independent of me. The world as always for-me.

Well to break this down, firstly there's the knowledge question, one can't ever know for certain that anything exists aside from one's own experiential states.

I can either infer from my experiencing of pigs and rocks and Londoner and everything else that they exist independently from my perception/experiencing, or admit I can't know anything other than the experiencing itself, which is a bit of a conversation stopper!.

That's the choice as I see it.

If I infer that pigs and rocks and a whole universe exists independently of me and doesn't disappear when I'm not looking or asleep, then we have a shared world and we can start categorising and reasoning from our observations. And note an apparently significant difference between what we call material stuff, and experiential states

I agree colour is construct of brains/minds, it's how we experience photons bouncing off stuff then interacting with our optical system. We're limited critters who function a particular way - But that's a different issue to whether photons and the things they bounce off exist when no-one's looking.

And unlike some of the material things in it, you have experiential states (consciousness). And experiential states seem to be a different type of thing to atoms and rocks, and brains.

That's the issue.

I would say it is the other way round. We only ever have consciousness, the experiential state. The problem is with the abstract idea of material substance; atoms and rocks and brains as they might exist unobserved, un-experienced. We posit that they 'exist', but whenever we try to say how they exist we have no language.

Yes the experiential states are all I (not we - I don't know you or anyone else exists) have, or know directly, everything else is inference. It could be that nothing exists other than my experiential states. Even my memories could have sprung into existence last Thusday, or only when they come to mind, the experienced Now is all that's certain.

But that's a bit of a conversation stopper.

But once I infer my experiential states refer to/interact with stuff which exists independently of me, including other people much like me, we can start comparing notes about our experience. I can tell you I saw that pig when you weren't there. You saw my friend Ellen when I wasn't there. Ellen reports experiential states when no-one's observing her, and so on. Which adds up to a picture of a world existing indepenent of observation, as does noting my seeds seem to grow and my kettle boils regardless of me watching. Can't be sure they exist unobserved, but it's a reasonable inference.

And we have language for all that, as well as atoms and forces and materialism, a whole scientific model of how the world of physical stuff works. We can't directly experience being the kettle or seed, but we can observe and categorise as best we can. Imperfectly, incompletely, from a third person pov, with all our biases and limitations. And we can note that there seems something significantly different between what we call material stuff and experiential states. In fact we can note that experiential states have no place in our scientific materialist model. And my guess would be that we're missing a more fundamental level of understanding the world, which encompasses what we call the material and experiential. Ideas like Monism and Dualism are stabs at trying to get a handle at that more fundamental understanding.

[Londoner]

Well to break this down, firstly there's the knowledge question, one can't ever know for certain that anything exists aside from one's own experiential states.

I can either infer from my experiencing of pigs and rocks and Londoner and everything else that they exist independently from my perception/experiencing, or admit I can't know anything other than the experiencing itself, which is a bit of a conversation stopper!

That's the choice as I see it.

If I infer that pigs and rocks and a whole universe exists independently of me and doesn't disappear when I'm not looking or asleep, then we have a shared world and we can start categorising and reasoning from our observations. And note an apparently significant difference between what we call material stuff, and experiential states

I agree colour is construct of brains/minds, it's how we experience photons bouncing off stuff then interacting with our optical system. We're limited critters who function a particular way - But that's a different issue to whether photons and the things they bounce off exist when no-one's looking. .

I do not see how inferring that things exist independently of my perception exist can be meaningful, or useful. As far as they might exist in that sense I can say nothing about them. It is like suggesting that there might be another dimension that exists but is entirely unconnected to our own. Yes, that might be the case, but so what? Whether it does, or it doesn't, it makes no difference. There is no possible observation that could either prove or disprove its 'existence', so the claim that it 'exists' is empty of meaning.

Regarding photons, they do not exist - not in the sense that we say objects of perception exist. We do not think photons exist because we have seen them - it is impossible that we could ever do that - but because they are part of a scientific model. They are like 'gravity', a description of a relationship that exists between things that are observable, it is not itself a 'thing'.

Yes the experiential states are all I (not we - I don't know you or anyone else exists) have, or know directly, everything else is inference. It could be that nothing exists other than my experiential states. Even my memories could have sprung into existence last Thusday, or only when they come to mind, the experienced Now is all that's certain.

But that's a bit of a conversation stopper.

It isn't whether I know other things 'exist' or not, it is what that claim of 'existence' could mean. If we are talking about objects of experience, then I understand what a claim that objects 'exist' might entail, but I do not understand what it would mean for an object outside experience to 'exist'.

But once I infer my experiential states refer to/interact with stuff which exists independently of me, including other people much like me, we can start comparing notes about our experience. I can tell you I saw that pig when you weren't there. You saw my friend Ellen when I wasn't there. Ellen reports experiential states when no-one's observing her, and so on. Which adds up to a picture of a world existing indepenent of observation, as does noting my seeds seem to grow and my kettle boils regardless of me watching. Can't be sure they exist unobserved, but it's a reasonable inference.

First, we cannot compare notes about experiential states. My experiences are mine alone. It may be that when Ellen reports 'seeing a pig' her experiences are quite different to yours. We cannot tell, because both you and she use the same word 'pig' for their experience. I know the name of the colour that grass is, is 'green'. Even if my experiential state when seeing grass was what you call 'red' we could never know it.

Even if we somehow knew that all humans sensed things identically, it would still be no help. Not unless we also knew that human sensory apparatus was of some special quality, such that it showed reality.

So we have no 'picture' of any independent world. It would be a contradiction in terms! A picture is an object of sensation, but this independent world is supposedly independent of our sensations.

And we have language for all that, as well as atoms and forces and materialism, a whole scientific model of how the world of physical stuff works. We can't directly experience being the kettle or seed, but we can observe and categorise as best we can. Imperfectly, incompletely, from a third person pov, with all our biases and limitations. And we can note that there seems something significantly different between what we call material stuff and experiential states.

I disagree with the last sentence. How could we see any difference? That would only be possible if we could compare one against the other, but all we can ever have is experience.

Yes, we can try to create a scientific model which leaves out individual experience, but the language of science excludes the language of experience, and thus our understanding of words like 'exist'. For example, you started off talking about 'my pig'. But science only recognises the abstract classes, not individuals. 'My pig' in science is thus not a separate thing in itself, but only an undifferentiated instance of general forces.

In fact we can note that experiential states have no place in our scientific materialist model.

But here is the paradox; we are born into an experiential state and we always live within it. The scientific materialist model comes later and is validated by it; we only hold a scientific theory true because it is validated by experience. If we really had a theory about what reality consisted of outside experience, then our theory would not be scientific, it would be metaphysical.

[BigBango]

Londoner, you are aguing an extreme position. You are demanding “experential” evidence of a thing that you are not experiencing. There is nothing wrong with your argument except that it fails to provide you with views of the world that have proved to be more useful, pragmatic and consensus building. It’s seems to me you must have played peek a boo games with an evil parent that never returned from behind the couch.

Aldous Huxley, after experimenting with LSD, suggested that our nervous system, rather than enabling experential states, actually serves to act as a governor and instead limits what we would be experiencing without it.

[Sy Borg]

Those who hold with substance dualism are not necessarily meaning blind. They may believe they do not possess bodies and minds but actually are their bodies and minds. They can be identified by either. But some go part way (this may actually be most people) and maintain that they have their bodies but are their minds. And then there are those who believe they have both bodies and minds, so they must be something else, i.e., the actual owner. But what this thing, the owner, actually is, must be shrouded in mystery because it cannot be anything we can conceive of. If it were physical or mental, objective or subjective, it would be mere a possession. But though it is inconceivable, it is argued, it must exist. Otherwise there would be nothing to stand in for the subject who owns his body and mind! Language has forced us to postulate things which cannot be conceived. Kind of like that fifth dimension: it's nothing we can possibly conceive of, but that does not mean it is not there! Really?

This seems to be trying to make sense of the cardboard box. Greta commented on this:

It would seem to me that my "owner" is the environment (including culture) of which I am a part. The owner accepts that its individual parts don't last and need to be replaced.

This doesn't seem to provide a personal identity. The environment's body and mind?

How does one person have a different identity than the next. Perhaps I misunderstand your comment.

I don't understand your question, Hal. Why does it need to provide a personal identity? Cheers.

[Halc]

I don't understand your question, Hal. Why does it need to provide a personal identity? Cheers.

You were responding to a paragraph toying with various interpretations of what a person is, as opposed to what the person 'has', such as mind and body and such. So your response about the environment confused me. I am not an environment, but merely a member of it. Yes, I'm a disposable part of it, and members come and go.
I don't think I'm arguing against what you said, just misunderstanding what you meant by your comment. Most of the history of it was reproduced in your post just above.

I suggested that I am my whole, and references to my-mind or my-body are just references to aspects of the whole, not possessions owned by a box that serves as an essence. This sort of view can be attacked by a ship-of-Theseus argument. Sans-essence, there is nothing to preserve an identity if the parts/aspects are replaced or copied.
If I were a dualist (I'm not usually), I could imagine the mind/identity/soul was suddenly transferred to another body. You're picking flowers and suddenly you (the experiencer) are in a poetry recital in a language that the flower picker doesn't know. What would that be like? Does the reading falter? There's not a correct answer to that, but any given answer helps sort out ones views on the subject. I've toyed with the view that the reading doesn't falter, but declared it unlikely.

[Sy Borg]

I am not an environment

Don't sell yourself short, Hal. You are not just an environment but multiple environments - an entire world to trillions of cells and microbes. We may generally think this to be trivial but who are we to decide which lives matter and which don't (if any do) in the greater scheme of things? There appears to be equivalent fractal relationships between constituents and hosts, complete with feedback loops.

I suggested that I am my whole, and references to my-mind or my-body are just references to aspects of the whole, not possessions owned by a box that serves as an essence. This sort of view can be attacked by a ship-of-Theseus argument. Sans-essence, there is nothing to preserve an identity if the parts/aspects are replaced or copied.

As per the above, you are the whole but you are many things - part of a family or other groups, part of a culture, part of a nation, of humanity, of mammalia, of chordata, animalia, biology, the Earth, the solar system etc.

I found the the ship of Theseus/grandfather's axe argument persuasive until someone told me a few years ago that most of our neurons stay with us for life. What are our neurons, their configuration and their dynamics but a conditioned blueprint for a particular way of doing things? What is a spirit but a particular way of doing things? Yet that's not the whole story, though, because the body's system - organised by the blueprints set by neurons - is so integrated that our other organs impact on how the brain operates, just as a company will not operate in the same way if the executive replaces the management team.

Is that narrowing "us" down to the feedback loops?

If I were a dualist (I'm not usually), I could imagine the mind/identity/soul was suddenly transferred to another body. You're picking flowers and suddenly you (the experiencer) are in a poetry recital in a language that the flower picker doesn't know. What would that be like? Does the reading falter? There's not a correct answer to that, but any given answer helps sort out ones views on the subject. I've toyed with the view that the reading doesn't falter, but declared it unlikely.

It's impossible to imagine - even more unlikely than a broken glass of wine undropping itself and returning to a whole state. It's theoretically possible but so unlikely that the probabilities would dwarf the number of atoms in the universe - as far as we know :)

[Halc]

I am not an environment

Don't sell yourself short, Hal. You are not just an environment but multiple environments - an entire world to trillions of cells and microbes. We may generally think this to be trivial but who are we to decide which lives matter and which don't (if any do) in the greater scheme of things? There appears to be equivalent fractal relationships between constituents and hosts, complete with feedback loops.

OK, you're using the word that way, so I can agree. I am in fact a commune of cooperating separate life forms, none of which is me, and none of which could know about the greater consciousness (next fractal layer up... My avatar is already appropriate for this conversation) of which they are a part. Said commune has a moral code and everything. Interesting to compare their morals to mine.

I found the the ship of Theseus/grandfather's axe argument persuasive until someone told me a few years ago that most of our neurons stay with us for life. What are our neurons, their configuration and their dynamics but a conditioned blueprint for a particular way of doing things?

But they're not a blueprint. We rearrange them all the time, and that rearrangement is more what we are than the neuron collection in the first place. Some of it is blueprints, but those parts don't much differentiate one person from the next. I have beliefs, not learned but built into the blueprints. They make me fit, but that doesn't make them true. The whole dualism thing came about trying to make sense of that belief rather than questioning it. I think the ego is a lie, a carrot on a stick making me make fit choices.

What is a spirit but a particular way of doing things? Yet that's not the whole story, though, because the body's system - organised by the blueprints set by neurons - is so integrated that our other organs impact on how the brain operates, just as a company will not operate in the same way if the executive replaces the management team.

I've referred to it as the IT department sometimes. Management team works too.

Is that narrowing "us" down to the feedback loops?

It's impossible to imagine - even more unlikely than a broken glass of wine undropping itself and returning to a whole state. It's theoretically possible but so unlikely that the probabilities would dwarf the number of atoms in the universe - as far as we know

I can imagine both quite effortlessly, and no, I didn't mean I expect it to happen. Not the point of the exercise. Nobody ever answers that question.