How does a disembodied soul/mind/consciousness operate?

[Tamminen]

In the attempt to separate the brain from the subject you are left with the task of explaining why drugs can alter state of minds? When people don't feel like themselves from mental illness why would drugs which effecr chemical levels alter moods? Why do personalities (projection of self) change after brain injuries?
You say the experience is contingent on the subject, I say the subject emerges/grows/evolves from the experience. Neonates do not show any signs of recognising self at birth however they react to the environment suggesting they have atleast a basic capacity to experience some forms of emotional reactions.
Now perhaps by stating "the being of the subject" you are not referring to i think, therefore I am if not what does this mean exactly?

Experiences and brains are on fundamentally different ontological levels, and no kind of emerging can happen here if we do not define emergence in a new way.

Ontologically, Yes they are - but what is the ontological difference between experience and consciousness? I refer to emergence as a gradual, evolving process.
As our brains evolved and our neuro pathways increased in complexity our conscious awareness and clearity also increased. We went from more that just seeing and reacting to our environment to looking, learning and interacting with it.

I do not want to separate the brain from consciousness on the functional level. I think there is a complete correspondence between them. In fact they are only two sides of the same relation that the subject has to the world. So of course drugs have an effect on consciousness. And we can indeed speak about causality here, if we define causality as the same thing always happening in the same conditions. But as we both seem to agree, mind and matter are on totally different ontological levels, so that consciousness cannot be an emergent property of the brain in any material sense.

You seem to look at this from a materialist point of view and think that although consciousness is ontologically on a different level than the brain, it is not a necessary phenomenon if we think about reality in general. It only emerges accidentally from matter, though not being matter itself. Here I have a different standpoint. I say that consciousness does not emerge from matter, it emerges - if we want to use that word - using matter, for the subject. So the subject is always there already from the beginning, and being itself transcendental, with no empirical content, it gets its concrete existence in consciousness of the world. So consciousness changes and evolves, being vague in the beginning and becoming sharper as the child grows. But the subject, which is the precondition of consciousness, and for which there is consciousness of the world, is always the same, because there is nothing in it which could change. It is the permanent reference point of our being in the world, it is me and it is you, here and now. It is the present abstracted from its content, and the being of its present content is the basic element of subjective time.

This is why speaking of emergence leads astray. The subject does not emerge from anything, consciousness emerges for the subject as it is in the world, being conscious of it and doing things with it.

For me experience and consciousness are synonyms. They presuppose the subject and subjective time for their being.

I also think that the 'I am' that Descartes detected was in fact the very same metaphysical subject which I have written about on these forums, also appealing to Wittgenstein. Descartes only misinterpreted it as some kind of soul-substance, res cogitans. The subject is no kind of substance, nor is consciousness. They are basic components of the subject-object relation, on the subjective side.

[Wayne92587]

How does the disembodied Soul/Mind/ consciousness operate.

Ask a dumb question and you get a stupid answer.

The Soul/Mind/ consciousness never dies it just fades away.

[Wayne92587]

consciousness cannot be an emergent property of the brain in any material sense.

Not exactly True.

The direct method of experiencing a material reality is the effect that it has on a subject.

The method of experiencing a non-material, a Spiritual Reality is the indirect method, is to have a sense of the effect
that a Non-Material, a Spiritual, Reality; either way we are able to experience both the material and the non-material.

The substance or subject of the non-Material and the effect that it has, makes the Spiritual as much a substance as the Material.

[Karpel Tunnel]

Monist materialists talk about their being one substance, and yet what can be included in the set of that substance can be anything they decides exists, regardless of properties.
Dualists often talk about non-material substances. Setting aside that that sounds like an oxymoron, what is this 'substance'.
Idealists say that reality is mental and therefore not material. But we really don't know what their substance is. Substance means the essential nature of something. So for idealists reality is essentially not something, that something being material. How does an experiencer decide that reality is not something that does not exist.

I think all these positions are strange, since in some ways they hinge on 'material' even the one that says it is not real. Since material keeps expanding to include whatever, it has no meaning about the substantial nature of X. So to say reality is not X may at least not be true as 'material' expands to cover more and more TYPES of phenomena. To say only X exists is silly since the boundaries of X keep expanding.
I don't think any of these philosophers having given us an answer, though each model may be helpful to explain some experience.

[Thinking critical]

Tamminen wrote

You seem to look at this from a materialist point of view and think that although consciousness is ontologically on a different level than the brain, it is not a necessary phenomenon if we think about reality in general. It only emerges accidentally from matter, though not being matter itself. Here I have a different standpoint. I say that consciousness does not emerge from matter, it emerges - if we want to use that word - using matter, for the subject. So the subject is always there already from the beginning, and being itself transcendental, with no empirical content, it gets its concrete existence in consciousness of the world. So consciousness changes and evolves, being vague in the beginning and becoming sharper as the child grows. But the subject, which is the precondition of consciousness, and for which there is consciousness of the world, is always the same, because there is nothing in it which could change. It is the permanent reference point of our being in the world, it is me and it is you, here and now. It is the present abstracted from its content, and the being of its present content is the basic element of subjective time.

I think the use of your term consciousness emerges using matter certainly aligns with my position and is essentially more accurate than saying emerges from. The difference in our views seem to boil down to origins, we both agree on the correlation between consciousness and brain, you however are saying that the "subject" somehow transcends the brain and simply uses the brain as a tool to interact with the physical world.
This view of a transcendent "soul" (is essentially what you're saying) offers no explanation nor does it add any real content to the problem of how the subject comes to be, it just simply moves the problem back one step further.
The subjective perception of self is intrinsic to the nature of consciousness - it is the looking and hearing outward (conscious acts) that inspires us to deduce the centre of consciousness is the "I" which is the "transcendent self " you're referring to. If this were true it infers that potential beings exist independently of any biological state just waiting to attach to a brain "so to speak".
When we speak of ontological existence, we are consciously recreating a "thing" by describing properties of the "thing" via language, we could say we are conceptualising. This does not mean that "ontological things" somehow exist independent in a state of potential existence prior to conception, that would be a line of thinking which is misconceived due the fact that our minds have evolved to understand the nature of reality as a causal process. No, the ontology or non physical existence (things which do not consist of matter) are bought into existence when beings with brains experience the neurological process of thinking which emerges in a state which we call consciousness. The subjective self exists necessarily...it is a natural occurrence due to the fact that we are self aware - self aware things are by definition aware of self, therefore the subject has to exist.

[Tamminen]

This view of a transcendent "soul" (is essentially what you're saying) offers no explanation nor does it add any real content to the problem of how the subject comes to be, it just simply moves the problem back one step further.

The term 'soul' usually refers to some kind of a substance, as was the case with Descartes. I do not share his view on this. What he really invented was the transcendental subject, later adopted by Kant, Husserl et al. And the main difference between our thinking seems to be that you need an explanation for the emergence of consciousness from - or using - matter. I think the subject is always already there along with the birth of consciousness. Its being needs no explanation, it is fundamental, like matter is fundamental. But this is not dualism in the sense of two substances. What is fundamental is the basic structure: (1) the subject is (2) conscious of (3) the world, by being in the world, doing things with the objects of the world, by means of its body.

In short: the subject cannot be eliminated, we cannot get rid of ourselves as experiencing subjects. The being of the universe is much more of a problem than the being of subjectivity.

[Tamminen]

...potential beings exist independently of any biological state just waiting to attach to a brain "so to speak".

This is the question of what is the primus motor of there being any brains, or the material world in general. My thesis is that the reason of the being of the world lies in the subject and its evolution towards some kind of balance or satisfaction, and this evolution is evolution of consciousness. So I think the universe has a telos, a purpose, that makes it rational. Perhaps this purpose is only a diversity of consciousness, perhaps it is something more, but a universe without subjectivity and its consciousness is impossible. Meaning is inherent in the world. So subjects are not waiting to attach to a brain, but subjectivity creates brains for its concrete existence as individual subjects. This does not mean, however, that the subject must be an active agent, only that the material world is there for the subject and runs in accordance with its laws and logic to make consciousness real.

[Gertie]

Tamminen wrote

You seem to look at this from a materialist point of view and think that although consciousness is ontologically on a different level than the brain, it is not a necessary phenomenon if we think about reality in general. It only emerges accidentally from matter, though not being matter itself. Here I have a different standpoint. I say that consciousness does not emerge from matter, it emerges - if we want to use that word - using matter, for the subject. So the subject is always there already from the beginning, and being itself transcendental, with no empirical content, it gets its concrete existence in consciousness of the world. So consciousness changes and evolves, being vague in the beginning and becoming sharper as the child grows. But the subject, which is the precondition of consciousness, and for which there is consciousness of the world, is always the same, because there is nothing in it which could change. It is the permanent reference point of our being in the world, it is me and it is you, here and now. It is the present abstracted from its content, and the being of its present content is the basic element of subjective time.

I think the use of your term consciousness emerges using matter certainly aligns with my position and is essentially more accurate than saying emerges from. The difference in our views seem to boil down to origins, we both agree on the correlation between consciousness and brain, you however are saying that the "subject" somehow transcends the brain and simply uses the brain as a tool to interact with the physical world.
This view of a transcendent "soul" (is essentially what you're saying) offers no explanation nor does it add any real content to the problem of how the subject comes to be, it just simply moves the problem back one step further.
The subjective perception of self is intrinsic to the nature of consciousness - it is the looking and hearing outward (conscious acts) that inspires us to deduce the centre of consciousness is the "I" which is the "transcendent self " you're referring to. If this were true it infers that potential beings exist independently of any biological state just waiting to attach to a brain "so to speak".
When we speak of ontological existence, we are consciously recreating a "thing" by describing properties of the "thing" via language, we could say we are conceptualising. This does not mean that "ontological things" somehow exist independent in a state of potential existence prior to conception, that would be a line of thinking which is misconceived due the fact that our minds have evolved to understand the nature of reality as a causal process. No, the ontology or non physical existence (things which do not consist of matter) are bought into existence when beings with brains experience the neurological process of thinking which emerges in a state which we call consciousness. The subjective self exists necessarily...it is a natural occurrence due to the fact that we are self aware - self aware things are by definition aware of self, therefore the subject has to exist.

I believe we can make a case for an emergent Subject-Self, or at least a Sense of Self
.

Perhaps there is no more to being a Subject-Self than a [i]sense[/i] of being one. By which I mean - the sense of being a unified, discrete, experiencing entity, embodied and moving through space and time, with a specific first person pov. That's really what I mean when I think of 'Me'.

So how could this fit in with the hypothesis that experiential states are a novel, emergent property of material processes?

Well I'd suggest this sense of being a discrete, unified Subject-Self could be how experiential states have evolved to manifest in our highly complex species.

If we look at brains, the neural correlates of experience, we don't find a little homunculus Self in there, sitting in the Cartesian Theatre watching the sensory perceptions pour in and issuing commands. Who knew, we might have found a unified central control and command system, but we didn't. Instead we found an unimaginably complex set of interacting specialised subsystems (sensory, motor, memory, etc), which somehow manifest as a unified field of consciousness. And I'd suggest that as we evolved from much simpler critters, which might have only one or two types of experiential states (seeing changes in light, sensing vibrations or whatever), alongside our evolving complexity we also evolved ways of integrating all this sensory and experiential overload into a single unified field of consciousness.

If we hadn't, then our experiential states would manifest as a cacophonous chaos of flickering images, smells, sights, emotions, memories, thoughts, etc. Overwhelmingly confusing and useless. So evolution came up with ways to maintain utility alongside the growing complexity, it gave us the ability to filter and focus, and to have this unified field of consciousness, where all those inputs are resolved into a useful, coherent unified whole. Hence we can use all these faculties to usefully model and navigate the world, and see oneself as a singular entity interacting with that world.

I believe this sense of being a unified whole, along with experiential states being inherently first person, is a good contender for the basis for a sense of self. As well as us noting our experiential states correlate to a discrete, unified physical body. And as well as this internal 'thinky' voice which acts as running commentary, creating an ongoing narrative of the Subject-Self interacting with the outside world.


A counter-argument to this view is that you simply can't have experiential states without there being An Experiencer-Subject to have them. But that might just be our habitual language influencing our thinking. We have a 'natural grammar' of

Subject --> Verb --> Object.

Which reflects and represents our observations of causal relationships in the world .

The Cat (S) --> Sat on (V) --> the Mat (O)

I (S) --> Like (V) --> Cats (O)

I (S) --> Experience (V) --> The World (O)

That's how experiential states manifest to us, with this sense of being a single unified Subject-Self, and that's how we think, and that's how we structure our language - which in turn influences how we think, and conceptualise how things must work.


So I think the hypothesis that experiential states are an emergent property of physical processes can in principle deal with the issue of Subjects/Experiencers. But there are still other problems which appear to call for a more fundamental solution.

[Atreyu]

There is no such thing as a disembodied soul/mind/consciousness, therefore the OP cannot be answered. It's basic premise is false.

There is always some kind of 'body', known or unknown, associated with any 'mind' or 'soul' or 'consciousness' that might exist. Similarly, there is always some kind of 'mind/soul/consciousness' associated with any 'body' that might exist. There is no such thing as a 'mind without a body', or a body without a mind. Wherever there is matter there is awareness, and wherever there is awareness there is always a corresponding 'vessel' or body.

Panpsychism is the resolution to this false 'mind-body' dualism which perplexes so many people....

[BigBango]

So I think the hypothesis that experiential states are an emergent property of physical processes can in principle deal with the issue of Subjects/Experiencers. But there are still other problems which appear to call for a more fundamental solution.

Nice post Gertie!

My recommendation is to simplify the problem. Tamminen seems to have done this by expanding Descartes' "I think therefore I am" into "I think about myself as an object" turning the ontological state of the world, the necessary condition for anything to exist, into a subject object relation. He then continues the dialectic by saying "So the universe is my relation to myself realized by the medium of matter" as stated in the thread about "Generic Subjective Continuity".

So Tamminen has contributed a great deal by framing the ontological issue in terms that avoid the insufficiency of mere correlations of brain states with conscious experience. In fact I was always amazed that there were different brain areas in the visual cortex for the left side of the eye and right side of the eye but NO brain center for the integrated image that we experience.

To be continued ...

[Tamminen]

I believe this sense of being a unified whole, along with experiential states being inherently first person, is a good contender for the basis for a sense of self.

That's right, but do you think the sense of self is the self, ie. what 'I' refers to? Who has the sense of self? What is the Cartesian 'I am'? You say that experiental states are inherently first person, but I think you do not take this seriously enough. As if the first person could just emerge from something non-personal, like the brain, or from experiental states that are also non-personal. So that there would be no other difference between a subject and a stone than the fact that the subject has experiences and a sense of self but the stone has not. And the experiences and the sense of self are non-personal like the color of a stone. Or what is it that makes them "first person"? Isn't that the whole point?

So you seem to think that two subjects are totally separate, they have two separate selves, two I's. And 'I' denotes all the individual subjects separately. And there is therefore nothing that unites those individual subjects, making them us. Or what do you think makes them us?

That is one possible way of seeing the ontology of mind, but it does not satisfy me, because it does not answer our most crucial existential questions. I think the subject is what unites all of us. We are all manifestations of one and the same subjectivity. Here I also refer to the hypothesis introduced on this forum by Cycswan, called 'Generic Subjective Continuity', which I find is in exact agreement with my own views.

[BigBango]

The next question is how do we continue to simplify the problem? For heaven's sakes let us analyze simpler cases of the existence of a "subject object relation" than a very complex human being. Focusing on any multicellular creature presents too many complexities that end up just inviting the pure materialist to claim "emergent properties" for everything that is not understood.

If we turn to a simpler organism, a single cell, that is also not really that simple, one can see all these issues of "subject object relation" that we have a tendency to ignore, thinking they are "emergent properties" of chemical substances. No, they are not. They are subjects with primitive visual inputs through an organelle called the centriole. These inputs and others are "thought about" in the "subject object: relation of Tamminen square and the cell responds in a coordinated way to these "experiential states" not in a mechanical way but in a way that the subject chooses.

[Wayne92587]

Consciousness allows us to experience Realities that have no substance, Illusion; Illusion does matter.

[Gertie]

Tam

I believe this sense of being a unified whole, along with experiential states being inherently first person, is a good contender for the basis for a sense of self.

That's right, but do you think the sense of self is the self, ie. what 'I' refers to? Who has the sense of self? What is the Cartesian 'I am'?

Descartes' undoubtable bottom line should have been 'Experiential States Exist'. (Including the sense of self). Everything else is inference, including the ontological existence of A Self which is something more than an experiential sense of being a self.

I'm suggesting that there might be no more to being a Self (noun) than the experiential sense (verb) of being a self, which is a feature of the way experiential states emerging from brain subsystems interacting manifests in a complex species like us.

If you agree the sense of being a Self(n) is an experiential state (v) which is potentially explainable by evolutionary utility, there's no need to posit some additional Some-Thing which is an ontological Subject, which will require its own explanation.

You say that experiental states are inherently first person, but I think you do not take this seriously enough. As if the first person could just emerge from something non-personal, like the brain,

Right. In terms of evolved utility, the specific first-person pov correlated with that specific body makes sense, I think. But you're right that doesn't get to the heart of the issue of subjective experience somehow emerging from physical processes or its essential nature. That's a genuine mystery.

or from experiental states that are also non-personal.

Not sure what you mean by non-personal? All experiential states are inherently subjective in terms of there is 'something it is like' to see a red apple, or to be a bat with sonar, which is private to that individual entity. Does that mean eg a bat has a sense of self? Depends how you define Self doesn't it? I doubt a bat has the ability to reflect upon itself as a Self. Maybe a chimp does, a bit. We can, because we have much more sophisticated models of the world and our relationship with it.

So that there would be no other difference between a subject and a stone than the fact that the subject has experiences and a sense of self but the stone has not. And the experiences and the sense of self are non-personal like the color of a stone.
Or what is it that makes them "first person"? Isn't that the whole point?

First-person perspective is an intrinsic quality of experiential states, and it's a mystery. It might be because there is a Some-Thing, A Subject (n), which is experiencing (v). I was pointing out that alternatively a sense of being a unified Self could in principle emerge from a correlated material interacting system of different parts (a body).

Maybe a stone does have some experiential state of 'what it's like to be a stone' and we just don't recognise it, we can't know.

My experience of the colour of a stone is personal in a sense, in that it private to me (you might see purple and call it my grey, I can't know). But I don't know what you mean by 'non-personal' here, can you explain?

So you seem to think that two subjects are totally separate, they have two separate selves, two I's. And 'I' denotes all the individual subjects separately.

Yes, that just seems to be the way it is.

And there is therefore nothing that unites those individual subjects, making them us. Or what do you think makes them us?
That is one possible way of seeing the ontology of mind, but it does not satisfy me, because it does not answer our most crucial existential questions.

The nature of reality might be irrelevant to our psychological needs. If experiential states are a happenstance of emergence, then there's no reason to believe it would be.
Caring, bonds, a sense of shared humanity make us Us. We've created the concept of Us because we're a social species, we've also created the concept of Them, the Other, because we're a tribal social species. Wanting it to be otherwise doesn't make it so. I think it's probably better to try to deal with the reality as best we can, hope that we're mature enough to handle our growing knowledge, and hopefully use that knowledge to overcome our nastier side and nurture our kinder side, broadening our idea of Us. To all conscious critters.

I think the subject is what unites all of us. We are all manifestations of one and the same subjectivity. Here I also refer to the hypothesis introduced on this forum by Cycswan, called 'Generic Subjective Continuity', which I find is in exact agreement with my own views.

Maybe, you might be right that this the more fundamental explanation. But how can you know?
If you start from the assumption of experiential states being fundamental, intrinsic to the universe, you still have to account for the existence of matter, and the relationship between the two. You have the same dilemma as those you argue against who start from the assumption that material stuff is fundamental, and posit that experiential states emerged. And the evidence we do have points to experience emerging from matter, it seems to support that case. However, their position is still problematic.

The real problem is that those more fundamental possibilities seem to be untestable, and are necessarily pushing the boundaries of current knowledge. So are necessarily speculative. IMO.

In other words, nobody really knows, and we haven't even worked out a way of showing how we could know. Hence Chalmers talks about the Hard Problem of consciousness.

[Tamminen]

...an ontological Subject, which will require its own explanation.

My point is that the being of the subject does not need an explanation. Philosophy must begin from somewhere, and for me subjectivity is a natural starting point, because it is something we cannot doubt, as Descartes concluded, and what philosophers like Kant and Husserl later adopted as their points of departure.

I doubt a bat has the ability to reflect upon itself as a Self.

This is a good point, because it throws light on what I think the self or subject is. A bat probably does not have the ability to reflect on its self, but I think it nevertheless has - or is - a self. Every experiencing subject is a self if it has temporal existence in subjective time. Therefore a stone does not have a self. But what is the external mark of subjectivity, I do not know. I know you are a subject, and I think a bat is a subject, but where is the dividing line?

Hence Chalmers talks about the Hard Problem of consciousness.

As I have said, I think there is no hard problem of consciousness.

I think the rest of your arguments are something we have gone through earlier, and we disagree on most of them, so I let them be without comments now.