Re: Inconsistent Theories Metatheoretically Prove Trivialism
Posted: May 2nd, 2018, 3:18 am
Paulemok, in answer to mosesquine you mean that's incorrect?
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paulemok wrote: ↑May 1st, 2018, 8:08 pm There are some additional things I might say, but some of the rules for this website are pushing me not to do so. I may have unfortunately chosen the wrong website for this discussion.
Yes, that's correct.Mosesquine wrote: ↑May 1st, 2018, 4:37 am You think that your sentence "that's correct" is true and not true, according to your theory, huh???
No, I mean that’s correct.
Yes, that’s correct.Mosesquine wrote: ↑May 2nd, 2018, 6:34 am You are made up of molecules, and you are not made up of molecules, Huh???
paulemok wrote: ↑May 2nd, 2018, 11:12 amNo, I mean that’s correct.
Yes, that’s correct.Mosesquine wrote: ↑May 2nd, 2018, 6:34 am You are made up of molecules, and you are not made up of molecules, Huh???
So, your argument for trivialism fails, since mere defining does not make things into existence.Transparent dragon itself is a such-and-such-and-such dragon. Therefore, the mere existence of transparent dragon as a dragon implies transparent dragon. So, transparent dragon is there.
is not a formal definition. It is a description, but is not a formal definition. My quoted claim may not be any definition of trivialism, since there may be, for all I know, an inconsistent theory that is not trivialism.
paulemok wrote: ↑August 5th, 2018, 8:59 am Mosesquine:
My claim
is not a formal definition. It is a description, but is not a formal definition. My quoted claim may not be any definition of trivialism, since there may be, for all I know, an inconsistent theory that is not trivialism.
Trivialism does exist. That's how trivialism can be talked about. Multiple paper publications discuss trivialism. Two such publications are On the Plenitude of Truth by Paul Kabay, copyright 2010, and Doubt Truth to be a Liar by Graham Priest, copyright 2006. Multiple paper publications thus indicate that in some sense, trivialism exists.
That implicit expression is not logically fallacious, and it is not begging the question.
What is meant by the preceding quoted material is unclear.Mosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am Disjunction elimination is related to formal structures. Of course, it's not that formal considerations are irrelevant to factual aspects.
Mosesquine's argument is unsound because the premiseMosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am If there is a building in Seoul, then the head of the nickname user 'paulemok' is not made up of molecules.
There is a building in Seoul
Therefore, the head of the nickname user 'paulemok' is not made up of molecules.
is false. There is a building in Seoul, but my head is made up of molecules.Mosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am If there is a building in Seoul, then the head of the nickname user 'paulemok' is not made up of molecules.
That argument is valid because the conclusion follows from the premise by reiteration. However, it's not clear what the premise of Mosesquine's argument means. For all I know, it could mean trivialism is not true, trivialism is unmoral, or something else.
The propositional functions for that proof have been neither defined nor sufficiently described. I'm unsure what they mean. I don't understand how the premise that trivialism is wrong is represented in Mosesquine's proof.Mosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am proof:
1. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
∴ ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
2. asm: (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
3. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) 1, R
∴ 4. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) from 2; 2 contradicts 3.
Q.E.D.
It's not clear what Mosesquine means by "formal structures," and it's not clear how the conclusion that trivialism is wrong follows by it.
paulemok wrote: ↑August 16th, 2018, 1:52 pmWhat is meant by the preceding quoted material is unclear.Mosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am Disjunction elimination is related to formal structures. Of course, it's not that formal considerations are irrelevant to factual aspects.
Mosesquine's argument is unsound because the premiseMosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am If there is a building in Seoul, then the head of the nickname user 'paulemok' is not made up of molecules.
There is a building in Seoul
Therefore, the head of the nickname user 'paulemok' is not made up of molecules.
is false. There is a building in Seoul, but my head is made up of molecules.Mosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am If there is a building in Seoul, then the head of the nickname user 'paulemok' is not made up of molecules.
That argument is valid because the conclusion follows from the premise by reiteration. However, it's not clear what the premise of Mosesquine's argument means. For all I know, it could mean trivialism is not true, trivialism is unmoral, or something else.
The propositional functions for that proof have been neither defined nor sufficiently described. I'm unsure what they mean. I don't understand how the premise that trivialism is wrong is represented in Mosesquine's proof.Mosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 4:46 am proof:
1. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
∴ ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
2. asm: (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
3. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) 1, R
∴ 4. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) from 2; 2 contradicts 3.
Q.E.D.
It's not clear what Mosesquine means by "formal structures," and it's not clear how the conclusion that trivialism is wrong follows by it.