Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).

[ThomasHobbes]

It's an empty question. A bit silly.
"Mass" is a property of matter just like consciousness is a property of matter.

Mass is a property of some matter, but not all matter. It is not a silly question, but in the scientific community the question is considered resolved in the affirmative. There are praticles considered real, like photons and gluons, that have no mass.

This does not change my point at all.
Photons are also physical.

[SimpleGuy]

Not only this , in order to replace carbon based binding in chemical compounds like dna with silicon. We should look at how far this is possible with explosives like hexamine (hexamethylenetetramine) in order to understand fast reactions based on other materials. We should replace as much carbon atoms to the favor of silicon, and look which properties of explosives and other materials are preserved, before building a simple cell.

[SimpleGuy]

Or even a silicon based RDX.

[JamesOfSeattle]

You can say Digestion is a 'big picture' shorthand description of the myriad processes involved, and Digestion is therefore reducible to those processes, not some additional property-thing.

But to claim experiencing is reducible to/identical to material processes is claiming something extra. Because this aadditional experience-state arises.

But what if the only thing “extra” in reducing consciousness to material processes is a particular kind of material process, for example, a process that can be said to have a purpose, or a process that can be said to process semantic information, or a process that can be self-referential? These all have something “extra” (well, digestion has purpose) but they all can be described by physical processes.

And maybe eg stomach processes or flying stones don't manifest consciousness, because the patterns of interactions don't meet those necessary and sufficient conditions.

The question is: which conditions. And the particular conditions may require a certain amount of complexity, but “a certain amount of complexity” is (almost) certainly not one of those conditions.

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[Mosesquine]

Physicalism is roughly defined as the view that everything can be explained by physical terms. Tables are explained by physical terms, for example, like sizes, heights, colors, shapes, and so on. Even imaginary beings like unicorns, and Pegasus are explained by physical terms (e.g. horse-shape, animal-shape, such and such color, and so forth).

Right, but there are physical things without sizes, colors, shapes, etc. There are massless particles. There are fields, particles in superposition, billions of neutrinos passing through us right now. The set of qualities that makes something physical has expanded. Anything that science decides is real, is considered physical. Which means, for example, that your statement that everything is physical is not falsifiable. Which is why I asked the various questions I asked. They were meant to probe at the problem with the word physical.

Some physical things are with sizes, colors, shapes, etc. But that's not all, and there are some more physical things. Your examples such as massless particles may not be explained such things as sizes, colors, shapes, etc. However, they can be explained by some physical terms other than sizes, shapes, etc. So, physicalism is still defended without problems.

[JamesOfSeattle]

Re: what is physical

What if we define something as physical if it interacts with its environment?

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[ThomasHobbes]

Re: what is physical

What if we define something as physical if it interacts with its environment?

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Everything is physical.
"Physical" is like "atheist". It only requires to be used as a word to imply that which does not have any material or energetic reality.
In the same way we would have no need os "atheist" is there were no theists in the world.

Whatever consciousness is, it is in fact physical. Specifically it is a property of biologically derived neural matter.

[Mosesquine]

A lot of physicists accept premise 2 above. It's a common sense. You can easily find physical objects around you. However, you can't find non-physical objects like souls, angels, gods, and the like.

You don't have to believe in souls or angels to believe you have a consciousness, or even a free will, as most people do. You can't fairly declare your position common sense while comparing theirs to fairy tales. It is, in fact common sense to believe one has a free will if this is the nature of every moment of waking experience as far back as memory allows.

Thoughts lead to murders or pyramids or Super Bowl titles or space ships and all kinds of other events and things beyond the scope of their existence. The thought has no noticeable weight or force to exert, so these results don't fit the rules of cause and effect. This area of thought, will, etc. is arguably outside the realm of laws which apply to material things, so we could fairly assume thoughts or consciousness are subject to different laws than rocks or Corvette Stingrays.

It's beyond our current scope to prove the answer in either direction, so it seems unfair at this point for either 'side' to dismiss the other. When you've worked out an experiment to prove your position to a satisfactory standard, then you could come to us with that level of certainty. In the meantime, it seems right to postpone judgment.

Your point is not clear. Say anything clearly.

[chewybrian]

You don't have to believe in souls or angels to believe you have a consciousness, or even a free will, as most people do. You can't fairly declare your position common sense while comparing theirs to fairy tales. It is, in fact common sense to believe one has a free will if this is the nature of every moment of waking experience as far back as memory allows.

Thoughts lead to murders or pyramids or Super Bowl titles or space ships and all kinds of other events and things beyond the scope of their existence. The thought has no noticeable weight or force to exert, so these results don't fit the rules of cause and effect. This area of thought, will, etc. is arguably outside the realm of laws which apply to material things, so we could fairly assume thoughts or consciousness are subject to different laws than rocks or Corvette Stingrays.

It's beyond our current scope to prove the answer in either direction, so it seems unfair at this point for either 'side' to dismiss the other. When you've worked out an experiment to prove your position to a satisfactory standard, then you could come to us with that level of certainty. In the meantime, it seems right to postpone judgment.

Your point is not clear. Say anything clearly.

You say you can't find souls, angels, and Gods. But you can find thoughts in your mind and you can and do experience consciousness and free will. You are cherry picking the aspects that are easiest to attack.

Thoughts, consciousness, will... these things don't have material existence, but they do impact the material world. So, if they can cause effects without any force, weight, etc. to exert, then perhaps they are not subject to the same laws that govern material things.

[Present awareness]

Re: what is physical

What if we define something as physical if it interacts with its environment?

*

Everything is physical.
"Physical" is like "atheist". It only requires to be used as a word to imply that which does not have any material or energetic reality.
In the same way we would have no need os "atheist" is there were no theists in the world.

Whatever consciousness is, it is in fact physical. Specifically it is a property of biologically derived neural matter.

Nothing is physical. According to Tesla, everything is electricity.

[Sy Borg]

Everything is physical.
"Physical" is like "atheist". It only requires to be used as a word to imply that which does not have any material or energetic reality.
In the same way we would have no need os "atheist" is there were no theists in the world.

Whatever consciousness is, it is in fact physical. Specifically it is a property of biologically derived neural matter.

Nothing is physical. According to Tesla, everything is electricity.

Some years ago there was a fierce storm and I ran outside to close the car windows. Just as I was getting back out of the car there was a lightning flash too close for comfort and, without a single thought in my head, I bolted like a jackrabbit back to the building. It was perhaps more physical than anything I've known!

[Tamminen]

Some years ago there was a fierce storm and I ran outside to close the car windows. Just as I was getting back out of the car there was a lightning flash too close for comfort and, without a single thought in my head, I bolted like a jackrabbit back to the building. It was perhaps more physical than anything I've known!

Escaping a storm surely feels physical, and thinking about eternity in a silent room surely feels spiritual, but both are modes of consciousness, and their logical and ontological status in relation to the physical world is the same.

[Gertie]

James

But what if the only thing “extra” in reducing consciousness to material processes is a particular kind of material process, for example, a process that can be said to have a purpose, or a process that can be said to process semantic information, or a process that can be self-referential? These all have something “extra” (well, digestion has purpose) but they all can be described by physical processes.

There are no shortage of competing 'What If...' hypotheses in Philosophy of Mind , the problem is finding ways to get further than that. Which is where our usual methodoloogy, our scientific model and toolkit, seems to fall short.


You're basically describing the brain here. Yes, the brain can be described by physical processes, like the stomach, but that description won't explain or even encompass experiential states. Unlike digestion, it is extra to the physical processes, not captured by our usual types of physical descriptions and explanation. That's why, unlike the stomach, brain processes which produce consciousness require further, perhaps more fundamental, explanation.

The brain has a different function/purpose to the stomach. From the pov of the physical system I call Me, the conscious Subject who has interests and thinks in terms of Purpose, the function/purpose of my stomach is digestion, and the function/purpose of my brain is making decisions. ''Processing semantic information' is one way of describing how that works, but making decisions is the purpose. The brain is the body's decision-making organ, that's what it's for.

And it's easy to see how the evolved ability to 'process information' by perceiving my environment, remembering, feeling sensations like pain and hunger, having a reward system, reasoning, imagining scenarios/consequences, self-awareness, etc can all help in the function of making beneficial decisions - if consciousness plays a causal role in my actions. (Tho the over-determinism of physical and mental causality looks puzzling, and again imo nods to the need for a more fundamental explanation of the mind-body relationship).

So the purpose/function (subjective attributes we conscious critters assign) of brain processes and stomach processes are well enough understood in terms of evolution. Why and how brains manifest consciousness when apparently the correlated physical systems can/are simultaneously doing all the causal work, is not.


Now... if you're hinting that purpose/function is more than something which can be contextualised in the above way, that it is perhaps more 'fundamental' to the way the universe works, then that's possible. Perhaps even that it's the material world of 'stuff' which should be contextualised as an emergent mechanism within a more fundamental teleological universe. But then you have to make a substantive argument. Which imo becomes very difficult because it's necessarily so speculative, and difficult to ground.

And maybe eg stomach processes or flying stones don't manifest consciousness, because the patterns of interactions don't meet those necessary and sufficient conditions.

The question is: which conditions. And the particular conditions may require a certain amount of complexity, but “a certain amount of complexity” is (almost) certainly not one of those conditions.

Nobody knows what the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness are. But we can look at known conscious systems and try to reverse engineer reasonable hypotheses. Brains are the most complex systems we know of, and they correlate to conscious states - that looks like a clue worth considering doesn't it?

[JamesOfSeattle]

There are no shortage of competing 'What If...' hypotheses in Philosophy of Mind , the problem is finding ways to get further than that. Which is where our usual methodoloogy, our scientific model and toolkit, seems to fall short.

Sorry, that was my way of starting to talk about one such hypothesis.

I’m trying to get at the fundamental requirements for consciousness, but different people have different views on what the fundamendental requirements are. I’m saying there is an underlying framework that establishes a hierarchy of physical processes, and where in that hierarchy consciousness begins is entirely dependent on personal preference.

The Framework is simple mechanism. Any physical process can be described as Input —> [mechanism] —> Output. This is a functional process in the mathematical sense: any given input will produce exactly one output. The mechanism can be said to discern the input and “cause” the output.

So at the bottom of the hierarchy is the Framework and nothing else. If your personal preference is that nothing more is required, you’re a panpsychist.

At (probably) the next higher level we have a process that serves a functional purpose. This includes mechanisms created by natural selection, like cell surface receptors, eyeballs, and brains. If your personal preference for the fundamental unit of consciousness is purposeful function, you’re a functionalist, and you would say bacteria are conscious.

At a higher level, you might require that:
1. the Input constitutes semantic information, and
2. the output constitutes a response which is a valuable response to the meaning of the input.
This category would include anything with neurons, or mechanisms that act like neurons. This is my personal preference because here you get qualia (see below).

At a higher levels, you might require that at least part of the output constitutes memory, or that the input and/or output constitute concepts, or that input and/or output concepts be self-referential.

The human brain is obviously at the top of the hierarchy I described. My point is, these “experiential states” you refer to can (ultimately) be explained in terms of the appropriate mechanistic processes.

If my understanding of consciousness is correct, the “mind-body relationship” is simply the relationship between mechanisms (body) and specific kinds of mental-type processes. It would be confusing to say that consciousness plays a causal role. Instead, you would say that some mechanistic (causal) processes are conscious-type processes.

Gertie, I assume that when you mention “manifest consciousness” you are referring to the “manifest image”, the “what it feels like” criterion, the “Hard Problem”, i.e., qualia. If my understanding of consciousness is correct, the explanation of qualia starts with processes with semantic information as input (thus, my personal preference described above). As mentioned above, in any process the mechanism can be said to discern the input and produce the output. If the input has meaning and the output is related to that meaning, the mechanism can be said to discern the meaning. A system which can produce concepts and memories can store the discernment of the input as a concept which represents the meaning of the input. Any time this system accesses that concept, it is accessing the meaning. I suggest that a “quale” is a discernment of meaning. A quale of “red ball” is simply a discernment of a “red ball” via semantic information whose meaning is “red ball”. The more commonly used term for this discernment is “feeling”.

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[Tamminen]

What we call consciousness is perhaps better described by Heidegger by his “concept” of Dasein or by Sartre by his “concept” of for-itself. 'Dasein' means literally 'being there', and the physical world as “ready-to-hand” is part of Dasein's ontological structure. For Sartre the physical world is “in-itself” and is only co-existent with the “for-itself”. So if we combine those two characterizations we can say that a being with consciousness is there for itself. It exists, in the existential sense. And this is all we can say about the “essence” of consciousness, in spite of the 500 pages of Heidegger and 600 pages of Sartre. It must be noted that neither of them had any intention to give a scientific explanation of consciousness, nor did Wittgenstein or any of the great philosophers, and I am sure this was not because they wanted to deny the worth of science.