Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).

[RJG]

Tam, it is LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for subjects to exist without a 'pre-existing' universe to exist in.

You are perfectly right on this. I have not claimed anything else.

Haven't you claimed -- "a universe cannot exist without subjects"? -- and now seemingly contradict that statement with -- "subjects cannot exist without a pre-existing universe"?

Aren't these contradictory statements?

Is the subject himself an 'object'?

No, it gets its objective form from the world, so that we see others and also ourselves as objects. This leads us again to the endless mind-body problematic.

Well, firstly, although a minor technicality, it seems logically impossible for subjects to see/experience themselves as objects. For one, we can't be in two places at one time; we can't be both the subject/object (observer/observed) simultaneously. And for two, we can only experience 'experiences' (sensations), and not actual 'things' or 'objects' (or self's) themselves.

Secondly, if the subject is not a object or "thing" (of some material 'substance'), then what is there left for him to be? He's gotta be some-thing, or he is no-thing, ...right? ...or is there a third option that I am missing?

Can experiencing happen, without an experiencer? Can something happen without some-thing happening?

No, logically we need the concept of 'subject' that experiences the world. But it is not a "thing", it gets its properties from the world, being itself without properties.

So in your view, then an 'experiencer' is not a 'material thing', such as a 'physical body' that reacts/experiences? ...why do you not accept this (seemingly only) obvious possibility? ...what else could this experiencer be, if not the 'physical substrate' upon which reactions (experiences) occur? ...what else is logically possible?

It would seem difficult (if not downright impossible) to make the claim that 'something is nothing'; that this subject is not-a-thing (or object) itself.

[Tamminen]

Haven't you claimed -- "a universe cannot exist without subjects"? -- and now seemingly contradict that statement with -- "subjects cannot exist without a pre-existing universe"?

Aren't these contradictory statements?

As I said, the being of the subject and the being of the world depend on each other. I see no contradiction in this.

it seems logically impossible for subjects to see/experience themselves as objects

We see our own bodies, and we can reflect on our experiences. But let's not go into this.

we can only experience 'experiences' (sensations), and not actual 'things' or 'objects' (or self's) themselves.

I would say that we have experiences of actual things. The Kantian problem.

Secondly, if the subject is not a object or "thing" (of some material 'substance'), then what is there left for him to be? He's gotta be some-thing, or he is no-thing, ...right? ...or is there a third option that I am missing?

I see the subject as the same kind of "metaphysical subject" as Wittgenstein in Tractatus, a kind of a reference point for the facts of the world.

So in your view, then an 'experiencer' is not a 'material thing', such as a 'physical body' that reacts/experiences? ...why do you not accept this (seemingly only) possibility? ...what else could this experiencer be, if not a 'physical substrate' upon which reactions (experiences) occur? ...what else is logically possible?

It would seem difficult (if not downright impossible) to make the claim that 'something is nothing'; that this subject is not-a-thing (or object) itself.

See above. I do not want to be a thing. And I am not a thing.

[Sy Borg]

How are you with replacing "consciousness" with "awakeness"? Awakeness seems to align okay with the "sense of being" definition.

So then you are basically saying that awakeness is the driving force of the universe. That reality is inherently awake? As far as I can tell, awakeness - consciousness - is a phase that alternates with dormancy, both spatially and temporally. Work and rest.

In my definition consciousness = the subject's immediate experiencing the world = presence = the content of present experiencing. Other versions are also available. But it is on-off: the subject is or the subject is not. And the world where the subject is not, is not logically possible, and the being of the subject keeps the universe existing. Where the subject is in nature is irrelevant in this context.

I'm going to take that as a "yes, consciousness equals awakeness". After all, if you are not awake your sense of being or presence is not "switched on", to use your analogy.

I actually disagree with the on/off notion too (need I take a ticket to join the queue of critics? :). I would say that inbetween states exist but they tend to be unstable and quickly resolve to either awakeness or sleep.

[Tamminen]

I actually disagree with the on/off notion too (need I take a ticket to join the queue of critics? . I would say that inbetween states exist but they tend to be unstable and quickly resolve to either awakeness or sleep.

I would say this is a logical question, not psychological. Either there is a content of experience or not. If there is not, then we skip a piece of physical time and our subjective existence continues without a break. So, in fact , there cannot be such a phenomenon as subjective nonexistence.

[Wayne92587]

Can experiencing happen, without an experiencer? Can something happen without some-thing happening?

Can something happen without there being a direct material cause?

[Wayne92587]

Tamminen wrote:
A unicorn is an abstraction that fits perfectly into our logical universe, and makes sense as part of a possible world.

You can not form a logical argument using an abstraction, the existence of which is impossible.

Form an abstraction using the word Ass as an example instead of a unicorn and your argument will perfectly into our logical universe, you will have a valid argument.

You can not use an abstraction that has no possibility of existence as an example of our logical Universe.

[RJG]

Can experiencing happen, without an experiencer? Can something happen without some-thing happening?

Can something happen without there being a direct material cause?

No. Something can't happen without some-thing happening.

[Wayne92587]

can it be an indirect cause such as an affect rather than an effect.

[Tamminen]

I have said that the ontological structure of reality is 'the subject - the world'. This is the structure that Wittgenstein in his Notebooks 1914-1916 calls “the two godheads”. The being of the subject depends on the being of the world and the being of the world depends on the being of the subject. So, as W. says in Tractatus,”the world is my world”, and in death “the world does not change but ceases”. But we must interpret this so that the world ceases for an individual subject, not the subject in general, because we know that the world does not end when someone dies. As long as there are subjects in the world, having a relationship to the world, we can meaningfully say that the world exists. It exists if there is a presence in subjective time, any time, anywhere.

So the subject – world relationship is the ontological precondition for the being of the world, any possible world. And it is also the ontological precondition for the being of the subject and any of its individual manifestations, individual subjects like me and all of us. If it were possible to remove the world, nothing would be left, and if it were possible to remove all subjects, nothing would be left. But fortunately it is not possible to remove either of them, so we do not need to worry about the end of the world.

So my claim that it is logically impossible to imagine or posit the possibility of a world without inhabitants is based on the ontological limitations for the application of logic. We cannot apply logic outside of the logical universe defined by the subject – world relationship. We can posit abstract objects like unicorns as part of a possible world, and there is no problem with that, because they fit perfectly into the logical universe defined by the ontology described above, but the possibility of a subjectless world lies outside of its limits.

In short: we can posit all kinds of possible objects into our world, and all kinds of possible worlds as long as their possibility lies inside the logical universe. But the world is not an object, and a world without inhabitants is not a possible world because its logical possibility is not inside the logical universe.

All abstractions are not possible. In relation to the world we are not spectators, we are participants. And we cannot escape that position. As I said, a good rule for finding out what is possible and what is not, is this: think about the possibility of having a dream of it, so you can easily see if it is possible. Imagining and dreaming are not logically very far from each other.

As to the logical universe, I repeat: Logic precedes the facts of the world, so that there are all kinds of possible worlds, but logic does not precede the being of the world. And because the being of the world is an ontological precondition of logic and the being of the subject is an ontological precondition of the being of the world, the limits for using logic are defined by the subject – world relationship.

This is what I mean by saying that it is impossible to consistently imagine a world without subjects.

[RJG]

No. Something can't happen without some-thing happening.

can it be an indirect cause such as an affect rather than an effect.

Well, I'm not sure I understand what your asking. An "effect" is not a cause, it is the presumed 'result' of a cause (as in 'cause-and-effect'). And "affect" is an action/verb that implies causation (influencing) of something upon something else; as in X affects Y.

[RJG]

I have said that the ontological structure of reality is 'the subject - the world'. This is the structure that Wittgenstein in his Notebooks 1914-1916calls “the two godheads”. The being of the subject depends on the being of the world and the being of the world depends on the being of the subject. So, as W. says in Tractatus,”the world is my world”, and in death “the world does not change but ceases”. But we must interpret this so that the world ceases for an individual subject, not the subject in general, because we know that the world does not end when someone dies. As long as there are subjects in the world, having a relationship to the world, we can meaningfully say that the world exists. It exists if there is a presence in subjective time, any time, anywhere.

1. From a 'relative' perspective, when one dies, then "for all intents and purposes", the world ceases to exist.
2. From an 'absolute' perspective, when one dies, then one cannot KNOW if the world ceases, or continues to exist.

So the subject – world relationship is the ontological precondition for the being of the world, any possible world.

...only from the 'relative' perspective.

So my claim that it is logically impossible to imagine or posit the possibility of a world without inhabitants is based on the ontological limitations for the application of logic. We cannot apply logic outside of the logical universe defined by the subject – world relationship.

If it is beyond our logic-world to logically posit an 'existence' of the world without subjects, then isn't it likewise beyond our logic-world to logically posit (or assume) the 'NON-existence' of the world without subjects?

In other words, without the logical world (containing existing subjects), we can't say/prove it either way, ...without subjects, the world may exist, and then again it may not, we have no way of logically knowing/proving/claiming 'either' way, ...right?

[Tamminen]

1. From a 'relative' perspective, when one dies, then "for all intents and purposes", the world ceases to exist.

Yes, but only for the one who dies, personally.

2. From an 'absolute' perspective, when one dies, then one cannot KNOW if the world ceases, or continues to exist.

I am quite sure that the world does not end when I die as an individual subject. I can infer this from the fact that the world does not end when someone else dies.

...only from the 'relative' perspective.

No, the absolute. For reasons I have presented.

If it is beyond our logic-world to logically posit an 'existence' of the world without subjects, then isn't it likewise beyond our logic-world to logically posit (or assume) the 'NON-existence' of the world without subjects?

In other words, without the logical world (containing existing subjects), we can't say/prove it either way, ...without subjects, the world may exist, and then again it may not, we have no way of logically knowing/proving/claiming 'either' way, ...right?

In a way you are right: we have no logical justification to say anything about the being or not being of the hypothetical world without subjects. But then, if there is no logical sense in the being of such a world, we can at least say that its being is impossible to imagine, as opposed to some other members of this forum who say that it is easy, and because the idea of its being is as absurd as it is, its being can be ruled out by appealing to its absurdity. I think this is what reductio ad absurdum means. And at the moment I think that the correct way of saying it is that its being is logically impossible, in line with the reasoning I have presented. And it is also the only way of saying it in the light of the clear phenomenological intuition of the absurdity of the being of the subjectless world. We must remember that there is only one world, by definition. That the idea of its being without subjects is beyond logic is based on this definition.

I have used many words to explain what I mean, but I can say it with six words:

We cannot get rid of ourselves.

This is my ontology.

[Wayne92587]

RJG;

I'm not sure I understand what your asking. An "effect" is not a cause, it is the presumed 'result' of a cause (as in 'cause-and-effect'). And "affect" is an action/verb that implies causation (influencing) of something upon something else; as in X affects Y.

Cause and effect do not stand alone, is not a single event, Cause and Effect exist as a series of events, an effect then becomes the cause.

Affect means to touch the feelings, an affect does not have a material cause.

What ever an affect is it is not Physical nor can it be reduced to the Material.

That is why some believe that God Created, did not cause, the Universe.

Not doubt an affect has a result, but an Affect is not a material cause.

God did not intend, cause, the Universe to come into existence.

This is not what I believe, I am speaking in metaphors, Tongues.

The Passion, Spirit of God is the seed of all living things.

A living thing existing in the material, Physical sense of the Word.

[Sy Borg]

I actually disagree with the on/off notion too (need I take a ticket to join the queue of critics? :). I would say that inbetween states exist but they tend to be unstable and quickly resolve to either awakeness or sleep.

I would say this is a logical question, not psychological. Either there is a content of experience or not. If there is not, then we skip a piece of physical time and our subjective existence continues without a break. So, in fact , there cannot be such a phenomenon as subjective nonexistence.

I still think not. After all, science makes clear that death is not the clear-cut moment that we'd assumed. So if life is not on/off, why would consciousness be such? Nature tends to be more analogue than digital.

What is clear-cut is what we perceive to be consciousness or not. It's only the apparentness based on responsiveness tests that is on/off because we cannot readily perceive the subtleties of unstable inbetween states.

[Tamminen]

I still think not. After all, science makes clear that death is not the clear-cut moment that we'd assumed. So if life is not on/off, why would consciousness be such? Nature tends to be more analogue than digital.

What is clear-cut is what we perceive to be consciousness or not. It's only the apparentness based on responsiveness tests that is on/off because we cannot readily perceive the subtleties of unstable inbetween states.

What happens in our brains may be analogue, but our subjective time is a succession of experiential contents. And what happens between successive contents in the physical world has no relevance to consciousness defined in this way. The "inbetween states" are states all the same, and they have a content even if we do not recognize it.