I am not saying deduction is bad, if this is what you mean by 'it's ashamed', my Point is that your definition of a physicalist is someone who respects physics - which is generally an empirical approach, that is, it does not accept as knowledge things that have not yet been demonstrated via empirical testing. That is what the physicalist is basing his or her position on. But then decides that they can use deduction to assume what future research will conclude. That is a position, and one can make a good version of it. But it is 1) certainly not the only kind of physicalist 2) can be criticized for building from physics, but then using epistemological approaches that differ from it.Mosesquine wrote: ↑August 7th, 2018, 7:01 am Arguments are objects of research in logic. Logic is the science dealing with arguments and related things. Deductively valid arguments are, according to logic, good arguments, so it's not ashamed.
Certainly at this level yes. When one is saying I can demonstrate deductively what all future physics research will show. There isa lot of deduction in scientific models. But this is quite a different use of deduction.You distinguish deduction from empirical research.
I don't see where this is relevant.However, there can be empirical-content-having-deductively-invalid arguments like:
All tigers are quadrupedal.
Therefore, all birds have wings.
All the contents including premise and conclusion of the argument right above are empirically verified ones. However, the whole argument itself is not formally valid. So, the first is formal validity, and the second is content-soundness, according to logic.
Some definitions are added as follows:
Validity = Validity is a property related to arguments such that conclusion necessarily follows from premises.
Soundness = Soundness is a property related to arguments such that an argument is valid and its conclusion is actually true.
So, when arguments are successful, they should be, at least, formally valid.
In your first post you said that a physicalist believes that everything can be explained by current physics. I pointed out this was very unlikely to be what physicalists believe, and without conceding this point you amended the definition to including future conclusions of physicists.
I am pointing out now that to say now what all future conclusions will be in physics is either
1) speculative
or 2) based on deduction.
If it is based on deduction - which I think we would both agree would be stronger - it is 1) a very large scale deduction. IOW not like deducing something from a specific model in science and 2) it is epistemologically odd. Why?
It is odd because it places physics up as the source of knowledge about everything. In physics one is not allowed to use that kind of global deduction. So why would this hypothetical physicalist decide, seemingly, t hat physics is the source of knowledge, but physicists are wrong not to allow the kind of global deduction I am making when I decide that it will never be the case that physics will have a different ontology in regards to substances AND that physics will be able to demonstrate that everything is physical.