Why We Do Not Perceive The External World

[Duckrabbit]

I like the Spinozan theory of existence which is that both materialism and idealism are true of nature and are complementary not inconsistent. I would like Duckrabbit further to support the position that it's only because we speak two languages, that of brain, and that of mind, that we have this difficulty with so-called 'external world'. I truly do want Duckrabbit's stance to be firmly supported and this is why I raise the following objection: Even including Spinoza's wisdom regarding dual aspect on the single fact of nature, the idealistic or mind-first aspect has at least a slight causal, sequential precedence over the materialistic. (I include the fact of inter-subjectivity with " idealistic".) The reason that I think that the idealistic aspect has this slight precedence is that mind is relative to development of the central nervous system whereas some massively material living creatures such as oak trees and colonies of ants either totally lack central nervous systems or lack CNSs that are in either quality or quantity similar to humans'.

Belinda is asking me to think. I already do too much of that. I bump into thinks alot. But she is right, I do need to provide further support of my views on this.

First, I feel uncomfortable when there is discussion about the nature of nature. This is essentially where the metaphysicians come in. Nature is all we have. There is nothing that is not a part or an aspect of nature. We can only talk about the nature of something within the context of nature itself. Nature itself does not have a nature because there would have to be a greater nature whose qualities we could apply to nature minor, so to speak.

Second I resist isms in general, including political ones such as liberalism and conservatism, because then one is pigeonholed as a supporter of a whole array of positions. They tie one down to a viewpoint that is the isms’ but not necessarily the particular thinker’s.

Idealism, as I gather, holds that everything is in some sense mental. The objects I observe are not out there in an objective, physical world. Rather the objects are ideas. Each person has their own table, for example; we are not all perceiving the same object which is “out there”. I believe Solipsism holds that we cannot really know if anything exists besides our own thoughts, ideas and perceptions. Other people are also only just our own mental objects. But if there is an uber-mind, such as God, then we do not have to go that far. The universe we all perceive is an idea in the mind of God.

So if everything we perceive is only an illusion, the word “illusion” has lost its purpose. If, on a hot summer day, I am driving down a blacktop road and I see up ahead what appears to be the edge of a shimmering body of water, but when I get there I find that it is just more blacktop, is this an illusion of an illusion? Was the water actually there, for me? Is it even less real than the blacktop road I perceive? Now, if we stipulate that there is a physical world, then we can talk about optical illusions and mirages. But we cannot in any real sense talk of optical illusions when we do not have lenses, retinas, rods, cones, and so forth, or brains for that matter. So what is the point of saying that none of it is real? Can we not just settle that we shall call all those things we treat as physical objects “physical objects”. Is not the meaning of “physical” determined by how we use the phrase, and not by a metaphysical theory? Do not such considerations show that not only are these metaphysical theories unverifiable but they are in fact empty?

Materialism holds that there is nothing but the physical world. All mental phenomena can be tracked and located in bodies, in brains. These physical causes give us the illusion that we are free agents who actually have some kind of mental life separate from the physical world. But there seems to be persistence of an “I”. I am the one who at least thinks I think. I do not perceive the physical world, it is maintained, just internal images. But are not internal images ideas? If everything is physical, where do these ideas come from? If they are illusions, we find ourselves in an analogous situation as with Idealism. “Illusion” has no practical application. I cannot trust my ideas, my perceptions, because they lack any real connection to the actual, physical world. There can be no such thing as an optical illusion because all my perceptions are optical illusions. So let us just say, “I see a chair”, when I see a chair because that is a case of what we call seeing. “You do not really see the chair” is a hollow claim.

There is much theorizing about consciousness being an “emergent” phenomenon. But I do not think that counters the materialist position that all is physical cause and effect even once the consciousness has emerged. Perhaps someone can clear this up for me because there seems to be confusion over whether the emergent consciousness actually takes on an autonomy, an agency of its own or is still a slave to physical processes.

I wrote about the idea of a choice of idiom when describing experiences. Belinda's example on another thread of an encounter with a scary dude is illustrative. It is perfectly reasonable to describe the whole situation in physical terms – chemical messages, electrical impulses, accession of stored memory information, etc. But this is only one kind of description, and useful in certain situations, depending on what you wish to convey. We have a tendency to think that only one form of description can be right, can tell us what actually happened. But even this physical description can never be complete. You can always drill down further and fill in gaps with further brain/chemical information. A psychological explanation could also be appropriate. Because of a childhood trauma, I have a fear of approaching strangers. Or I can just say: “I saw someone coming, I got scared, I split.” One can always ask for more details, and then it would be appropriate to give more. But we can never give all the details, no matter what idiom we are speaking in.

It just depends. I think that statement is actually truer than we give it credit for being.

PS: A shout-out to Spectrum for posting a drawing of me. It is a very flattering likeness.

[Grunth]

From the original op;

So-called “perception of the external world” and the external world itself simultaneously exists; the world in the absence of consciousness exists despite the presence of consciousness. If not, does the external world transform into brain-generated consciousness? Does the external world cease to exist when personal consciousness is generated by the brain, only to come back into existence when the brain ceases to function?

In order to answer these questions we have to know AS EXPERIENCE what "the world in the absence of consciousness" is before discussing it. What is inevitable is that the discussion of such will be more about arguing or finding agreement as to what terms are used and what is meant by each term. Therefore in the final analysis the terms will be the only thing that could be known. We can only know the result of a consensus as to terms and not the answer to the question itself.

[Belinda]

Grunth wrote:

In order to answer these questions we have to know AS EXPERIENCE what "the world in the absence of consciousness" is before discussing it. What is inevitable is that the discussion of such will be more about arguing or finding agreement as to what terms are used and what is meant by each term. Therefore in the final analysis the terms will be the only thing that could be known. We can only know the result of a consensus as to terms and not the answer to the question itself.

But in fact we do know from experience what the material world is like, and we also know from experience what the mental world is like. The arguments are about whether or not the material and mental worlds are identical, two aspects of the same thing, unbalanced as to causal precedence, or (Cartesian) absolutely separate.

There are religious and it follows, ethical applications, that attach to each of the metaphysical theories of existence.

[Grunth]

Grunth wrote:

In order to answer these questions we have to know AS EXPERIENCE what "the world in the absence of consciousness" is before discussing it. What is inevitable is that the discussion of such will be more about arguing or finding agreement as to what terms are used and what is meant by each term. Therefore in the final analysis the terms will be the only thing that could be known. We can only know the result of a consensus as to terms and not the answer to the question itself.

But in fact we do know from experience what the material world is like, and we also know from experience what the mental world is like. The arguments are about whether or not the material and mental worlds are identical, two aspects of the same thing, unbalanced as to causal precedence, or (Cartesian) absolutely separate.

There are religious and it follows, ethical applications, that attach to each of the metaphysical theories of existence.

The 'experiences of the mental world and the material world' you speak of are both experiences of consciousness as 'generated by the brain'. The op is speaking of an assumed 'external world' which is external TO experiences of the brain.

[Belinda]

From the original poster's post this apt quotation from JRR Tolkien:

If Death and cerebral creation of perception (in stark contrast to lack of cerebral construction of the external world) falsifies belief that we directly and immediately perceive the external world, the true form of the external world, how it is when there is no consciousness in existence, falsifies belief that we have knowledge of its nature. The Externalist, at the last, is forced into the deepest dungeons of Angband to cower*, having at the last only a quasi-religious faith in the nature of the external world, despite the fact that experiential knowledge of the external world is logically and metaphysically impossible.

* (from J.R.R Tolkien's, The Simarillion)

I query that consciousness alone is what makes the external world real. The not-conscious external world, even 'before' differentiation, plus the conscious world, is equivalent to existence itself. Human consciousness superimposes upon existence itself whatever humans need to integrate themselves i.e. including theories about and attitudes towards quarks, and neurons. Whatever consciousness sharks for instance, possess those also impose upon existence itself their whatever they need to integrate themselves into sub-wholes, and into the totality of nature.

Existence itself may be differentiated by nature or it may not, and this we cannot know. The Biblical Creation myth about God's creation explains how God made the undifferentiated besides what He made by breathing over the deep. All manifested and possible consciousnesses of whatever quality and quantity ( sharks, dogs, humans, ant colonies etc.) are differentiators and, in the case of humans, the definers of the external world. It follows then that each and every manifested and possible consciousness is part of the whole and necessary to the whole of existence itself.

So I disagree with Tolkien that " knowledge of the external world is logically and metaphysically impossible" . The basis of religious faith is not about " the nature of the external world " but about that there be an external world.

[Spectrum]

Aha, an argument 'von Oben herab'--very characteristic of Kantians who, so to speak, are seated upon a pedestal that reaches into an oxygen-depleted philosophical orb.

Against the charge of metaphysicism it is argued that the thing-in-itself is purely a "limiting concept". It implies that the thing-in-itself is known as an appearance, because this is the only way that it could be known, per definition. Accordingly, it is tautological to claim that we know only appearances, but not things-in-themselves. It's like saying that objects are known only as they are known.

Thus, George Schrader (1967) concludes:

"There are at least three important ways in which Kant employs the concept of the thing-in-itself dogmatically:
(1) in positing the thing-in-itself as the cause of appearances;
(2) in holding that the categories are applicable to things in themselves;
(3) in maintaining that the practical reason affords an access to things in themselves.
This threefold dogmatic employment of the concept is indicative of the metaphysical undercurrent which runs through the critical writings. Kant was personally convinced of the reality of God as a transcendent being, of the world as teleologically ordered, and of the soul as free [...]
It may even be doubted whether Kant was, in attempting to answer these questions, operating as a critical philosopher rather than as a traditional metaphysician. The important point is that while Kant flatly declared that reality in itself is theoretically unknowable, he could not escape trying to formulate meaningful theoretical concepts of it."

Mats Winther
http://two-paths.com

Reference

George Schrader (1967). 'The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy' in Kant - A Collection of Critical Essays, Robert Paul Wolff (ed.). Anchor Books. ($3 at Abebooks)

The above are all straw-men.
That is the problem of not understanding [not necessary agree with] Kant thoroughly and correctly.

Kant never claimed the thing-in-itself is the cause of appearance.

As you have stated, the thing-in-itself as noumenon is a limiting factor but you did not know further that it is to be used in the NEGATIVE ONLY and never to be reified in any sense at all.

The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. B311

Note Kant stated "ONLY of Negative Employment" and I wonder if you understand the context and why it is merely a "limiting Concept."

[Mlw]

Professor George Alfred Schrader Jr. (1917-?) was a leading authority on Immanuel Kant. He does not resort to strawman arguments. Kant does indeed reason as if the thing-in-itself is the cause of appearance, as evident from the following excerpts:

Prol. § 32:

"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

Crit. A 190=B 235:

"For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere."

Crit. A 288=B 344:

"[Understanding] thinks of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance (thus not itself appearance)..."

Crit. A 494=B 523:

"Meanwhile we can call the merely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object..."

Crit. A 614=B 642:

"Many forces of nature that express their existence only through certain effects remain inscrutable for us, for we cannot trace them far enough through observation. The transcendental object lying at the ground of appearances, and with it the ground why our sensibility has it rather than another supreme condition--these are and remain inscrutable for us, even though the thing itself is given, only we have no insight into it."

Mats Winther
http://two-paths.com

[Spectrum]

Professor George Alfred Schrader Jr. (1917-?) was a leading authority on Immanuel Kant. He does not resort to strawman arguments. Kant does indeed reason as if the thing-in-itself is the cause of appearance, as evident from the following excerpts:
Crit. A 288=B 344:

"[Understanding] thinks of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance (thus not itself appearance)..."

Kant did not assign any agency power to the noumenon [thing-in-itself] but merely stated it is a limiting factor for negative employment.

I am not sure which book you are referring to, but note Smith's translations;

1. Understanding accordingly limits Sensibility, but does not thereby extend its own sphere.
   In the process of warning the latter [Sensibility] that it [Understanding] must not presume to claim applicability to Things-in-Themselves but only to Appearances,
   it [Understanding] does indeed think for itself an Object-in-itself, but only as Transcendental Object,
   which is the Cause of Appearance and therefore not itself Appearance,
   and which can be Thought neither as Quantity nor as Reality nor as Substance, etc. (because these Concepts always require Sensible Forms in which they determine an Object). A288

In this case, the transcendental Object is NOT the Object-in-itself [aka thing-in-itself].
Note object in Kant's sense has various levels, i.e.

1. Empirical object [in appearance]
2. Transcendental Object [understanding]
3. Object-in-itself [think-in-itself] [a transcendental illusion]

As in A288, it is the transcendental object that cause appearance not
Object-in-itself that cause appearance.

The above principle is also reflected in the different levels of the Self, i.e.

1. Empirical "I" [appearance]
2. The "I" that thinks [understanding]
3. The "I AM" [I-in-itself or thing-in-itself] [transcendental illusion]

There is a correlation between object-in-itself and appearance but not causation as the object-in-itself [aka noumenon -thing-in-itself] has no agency power.
Since the thing-in-itself is a transcendental illusion how can it cause anything?

Being a Professor and even as a specialist who had studied Kant do not guarantee s/he will understand Kant thoroughly.
Note Professor Allison and Professor Guyer who specialize in the philosophy of Kant in their entire philosophical career has serious disagreements on the idea of the thing-in-itself. One of them must be wrong. I am with Professor Allison who had studied Kant for more than 40++ years, even then he missed out on a critical point which was discovered by his student.

This is why I decided to study Kant myself and my understanding of Kant is greatly enhanced with Buddhist philosophy wherein the two are in parallel.

[Mlw]

But Kemp Smith argued for a complete identification of the transcendental object and the thing-in-itself, because it is a pre-Critical and semi-Critical survival and plays no essential role in his final position. As I understand it, it hardly occurs in the second version of the Critique. Others have argued that Kant is simply being ambiguous. Anyway, it is clear from the above excerpts that Kant thinks our senses are affected by this "unknown something", which is the thing-in-itself, lacking in qualities. This turns his Critical position on its head. He is being ambiguous. He resorts to metaphysical reasoning sometimes, and epistemological reason at other times. Indeed, he claimed that we have access to the thing-in-itself through our moral faculty. He never produced a consistent system, as people seem to think.

Mats

[Spectrum]

But Kemp Smith argued for a complete identification of the transcendental object and the thing-in-itself, because it is a pre-Critical and semi-Critical survival and plays no essential role in his final position. As I understand it, it hardly occurs in the second version of the Critique. Others have argued that Kant is simply being ambiguous. Anyway, it is clear from the above excerpts that Kant thinks our senses are affected by this "unknown something", which is the thing-in-itself, lacking in qualities. This turns his Critical position on its head. He is being ambiguous. He resorts to metaphysical reasoning sometimes, and epistemological reason at other times. Indeed, he claimed that we have access to the thing-in-itself through our moral faculty. He never produced a consistent system, as people seem to think.

Mats

If you understand Kant thoroughly you will not have any doubts or see any contradictions in his philosophy.

True Kant resorted to metaphysical ideas [impossible] and also epistemological concepts depending on the relevant perspective. For example, note as in the duck-rabbit or necker cube, wave-collapse function, etc. one has to shift perspective and there is truth in relation to the respective perspective on what is apparently one image or thing.

Kant relied on the idea of the thing-in-itself for his moral philosophy. Again if you understand his moral/ethics framework and system there is no issue at all.
In this case the metaphysical thing-in-itself and the practical ethics work in parallel [never the twain shall meet] to each other for the system to strive towards complementarity.