Scott wrote: Again, I would say that the inductive evidence is very weak evidence that "something is wrong" so to speak. However, I think that is also a moot point. It seems to me like in the absence of any evidence that 'something is not wrong' it would be delusional to believe something is not wrong regardless of whether I had that little bit of evidence that something is wrong. (In reality, I think I would also have evidence even if equally weak that something is not wrong because I could induce from the fact that most days nothing goes wrong; her habits are regular but so is things not going wrong which seems to be two weak inductions that cancel each other out.) I just don't see why that tiny bit of evidence against the evidence-less belief turns it into delusion, particularly if the evidence-less belief is held confidently. Does someone who reasonably suspects something therefore believe it? If not, then the utter lack of evidence is so far removed from the probable cause that would warrant belief that the little extra evidence against isn't needed to make the person delusional because the person doesn't even have enough evidence to reasonably suspect the thing let alone have probable cause.
Again, I suspect that the entire question turns on whether or not you consider inductive experience to constitute evidence and if so, what interpretation you place upon it.