Zombies Should Have Human Rights

I believe that zombies(philosophically defined)* should have human rights. This belief is based upon that the more something resembles a human being the more it is a human being.
I justify the latter by reference to the fact that neither protoplasm nor such essences as souls exist, and that there is no reason that natural reproduction should be ethically privileged. Indeed in view of the fact that humans can probably be cloned , together with the protoplasm fallacy, is is ethically necessary to accord human rights to zombies.

Together with reasoning in favour of the proposition I also feel that zombies should have human rights, and even if some zombie were identified as a zombie I would nevertheless have sympathetic feelings for them.I would stop and help one if I saw that they had been hurt or taken ill, and get help for them, and be angry if they were denied that help because they were believed by authorities to be a zombie.

* Except for its history,a zombie for the purposes of this thought experiment is indistinguishable in every way including the nature of the zombie's mind from a natural human being

You're right, I agree. Zombies should have human rights since most humans are zombies. They even eat brains, figuratively

I could go as far to say that zombies should have rights.

Basically you said that zombies are the same thing as people in your definition.

What's your point?

-Are zombies conscious enough to exercise those rights though?
-Yes, it resembles a human and apart from the undead thing, lives out their "life" similarly.
-But, I don't think they are conscious of their life enough to be able to exercise those rights (i.e. Voting, bearing arms, the right to an attorney...)

Aren't philosophical zombies unconscious by definition? They woud show external sides of being in pain, but they would never feel anything. If their perspective doesn't differ from the perspective of a stone, why should they have rights?

Maybe I'm not understanding the last sentence of the OP and it does actually mean something else. If by "zombie" you mean i.e. clones, or artificially created humans (Frankenstein?) that still DO have awareness, then I would definitely be in favor of granting them human rights.

Well I am not inviting them to sit next to me on a bus. They smell.

Aren't philosophical zombies unconscious by definition? They woud show external sides of being in pain, but they would never feel anything. If their perspective doesn't differ from the perspective of a stone, why should they have rights?

Maybe I'm not understanding the last sentence of the OP and it does actually mean something else. If by "zombie" you mean i.e. clones, or artificially created humans (Frankenstein?) that still DO have awareness, then I would definitely be in favor of granting them human rights.

That they are unconscious by definition is the proposition that I am contesting.My claim is that awareness is the inevitable accompaniment of certain brain conditions. If the zombie's brain processes , as shown by brain scans, are the same as those of naturally born humans the zombie is conscious , i.e. it has feelings. The question is one of qualia. What is it like for a zombie to see red, or to feel pain? I support the idea that if the zombie's brain anatomy, physiology and activity is the same as that of a naturally born human then the zombie feels qualia the same as a naturally born human with approximately the same brain power. So, yes, the sort of zombie that I have in mind is the extremely well constructed one such as the Frankenstein zombie..

I believe that zombies(philosophically defined)* should have human rights. This belief is based upon that the more something resembles a human being the more it is a human being.
I justify the latter by reference to the fact that neither protoplasm nor such essences as souls exist, and that there is no reason that natural reproduction should be ethically privileged. Indeed in view of the fact that humans can probably be cloned , together with the protoplasm fallacy, is is ethically necessary to accord human rights to zombies.

Together with reasoning in favour of the proposition I also feel that zombies should have human rights, and even if some zombie were identified as a zombie I would nevertheless have sympathetic feelings for them.I would stop and help one if I saw that they had been hurt or taken ill, and get help for them, and be angry if they were denied that help because they were believed by authorities to be a zombie.

* Except for its history,a zombie for the purposes of this thought experiment is indistinguishable in every way including the nature of the zombie's mind from a natural human being

If your definition of a zombie is absolutely unlike anything anyone has ever previously used the word zombie to mean...why are you using the word zombie?

That's not even rhetorical - I'd actually like to see it explained.

Invictus, I dont take the credit for inventing this zombie thought experiment. I used the word zombie becausse that is what the inventor of the thought experiment called it.

Who did it? Their thought experiment is really badly named. Apparently it's not important enough in itself to get by without inappropriately pinning itself to pop culture, bad show. Was it Peter Singer, or something?

[color=#400040]The veteran artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky thinks the problems posed by qualia are essentially issues of complexity, or rather of mistaking complexity for simplicity.


Now, a philosophical dualist might then complain: "You've described how hurting affects your mind — but you still can't express how hurting feels." This, I maintain, is a huge mistake — that attempt to reify 'feeling' as an independent entity, with an essence that's indescribable. As I see it, feelings are not strange alien things. It is precisely those cognitive changes themselves that constitute what 'hurting' is — and this also includes all those clumsy attempts to represent and summarize those changes. The big mistake comes from looking for some single, simple, 'essence' of hurting, rather than recognizing that this is the word we use for complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources.[25][/color]If you google 'qualia zombie' you will find a lot regarding the philosophical zombie. I got the above from Wikipedia.

Thank you for the extra information! I can finally reply to your post without getting distracted by the bad use of the word 'zombie' which misled several previous contributors. Appreciated!

-- Updated Thu Mar 08, 2012 9:34 pm to add the following --

I believe that zombies(philosophically defined)* should have human rights. This belief is based upon that the more something resembles a human being the more it is a human being.
I justify the latter by reference to the fact that neither protoplasm nor such essences as souls exist, and that there is no reason that natural reproduction should be ethically privileged. Indeed in view of the fact that humans can probably be cloned , together with the protoplasm fallacy, is is ethically necessary to accord human rights to zombies.

Together with reasoning in favour of the proposition I also feel that zombies should have human rights, and even if some zombie were identified as a zombie I would nevertheless have sympathetic feelings for them.I would stop and help one if I saw that they had been hurt or taken ill, and get help for them, and be angry if they were denied that help because they were believed by authorities to be a zombie.

* Except for its history,a zombie for the purposes of this thought experiment is indistinguishable in every way including the nature of the zombie's mind from a natural human being

A p-zombie would have to be given human rights, because they are in practice indistinguishable from human beings. If they were distinguishable, then debate could open up,but as a p-zombie is by its own definition "indistinguishable" we would obviously have no choice.

Basing this extension of human rights to p-zombies on the rationale that "...the more something resembles a human being the more it is a human being." however, seems pretty untenable. A lifesized synthetic doll might resemble a human more than a baboon does...but is it therefore "more human"? Obviously not. Neither are human; one is a doll, the other is a primate.

* Except for its history,a zombie for the purposes of this thought experiment is indistinguishable in every way including the nature of the zombie's mind from a natural human being

Given that "hydration, nutrition, and comfort measures" are provided to even anencephalic infants, I assume that the only requirement for "rights", anyway, is to be born to a human or develop from such genetic material. (Of course, it may depend upon the country, too, wherein few privileges may be granted to those of non-controversial personhood, to begin with. Advanced robot citizens/workers may someday be more prized by a state than their human counterparts, if the former have less propensity for dissatisfaction and rebellion).

I believe that zombies(philosophically defined)* should have human rights.

Philosophically defined? Can't you define 'zombies' for us here? Why do people constantly refer us to, or just omit, relevant material. I mean, you're advocating giving these non-existent things human rights for gods' sake. Does Pegasus have animal rights? I think we should give mannequins human rights, because, well, they resemble human beings also. In fact, my last girlfriend was a mannequin. Best relationship I ever had. Here's a tip: JcPenny on Saturday mornings. Goldmine.

Invictus #13 and I seem to be agreeing as far as his latest post.
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Fiveredapples, the post above yours, from HM, has repeated in it what I took to be an adequate definition for the purpose of this discussion.

I now accept Wowbagger's earlier point that philosophical zombies are properly defined as not experiencing qualia. I now see that the zombie idea is a thought experiment that is within the major discussion of the status of qualia.

My stance on this is physicalist, by which I mean that there is no extra qualia dimension that cannot be explained adequately from a physical perspective.

As for animal rights, this is the fine print and where we are nowadays is that the great apes should be accorded human rights as far as they are capable. I'd go further and claim that every animal should be accorded the right to live its life as it is naturally formed to do, and human interference in animals' lives should always consider the animals' needs as well as human needs.