Self Awareness

[Jax Agnesson]

(Nested quote removed.)

How can this be? It is not possible to know the existence of others without first recognizing my own existence. Being self aware / recognizing my existence is first and primary. Anything after that, such as recognizing the existence of others is further out on the limb of assumption. I need the existence of me first, so that there is a 'me' which exists that is able to recognize the existence of others.

Why? A human baby does not make such a distinction, as far as anyone can tell. The construction of a person called 'I' is a later development. My contention is that this mental construction called 'I' is actually less real than the physically existant persons the infant recognises and interacts with.. We recognise other objects, including human faces and voices, long before our brains start to make abstractions, and longer still before they start to over-value the 'objects' of their own invention, such as the narrative character 'I'. The test? Interact with a human baby. It's an astonishing experience. She knows that you exist as much as she knows anything. Later, she will invent an internal person she will call 'I'. Later still, she may learn to think that her internal 'I' is more real than you are. Will she be right? No? Then what makes you think you are right to accord your internal 'I' more reality than it accords to, for example, me?

[Toadny]

Hi Jax,

But there's another kind of "I" or "self" that doesn't have a name and that (I think) is there well before the baby leaves the womb.

Any experience is necessarily experienced by someone (some animal, some thing) and that experiencing someone is what you more mature humans later call the self or I.

[RJG]

Why? A human baby does not make such a distinction, as far as anyone can tell. The construction of a person called 'I' is a later development. My contention is that this mental construction called 'I' is actually less real than the physically existant persons the infant recognises and interacts with.. We recognise other objects, including human faces and voices, long before our brains start to make abstractions, and longer still before they start to over-value the 'objects' of their own invention, such as the narrative character 'I'. The test? Interact with a human baby. It's an astonishing experience. She knows that you exist as much as she knows anything. Later, she will invent an internal person she will call 'I'. Later still, she may learn to think that her internal 'I' is more real than you are. Will she be right? No? Then what makes you think you are right to accord your internal 'I' more reality than it accords to, for example, me?

Hmmm, Jax you make a good and interesting point. I will have to respond later tonight when i get off work and have had time to dwell on this.

[Jax Agnesson]

Hi Toadny. Does every lump of clay or electrical charge have an individual 'I'? Or is the 'I' assigned by an observer who assumes that the lump of clay, once separated from the mass from which it came, has an identity? It is normal to say that an electron in an electrical field 'experiences' a force, and that a lump of clay in a gravitational field 'experiences' a force; but we surely don't mean by such terminology that every separately identifiable bit of stuff actually has a consciousness. When we 'identify' an object, by separating it conceptually from the rest of the world, we may or we may not assign that identified thing some sort of consciousness. At some point it might be reasonable to suppose its consciousness is sufficiently sophisticated to include self-awareness. Is a fly conscious? Is it self-aware? What about a fish? A cow? Is a human foetus conscious? Self-aware? At some point we might guess 'Yes, I'd say that thing/creature/person is self-aware.' But how would we know? The unique thing about the concept of 'I' is that it requires a conscious being to think it. IOW, the existence of the 'I' is dependent on a self-aware consciousness, so it doesn't make sense to argue that the fact of consciousness proves that the 'I' exists.

-- Updated January 4th, 2013, 3:31 pm to add the following --

Hmmm, Jax you make a good and interesting point. I will have to respond later tonight when i get off work and have had time to dwell on this.

Hi RJG. Look fwd to your comments. Jax.

[RJG]

Hi RJG. Look fwd to your comments. Jax.

Okay, here are my thoughts.

I think what you are saying is that since a baby interacts with other people, she is therefore conscious (aware) of these people, and since this occurs long before she becomes conscious of herself (self-aware), that this is reason why she should think other people may be more real than herself.

I think the mistake here is assuming the baby has consciousness when it interacts with other people during its early life. I doubt the baby is truly aware or conscious of its interactions, but instead just simply acting instinctively or emotionally, just like my pet dog does when I interact with him.

Consciousness is the awareness of self, and it is what creates the identity of I. For without consciousness, I don't really exist (or wouldn't know it if I did). Also, I don't think consciousness is possible outside of self awareness.

[Jax Agnesson]

Okay, here are my thoughts.

I think what you are saying is that since a baby interacts with other people, she is therefore conscious (aware) of these people, and since this occurs long before she becomes conscious of herself (self-aware), that this is reason why she should think other people may be more real than herself.

Very nearly, but with one crucial difference. It's not that I think she should think other people are more real than her; it's that you know very well that your existence is more real than her 'ideas' either about you or (much later) about herself. Later on, given a philosophical adolescence, she might well develop an idea that her 'self' seems more real than your physical existence. And if she does develop such a notion, you will know that this idea is wrong.

I think the mistake here is assuming the baby has consciousness when it interacts with other people during its early life. I doubt the baby is truly aware or conscious of its interactions, but instead just simply acting instinctively or emotionally, just like my pet dog does when I interact with him.

Evidence?

Consciousness is the awareness of self,

Of course you can define it as such, thereby circumventing the entire discussion. But now you have to say either that an infant has an awareness of self or that small children are unconscious. Neither proposition stands up to much scrutiny.

and it is what creates the identity of I. For without consciousness, I don't really exist (or wouldn't know it if I did).

But other people will reassure you, if you seriously doubted it, that even while you were asleep for eight whole hours, you continued to exist.

Also, I don't think consciousness is possible outside of self awareness.

Why not?

[Janus D Strange]

Descartes statement 'I think therefore I am' makes two fatal assumptions. First it makes the assumption that if a process is ongoing, something must be 'doing it'. So, if there is consciousness, something must be thinking. Second, it assumes that the thing that is thinking is an integrated entity labelled 'I'. So, Descartes seems to claim, if the 'I' is thinking, the 'I' that is thinking must exist. A challenge to both these assumptions is at least plausible. First, we notice that error is possible. But error is only possible within consciousness. For example if I flip a coin and it rolls down a crack between two floorboards, the coin hasn't made a mistake, the floor hasn't made a mistake, and the laws of motion haven't made a mistake. Only I, if I assumed the coin must land either heads or tails showing, have been mistaken. The objectively existing world doesn't make mistakes; consciousness frequently does. Second, we observe that careful observation, tested and verified many times, will show that the 'real world' is in some fundamental ways very different from our observations and experiences. For example every human on the planet can see, every day, that the sun comes up in the East, flies across the sky, and goes down in the West. This is a perfectly adequate description of our experience and knowledge of the sun's behaviour. Close study reveals that that isn't what 'really' happens at all. Third, we discover that this integral person called 'I' exists only within my consciousness. So it is at least arguable that the consciousness constructs the 'I', rather than that the 'I' constructs the consciousness. With these notes in mind, we can restructure Descartes' Cogito ergo sum as the rather absurd circular claim 'I exist because I seem to exist'. In respect of what other experience available to consciousness can we legitimately make the claim 'x is true because x seems to be true?'

The most that can be said with certainty is that something is going on. Descartes was right to say that I know this from experience, and because the 'goings on' might be illusory (whatever that could mean, but it is a separate issue) and because I am nonetheless experiencing them, that I can only be certain of the fact of my own existence (as experiencer).

Descartes was wrong that this proves the 'substantial existence' (whatever that might be, but that is a separate issue) of the self. But Kant was right to say that Descartes' 'cogito' demonstrates that to make sense of experience we must posit the self. Our language is permeated with this metaphysic, and no meaningful discourse seems to be possible without it.

Our language always 'fossilizes' experience in one way or the other, in trying to pin it down to 'something' determinate, to reduce it to 'fundamentals'. This is reductive, philosophically pointless and ultimately doomed to failure, but nonetheless necessary for life as we know it.

We need to become comfortable with our 'sublime ignorance', our inability to determinately know anything at all beyond clearing up mistakes, contradictions and inconsistencies within our inter-subjective discourses and groping our way towards the light.

[Logic_ill]

Interesting question. I've been thinking about Descartes for a while, and wonder if he ever considered his childhood, straight from infancy? I mention this becasue one thing that many people tend to overlook is how they reached their "complex thinking". In other words, what made Descartes come up with "I think, therefore I am"?

I think that if it hadn't been because others surrounding him during his infancy and childhood, wouldn't have taught him to think, he may not have had this self-awareness. Human beings need other human beings as models and nurturers, in order to become human. I would have thought that a great philosopher such as Descartes would have come to the conclusion that if it hadn't been because others saw he was there and acknowledged him, he may not have realized he was there or may not have asked himself the question.

Anyhow, I write this because you ask how others have self-awareness other than yourself, well there's your answer. If it hadn't been for the others you may not have had self-awareness or may not have been able to verbalize it.

Theories of language and others had not yet been considered in Descartes' time, but still I would have expected him to be able to put two and two together with all the time he had on his hands .

I know we don't have access to other brains, except through our means of communication, but it is via our communication (as far as we know) that we understand we are here...

[RJG]

Very nearly, but with one crucial difference. It's not that I think she should think other people are more real than her; it's that you know very well that your existence is more real than her 'ideas' either about you or (much later) about herself. Later on, given a philosophical adolescence, she might well develop an idea that her 'self' seems more real than your physical existence. And if she does develop such a notion, you will know that this idea is wrong.

Let me see if I follow -- Okay, I know my existence is more real than this child or her ideas. Then this (less real / imaginary) child has self aware thoughts that she is more real than me. And because I know that she can't be more real than me, that this proves other people are more real than my awareness of myself? I don't get it. Am I missing something?

Evidence?

I don't think either of us can gather the evidence to prove or disprove that a baby is conscious of its interactions. We don't have access to the inner brain of this baby.

[Jax Agnesson]

. . . . Our language always 'fossilizes' experience in one way or the other, in trying to pin it down to 'something' determinate, to reduce it to 'fundamentals'. This is reductive, philosophically pointless and ultimately doomed to failure, but nonetheless necessary for life as we know it.

We need to become comfortable with our 'sublime ignorance', our inability to determinately know anything at all beyond clearing up mistakes, contradictions and inconsistencies within our inter-subjective discourses and groping our way towards the light.

Exactly what I have been thinking, and what I have been trying to say in my responses this topic. Well, apart from there being anything sublime about ignorance Since the Cogito was formulated (AFAIK) to pin down what can be known perfectly, then either the recognition of the possibility of error reduces this to 'something is conscious, and I'm labelling it 'I', which hardly qualifies as perfect knowledge anyway, or else we accept that knowledge is always at least marginally imperfect, in which case the Cogito is redundant. I haven't studied philosophy formally, so would be interested in any recommended reading on epistemology.

-- Updated January 6th, 2013, 7:04 am to add the following --

I know we don't have access to other brains, except through our means of communication, but it is via our communication (as far as we know) that we understand we are here...

Yes. We access our own thoughts also through the use of language. We have access to our own experiences immediately, but almost all our thinking is done through the manipulation of symbols representing the objects of earlier experiences, not through precise re-running of the experiences themselves.

-- Updated January 6th, 2013, 7:40 am to add the following --

Let me see if I follow -- Okay, I know my existence is more real than this child or her ideas.

I don't see how you can think this child is less real than you. After all, if in her adolescence she stumbles into certain schools of philosophy, she might end up thinking you are less real than her! Would she be right to think that? Of course not. Whether she studies philosophy or not, it is likely that you will always seem slightly less real to her than her own self, but that's an effect of perspective, isn't it?

Then this (less real / imaginary) child has self aware thoughts that she is more real than me. And because I know that she can't be more real than me, that this proves other people are more real than my awareness of myself? I don't get it. Am I missing something?

Other people are not more real than you, and you have no real reason to suppose that you are more real than other people. You know how cows close up to you look a lot bigger than cows far away? This effect is perfectly explicable by straightforward geometry, and with a bit of walking you can satisfy yourself that those far away cows were not really tiny, after all. In a similar, tho slighly more complicated manner, it is possible to determine that things and people who originate some distance away from your skull are not less real than the multitude that is created within it. In fact, I would say they are more real.

I don't think either of us can gather the evidence to prove or disprove that a baby is conscious of its interactions. We don't have access to the inner brain of this baby.

Communication. Happens all the time. Ask anyone who's ever spent time with a child, especially a mother. For a more scientific, but still highly readable exploration of this subject, I recommend 'How Babies Think' by Alison Gopnik

[Logic_ill]

Yes. We access our own thoughts also through the use of language. We have access to our own experiences immediately, but almost all our thinking is done through the manipulation of symbols representing the objects of earlier experiences, not through precise re-running of the experiences themselves.

I also mean other non-verbal forms of communication. If other human beings hadn't interacted with us, we may not have reached this self awareness...

[Jax Agnesson]

[ I also mean other non-verbal forms of communication. If other human beings hadn't interacted with us, we may not have reached this self awareness...

Yes. We are social animals. Almost all of our learning is social. It has even been speculated that the development of the internal narrative 'I' came about as a way of negotiating the status-play that is so much a part of reproductive selection amongst primates. Maybe a biological equivalent of computer modelling. In this scenario, possible courses of action would be trialled virtually, thus reducing the individual's risk of deploying socially disastrous tactics in real life. A progenitor of morality, in the sense of 'How would you like it if . . .' And if we realise that our knowing is slightly less than perfect, well, so what? I do not sing perfectly. Doesn't mean I cannot sing at all. I do not walk or run perfectly. Even my breathing isn't perfect. But as long as these things are done well enough, that's pretty good. What's so special about thinking, that we should insist on an absolute standard of perfection?

[Newme]

"I think therefore I am"

This quote basically means that by thinking about the true nature of existence, you are proving that you exist.

My thought is this, I know that I am self aware. I have thoughts and opinions that are my own, granted they are influenced greatly by a variety of factors. But how do I know that everyone else has self awareness? One cannot simply assume such a thing. I understand this sounds conceded, but as far as I know, the world as a whole is just a series of electrical impulses. How can I, as a self aware being, ever know whether or not I am creating the world I perceive?

Sometimes, I feel that we make philosophy too complicated. I understand it is important to explore truth, to question common, but illogical assumptions. Yet, there are some assumptions that work, like the fact (or taken as fact) that when I hear somebody yelling at me, or I feel somebody touch me, it is not in my head, but I did in fact experience evidence of another person.

"I think, therefore I am" may mean, "I think, therefore I think I am, & I trust in what I think, because it is the only sane way to live." So much for simplifying.

[Naughtorious]

Yet, there are some assumptions that work, like the fact (or taken as fact) that when I hear somebody yelling at me, or I feel somebody touch me, it is not in my head, but I did in fact experience evidence of another person.

If you didn't have ears, no yelling.

If you didn't have nerves, no feeling.

Well, I simplified those falsifiable assumptions right away! Would you like a cup of tea?

[Forswanked]

A baby interacts - it does not exist, an interaction occurs. On reflection, we assign value to approximate forms, such as bodies, our body. Very practical to living an extended life. Not practical to recognizing what that life is.