Should Morals Be Judged In A Cultural Context?

[Iapetus]

Reply to Fooloso4:

The conversation seems now to be focusing on judgements and, specifically, on ‘moral’ judgements. I say, ‘moral’, because, at an early stage, you told me that that

...the action may be judged to be immoral but not the man.

That suggests that a judgement can be made of the action independently of ‘the man’.

Not only that, but you have specified that it can be a moral judgement. We could, of course, call on a huge range of vocabulary to describe an action and the choice of vocabulary would imply some form of judgement. But I am refering to moral judgement of an action.

I have asked you, repeatedly, how you would make such a moral assessment. I have asked you to suggest criteria for judgement. Each time that I have asked about such a judgement, you have brought in the issue of judging the person and you have usually associated it with competence, even though this is only one factor among many. This is irrelevant and you have confirmed this:

Competency has no bearing on the action, only on the actor.

I have been asking about independent moral judgement of the action. I am asking for explanations, not assertions.

You have also claimed:

If we are not judging the person then we are judging the action.

This seems very similar to the first claim. So I want to know how you would morally judge the action. I don’t want to know about judgement of the person or anything about competency. I want to know about moral judgement of the action because you are suggesting that judgements can be made separately.

In post #74, you said:

It is not a matter of judging the action independent of the actor, it is that even when the actor is not morally responsible, the action remains.

It strikes me here that, if you say that “the action remains” and you have already said that the action can be judged morally, then it is very much a matter of judging the action independent of the actor.

So, here is the rub. More recently you have stated:

In general, however, a moral assessment takes both the actor and the action into consideration and does not treat them independently.

If a ‘moral assessment’ does not treat the actor and the action independently, then how can an action be judged to be immoral but not 'the man'? Does that not mean precisely the opposite? How can ‘the action remain’?

Have you changed your mind?

Changed my mind about what? I do not think I have changed my mind about anything. I did say that my assessment of a particular individual or a particular action might change if additional information comes to light.

A first-class wriggle. The additional information which has come to light is the apparent contradiction in statements which you have made.

In relation to the “in general …” of your new statement, I asked about exceptions:

Once again, different cases are treated differently. In most cases there is a judgment of both the actor and the action.

Sort of OK so far, though you have not specified that the moral judgements are made together and not separately.

There are, however, exceptions: When it has been determined by a qualified professional that a person is not competent then no moral judgment is made of that person. When the action is one that is always immoral without exception then the action can be judged without regard to the person.

“… always immoral without exception”is an assertion and not an explanation. Neither does it give any idea of how that determination can be made, independently of the person initiating the action. Once more, it doesn’t answer the question.

But since moral judgments are about actors and actions even when the action is judged to be immoral we may still judge the person who is competent. If and how that person is judged must be taken on a case by case basis.

Here you are resorting once more to the irrelevant competency argument. You have made no reference to separate moral judgement of the action. Yet again, you resort out of desperation to judgement of the person. You have suggested that there are exceptions but you have only written about irrelevant judgement of the person.

For the umpteenth time I asked you how you would judge the action. Your replies are becoming more and more desperate:

What action?

For crying out loud. Any action which you can judge, morally, to be independent of the actor.

I have said that I will always judge some actions such as child torture and murder to be immoral.

In the context of our conversation, I don’t care, particularly, what your personal judgements are. They are assertions. I want to know why you make them. I want you to explain what criteria you use to make your moral judgements. Particularly when you separate the actor from the action. You have not told me.

Other actions are judged on a case by case basis and usually take into consideration the actor.

That is irrelevant. I asked about the action, not the actor!

I asked: “If you reject competency, then can you still make a separate moral judgement of the action? If so, then how?”

I am not sure what this means. If you mean that it has been determined that the person is not competent, then the person is not morally responsible and is not morally judged.

Another wriggle. We have been here so many times before. I want to know about the action, independent of the actor. The competency, as you have already admitted, is irrelevant.

The action, however, was still committed and we can deliberate as to the morality of the action - is it morally permissible to do X?

I have asked you to deliberate – to explain to me – and you refuse to do so.

It should be kept in mind that moral judgment is not only about what has been done, but is also about what should or should not be done. We can and do raise questions about actions that have not yet been done. We can and do ask if we or someone else should or should not do 'X'.

So, if all you can say is that this is an issue which raises questions, then you have said absolutely nothing to justify exceptions to your statement:

In general, however, a moral assessment takes both the actor and the action into consideration and does not treat them independently.

So, for the fourth time, in relation to your previous statements about judging actors and actions separately, have you changed your mind?

-- Updated 24 Apr 2017, 11:48 to add the following --

Reply to Spectrum:

I notice that you have ignored all the significant aspects of my last post and have decided, instead, to concentrate on a definition of the word, ‘system’. I know what a system is and, if I didn’t, then I am quite capable of looking it up. What you haven’t done is to explain the significance of term in the context of your proposal for laws which are inflexible, prescriptive, prejudging and contrary to all concepts of human justice.

Your ‘system’ is not only ‘very complex’ but also very silly.

-- Updated 24 Apr 2017, 12:09 to add the following --

Reply to Belindi:

Spinoza depended his large ethical system from reason. Nietzsche supported freedom from unreason. Hume was reason personified; look at his statue in Edinburgh placed where he confronts the statue of John Knox. Hume said "The rules of morality are not the conclusion of our reason."

Belindi, I offered examples of philosophers who have written in contradiction of the idea of ‘fixed goals’. It was to make the point to Spectrum that such views existed. I am not particularly interested in discussing them because I don’t see that it has direct relevance.

BTW, Iapetus, in a later post you sort of objected to my usage of 'evil' ,saying in effect that evil implies supernatural. True, many people think that this connotation of 'evil' defines the concept of evil. The problem for me is finding a word that substitutes for 'evil' without the connotation of supernatural.

If you know of a synonym for 'evil' which is as all-embracing but lacks the supernatural connotation please tell.

It didn’t so much object as disagree. Because you asked me. I offered many alternatives, including base, ignoble, dishonourable, corrupt, iniquitous, degenerate, villainous, nefarious, sinister, vicious and malevolent. I did not say that they were synonymous because I didn’t want them to be. That was the point. If you want ‘evil’ to imply demonaic possession, then please use ‘evil’. It would be appropriate. If you did not want to imply supernatural intervention, then I suggest one of my alternatives might suffice. If not, you could use a combination of words. But the combination would depend on what precise meaning you wanted to convey.

[Belindi]

Iapetus wrote:

Belindi, I offered examples of philosophers who have written in contradiction of the idea of ‘fixed goals’. It was to make the point to Spectrum that such views existed. I am not particularly interested in discussing them because I don’t see that it has direct relevance.

Instead of fixed goals Spinoza,Nietzsche, and Hume are philosophers of the age of reason who don't specify goals but who tell that reason is better than faith in fixed maxims. So a brief resume of how all three philosophers endorsed reason instead of faith is relevant; however I'd be surprised if Spectrum did not know all that already.

[Lark_Truth]

We see almost every last act as either a moral or immoral one. I have certain intentions posting this in and of itself which would be judged as either moral or immoral. Overall, we live in a world of relative morals, and each culture, society, and even person has a different moral code to every other person. Personally I see morals as non existent but still have something that can loosely be based on a moral code, which is to embody the morals relative to my current position. If I am on my own, I can embody how I feel like, because for me there are no morals. I don't feel restricted if I do something 'wrong', which is what I find a whole lot of people have trouble with getting their heads over with me. I just wanted to clear that up.

I say: Hang society's cultural morality! It all gets very stupid on big levels. Take a look on the hypocrisy of the British Victorian elite, all nice and pretty in public, but behind closed doors was something that was definitely not apart of the "Christian" life that the Victorians were claiming to live. Though that is not true of all of the Victorian elite, it did account for a large segment of them.
In essence: No, morals should not be judged in a cultural context. To me, society's opinions on morality do not matter, though that isn't to say that all of society's moral standards are wrong. I see Virtue as something more ... pure. Virtue for virtue's sake is what I see as morality, and greater happiness is obtained thereof.

Having no set moral code does seem to be un-restricting, doesn't it. No booboos on your conscious, no worries, happy life. You can do what you want, with who you want, and be completely guiltless, right? Or is it?

Since morals are relative, should I call another man immoral if he does something I call immoral although it is suitable in his culture and in his own eyes. Should we judge morals in whichever context is our own or whichever is used by the man being judged?

If somebody does something immoral without realizing that it is immoral, that would be called ignorance. Can we judge ignorance? We can try, but that doesn't mean that it is right.
My parents have always taught me to stick to clean, and wholesome moral values, for which I am extremely thankful to them. I know what it means to be moral (whether I know all of what it means to be moral could be debated) and so if I go against the moral standards that my parents taught me, then feel free to judge, because I would not be acting in ignorance, but against what I was taught in my youth. Though whether or not it is right to judge someone in such a situation as I have given could also be debated.
In all: Perhaps we shouldn't judge, because we don't know precisely why someone is behaving immoral. Look to your own moral behaviors first before you judge someone else.

[Eduk]

In essence: No, morals should not be judged in a cultural context.

It's possible we disagree on the definition of 'culture'. But I would say a religion provided a cultural context? There's more than one culture available I guess is what I'm trying to say?

If somebody does something immoral without realizing that it is immoral, that would be called ignorance. Can we judge ignorance?

There are different levels of ignorance. Some are acceptable some are not. Much like closing your eyes and driving a car wouldn't excuse you from running a red light.

I go against the moral standards that my parents taught me, then feel free to judge, because I would not be acting in ignorance,

But what if what your parents taught you was immoral? I'm not saying it is by the way, just hypothetically.

In all: Perhaps we shouldn't judge, because we don't know precisely why someone is behaving immoral. Look to your own moral behaviors first before you judge someone else.

I agree with the sentiment. Perhaps it comes down to proportionality. You have to judge, all the time, I would argue it's immoral not to (not all the time but sometimes). But certainly with a degree of trepidation and without righteousness.

[Lark_Truth]

It's possible we disagree on the definition of 'culture'. But I would say a religion provided a cultural context? There's more than one culture available I guess is what I'm trying to say?

Very true. Religion does indeed provide a different medium then society for moral ideals for its followers to live up to. Sometimes it depends on how much both society and religion enforce their moral standards upon their followers.

There are different levels of ignorance. Some are acceptable some are not. Much like closing your eyes and driving a car wouldn't excuse you from running a red light.

Very correct.

But what if what your parents taught you was immoral? I'm not saying it is by the way, just hypothetically.

Intentionally or ignorantly?

I agree with the sentiment. Perhaps it comes down to proportionality. You have to judge, all the time, I would argue it's immoral not to (not all the time but sometimes). But certainly with a degree of trepidation and without righteousness.

Okay, yes, you are correct that we have to judge. It is hardwired into the human psych to figure out what action to make next and that requires judgement. If one doesn't judge their own actions, then they don't make corrections to their course in life and that might just lead to places that nobody wants to go.

[Eduk]

Sometimes it depends on how much both society and religion enforce their moral standards upon their followers.

I may be wrong here, it's hard to define words But we all live in a society? That society may incorporate religious views, or not, but either way it's a society.

But what if what your parents taught you was immoral? I'm not saying it is by the way, just hypothetically.

Intentionally or ignorantly?

In terms of your ignorance does it make a difference?

[Spectrum]

Reply to Spectrum:

I notice that you have ignored all the significant aspects of my last post and have decided, instead, to concentrate on a definition of the word, ‘system’. I know what a system is and, if I didn’t, then I am quite capable of looking it up. What you haven’t done is to explain the significance of term in the context of your proposal for laws which are inflexible, prescriptive, prejudging and contrary to all concepts of human justice.

Your ‘system’ is not only ‘very complex’ but also very silly.

I am aware of the insignificant points [take too much time] I have ignored.

Note I have never made proposals for 'enforceable' laws which are inflexible, prescriptive, prejudging. Read my posts again.

What I had proposed are as follows;

• 1. Grounded Absolute Moral Principles [Laws, rules, etc] which are not enforceable but merely to act as a guide.
  
  2. Above in 1 to be adapted as Ethical Principles [Laws, rules, etc] as standards for practical applications for the individual[s] and society.
  
  3. Society to enact statutory Laws via the political, legislature, and judiciary system [guided by 1 & 2] which are enforceable within that system. This is actually more to politics and legal [justice], and has very little to do with Philosophy of Morality.

Why I highlighted 'system' is I believe morality, ethics and judiciary [the little part of it] matters must be tackled holistically rather than in their specific parts without consideration for the interdependent whole.

Your problem is your inability to grasp the whole [not easy]. Your natural tendency is to focus on specific parts, i.e. judge the person, judge the person ... ad infinitum. A focus on judging the person is merely fire-fighting the fire rather than preventing the fire at its root cause.

I mentioned my moral and ethics view are heavily weighted on the Kantian model. It is silly [philosophically immature] to think Kant is silly?

-- Updated Mon Apr 24, 2017 9:27 pm to add the following --

Reply to Iapetus:

Instead of fixed goals Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Hume are philosophers of the age of reason who don't specify goals but who tell that reason is better than faith in fixed maxims. So a brief resume of how all three philosophers endorsed reason instead of faith is relevant; however I'd be surprised if Spectrum did not know all that already.

Note there are many levels of reason, i.e. from primal [reptillian] to high rationality [neo-cortical].
This is why Kant wrote his 'Critique of Pure Reason' which is actually 'Critique of Pure [bestial/primal*] Reason.' *=in traces of it.

Spinoza, Nietzsche [Perspectivism], and Hume [Empiricism] used reason but not at the highest levels.
Spinoza despite using the higher levels of reason for various philosophical thoughts was still influenced by his primal faculty, i.e. bestial/primal mode of reasoning, ending with some sort of non-personal 'god.' This is the same for all theists.

[Belindi]

I disagree with Spectrum's post, immediately above. I won't copy it because I cannot reply in detail as that would be tangential to the theme of this discussion.

I can say what my objections to Spectrum's post are in general.

Implying that reason and or nature are gods. Omitting to say what criterion he used to grade religions in order of badness. And Spectrum implies that when he dislikes 'religions' it's actually the canonical texts that he objects to.

[Iapetus]

Reply to Belinda:

Instead of fixed goals Spinoza,Nietzsche, and Hume are philosophers of the age of reason who don't specify goals but who tell that reason is better than faith in fixed maxims. So a brief resume of how all three philosophers endorsed reason instead of faith is relevant; however I'd be surprised if Spectrum did not know all that already.

Spectrum stated; "The concept of 'moving goal posts' is always a sign of weakness in philosophy. Therefore I don't believe the philosophers you mentioned would buy the concept of 'moving goal posts' in doing their philosophy".

It is not necessary to explain exactly what the various philosophers espouse. It is sufficient to demonstrate that they have argued against ‘fixed goal posts’. Your comments seem to support this idea.

-- Updated 25 Apr 2017, 10:17 to add the following --

Reply to Spectrum:

Note I have never made proposals for 'enforceable' laws which are inflexible, prescriptive, prejudging. Read my posts again.

Spectrum, I have read your posts. It is hard work. Whether or not they are enforcable, your proposals are certainly inflexible, prescriptive, prejudging and contrary to all concepts of human justice and I have explained why.

1. Grounded Absolute Moral Principles [Laws, rules, etc] which are not enforceable but merely to act as a guide.

I still don’t understand the significance of ‘grounded’. It seems superfluous. I could understand the concept of broad principles which can provide the basis for interpretation on a case-by-case basis. But that is not what you have suggested. I don’t see why I should have to repeat my explanation but I shall do so. In relation to your example:

Killing of another human being is not permissible, period! no ifs nor buts

If you had written something that suggested that any killing of another human would be answerable to the state, then that could be an example of a broad principle; an action followed by an unspecified response. Yours is not worded in such a form. You said that killing is not permissable. You have determined that the action will be followed by a fixed decision. Yet you know that there are many occasions when it has been demonstrated – in courts of law - to be permissable. Millions in various wars. Self-defence. Incapacity to understand the consequences. Accident. We are talking about rules for society. Your personal preferences are insignificant. Yet you have insisted that killing is not permissable. You have removed all flexibility. Yours is not a guide. It is a prescription. Then you have gone and constrained yourself still further, with ‘no ifs and buts’. In other words, no extenuating circumstances. No possibility of justifying the killing. This is not a guide. It is a prejudgement. There is no point in attempting a justification because the decision has already been taken. This makes it contrary to all concepts of human justice.

It is about as far from a guide as it is possible to get.

Your problem is your inability to grasp the whole [not easy]. Your natural tendency is to focus on specific parts, i.e. judge the person, judge the person ... ad infinitum. A focus on judging the person is merely fire-fighting the fire rather than preventing the fire at its root cause.

Your problem seems to be that you have no concept of justice. You do not tackle the system holistically from premises which are, to put it very mildly, badly-constructed. Neither do you seem to recognise that nearly every nation or state has already gone through a process of establishing broad principles. And they are nearly always better than yours. They are usually – but not always - presented as written constitutions. They are usually flexible enough - unlike yours – that they can be adapted in the light of legal judgements. There is an interplay between the established principles and their interpretation. Justice.

[Fooloso4]

Iapetus:

I want you to explain what criteria you use to make your moral judgements. Particularly when you separate the actor from the action. You have not told me.

In broadest terms it is an assessment of benefit and harm, of whether an action promotes or decreases the well-being of those affected by the action. One’s well-being involves such things as having basic needs satisfied and enjoying a degree of freedom to choose and act without undue harm to others. It is related to Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia and the Utilitarian notion of happiness.

Now if in response you demand I explain why it is immoral to cause harm without benefit then I am at a loss to explain. You have, however, already demanded that I explain why torturing innocent children for pleasure is immoral, to point to the obvious - that it causes harm without benefit or harm that far outweighs the benefit of pleasure the torturer receives, gets us no further.

So, let’s approach this from a different angle. Do you think that torturing innocent children or pleasure is ever morally acceptable? By what criteria?

[Iapetus]

Reply to Fooloso4:

No, let's not approach this from a different angle until you have answered the questions from this angle, and there are many. Let's start with;

Have you changed your mind? Fifth time.

[Eduk]

Torturing children for pleasure already adds a great deal of context and judgement. By definition torture is immoral. Doing something for pleasure by definition means not for moral reasons (not that pleasure is immoral). If you define something as immoral then yes it's immoral by definition.

[Fooloso4]

Iapetus:

No, let's not approach this from a different angle until you have answered the questions from this angle, and there are many.

I addressed the question of criteria, but you say nothing about it. Instead you ask once again:

Have you changed your mind? Fifth time.

No, I have not changed my mind.

I will try yet again to make it clear to you where your mistake is.

In post #74, you said:

It is not a matter of judging the action independent of the actor, it is that even when the actor is not morally responsible, the action remains.

It strikes me here that, if you say that “the action remains” and you have already said that the action can be judged morally, then it is very much a matter of judging the action independent of the actor.

So, here is the rub. More recently you have stated:

In general, however, a moral assessment takes both the actor and the action into consideration and does not treat them independently.

If a ‘moral assessment’ does not treat the actor and the action independently, then how can an action be judged to be immoral but not 'the man'? Does that not mean precisely the opposite? How can ‘the action remain’?

In the first quote I am talking about a case where we no longer judge the actor because: “the actor is not morally responsible”. So, we are left judging only the action.

In the second quote I am talking “in general”, that is, not about cases where we would judge the action and not the actor. What is true in general is not true of the exception. Lack of competency is the exception. We do not treat the general in the same way we treat the exception. And so, even though I discussed exceptional cases where we treat action and actor separately, that does not mean that we treat all cases according to the exception.

There is no contradiction here and no change of mind. Once again, everything I have said is consistent and basic. You take two statements I made about different things, ignore the fact that they are about different things, and go on and on about how I have contradicted myself or changed my mind because you mistakenly treat the exception as the rule.

[Iapetus]

Reply to Fooloso4:

I have just written 2,390 words in answer to your two questions;

Do you think that torturing innocent children or pleasure is ever morally acceptable? By what criteria?

I am not, however, going to submit the post immediately. You are looking for a way to avoid answering a whole range of questions fundamental to our discussion about moral judgements of 'actors and actions' and I do not intend to give you the opportunity. In post #96 I already warned you, “If you try to lead the conversation elsewhere before answering all the questions you owe me, then I shall take it that you have conceded the argument”.

Torturing of children is a side issue, albeit an interesting one. Which is why I have written up a response.

-- Updated 25 Apr 2017, 23:07 to add the following --

Sorry; I posted this without realising you had offered a reply. I'll respond tomorrow.

[Fooloso4]

Iapetus:

You are looking for a way to avoid answering a whole range of questions fundamental to our discussion about moral judgements of 'actors and actions' and I do not intend to give you the opportunity.

Please stop with the accusations. Instead of telling me what I am avoiding, attend to the questions I just answered. Pay particular attention to what I have identified as your mistake.

In post #96 I already warned you, “If you try to lead the conversation elsewhere before answering all the questions you owe me, then I shall take it that you have conceded the argument”.

Stop the meaningless warnings as well. You can take it anyone you like, but I am not going to continue answering your questions unless you first address my answer to the question about the criteria for judging an action and the mistake that I think is leading to your general confusion.