Is morality objective or subjective?

Felix · Post by **Felix** » July 19th, 2018, 2:38 am

Not only did Hume think one could not get an Ought from an Is, he didn't think one could get anything else from an Is except more Is'es. He said there are only two types of knowledge: (1) That which deals with abstractions and does not involve judgements about matters of fact or real existence, i.e., mathematics and the science of logic, and (2) That which deals with particular or general facts, i.e., the natural and physical sciences. He said all else was "sophistry and illusion." (Maybe we should rename this forum the "sophistry and illusion club"? ... nah, that sounds like a forum for magicians.)

He also asserted that, (a) the ideas in our mind are the only objects we directly apprehend, and (b) we can have knowledge of a reality independent of our minds. Apparently he did not see the contradiction in those two statements, they are about as well thought out as his "no ought from is" premise.

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 19th, 2018, 2:54 am

Thanks for the information. I'm sure some of us didn't know it already.

If your aim is to discredit all of Hume's ideas by pointing out that some of them were mistaken - products of his time and culture - then, bravo.

Now show how a value judgement can be conclusively deduced from a fact - or how a value judgement can be a fact - if that's what you believe - I'm not sure. Because that's the crux here. Time to put your money down, perhaps.

I note you'e no longer promoting Aristotle's mistake over the fact-value distinction.

Felix · Post by **Felix** » July 19th, 2018, 3:10 am

You must have missed it, Peter, in my post of 7-18, I said that Mortimer Adler explains in his essay (link below) how an Is can give birth to an Ought (without a C section) better than I could ever hope to:

http://selfeducatedamerican.com/2015/01 ... scriptive/

If you'd like to explain in what way he is mistaken, please do, but I'd say that Hume lost the argument. I guess he never directly apprehended the idea of prescriptive truth either in or independently of his mind.

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 19th, 2018, 3:53 am

Thanks, but Adler doesn't show that an is can be an ought, nor that an ought ever necessarily follows from an is. Perhaps I missed it - but if all you can do is say - 'what Adler says' - there's nothing to see there.

If you can't show how a value judgement can be, or be necessarily deduced from, a fact, I don't understand why you believe it can.

And you still haven't given an example of a prescriptive truth that isn't a falsifiable factual assertion - which, by the way, is a linguistic expression. Actual words. No point claiming such things exist - because I'm sure they don't, or rather can't, so I have no reason to believe you or Aristotle.

Please - no more evasion. Time to put your money down. Clinch the argument, and I'll have to re-think my position.

Felix · Post by **Felix** » July 19th, 2018, 1:33 pm

Peter Holmes: Adler doesn't show that an ought ever necessarily follows from an is.

Yes, he does.

Perhaps I missed it.

How convenient, because it refutes your argument.

If you can't show how a value judgement can be, or be necessarily deduced from, a fact, I don't understand why you believe it can.

Practical or prescriptive reasoning does not rely upon factual knowledge alone.

you still haven't given an example of a prescriptive truth that isn't a falsifiable factual assertion

Example: Knowledge is good, therefore we should seek to have it.

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 19th, 2018, 2:38 pm

'Knowledge is good' is a value judgement. I assume you agree. Do you think it possible that, in a certain situation, knowledge may not be good? Do you think the claim 'knowledge is good' is a falsifiable factual assertion - that it has a truth value? Is the claim 'knowledge is good' independent of judgement, belief or opinion? What is it that objectively justifies the claim?

Is the word 'good' here being used as in 'food is good' or 'health is good' or 'happiness is good'? If so, what is the criterion for 'goodness' of this kind? And is that criterion factual, or a matter of judgement? Or does the word 'good' here mean morally good?

Is the claim 'we should seek knowledge because it is good' a value judgement or a falsifiable factual assertion? Is the criterion for claiming that we should seek what is good for us an objective thing, or is this a matter of judgement?

How about this?

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 19th, 2018, 2:48 pm

'Knowledge is good' is a value judgement. I assume you agree. But you and Aristotle call it a prescriptive truth - an assertion with a truth value. What is it that verifies it? Do you think it's falsifiable? Is it possible for knowledge not to be good?

Is the word 'good' here being used as in 'food is good' or 'health is good' or 'happiness is good'? If so, what is the criterion for 'goodness' of this kind? And is that criterion factual, or a matter of judgement? Or does the word 'good' here mean morally good?

Is the claim 'we should seek knowledge because it is good' a value judgement or a falsifiable factual assertion?

How about: Ignorance is bliss, therefore we should seek it?

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 19th, 2018, 2:56 pm

Sorry - I managed to post the first draft. Please ignore it.

One other point. Is knowledge of how to make an IED to kill people good?

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 20th, 2018, 12:14 am

Felix

To spell out the problems.

1 'Knowledge is good, therefore we should seek it' is two separate value judgements. Any arguments deployed to justify them rest on more value judgements - why any criterion is correct is a judgement. We're not dealing with objectivity (independence from judgement), truth or fact. Another example of this delusion is 'this god is a maximally great being' - as though 'the great' or 'greatness' are value-free.

2 Is the 'is' in 'knowledge is good' the 'is' of identity or the 'is' of predication? If it's the 'is' of identity, what is the 'good'? Aristotle never escaped Platonism, and nor did Kant - and nor does Adler. But if it's the 'is' of predication, what is the meaning of 'good'? Is what is good an objective property? And is there equivocation on 'good' between its non-moral and moral uses?

3 What is 'knowledge' - another Platonic form?

It's rational to want a foundation for what we believe, including for our moral values and beliefs. And that we have to build and repair our own foundations doesn't mean the edifice has to be shaky.

Felix · Post by **Felix** » July 20th, 2018, 12:34 am

Knowledge is good' is a value judgement. I assume you agree. But you and Aristotle call it a prescriptive truth - an assertion with a truth value. What is it that verifies it?

A prescriptive truth is a factual assertion (about human nature, in the case of moral injunctions) that is founded on a self-evident premise or injunction.

In the case of moral prescriptive truths, the self-evident injunction is: We ought to desire - seek and acquire - that which is really good for us. This premise is self evident because we cannot logically assert that the reverse of it is true, i.e., that we ought to desire that which is really bad for us, or that we ought not to desire that which is really good for us.

Starting with this self-evident premise, a factual assertion about human nature is made. If the initial premise is true, and the statement about human nature based on it is also true (beyond a reasonable doubt), than the prescriptive conclusion is true.

Do you think it's falsifiable? (e.g., the premise that knowledge is good)

As I said, it's based on a self-evident premise. You may be able to find an instance where knowledge is not a real good, say a human being raised by wolves who is happy and productive, but it's unlikely.

Is it possible for knowledge not to be good?

Man by nature desires to know and all human beings need knowledge. What they do with it is a separate (but related) question, but I would suspect that those who subscribe to your theory of moral relativism would have less compunction about misusing it.

Is the word 'good' here being used as in 'food is good' or 'health is good' or 'happiness is good'? If so, what is the criterion for 'goodness' of this kind? And is that criterion factual, or a matter of judgement?

As I indicated earlier, it's based on the distinction between real and apparent goods. Real goods, such as knowledge, accommodate universal human needs and desires whereas apparent goods do not, they are based on more subjective judgments.

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 20th, 2018, 1:53 am

Thanks, but you're merely repeating the argument without addressing the problems I've pointed out. Why should we seek that which is good for us? Is that a fact (a true factual assertion) or a judgement? What makes it self-evident? And what is this 'good' that is good for us? Is that self-evident? What criteria apply here? And are they objective, or matters of judgement?

I know this confusion is a deep. Can you specifically address the three problems I've pointed out? If you can show a falsifiable factual foundation - independent of judgement - then it's game on.

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 20th, 2018, 2:04 am

Felix

By what criterion is what is really good for us distinguished from what is only apparently good for us? Is that criterion objective, or a matter of judgement.

If there could be a situation in which knowledge is not good - and it's easy to imagine many - and you concede that possibility, what price the factual truth of 'knowledge is good'? Are you saying 'some knowledge is good', or 'knowledge is usually good'? And by what criterion is good knowledge distinguishable from not-good knowledge? Is that criterion objective or a matter of judgement?

Peter Holmes · Post by **Peter Holmes** » July 20th, 2018, 2:23 am

Felix

Sorry about the typos. I'm rushing to find a way to explain this, but I apologise for them.

Do you agree with the following?

'Everyone needs food' is a fact - a true factual assertion. But 'everyone should have food' and 'everyone should seek food' are judgements, not facts. And there's no deductive (logical) route from the fact to the judgements.

Felix · Post by **Felix** » July 20th, 2018, 4:29 am

Peter Holmes: Do you agree with the following? - 'Everyone needs food' is a fact - a true factual assertion. But 'everyone should have food' and 'everyone should seek food' are judgements, not facts. And there's no deductive (logical) route from the fact to the judgements.

Why would I agree with that?, it's completely illogical. When you experience the fact that you are hungry, you cannot deduce that you should eat? And you cannot logically deduce that other human beings have that same need? This is a self-evident proposition and the basis for reaching the prescriptive conclusion that all people should have the right to seek and have food.

What moral code would you prefer, "every man for himself and the Devil take the hindmost"? Do you think that would be a more reasonable prescription for a healthy and productive life and harmonious society?

Post by **Belindi** » July 20th, 2018, 4:51 am

Peter Holmes wrote:

'Everyone needs food' is a fact - a true factual assertion. But 'everyone should have food' and 'everyone should seek food' are judgements, not facts. And there's no deductive (logical) route from the fact to the judgements.

That's true as it stands. But if you are judging all 3 claims by the criterion " Men are ruled by their nature as human beings" then you need to include that human nature includes sympathy.

Peter, maybe you are basing your stated difference between factual and moral judgements upon the forms of language, the structure of sentences.
Maybe if you had written :

"Everyone needs food"

"Everyone needs to have food"

" Everyone needs to seek food"

then you would see that there is no difference between moral and factual judgements, except that moral and factual judgements are traditionally constricted and are subject to linguistic determinism that pervades how we frame claims.