Hi Londoner. You raise a few valid points. Whatever controls the person's body (i.e. the mind) must either have some nonphysical component, given how the laws of thermodynamics both induce and limit causality, even under quantum variability, or it must follow that the theory of emergentism, which allows for novel causal powers beyond the bases of what cause it, must be true.Londoner wrote: ↑April 24th, 2018, 5:10 amIsn't a person a physical thing? Then why shouldn't that person have an effect on other physical things? It would be odd to describe the entireVictorianoOchoa wrote: ↑April 23rd, 2018, 11:45 pm
In fact, I would argue that no argument for free will, thus far, has been convincing, given the consequence argument, which relies on the causality of all physical things, given materialist premises. I would venture to state that no argument of free will is sufficient unless it argues for supra-causality, the ability to supersede the causal laws of nature, which may necessarily incur an argument for an ideal mind (under idealist premises) or an emergent mind, which may thus have emergent causal powers, that can grant free will (under materialist premises).
universe in terms of the causal laws of nature - with the sole exception of people. Certainly we can describe the universe in such a way that it excludes humans as a 'cause', but we can do that for anything. That would be an argument against all notions of causality.
But assuming we do think of the universe in terms of particular things, including people, that have an effect on other things, 'free will' has got to be somebody's free will. (I assume we are not saying 'Free Will' is some sort of disembodied force in its own right.)
I would suggest that the problem is with the 'free' bit in 'free will', which is vaguely understood to mean something like 'cause-less' or 'for no reason'. But then it makes no sense to couple it with 'will' because 'that I will something' is a cause and a reason. It is saying that a decision to make a cup of coffee cannot be an exercise of free will - because I wanted the cup of coffee so it wasn't 'free'. In that case, in order to be 'free', an act would have to be independent of will, something like a nervous twitch.
So where is the problem? I find myself in the world. I am aware that things can be other than they are, that there are alternative futures. I try to make things go the way I want. I can only create a problem out of that if I deny my own existence as a subject that stands in relation to the world. But since this situation is prior to everything else, then to reject my own existence is to reject everything.
As per the cause bit, this is why I stated that free will must, in my opinion, be supra-causal, as opposed to contra-causal. Contra-causality is without a cause, whereas supra-causality would be causality with a dimension that supersedes the causal laws of nature (the ability to will against the causality of natural laws).
In other words, as you stated, the mind must be somehow unique for any amount of will to exist. Otherwise, our understanding of math would suggest that any amount of will is impossible.