Fooloso4 wrote:
The idea that we are self-sufficient beings who live in groups as a matter of utility is contrary to the view that we are social animals.
Well,
prima facie it is not contrary. Two propositions are contraries when both cannot be true. The propositions, "Humans are social animals," and, "Humans associate for pragmatic/utilitarian reasons" may both be true.
I suspect you argue otherwise because you believe that humans are "instinctively" social; that they are naturally programmed, or at least predisposed, to group together, to form bonds with others of their species. So while the second statement above is not contrary to the first, it is false (in your view). It gives a wrong reason for human sociality.
Am I guessing correctly here?
If you look again at my previous post outlining the "organic fallacy" (#31) you'll see that I agree with you. There, I said,
"All these laments of lost innocence and alienation are atavisms, psychic echoes of our tribal heritage, the social form honed over the course of our 3 million year primate history. All of our fellow primates still practice that form, and until the rise of civilization, so did all humans. It would be surprising were our brains not adapted to that social form. They have evolved synchronously with that form, and thus may be expected to function optimally in that environment, in many ways. So it is not surprising that we miss that form, or that we long to regain it. We are ducks out of water, trying to find our way back to the pond . . . We remain 'wired' for tribal life."
Yes, we are "instinctively." or "naturally," social. My argument has not been that we are social for pragmatic reasons, but that we (most of us) remain in
large civilized societies for pragmatic reasons. The argument has been that our social "instincts" become inapplicable and unworkable when we expect that larger group to offer the intimacy and unity of a tribal group, and that they lead us to oppressive and destructive behaviors.
Civilized societies not only allow, but facilitate, the "instinctive" sociality you wish to defend. Indeed, they offer many more opportunities to indulge that "instinct" than any tribal setting. They offer millions of candidates for mates, friends, fellow travelers along some chosen path. It is only when we expect --- or demand --- that society "as a whole" behave like a tribe, a giant commune, or a "big happy family," that nastiness ensues. Civilized societies do not have that structure. They are randomly-assembled groups of unrelated, independent, autonomous individuals and kinship groups who happen, by accident of birth, to occupy a common territory. They have no common interests or goals, no natural bonds with one another or any
a priori obligations to one another.
I hope this clarifies the argument.
Aristotle’s ethics, unlike modern ethical theories, is not based on obligation but rather on the observation that we all seek what is good and ethics is about how best to achieve that good. (See below)
Yes. Aristotle (and many others) assumed that at least some things are inherently, or "objectively," good. Those propositions are non-cognitive.
The simple fact of the matter is that if you were born in Mongolia or New Guinea a thousand years ago you would not think and believe as you do and the particular people around you would not think and believe as 21st century westerner do.
Well, that's essentially what you said before. I'm still unclear as to the relevance you think it has to these arguments, or how it bears on their validity. Since 11th century Mongolians and New Guineans did not live in civilized societies the issues currently in dispute would not have arisen.
That while the Greeks did not ponder the relationship of the individual to his society …
They did, but as members of rather than in distinction from society.
Those two are not incompatible or contraries. Every member of every group is distinct from the group (in fact, if the members were not distinct we could not define the group, except generically, or specify its cardinality). I know of no philosopher, liberal or otherwise --- not even the anarchists --- who denies he is a member of society.
It might be worthwhile to point out that there are two kinds of memberships in groups (of people). One may become a member of a group by definition, or by enlistment. We can define groups at will: "All bald-headed males now alive in N. America over the age of 40." I've just defined a group. Everyone who satisfies that criterion is a member of it. One may also become a member of a group by enlistment --- by approaching another person or persons with whom one wishes to associate, and being accepted by them. Typically, membership by enlistment is conditional; one may be required to agree to to certain conditions before he is accepted into the group, which are spelled out in a membership application. By signing that application the new member takes on certain obligations to other members of the group. The bald-headed males in my defined group, on the other hand, incur no obligations by their membership in that group (most of them won't even know they're members of it).
The US Constitution states, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." What type of membership is that, and what obligations does it impose?
Methinks you need to think that through. How do you decide what is beneficial, other than by observing what others regard as beneficial?
Your statement is ironic. It is all about thinking it through. Fundamental to Aristotle’s ethics is the question of the good life. It is a question that requires deliberation, and for Plato and Aristotle this meant both self-reflection and reasoned speech, that is, philosophical discussion. Observing what others regard as beneficial is certainly part of that, but this means critical examination.
That doesn't answer the question. The question, "How do you decide whether X is or is not beneficial?" is not answered with, "by examination and critical reflection." That is a process for arriving at an answer (and a given), not the answer itself. If observing what others regard as beneficial is only part of the answer, what are the other parts? My own answer is, "X is benefical if P considers it beneficial, as evidenced by his efforts to secure X." I can only claim that X is not beneficial to P if I know, based on other observations, that P considers Y more beneficial than X and that pursuing X will foreclose securing Y (which P may not realize).
The thrust, of course, is that what is beneficial is agent-dependent --- it depends upon the interests and goals of the agent, and those differ from agent to agent. No amount of critical reflection will tell me anything except what is
beneficial to me, and perhaps beneficial to certain others whom I know well enough to know what are their goals and interests.
And we certainly can separate value from human life; we do so routinely --- when we perform abortions, send soldiers to war, remove life support from vegetative patients, kill someone in self-defense, execute murderers, commit suicide. In all those cases we decide that some human's life is of less value than some other end.
This is not the sense in which I meant not separating value from human life. What I meant was that valuing is an essential part of our lives.
Of course, and I never claimed otherwise. But perhaps I was a bit unclear. The question was whether ethics should be separated from value (axiology). That doesn't mean ethics pays no heed to values. It is all about values; its aim is to assure that each agent can pursue that which he values to the extent of his abilities. But it cannot presume or stipulate values, since those are for each agent to define for himself.
A statement about what one values is not the same as the statement that we all are valuers. We are not purely rational beings, how we think and what we think are inextricably tied to what we value.
I agree. Indeed, values --- at least the things we count as "end goods," rather than "means goods" --- are non-rational. No one chooses, say, to prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, Beethoven to Mozart, to be more attracted to females than males, or to science than art. We don't choose those interests and preferences; we just have them.
(Nested quote removed.)
You can get "common goods" if you speak generally enough. For example, being free to pursue whatever one regards as good will surely be regarded as itself a good by everyone (in fact, everyone who values anything else must value that freedom, at least for themselves, as a logical matter). Hence it is a common good. There are other goods which are close to being universal. For example, very few people wish to be invaded and occupied by foreign armies (though there are some who wouldn't object), or to be preyed upon by criminals. The US Constitution enumerates the powers the federal government may exercise, most of which relate either to securing those near-universal goods or suppling a few other "public goods" (goods which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable and therefore can only be provided by government). For Madison, Jefferson,
et al "promoting the general welfare" consisted in supplying those goods:
"To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States, that is to say, “to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare.” For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless."
---Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (1791).
"If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare, the Government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to particular exceptions. It is to be remarked that the phrase out of which this doctrine is elaborated, is copied from the old articles of Confederation, where it was always understood as nothing more than a general caption to the specified powers."
---James Madison, Letter to Edmund Pendleton (1792)